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During the detailed design effort for the IAPSA II contract, a candidate
architecture design based on AIPS fault-tolerant system building blocks was
evaluated for its ability to meet the demanding performance and reliability
requirements of a flight-crltical system. This effort yam conducted in
accordance vlth the IAPSA II prevalldatlon methodology. This methodology
was defined and an advanced fighter configuration was selected during an
earlier phase of this contract. A mission analysis of the
hlgh-perfor,mnce, multlrole, twln-englne fighter was conducted to define a
set of fllght-crltlcal requirements for this study during the earller
effort.
The preliminary evaluations shoved that the candidate needed some
refinements to meet the system requirements. It is significant that
several weaknesses in the candidate architecture became apparent that were
not evident in the initial rough performance and reliability calculations.
This effort shows that it is both possible and preferable to perform
detailed evaluation of concepts based on specifications before committing a
project to a hardware and software design.
The refined configuration was evaluated for reliability using improved
Markov modeling techniques. Although thls was much better than earlier
evaluation techniques, improvements are needed in the handling of very
large systems wlth a high degree of interdependency.
A set of objectives and experiments was defined for testing critical
performance characteristics using a small-scale system. The small-scale
system consists of existing proof-of-concept AIPS building-block hardware
and software components. It embodies key features of the IAPSA II design
and vlll be used to explore issues identified as a result of the
performance and reliability modeling effort. Experimental data will be
obtained that verify performance estimates obtained during the preliminary
simulation effort and measure timing characteristics critical to successful
operation.
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2.0 _TRODUCI'ION
The purpose of this report is to document the results of the detailed
design of the IAPSA II system. This effort was carried out using the
prevalldatlon methodology developed during an earlier phase of this
contract. This report discusses the preliminary simulation experiments and
the reliability evaluation of the candidate architecture and shows how they
affect the resulting design. Additionally, a small-scale system that
captures the fundamental characteristics of the IAPSA II design and a plan
for using it in AIRLAB experimentation are defined.
The IAPSA II analysis and design effort is the continuation of a research
and technology program to investigate the benefits of integrated system
architectures and to demonstrate by experimentation in the NASA Langley
Avionics Integration Research Laboratory (AIRLAB) the properties of
promising architectures. Work under previous contracts achieved the
following: (1) defined major characteristics of an Integrated Airframe
Propulsion Control System Architecture, (2) proposed several candidate
system configurations, and (3) selected one as a basis for a preliminary
system design.
The overall objectives of the IAPSA II program are (1) analysis and
detailed design of an integrated control system architecture that satisfies
stringent performance and reliability requirements, (2) an analytical and
experimental approach for evaluating the architecture, and (3) installation
and limited experimentation on a small scale system test specimen in
AIRLAB.
The first phase of this contract, documented in reference 1, defined an
advanced fighter configuration for analysis, a prevalidation methodology,
and a candidate architecture based on the use of fault-tolerant system
building blocks. The advanced fighter is a twin-engine design with a high
degree of coupling between the propulsion system and the airframe. A
mission analysis was conducted on mission scenarios for this fighter to
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILI_AED
derive the control system requirements. These requirements formed the
basis for the design of a control system architecture.
The methods used to design and validate the control system architecture are
as important to the IAPSA II contract as the architecture itself. The
prevalidatlon methodology defined in reference 1 emphasizes the early
evaluation of key performance and reliability characteristics of system
concepts using models of system behavior. This early evaluation ensures
that the system design is capable of meeting critical requirements. System
concept changes needed to meet these requirements can then be made early
when they have the greatest performance benefit and the least impact on
schedule and cost. Key performance and reliability assumptions identified
by the modeling effort will be tied to activities to validate the
implemented system.
A candidate system architecture defined by our subcontractor, Charles Stark
Draper Laboratory (CSDL), was evaluated to exercise the methodology. The
basic outline of the candidate architecture is provided in chapter five of
reference I. The more detailed definition of the candidate system
necessary to support the modeling effort is presented in sections 3 and 4.
The reliability evaluation effort was accomplished in four partsz (1)
system operating details and key reliability assumptions were defined to
support system modeling; (2) based on the key reliability measures
(safety, mission success, etc.), a failure analysis was conducted to define
how the system fails; (3) the ASSIST program was used to create a
corresponding failure model; and (4) the SORE model was executed and its
results used to indicate the candidate's strengths and weaknesses. The
reliability effort is covered in section 3.
The performance characteristics of the candidate architecture were
evaluated in normal and failure situations as required by the prevalidation
methodology. The evaluation effort consisted of four major parts: (1) the
key application sequencing and control options in the candidate system were
defined; (2) critical performance issues and simulation experiments were
defined for the candidate configuration; (3) a model of the critical
system workload and its use of the configuration elements was built using
4
the DENET tool; and (4) the DENET experiments were executed and the results
analyzed. This performance evaluation effort is described in section 4 of
this report.
The candidate system evaluation described in sections 3 and 4 shoved that
it was not capable of meeting the system requirements. The predicted
safety and mission reliability values exceeded the system constraints.
Additionally, the predicted timing needs of the major control functions
executing on the concept system did not leave adequate growth capabillty.
The flight control group application workload strained the system capacity
in both computing and II0 activity. As a result the IAPSA II system
concept was refined to improve its performance and reliability. The three
approaches taken to refine the candidate architecture to better match the
system needs are described in section 5. The results of a detailed
reliability evaluation of the refined configuration and a preliminary
performance analysis are also presented in this section.
Section 6 outlines the objectives and presents experiment definitions for
the small-scale system testing effort. The small-scale system embodies key
features of the IAPSA II design that will be evaluated in a limited
experimentation effort. The limited effort will explore a set of critical
aspects of the IAPSA II candidate architecture that were identified as a
result of the performance and rellability modeling effort. The small-scale
system consists of existing proof-of-concept AIPS building-block hardware
and software components. Two kinds of experimental data will be obtained.
First, certain performance estimates obtained during the prellminary
simulation effort will be verified. Performance simulation results will be
directly compared with applicable measurements made on the small-scale
system. Second, certain timing characteristics critical to successful
operation in normal and faulted situations will be measured experimentally.
One limitation of this small-scale system, of course, is that system level
interactions (e.g., communication between the flight control group and the
engine groups) cannot be tested. Another limitation is that the
experiments must make use of existing system testability features. Because
5
existing building block elements are used, no new "hooks" or test points
can be used to enhance visbility during experimentation.
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3.0 CANDIDATE ARCaI_ECTL_E EVALUATION
The prevalidatlon methodology defined in reference A emphasizes the early
evaluation of key performance and reliability characteristics of system
concepts using models of the system behavior. Early evaluation ensures
that the system design is capable of meeting critical requirements. System
concept changes needed to meet these requirements can then be made early
when they have the greatest performance benefit and the least effect on
schedule and cost. In the IAPSA II detailed design effort a candidate
system architecture defined by our subcontractor, Charles Stark Draper
Laboratory (CSDL), was evaluated to exercise the methodology. The basic
outline of the candidate architecture was provided in chapter five of
reference A. A more detailed definition of the candidate system necessary
to support the modeling effort is developed in sections 3 and 4. Section 3
deals with reliability issues and section 4 with performance issues.
To support system modeling, three key aspects of the system must be
defined: (1) function partitioning, (2) physical and functional
interconnection, and (3) failure protection. Function partitioning defines
how the system functions (or processes) are allocated to system
configuration elements. Interconnection defines how the system elements
are interrelated. Finally, failure protection describes how the critical
system functions are preserved when system elements fail. The following
sections will provide elaboration of these characteristics for the
candidate architecture.
3.1 Development of Major Control Functions
The IAPSA II system performs control functions that are critical to the
flight safety and mission effectiveness of an advanced fighter. Table 3.1-
1 presents the major control functions developed for the vehicle in
reference i. These functions impose demanding performance and reliability
requirements on the system. Furthermore, the designed system must have the
capacity to handle the demanding workload of these functions in normal
situations and in failure situations where a specified level of performance
7
Table 3.1-1. IAPSA II Major Control Functions
System functions
Manual control
Capabilities
Basic flight path control
Needed for:
SFL
Flutter control High speed ingress with stores FMC
Trajectory following Track optimized flight paths FMC
Wing camber control Optimized wing performance for FMC
mission segment
Trim control FMC
Inlet control Full supersonic capability FMC
Engine control SFL
Nozzle control Thrust vectoring/reversing FMC
Notes:
SFL: Safe flight and landing
FMC: Full mission capability
s
must be provided after faults. The specific reliability goals are that (1)
the system contribution to loss of aircraft probability will be less than
10-7 for a 3-hour flight, and (2) the system contribution to loss of
mission probability will be less than 10-4. The major control functions are
developed in more detail in the following sections.
Table 3.1-1 specifies the high-level capability provided by each major
control function. Two of the major functions, manual control and engine
control, are needed to allow continued flight to a safe landing. The rest
of the functions are needed to provide full mission capability. No attempt
was made during the reliability study to distinguish lesser or intermediate
levels of mission capability. The effects of system element failures and
combinations of failures were categorized in terms of the three system
failure conditions: safe flight and landing (SFL), fully mission capable
(FMC), and unsafe.
The major control functions have specific sensing and actuation
requirements. These requirements are shown for each of the major control
functions in figures 3.1-1 through 3.1-8. The figures also list the
required cyclic execution rate derived in the function development effort
documented in reference 1. The major control functions were decomposed
into subfunctions based on this information. The resulting subfunction
definition and data transfer details are presented in the following two
subsections.
3.1.1 Derivation of Subfunctions
The IAPSA II functional design was developed in more detail by decomposing
the major control functions into subfunctions. The design at the
subfunctlon level identifies the sensor and actuator redundancy management
processes. The detailed development was based on several ground rules. A
major design ground rule is the sharing of sensors and computing processes
among the major functions. If more than one function requires a particular
computed parameter_ it is computed only once.
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Body pitch rate
Right and left wing
acceleration
(outboard, mid,
inboard)
Flutter suppression
(100 Hz. 10 MSEC)
__._ Right and left
trailing edge flaps
Right and left
_---_ flaperons
--(outboard, inboard)
Figure 3. I- I. FlutterControl Function
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Body accelerations
(normal, lateral)
Body rates(pitch, roll, yaw)
Attitude _====_b
(pitch,roll)
Angle of attack,
angle of sideslip
Pilot commands
(pitch, roll, yaw)
Manual control
(50 Hz, 20 MSEC)
,_=_=._Right and left
canard commands
Right and left
rudder commands
Right and left
•=,_ flaperon commands
(inboard and
outboard)
._.._ Nosewheel
commands
Thrust vector
_l_command
(nozzles)
Maneuver
Figure 3.1-2. Manual Control Function
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8ody normal
acceleration
Dynamic
pressure
Mach
number
Pilot's flap
command
Wing camber control
(50 Hz. 20 MSEC)
Right and left leading
edge flap commands
Right and left
trading edge flap
commands
Right and left flaperon
commands (inboard and
outboard)
Figure 3.1-3. Wing Camber Control Function
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Body accleration
(normal, lateral,
longitudinal)
Body rates
(pitch, roll. yaw)
Roll angle,
heading angle
Vertical
acceleration
Pitch attitude
rate
Altitude.
altitude rate
True airspeed,
math number
Trajectory following
(20 Hz. 50 MSEC)
Left and right
canard command
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rudder corn mand
Left and right
flaperons command
(inboard, outboard)
Nosewheel comma nds
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Th rust vector
command (nozzles)
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Figure 3. I-4. Trajectory Following Function
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Right and left
trailing edge flap
position
Right and left
flaperons position
(IB&OB)
Right and left
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canard position
Right and left
nozzle flap
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Pilot's trim
commands (pitch,
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Trim controller
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Figure 3. I-5. Trim Control Function
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Angle of attack.
angle of sideslip
Math number, static
pressure, dynamic
pressure
inlet normal shock
pressures (total.
static)
Inlet duct static
pressure
Maneuver
anticipation (manual
control, trajectory
following)
Inlet control
(100 Hz. 10 MSEC)
Right and left inlet
ramp commands
Right and left bypass
ring commands
Figure 3. I-6. Inlet Control Function
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Pilot's thrust
commands
Mach number
Fan face conditions
(total temperature.
total pressure)
Rotor speeds (fan,
high press =======_
compressor)
Fan turbine inlet
temperature
Engine pressures
(main burner,
afterburner)
Fuelflowrate
Maneuver
anticipation (manual
control, trajectory
following)
Thrust command
{trajectory following)
E ngine control
(25 Hz, 40 MSEC)
Figure 3.1-7. Engine Control Function
Main fuel metering
====='=_ commands
Afterburner fuel
metering commands
(5 per engine)
Main fuel shutoff
commands
Afterburner fuel
shutoff commands
(5 per engine)
Fan guide vane
commands
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=====_ vane commands
Nozzle area command
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Thrust vector
command (manual,
trajectory)
Area command
(engine)
Nozzle control
(25 Hz, 40 MSEC)
Convergent nozzle
commands
Nozzle flap commands
(upper and lower)
Figure 3.1-8. Nozzle Control Function
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The shared elements must satisfy the requirements of all dependent
functions. This means that a shared sensor must have adequate performance
and adequate failure protection for its most critical user. For shared
computing processes, the most demanding function defines the failure
protection requirement and also sets the cyclic execution rate. For this
study, the rate used for all derived subfunctions and sensor and actuator
signaling is based on the fastest control function. Detailed control law
performance analysis might show that some of these rates can be relaxed;
however, because control law design and analysis is beyond the scope of the
contract, this possibility was not investigated.
The resulting central computing
figures 3.1.1-1 through 3.1.1-15.
subfunctlons are presented in
The first group of figures (3.1.1-1 through 3.1.1-8) are organized by major
control function. The sensor management computing subfunctlons shown
perform the redundancy management for sensor failures. The process
provides parameter estimates to all using functions. The actuator
management functions shown on the figures have two purposes: first, they
combine actuator commands from all control law functions that share the
control surface or device; second, they perform any necessary central
actuator redundancy management. Failure protection details are covered in
section 3.3.
The next two figures (3.1.1-9 and 3.1.1-10) detail the inertial data and
air data sensor processing subfunctions. Both processes have subfunctions
that execute at different rates to support different users. Air data
computing is divided into two rates. The fast rate provides the sensor
redundancy management and the computing needed by the inlet control
function. The slow rate provides the redundancy management functions for
the rest of the sensors and calculated variables needed by the trajectory-
following function. Inertial data has a fast subfunction that does some
redundancy management and estimation necessary for the flutter law. The
rest of the inertial data processing can be done at a slower rate. Note
that these figures only show the interfaces for the integrated control
functions. In a complete system, air data and inertial data are also
needed by the pilot display functions of the pilot-vehicle interface.
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A pitch coordination subfunction handles the blending of control effectors
for longitudinal axis control. This allocation is primarily one of
convenience. It provides a coordinated interface for the pitch control
surfaces and the vectored nozzle. Another integrated control design
alternative might signal the actuator devices directly, without the need
for an explicit coordination process.
The subfunction figures conclude with the actuator management subfunctions.
These figures show which major functions interface to each set of
actuators.
The candidate architecture definition from reference I allocated the
IAPSA II computing functions to the flight control computing site and to an
engine control computing site for each engine. The resulting
stalghtforvard allocation of computing subfunctions and associated update
rates are shown in tables 3.1.2-1 and 3.1.2-2. The pitch coordination
subfunction responsible for pitch control blending is performed at the
flight control site. The engine control site performs the nozzle actuator
management subfunctlon. Note that the execution rates for the slower
functions at the flight control site have been adjusted upward. By
maintaining an integer multiple relationship between all rates, potential
problems associated with tasks drifting in and out of phase with each other
are avoided. The figures show the computing allocation for the functions
of the candidate architecture to be discussed in this section and section 4
as well as the refined configuration discussed in section 5.
In addition to division by computing sites, the subfunctlons are also
organized into units by rate group. That is, all subfunctlons executing at
one site at the same cyclic execution rate are treated together. This has
performance implications in terms of decreased overhead processing
necessary for sequencing and control of the application computing, which
are discussed in section 4. The results of this grouping are special data
transfer requirements incorporated into the system design. Note that these
are examples of requirements that are due to the way the system is
implemented.
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Table 3. 1.2-1. Computing Allocation - Flight Control
100 Hz 50 HZ 25 HZ 12.5 Hz
Wing accelerometer SM Pilot command SM Trajectory law 1 Trim command SM
Flutter law
Body rate SM
Manual law
i
Camber law
Fast air data $M 1 LE flap AM
Fast air data calculationt Body accelerometar SM
Flaperon AM Inertial calculation
TE flap AM Pitch coordination
Cona"rd AM
Rudder AM
Nosewheel AM
Flap command $M
Slow air data $M 1 Trim law
Slow air data calculation _
, ,,, , , ,, , ,_
SM - Sensor management
AM -Actuator management
1 - Reference configuration
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TaMe 3. 1.2-2. Computing Allocation - Engine Control
100 Hz 50 Hz 25 Hz
Inlet SM Nozzle AM Pilot thrust SM
inlet law Fan face SM
inlet ramp AM Engine SM
inlet ring AM Fuel flow SM
Fast air data SM 2 Engine law
Fast air data z calculation Mmn fuel AM
Afterburner fuel AM
Fan guide vane AM
Compressor guide vane AM
Trajectory law 2
Slow air data SM 2
Slow air data calculation 2
Notes:
SM - Sensor management
AM - Actuator management
2 - Refined configuration
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3.1.2 Derivation of Data Transfer
Any data transfer between functions in different computing sites must take
place on the intercomputer (IC) network. Intercomputer data transfer takes
place between independent computers. A computer with data must first gain
access control of the network and then transmit its message. The receiving
computer processes the message based on its priority and the current
processing workload. A key assumption is that the corresponding time delay
is acceptable to the control law performance. As discussed in section 4,
IC network operation was not modeled in this study.
Data transfer among subfunctions in different rate groups at the same site
will generate intertask activity. The integrity of such transfers will
undoubtedly be protected by some operating system kernel or executive
system service. This protection will require some overhead processing and
corresponding time delay. The operation of these features was not modeled
in this study.
The activity in these two categories resulting from the candidate system
computing allocation is presented in table 3.1.2-3. The data in this table
are listed under the major subfunction that is the data source.
3.2 Reference Configuration Layout
The physical configuration of the IAPSA II candidate architecture is shown
in figure 3.2-1. The components are arranged in three major groups: (1) a
flight control group, (2) a right engine control group, and (3) a left
engine control group. The candidate makes extensive use of advanced
information processing system (AIPS) fault-tolerant system building blocks.
These are the fault- and damage-tolerant IC networks, input/output (I/O)
networks, and FTP. These elements are described in detail in reference 1,
appendix A.
The flight control group consists of flight control sensors and actuators
connected to a quadruple-channel FTP via two I/O networks. The FTP
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Table 3. 1.2-3. Data Transfer Activity by Source
Major subfunction (rate) IC activity Intertask activity
i
Manual law (50) Maneuver anticipation Flaperon commands
Camber law (SO) TE flap commands
Flapperon commands
Trajectory law (25) Thrust commands
Maneuver anticipation
Rudder commands 2
Fla peron commands 2
Nosewheel command 2
Maneuver command 2
Rudder commands I
Flaperon commands 1
Nosewheel command
Maneuver command i
Trim law (12.5) TE flap commands
Flaperon commands
Rudder commands
Pitch trim command
Engine (25) Throttle position 1 Nozzle area commands
Nozzle (50) Thrust vectoring position
Inertial (100/50) Body rates 2
Body accelerations 2
Roll angle 2
Heading 2
Pitch attitude rate 2
Vertical acceleration 2
Flight path acceleration 2
Body rates
Body accelerations
Roll angle I
Heading 1
Pitch attitude rate 1
Vertical acceleration I
Flight path acceleration _
Air data (100/25) Angle of attack 2 Angle of attack 1
Angle of sideslip 2 Angle of sideslip 1
Mach Mach
Dynamic pressure Dynamic pressure
Static pressure 1 Static pressure
Pitch coordination (50) Thrust vector command
Flaperon AM (100) Flaperon position
TE flap AM (100) TE flap position
Rudder AM (50) Rudder position
Reference configuration
2 Refined configuration
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channels are physically dispersed for damage tolerance. Each of the two
engine groups controls the operation of one of the two propulsion systems.
An engine group consists of the sensors and actuators of one propulsion
system connected to a triple-channel FTP through two I/O networks. The
three groups are interconnected by an IC network Joining the three
computing sites. The following two subsections present details about the
flight and engine groups from an I/O network point of view.
3.2.1 Flight Control IIO Netvork
One of the two flight control I/O networks is shown in figure 3.2.1-1.
Half of the flight control sensors and actuators are connected to network
I; half are connected to network 2. The sensors and actuators interface
the network through device interface units (DIU). The DIU provides signal
conditioning and conversion for the devices and handles the network
communication protocol. Each DIU connects to a single network node. The
lack of cross-connectlon between sensor and actuators, nodes, and DIUs
alleviates any fault containment concerns. This form of "brickwalled"
system organization introduces an element of dependency into the system,
which will be evaluated in the reliability analysis.
The I/0 network consists of a mesh of 18 nodes connected by full duplex
point-to-point links. The nodes can be commanded to turn links on or off.
In operation, enough links are turned on to create a path from the FTP to
all nodes and DIUs in the network. The remaining links act as spares.
Each network node in the candidate architecture is connected to three other
network nodes. This means that two-thlrds of the links are active and the
remaining one-third are spare during operation. With three connections, at
least three faults are necessary to destroy communications with a good node
and its attached devices.
The flight control I/O networks are connected to the FTP with three root
links, each connected to a different channel. During operation, only one
of the root links is active, and the others act as spares. With three root
links, at least three faults must occur to isolate an entire network of
sensors and actuators.
4O
0Z
0
0
t
0
i
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The redundant flight control sensors and actuators are spread evenly across
the two networks and the redundant DIUs. The specific assignment of these
elements is shown in table 3.2.1-1. The safety-crltlcal flight control
sensors are primarily quadruple redundant. The skewed body motion sensors
are an exception because a different redundancy level is required to
achieve the same degree of failure protection. A total of eight were
needed in the IAPSA I system due to Interconnectlon dependencies. Eight
were used in the candidate architecture because a similar situation exists
for IAPSA II. The mlsslon-crltlcal flight control sensors are triple
redundant. The flight control surface actuators have a dual redundant
control channel arrangement. Each actuator channel is connected to a
different network and is capable of full operation. If coeuaunlcations to
one channel of the actuator are interrupted for any reason, control can be
maintained through communications on the unaffected network. Failure
protection details for these elements will be provided in section 3.3.
3.2.2 Engine Control I/O Network
The two I/O networks for one propulsion system are shown in figure 3.2.2-1.
Like the flight control arrangement, the propulsion control sensors and
actuators are connected half to one network and half to the other network.
The devices are also connected in a "brlckwall" manner, with one device
connected to only one DIU, which in turn is connected to only one network
node and therefore one network.
The engine control networks each contain four nodes, and because the
network is a system building block entity, its operation is identical to
the flight control networks. Like the flight control network, each network
node is connected to three network links. Unlike the flight control
network, each network is connected to the FTP through two root links, which
means that an entire set of sensors and actuators can be isolated after two
failures.
The candidate system requires a lower level of failure protection for each
propulsion system because safe flight and landing is possible after los_ of
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Table 3.2. 1-1. Sensor Actuator Connection - Flight Control Networks
Devices
I i
Body accelerometers
Redundancy
2
2
2
2
DIU/node ID
$1
S2
S3
$4
Body gyros 2 s 1 1
2 s2 1
2 s3 2
2 54 2
Angle of attack 1 S 1 1
1 S2 1
1 S3 2
1 $4 2
Angle of sideslip 1 S 1 1
1 52 1
1 S3 2
1 $4 2
Static pressure 1 S 1 1
1 $2 1
1 S3 2
I $4 2
Total pressure I S 1 1
1 S2 1
1 $3 2
I S4 2
i
Total temperature 1 S1 I
1 S3 2
Pitch stick 1 CP1 1
1 CP2 1
1 CP3 2
1 CP4 2
Roll stick 1 CP1 1
1 CP2 I
1 CP3 2
1 CP4 2
Rudder pedal 1 CP1 1
1 CP2 1
I CP3 2
1 CP4 2
Left throttle '1 CP2 1
1 CP3 2
Rig ht throttle 1 CP 1 1
1 CP4 2
Flap lever 1 CP1 1
1 CP2 1
1 CP3 2
i
Pitch trim 1 CP2 1
1 CP3 2
1 CP4 2
ROll trim 1 CP1 1
1 CP3 2
1 CP4 2
Yaw trim 1 CP 1 1
1 CP2 1
I CP4 2
NW
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Table 3.2. 1-1. Sensor/Actuator Connection - Flight Control Networks (Continued)
Devices Redundancy OlU/node ID NW
Left canard actuation 1 CDL1 1
1 CDL2 2
Right canard actuation 1 CDR1 1
1 CDR2 2
Nosewheel actuation 1 N I 1
1 N2 2
Leading edge actuation 1 LER 1
1 LEL 2
L outboard flaperon actuation 1 OFL1 1
1 OFL2 2
L inboard flaperon actuation 1 IFL1 1
1 IFL2 2
L TE flap actuation 1 TEL1 1
t TEL2 2
L rudder actuation 1 RL1 1
1 RL2 2
R rudder actuation 1 RR1 1
1 RR2 2
R TE flap actuation 1 TER1 1
1 TER2 2
R inboard flaperon actuation 1 IFR1 1
1 IFR2 2
R outboard flaperon actuation 1 OFR1 1
1 OFR2 2
L outboard wing accelerometers 1 OFL2. 2
1 OFL1 1
1 IFL2 2
L mid-wing accelerometers 1 IFL2 2
1 IFL1 1
1 TEL2 2
L =nboa rd wing accelerometers 1 IFL 1 1
1 TEL2 2
1 TEL1 1
R inboard wing accelerometers 1 TER2 2
1 TER1 1
1 1FR2 2
R m id-wing accelerometers 1 TE R1 1
1 1FR2 2
1 1FR1 1
R outboard wing accelerometers 1 1FR1 1
1 OFR2 2
1 OFR1 1
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one of the two engines. The specific assignment of the redundant sensors
and actuators for one propulsion system is presented in table 3.2.2-i.
Notice that most propulsion system sensors are dual redundant. An
exception is the engine core sensors that are covered by an analytic
redundancy management scheme. The propulsion system actuators are dual
channel. Each actuator channel is connected to a different IlO network
llke the flight control actuators. More detail on the failure protection
for these elements is presented in section 3.3.
3.3 Reference Configuration Failure Protection
Failure protection is the central issue in the design of flight-crltical
systems. To provide the necessary levels of safety and mission
reliability, the system must be able to tolerate faults without affecting
the operation of its critical functions. This capability is provided by
redundancy management processes that are responsible for the detection and
identification of system element faults and any necessary reconfiguration
of functions to maintain safety or mission capability. This section will
discuss the failure protection assumptions for the candidate system.
Elements will be discussed by functional category. The primary function of
each candidate configuration element will be used to group it in one of
four major categories: computing, data transfer, sensing, or actuation.
Before presenting these assumptions, function migration will be discussed.
A key failure protection issue for the candidate architecture is function
migration. This is a high-level scheme that can be used on the group level
to provide failure protection for the computing functions. In an AIFS
system, function migration is a nonroutine change of computing assignments
for the different system computers. An external stimulus such as a fault,
a change in mission phase, or crew direction is necessary for function
migration. An early design decision was to not implement this capability
for failure protection in the candidate architecture. The capability was
judged to be relatively immature for the time frame of the IAPSA II
application.
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Table3.2.2-1. Sensor/Actuator Connection- Engine Control Networks
Devices Redundancy DIUInode ID
i ii
1 INL1
Upper ramp actuation 1 INL2
Inner ramp actuation 1 INL11 INL2
1 INL1
Bypass ring actuation 1 INL2
1 INL1
Ouct static pressu re 1 INL2
1 INL1
Normal shock total pressure 1 INL2
1 INL1
Normal shock static pressure 1 INL2
1 NOZ1
Convergent nozzle actuation 1 NOZ2
Upper nozzle flap actuation 1 NOZl1 NOZ2
1 NOZ 1
Lower nozzle flap actuation 1 NOZ2
Fan face pressure 1 ENG 11 ENG2
1 ENG1
Fan face temperature 1 ENG2
1 ENG1
Fan speed 1 ENG2
Corn pressor speed 1 ENG 1
1 ENG1
Fuel flowmeter
,J
Burner pressure
Fan turbine inlet temperature
Afterburner pressure
Fan guide vane actuation
Corn pressor guide vane actuation
1 ENG2
1 ENG2
i ENG1
1 ENG2
1 ENG1
I ENG2
1 ENG1
1 ENG2
1 ENG1
1 ENG2
ENG1
ENG2Fuel metering valve actuation
Afterburner fuel metering valve actuation (each of 5) 1 ENG11 ENG2
Afterburner light off detector 1 ENG I1 ENG2
1 ENG1
1 ENG2
.1 ENG1
1 ENG2
L , ,,
Main fuel SIO device
Afterburner zone fuel S/O device (1 of 5)
47
Function migration imposes very challenging requirements on a system
performing flight-critlcal functions with critical timing needs. The
function must be reliably terminated at one computing site and started at
another with minimum delay. Performance transients must be minor.
Additionally, communications responsibility for the associated sensors and
actuators must be transferred to the new site with minimum delay. For the
new site to fulfill this responsibility, there must first be a physical
path from the new site to the appropriate networks. Second, all the
software definitions necessary to pick up the periodic communications with
the devices must be resident at the new site. Finally, the new site must
be able to perform redundancy management on the networks. The critical
software elements are AIPS system service functions: system manager, I/O
services, and I/O redundancy management.
The decision to include function migration would necessitate changes to the
candidate architecture. Spare links would be needed between the computing
sites and the networks of the different groups to support the alternative
communications capability. The I/O networks might be operated differently,
for example, as regional networks instead of local networks, if function
migration was a possible reconflguration action. However, because of the
uncertain availability of this technique, the candidate system was
evaluated with no function migration capability.
3.3.1 Application Computing
The first functional category for the failure protection discussion is
application computing. The application computing functions are centered on
control laws that provide integrated flight and propulsion control
capabilities. These control laws run on the FTP general-purpose computers.
A key feature of the AIPS system is that application software functions can
be written as if they execute on a perfectly reliable single channel
computer. The AIPS system hardware and software elements provide
protection from computing element failure.
The FTP operating concept has all redundant channels executing exactly the
same software in instruction synchronism. All of the computed outputs are
voted to ensure bit-for-bit agreement. An unsuccessful vote points out a
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faulty channel. All inputs go through a byzantine fault-tolerant data
exchange process to ensure that each good channel is operating with exactly
the same data. Special fault-tolerant clock (FTC) hardware keeps each
channel in synchronization, while special data exchange (DX) hardware
allows for fast, reliable exchange of interchannel data.
A key element of the FTP concept is the AIPS system software FDIR process.
FDIR has the overall responsibility for FTP redundancy management. The
portion of FDIR that executes most frequently is called Fast-FDIR. This
process checks every cycle for indications of output disagreement and
ensures that all channels are in instruction synchronism. When necessary,
processor interlock hardware is used to disable faulty channel outputs.
FDIR programs running in background perform self-tests on the channel
hardware. A watchdog timer monitors the periodicity of the channel cyclic
execution. More detailed information about the FTP failure protection is
provided in reference I.
Two good FTP channels are needed for operation when a guaranteed shutdown
is required for a subsequent channel fault. Two are necessary so that
comparison between channels can immediately detect the fault. The FTP
building block has the ability to be safely reconfigured into a special
simplex operating mode if the failures can be rapidly identified by self-
test. This ability allows for continued operation for those which do not
cause a loss of synchronization. However, the capability to degrade to
simplex operation was not evaluated in the candidate architecture. Based
on this decision, the quadruple flight control computer provides fail-
operational/fail-off failure protection capability for the safety-critical
functions. Similarly, the engine computer provides fail-operational/fail-
off capability for each propulsion system.
3.3.2 Application I/O Activity
The next functional category is data transfer. Sensor and actuator data
transfer takes place on the I/0 networks. As previously mentioned, not all
of the links in the mesh network are active during operation. During
system startup before flight, two out of three mesh network links are
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activated to form a virtual communications bus. This virtual bus provides
a path between the FTP and all good nodes and DIUs. Responsibility for
maintaining a communication path to all good devices during operation rests
with the I/O redundancy management process, which is a software building
block element of the AIPS system services software.
Network data transfer involves many of the FTP hardware and software
elements. These are shown in figure 3.3.2-1. The application process
requests I/O activity from one of the AIPS system service software
processes, which primarily resides on the lOP coprocessor. The network
activity called for by the I/O request consists of a sequence or chain of
transactions. Each transaction involves a command message addressed to a
specific DIU followed (usually) by a response message from that DIU. Each
chain is setup for execution, initiated, and post processed by the services
software on the IOP. Once initiated, the chain runs without IOP
involvement. The network interface (NI) hardware sends each command
message and receives each response message until the chain sequence is
complete.
The NI hardware, which transmits and receives all chains, detects and logs
network protocol errors. Missing response messages are caught by the NI
timer that sets a timeout interval for each transaction. The IlO services
process implements a chain timeout to detect faults that result in an
incomplete chain. The data transfer status information and all data
returned by the DIUs are distributed to all FTP channels by the I/O
services through the data exchange. The status information is analyzed by
I/O redundancy management and, when necessary, network repair action is
taken to restore communications.
Host network repair actions command nodes to enable or disable network
links using special command messages over the I/O network. The repair
strategy fundamentally consists of turning links on and off to isolate
faulty network elements and to provide an alternate data path to the
affected DIU(s). An example of this is shown in figure 3.3.2-2, where a
spare llnk is used to bypass a failed active link. The specific re-_ir
action must be based on fault indications available to I/O redundancy
5O
FTP !
channels i
Application
SW
II0 services
SW
iB
I- ..............
I
I
I
:c .........
\
Data
exchange !
- - - -1 Network nodes
I
I
I
I
Figure3.3.2-1. I/0 Network Operation
51
• Spare link used to bypass failure
Figure 3.3.2-2. Link Failure Reconfiguration
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management at the FTP. Because many faults have similar indications,
speclal chains are usually necessary before the repair activity to help
diagnose the fault. In some cases, the fault may not be identified except
by a process of ellmlnation during the repair sequence. Certain candidate
architecture faults, such as DIUs or nodes, will permanently disable the
directly connected sensors and actuators because no alternative path is
possible. The specific IlO network repair strategy assumed for the
candidate architecture is discussed further in section 4.
3.3.3 Flight Control Sensing
Host of the safety critical sensors listed in table 3.2.1-1 in section 3.2
were quadruple redundant to provide full operation after two like sensor
failures. Hisslon critical sensors are triple redundant to provide fail-
operational/fail-off failure protection for the misslon-critical control
functions. Voting processes executing in the FTP compare redundant sensor
readings to detect and identify sensor failures. These voting processes
have demanding false alarm, missed alarm, and failure transient performance
requirements. Sophisticated dynamic processes are used to meet these needs
for full-tlme critical operation. Distinguishing failures from normal
channel mismatches is a very challenging engineering task. As a result, a
significant failure recovery time is needed to react to a sensor failure.
Because a comparison process is used, only failure detection can be
accomplished when two sensors remain operational.
The skewed axis sensor readings are processed to provide estimates of the
three axis rates and accelerations. A sophisticated process compares the
readings for consistency in order to detect and identify sensor failures.
In this situation, four sensors are needed for the process to provide
failure detection capability. Five are needed to identify the failed
sensor.
All of the sensor redundancy management processes can use external
information to aid fault identification. Nhen data is unavailable to a
comparison process because of a known communication fault, operation can be
continued with a single remaining sensor (or three skewed sensors).
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However, in this situation, the voting process is unable to detect a
subsequent sensor fault.
3.3.4 Flight Control Actuation
Eight primary surfaces provide basic flight path control. At least two of
the surfaces contribute most of the control moment for each axis. Pitch
axis control is provided by two canards. Two flaperons on each wing
control roll axis motion. Similarly, two rudders control motion around the
yaw axis. Secondary surfaces and devices include leading edge flaps,
trailing edge flaps, and nosewheel steering.
Each surface or device is moved by a dual actuator. The actuator is based
on a dual coil-dual monitored valve approach. Figure 3.3.4-1 shows the
configuration of the standard actuator. Most of the actuator components
are dual with the exception of the servodrlve and valve monitoring
elements. Two processors, each of which has the capability to drive both
control valves, close the actuator position loop. Position errors cause
control valve movement that routes hydraulic flow to one side of a dual
tandem power ram.
Local redundancy management is used to react to most failures. Special
monitor hardware detects most failures of the actuator position and valve
position sensors. When failures are detected, the other actuator processor
can take control. The actuator processor computes a model of the control
valve dynamics to detect valve failure. Valve failure will lead to bypass
of that side of the dual tandem ram and continued operation using the other
valve. A self-test process and watchdog timer hardware detect failures of
the actuator processor hardware. Detected failures result in control of
the surface by the other processor.
Some actuator failures may be missed due to a lack of coverage by the
monitor processes. As a last line of defense, the actuator management
process in the FTP generates a "safe" command for the surface when it sees
indications of an unresponsive surface. Undetected failures may lead to
force fight situations, seen as a stuck or slowly drifting surface. They
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can also lead to a surface moving rapidly hardover if, for example, the
other actuator channel has been bypassed due to a previous failure.
Because it can deactivate an entire surface, the central process must
satisfy stringent false alarm requirements. It must correctly handle
anomalies occurring during normal operation or caused by failures in other
system elements.
The response to an uncovered failure is more time critical in the case of
an actuator that is controlled by a single channel due to a previously
detected fault. In this situation, the surface may be moving rapidly
hardover until the central process commands passive operation. This
condition sets the time response requirements for the central actuator
management process.
3.3.5 Propulsion Control Sensing
As previously described, most of the propulsion sensors are dual redundant.
For the candidate system, model-based redundancy management processes were
assumed to allow fail-operational/fail-off failure protection capability.
The specific approaches used for the different sensors are described in
this section.
It should be noted that a more detailed examination and definition of the
propulsion control concept was carried out during the refined configuration
evaluation. The concept and failure analysis described in this section
were reevaluated during that study. Shown here are the results of the
initial analysis. The results of more detailed evaluation are presented in
terms of changes to this baseline in section 5.
An inlet flow model identifies failures among the inlet pressure sensors,
fan face sensors, and inlet device position sensors. The model executes on
the engine control FTP using air data sensor information and engine fan
speed. It identifies the failed sensor of a pair and detects a second
like-sensor failure by looking for an inconsistency among the measurements
and the device positions. Loss of any of the required measurements will
deactivate this redundancy management process.
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Throttle conmand sensor management uses the throttle setting of the other
engine to help identify sensor failures. The logic assumes that the two
engine cosmands will be nearly identical. When the logic indicates that
the final sensor of a palr has failed, the engine reverts to a flxed-thrust
operation. In this situation, or at any time the engine does not follow
commnds, the pilot can shut the engine down when conditions permit.
Redundancy management for the engine core sensors employs a sophisticated
algorithm described in detail in reference 2. The core sensors include:
fan speed, compressor speed, burner pressure, fan turbine inlet
temperature, and afterburner pressure. The analytic redundancy method
detects and identifies failures among the five sensor types to provide
fail-operational/fail-off capability. When measurements from a specific
sensor type are lost, the algorithm provides an estimated sensor value to
be used by the control law. In addition to the core sensor measurements,
the algorithm needs fuel flow, nozzle area, and fan and compressor guide
vane position measurements to perform its function. Some of the core
sensors are dual redundant to maintain failure detection capability after
communication element failures. Because the sensors are divided between
two node/DIUs, one failure can eliminate half of them.
The afterburner lightoff detectors, used in the staged control of the
afterburner, use a simple consistency scheme to identify detector failures.
The scheme is based on the commanded afterburner operating mode. When the
detectors disagree, the one consistent with the commanded operation will be
used while the other is declared failed. Similarly, a remaining detector
indicating uncommanded lightoff will be declared failed. If the remaining
detector fails to indicate lightoff when operation is commanded,
afterburner sequencing will be stopped.
3.3.6 Propulsion Control Actuation
All propulsion devices employ the same general actuation control concept
shown in figure 3.3.6-1. A propulsion actuator is basically a dual-channel
device incorporating fail-passive electronics. Each ehannel drives its
control valve based on the error between the position command from the DIU
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*Active failure mode
Figure 3.3.6-1. Propulsion Actuation
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and the position feedback sensor. The two control valves are mechanically
linked together; Each valve controls hydraulic flow to one side of the dual
tandem power ram. Either channel can engage the actuator through a dual
solenoid-operated bypass valve.
Generally, propulsion actuation element failures are detected using self-
test methods. Failures detected in the electronic elements cause one
channel to fail passive, which means it stops driving its control valve and
takes away its engage power from the bypass solenoid. Vhen both sides fall
passive, disengagement causes the device to move to a preferred fixed
position. The propulsion system operates at a degraded performance level
when one of its devices is in the fixed position. This will be further
discussed in section 3.4.
Failures that are not detected by the self-test methods result in
disagreement between the feedback sensors or force fight at the control
valve. This will be manifested by a stuck or slowly drifting propulsion
device. The actuator management process in the FTP detects this situation
and commands disengagement to force the device to move to its preferred
fixed position. Certain mechanical failures in the actuator will also be
detected by the central redundancy management. Mechanical jam of the
control valve will cause the device to move toward a hardover position
until it is disengaged; however, mechanical jam of the power ram, which is
an unlikely failure mode, will jam the device permanently.
A fuel flow model identifies metering valve position sensor failures and
fuel flowmeter failures. The model can identify the first failure of a
pair of sensors and detect the second failure to provide fail-op /fail-off
capability. Its operation is based on consistency between the valve
position and the measured flow.
The fuel handling portion of the system includes special fuel shutoff
devices where needed for additional safety. The fuel to each engine passes
through a dual device fuel shutoff valve. Either shutoff drive can
terminate fuel flow to the engine. This capability is used by the fuel
metering actuator management process as a last resort to protect against
59
hazardous overspeed or overtemperature situations. Additionally, fuel flow
to the afterburner incorporates dual solenoid zone flow shutoff valves.
Either drive can open the valve to allow zone flow that is modulated by an
afterburner metering valve. Flow to a specific zone is cut off when neither
solenoid drive is powered. Central RM commands fuel shutoff if continued
operation of a specific engine is hazardous, for example, if the thrust
vectoring and reversing devices won't move to a safe position.
In the next section, this detailed description of the candidate system will
be used to evaluate its key reliability characteristics.
3.4 Reliability Evaluation of Candidate
The candidate system performs functions that greatly enhance the mission
effectiveness of an advanced fighter. Two key measures were established
for this system to address the reliability specifications presented in
section 3.1. The first, safe flight and landing (SFL), is a measure of the
safety implications of the system design. Safe flight and landing
capability means that the aircraft can fly to a recovery airfield and land
safely. Aircraft operation may require the use of emergency procedures and
diversion to an emergency base. This reliability measure is based on a 3-
hour period, which is representative of a long-deployment mission.
The second measure, full mission capability (FMC), indicates the ability of
the aircraft to complete its mission. Full mission capability means that
the aircraft can continue to fly any of its possible missions after the
failure of a system element. The applicable redundancy management process
must automatically perform any necessary reconflguration so that continued
operation requires no special procedures and no significant performance
degradation. A 1-hour time period consistent with a combat mission is used
for numerical evaluation.
A key study assumption, implicit in most reliability evaluations, is that
all significant elements are fully operational at the start of the mission.
This implies that preflight system tests, necessary to guarantee correct
operation of all critical system elements, are implemented. Creation of
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these tests is another challenging task for flight-crltical systems. Most
successful approaches for ensuring integrity before flight rely heavily on
the redundancy management processes designed for use during flight.
Preflight test definition has not been addressed in this study.
The reliability evaluation process was accomplished in three phases. The
first phase is a functional failure analysis, undertaken to define how the
system fails. Next, an abstract model of the resulting failure behavior is
formulated and converted for input to a reliability tool. Finally, the
system loss probabilities are numerically computed and evaluated to
understand the particular system concept's strengths and weaknesses. The
failure analysis phase is described next.
The candidate system operation must be analyzed to understand how the
system fails. A combination of top-down and bottom-up techniques was used
in the failure analysis. Top-down techniques were used to classify and
group the failure conditions at different levels of the organization
hierarchy. Bottom-up techniques, based on failure mode effects analysis,
were used to identify the effects of an element failure on the next higher
level of system organization. As mentioned earlier, the two system-level
failure conditions of interest are loss of SFL capability and loss of FMC
capability.
The flight control portion of the system performs the functions organized
into the functional blocks illustrated in figure 3.4-1. Similarly, the
propulsion control functional blocks for one of the two systems are
presented in figure 3.4-2. The top-down technique determined the
significant operational states of these functional blocks by relating
system performance after failures within the blocks to the two system
failure conditions of interest. The goal is to identify those functional
block states which by themselves or in combination with the states of other
blocks leads to a loss of system capability.
The functional blocks were used to organize the system elements for the
failure analysis. Specifically, each element was assigned to a functional
block based on its primary function. Each element's failure effect is
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determined by the resulting operational state of the functional block. The
process then can relate an element failure and the resulting redundancy
management action to an effect on the system operational capability through
the state of the functional block.
The failure effect ultimately depends on how the element is used by the
major control functions and the element failure mode. The basic failure
mode assumed in the analysis is loss of element function. The failure
analysis also considers possible active failure modes to see if any can
have a more serious effect on the system. Any significant failure modes
were included in the reliability models. The failure analysis must also
consider the performance of the redundancy management process that handles
the affected element. The current operating configuration is usually
important to the performance of the redundancy management. These processes
can perform imperfectly, failing to detect certain faults and incorrectly
diagnosing others.
3.4.1 Flight Control Group Failure Analysis
The failure analysis for elements in the flight control sensing functional
blocks was based on some standard assumptions and groundrules. The voting
processes used for sensor redundancy management were assumed to operate
perfectly. This means that no false alarms, missed alarms, or incorrect
identifications occur as long as good sensors outnumber bad sensors. W'hen
only two sensors remain (four for skewed sensors), it is assumed that the
process can detect that a failure has occurred but cannot identify which of
the remaining sensors is bad.
For safety-critlcal sensing elements, it is assumed that when the
redundancy level supports failure detection only, a subsequent sensor
failure causes loss of safety. However, in the same situation, if the
subsequent failure is loss of data due to a known communication failure,
the assumption is that safe operation continues using the remaining sensor.
Of course, loss of good data from the final sensor causes loss of the
aircraft.
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The assumed operating rules for most of the mission-critical sensing
elements are slightly different. Vhen data are lost or unreliable, the
affected function can be terminated with no affect on aircraft safety.
Therefore, when there are only enough sensors to support detection, it is
assumed that the function is deactivated when the sensor fails. In the
same situation, if data from one sensor becomes unavailable due to a known
communication failure, function deactivation is also assumed. Full mission
capability is lost when deactivation occurs, but the policy prevents
hazardous operation resulting from mission-critical sensing failures.
One aspect of redundancy management operation considered deals with the
time required to identify a failed sensor and reconfigure the algorithm
accordingly. A possible hazard exists if, during a sensor failure recovery
period, another sensor from the redundant set fails. This situation will
be referred to as nearly coincident sensor failure. In the case of a
quadruple set of sensors, it means that two good sensor values will be
processed with two bad values. The resulting inability to "outvote" the
bad data is assumed to lead to the use of bad data by the system. For a
safety-critical function, this means loss of SFL capability. The results
in section 3.4.4 show that the likelihood of this situation is very small
and therefore significant only for the safety-critical sensors.
The results of the failure analysis by functional block are presented in
table 3.4.1-1 for the flight control group of elements.
Flight Control Sensing
The pilot command sensing functional block includes the pitch, roll, and
yaw command sensors as well as the flap lever and trim command switches.
0nly the flight path command sensors are safety critical, the rest are
mission critical. Nearly coincident like sensor failures are a hazard for
the flight path command sensors. The standard ground rules apply to the
elements in this block.
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Table 3.4. 1- I. Function Failure Analysis - Flight Control
Function
Pilot command
Pitch, roll, yaw, sensing
Total loss
effect
Unsafe
Trim command sensing SFL
Flap lever SFL
Body motion sensing
Rate sensing Unsafe
Acceleration sensing Unsafe
Air flow sensing
Angle of a_ack Unsafe
Angle of sideslip Unsafe
Static pressure SFL
Total pressure SFL
Total temperature
Wing acceleration sensing SFL
Flight control computing Unsafe
Active failure mode considerations
Total loss of capability during critical phase of flight is
catastrophic
Loss of single surface - SFL (if all primary surfaces
operational)
Surface stuck/jammed - Unsafe
Canard control Unsafe
Loss of single surface or two sym metrical surfaces - SFL
Flaperon control Unsafe (if other primary surfaces operational)
Surfaced stuck/jammed - Unsafe
Rudder control Unsafe
TE flap control SFL
Nosewheel control SFL
LE flap control SFL
LOss of single surface- SFL (if all primary surfaces
operational)
Surface stuck/jamm ed - Unsafe
Loss of single surface - SFL
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The body rate sensors and the body acceleration sensors are included in the
body motion sensing functional block. It is assumed that the redundancy
management can identify fallures perfectly as long as five or more sensors
are being used. Detection is possible only when four sensors are
operatlng_ however, operation can continue with three sensors if data is
lost due to a known communication failure. Because dual simultaneous
failures can theoretically be identified with seven or more sensors, nearly
coincident sensor failures are not a concern with the assumed complement of
eight instruments.
The airflow sensing functional block includes the angle of attack, angle of
sideslip, static, and total pressure sensors. The angle of attack and
angle of sideslip sensors are safety critical while the static and total
pressure sensors are mission critical. The safety-critlcal sensors are
vulnerable to nearly coincident sensor failure situations.
The wing acceleration sensing block includes the wing accelerometers at six
wing sites used by the flutter control major function. The fault reaction
for flutter control devices is sllghtly different from that assumed for
other mission-critical elements. Flutter control allows hlgh-speed, iow-
altitude ingress with external stores. The capability is needed for only
part of some mission scenarios. However, if the aircraft is operating in
the critical part of its flight envelope, total loss of this function will
cause loss of aircraft. Flutter control is different from the other
mission critical functions in that it cannot be immediately deactivated.
The aircraft must fly out of the critical region before the function can be
turned off.
A major analysis assumption is that the flutter control law design is
constrained to drastically lower the failure protection requirements for
sensing and actuation. The specific design objective is to provide a
minimum safe level of performance when sensing at a single site or
actuation of a single surface is lost. The resulting degraded performance
with a single passive surface or a loss of sensing at one location must be
adequate to allow safe flight out of the critical flutter envelope.
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With this constraint, flutter sensing needs can be met with triple
redundant sensors at each site, providing fail-operatlonal/fail-off
capability. The operating assumption is that the aircraft will slow down
out of critical envelope before flutter control is deactivated. Full
operation continues after the first sensor failure, when only two good
sensors remain at a site. If one of the two remaining sensors fail, data
from that site is not used while the aircraft slows down. After slowdown,
the flutter control function is deactivated. Aircraft slowdown and function
deactivation is also assumed if sensor data becomes unavailable due to a
known communication failure. This fault reaction will prevent flutter
control operation with a single sensor, thus precluding exposure to a
subsequent fault with catastrophic effects.
The control law performance tradeoffs associated with this design
constraint were not evaluated because control law design and analysis is
not a part of this study. If it is impractical to design a control law to
this constraint, there will be an additional safety hazard with the
candidate architecture if flutter control operation is continued after
sensor failure (or surface actuator channel failure). This additional
hazard was not quantified during this study.
These assumptions on system behavior after sensor failures mean that except
for nearly coincident faults, three similar sensing failures must occur
before SFL capability is affected. Similarly, FMC capability is not lost
until two like failures have occurred.
Flight Control Computing
The major flight control functions all have computing subfunctlons
performed in the FTP. The flight control computing functional block
includes all of these subfunctions. Manual control, needed for SFL
capability, is the most critical flight control function dependent on the
FTP. Because FTP throughput performance is not dependent on channel
redundancy level, all functions will continue execution after channel
faults until safe operation is impossible. Therefore, the flight control
computing functional block remains fully operational after most FTP channel
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bfailures. Exact agreement of channel outputs can only detect faults when
two FTP channels remain. Thus, the final FTP channel failure occurs,
causing all functions to fall when there are only two channels operating.
There were a couple of worst case FTF channel failure mode possibilities.
Worst case computation failure modes would result from events or faults
that could affect correct computation in more than one channel; however,
because avoidance of these situations is a key FTP design goal, they were
not considered further in this analysis. In another failure scenario, an
FTP channel could fail, generating valid but incorrect messages to the
actuator interfaces on one of the two networks. In this situation, an
actuator force fight will occur due to the disagreement between the good
commands on one network and the bad commands on the other. It was assumed
that the system could tolerate this situation for one or two application
cycles. Furthermore, it was assumed that all such failures would be
detected and full operation restored within this time period. Thus, no
active computation failure modes were modeled.
Flight Control Actuation
The common ground rules and assumptions used for flight control actuation
will be presented before the specifics of each functional block. The
flight control devices include the primary surfaces used in basic flight
path control, canards, flaperons, and rudders. Flight control secondary
devices include the nosewheel and the leading and trailing edge flaps. The
primary control surfaces are used by the safety critical manual control
function. A key failure analysis assumption is that continued safe flight
and landing is possible if a single primary surface fails passively. For
roll axis control, it is assumed that symmetrical pairs of flaperons can be
lost. In these situations, the performance reduction caused by the loss of
a single surface takes away FMC capability. Another key assumption is that
failures that leave any primary control surface stuck or hardover causes
loss of safety.
Most actuator control element failures are handled by the local redundancy
management processes. One assumption is that control valve and hydraulic
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power failures are perfectly identified by the local process resulting in
an operational surface using the redundant devices. The remaining
actuation elements have uncovered failure modes that cause the central
actuator management process to command passive operation of the device. A
worse surface failure mode occurs when a failure leaves a device in a
Jammed or stuck position. One cause is a rare mechanical jam failure mode
of the hydraulic power ram. Other combinations of failures can also lead
to this situation. The failure effect on system capability of a jammed or
stuck actuator is device specific.
Generally, passive device operation eliminates FMC capability, but safe
flight and landing is still possible. For example, loss of high lift or
nosevheel steering may require diversion to an alternative base, but
landing is possible using emergency procedures. Similarly, a passive
flaperon will degrade the aircraft roll response below FMC standards, but
will allow a safe landing. A summary of these assumptions is that covered
actuation element failures will result in full operational capability,
while uncovered failures will lead to central safing action and a
corresponding loss of FMC capability.
The special fault reaction considerations for flutter control have been
previously described. For actuation, the assumption is that the control
law is designed with the capability to fly out of the critical flutter
envelope with a single passive flutter control surface. Fault reaction
will take place if a flaperon or trailing edge flap fails passive for any
reason during flutter operation. The flutter control function will be
deactivated after the aircraft slows down out of the critical flight
envelope.
The canard control, flaperon control, and rudder control functional blocks
include all eight primary control surfaces. The standard operating
assumptions apply to these surfaces. Passive operation of a single surface
results in loss of FMC capability. SFL capability is lost if any two
primary surfaces are passive (except for symmetrical flaperons). Jam of
any primary control surface is assumed to prevent safe flight and landing.
The flaperon control blocks are subject to the special fault reaction
considerations when flutter control is active.
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The nosewheel control and leading edge flap functional blocks include a
dual-channel actuation device for each function. Passive operation of
either device results in a loss of FMC performance. The leading edge flaps
are assumed to remain in their last commanded position during passive
operation. It is assumed that a safe emergency landing can be accomplished
with a jam of the nosewheel.
The trailing edge flap functional blocks include the two trailing edge
surfaces and dual-channel actuator devices. A passive trailing edge flap
results in a loss of FMC capability. Additionally, if the failure occurs
during flutter control operation, the special flutter fault reaction
operation is required. Jam of either trailing edge flap results in a loss
of FMC capability.
3.4.2 Propulsion Group and Common Device Failure Analysis
Before discussing the propulsion control elements, the capabilities
provided by the propulsion system will be evaluated. The most critical
capability is control of thrust adequate to support safe flight and
landing. For the candidate twin-englne aircraft, a certain level of
single-engine performance is assumed to be necessary. The remaining
propulsion system capabilities primarily support the advanced fighter
missions; for example, the variable inlet is necessary for supersonic
missions, and the vectoring and reversing nozzles support short takeoff and
landing, enhanced supersonic maneuvering, and other mission capabilities.
t
The capability of each propulsion system after failures can be divided into
three major performance categories: full, normal, and low capability. Full
capability means that all functions are fully operational; this includes
full supersonic inlet control; full afterburner thrust control and full
thrust vector, and thrust reverse capability. The normal capability
category allows some degradation from the full performance level. As a
minimum requirement, the engine must be capable of providing the full
unaugmented thrust range. The nozzle and the inlet can be operating in a
fixed position mode. In the low capability category, the system cannot
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meet the normal category minimum requirements. The engine has either
suffered a serious malfunction and cannot be operated, or it can only run
at a fixed thrust level.
The performance levels of both systems must be considered together in order
to determine vehicle capability. To fly all of the mission scenarios
envisioned for the advanced fighter, both engines must have full
performance capability. Full mission capability is lost when either system
suffers a failure reducing its capability below full. Based on the initial
discussion, safe flight and landing capability is provided if one of the
systems has at least normal capability. Safe flight and landing capability
is lost when a failure occurs that results in both systems having less than
normal performance capability. An argument could be made for requiring
afterburner capability for slngle-engine operation; however, this more
restrictive ground rule was not used in this analysis.
The propulsion control system moves several devices to provide its
capabilities. If sensing or actuation failures disable the control
function, some of these devices are assumed to have safe positions that
allow continued operation with degraded performance. These assumptions are
indicated in table 3.4.2-1 along with the consequences of this fixed
operation. These consequences are used in the detailed failure analysis.
Table 3.4.2-2 presents the results of the failure analysis of the
propulsion control elements for a single engine. The total loss effect is
expressed in terms of the single propulsion system capability. The next
column summarizes any special failure considerations for that functional
block. The rest of this section will discuss these results in more detail.
Propulsion Sensing
The inlet sensing functional block includes the three sensor types needed
to support variable inlet operation. The mission-critical inlet operation
occurs only during transonic and supersonic flight. The inlet sensor
redundancy management is based on the inlet flow model. The inlet model is
assumed to allow perfect identification of the first inlet pressure sensor
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Table 3.4.2-1. Fixed Propulsion Device Operation
Device Fixed posit_on Consequences
i I i i i ii i
Upper ramp Subsonic Limited supersonic capability
Inner ramp Subsonic Limited supersonic capability
Bypass ring Subsonic Limited supersonic capability
Lrmited thrust
Fan guide vanes Run Range/reduced accel/decel
Limited thrust
[ Compressor guide vanes Run Range/reduced accel/decel
Main fuel metering Off Engme shut down
•[' Afterburner fuel metering Off No afterburner capability
No afterburner capability/r Convergent nozzle Minimum area reduced accel/decel
Thrust vectoring nozzle Centerline thrust No vectored thrust capability
73
Table 3.4.2-2. Function Failure Analysis - Propulsion Control Loss Effect
Function
Inlet sensing
Duct static pressu re
Normal shock static pressure
Normal shock static pressure
Fan face sens,ng
Fan face pressure
Fan face temperature
Engine core sensing
Fan speed
Corn pressor speed
Propulsion
System
Normal
(Vehicle)
(SFL)
Normal (SFL)
Normal (SFL)
LOW (SFL)
Low (SFL)
Full (FMC)
Full (FMC)
Burner pressure Full (FMC)
Fan turbine inlet temperature Full (FMC)
Afterburner pressure Full (FMC)
Throttle command sensing
Propulsaon computing
Inlet control
Upper ramp
Inner ramp
Bypass rmg
Vane controJ
Low (SFL)
Low (SFL)
Normal (SFL)
Normal
Normal
(SFL)
(SFL)
Low (SFL)
Low (SFL)
Low (SFL)
LOW (SFL)
Fan guide vane
Compressor guide vane
Main fuel control
Metering valve
Flowmeter
Fuel shutoff
A/B fuel control
Zone metering valve
Zone fuel shutoff
L_ght off detector
Nozzle control
Lower flap
Upper flap
Convergentnozzle
Normal (SFL)
Normal (SFL)
Normal (SFL)
Normal (SFL)
Normal (SFL)
Normal (SFL)
Special considerations
Full operation w_th 4 of S sensor types Run/off if
only 3 sensor types available m engine core
Pilot shut down of engine if failure detection
process doesn't detect last sensor failure
Active failure mode may cause reduced thrust
operation at subsonic speed
Active failure mode may cause flameout or
corn pressor stall
Passive failure unsafe m conjunction wfth actwe
metering valve failure
Active failure mode may cause
overspeed/overtem p or flameout
Active fadure mode requires engine shutdown
Active fadure mode requ#res engine shutdown
Active fadure mode may cause overspeed or
compressor stall
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failure and perfect detection of the second like sensor failure. This
allows the inlet to remain fully operational after the first failure.
Without the inlet flow model, failures cause fixed subsonic inlet operation
and a corresponding loss of FMC capability.
The fan face pressure and temperature sensors are covered by the fan face
sensing functional block. These sensors are used throughout the full
engine operating range. Detection and identification of failures is also
accomplished with the inlet model. The redundancy management is assumed to
operate perfectly while the inlet model is operational. When sensor data
is not available due to a dual like sensor failure or loss of inlet model
capability, the engine reverts to flxed-thrust level operation. This
reduces capability to the low performance level.
The engine core sensing includes the fan and compressor speed sensors, the
burner and afterburner pressure sensors, and the fan turbine inlet
temperature sensor. The engine core sensors are critical to normal
performance. Failures are detected and identified using analytic
redundancy techniques. The process handles certain sensor failure modes
very easily, while other failure modes present more difficulty. A fail-
operations/fail-off level of failure protection is assumed, which means
that the engine is fully operational with the loss of one sensor type.
When two sensor types are lost, the assumed fault reaction causes fixed-
thrust level operation, which is low performance capability.
The first throttle command sensor failure of a pair is assumed to be
perfectly identified with the redundancy management scheme. When the final
sensor of a pair fails, the engine reverts to low performance capability.
If the sensor failure is detected by the process, fixed-thrust operation
results. If the other throttle logic fails to detect the second failure,
the pilot can shut the engine down for not following commands. In either
case, the result is a loss of normal performance capability. With these
operating assumptions, it isn't necessary to distinguish between covered or
uncovered second failures in the reliability model.
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Propulsion Computing
Propulsion computing operates like flight control computing in failure
situations. All computing functions are fully operational until the
failure of one of a remaining pair of FTP channels. The assumption is that
redundancy management automatically commands fixed-thrust operation when
computing is lost. There may also be a procedural requirement to shut the
engine down when conditions permit. In either case, performance is reduced
below the normal capability level.
Propulsion Actuation
Some standard assumptions and ground rules were used in the failure
analysis for the propulsion actuation functional blocks. A common
propulsion actuator was used for all devices. The key failure behavior
assumptions are as follows. All but a fraction of the propulsion actuation
element failures are detected by the self-test processes. These covered
failures result in the disengagement of one actuator channel, but the
device still has full operational capability through the remaining channel.
If the remaining channel then suffers a covered failure, disengagement
causes the device to move to the preferred fixed position.
Failures not detected by the self-test processes cause the central actuator
management process to command the propulsion device to the preferred fixed
position. These failures include undetected feedback position and actuator
drive failures, as well as a mechanically jammed control valve. These are
single failure situations resulting in fixed-device operation. Finally,
the consequences of the rare mechanical jam of the main actuator ram are
device specific, which will be described in each functional block
discussion.
The inlet control functional group moves three inlet devices. If any inlet
device fails to the preferred subsonic position, both engines are assumed
to operate with limited supersonic performance. Full mission capability is
lost because this eliminates the ability to perform some of the aircraft
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missions. The jam failure mode could leave an inlet device in the
supersonic position. This is assumed to lead to reduced thrust capability
at slower speeds and therefore a loss of normal performance capability.
The vane control functional group includes both the fan guide vanes and the
compressor Ruide vanes. Loss of ability to move either set degrades the
engine performance while allowing continued operation. A conservative
assumption is that this degraded operation does not provide the normal
level of performance for the system. A jam failure of the device is
assumed to have the same result.
The main fuel metering valve, the fuel pumps and the fuel flow meters are
included in the main fuel control functional group. The fuel metering
valve moves to the shutoff position when continued control is impossible.
The resulting performance is below the normal level, resulting in at least
a loss of full mission capability. The main fuel flow model is assumed
perfect in detecting and identifying flowmeter and actuator position sensor
failures. Continued full operation is therefore possible after the first
failure of either sensor type. The model also is assumed to detect second
like failures. The maln fuel metering valve reverts to the fixed shutoff
position when both flowmeters or both position sensors are lost. Because
of the flow model, there are no uncovered metering valve position sensor
failures.
The unlikely jam failure of the main fuel metering valve causes a safety
hazard. In these situations, the central actuator management commands a
shutdown of the engine through the fuel cutoff valve. The fuel cutoff
valve is dual so that there are two ways to accomplish shutdown. A
significant active failure mode for this device would be uncommanded fuel
cutoff. This failure mode would of course also lead to loss of normal
performance for the system. The fuel pumps are sized to handle the
afterburner fuel flow. Full operation is therefore assumed possible if one
pump fails. Failure of both pumps leads to engine fuel shutdown and loss
of normal performance capability.
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The afterburner fuel control functional group includes the A/B zone flow
metering valves, the zone flow fuel cutoff valves, the light off detectors,
and the ignitors. The afterburner is operated during limited periods of
the flight scenarios. The preferred fixed position for the metering valves
shuts off the fuel to that zone. Loss of metering capability for any zone
is assumed to disable all A/B capability. An assumption is that the
central actuator management process detects a jammed metering valve and
reacts by commanding disengagement of the zone flow cutoff valves. The
fault reaction also disables afterburner operation for the remainder of the
flight. The zone flow cutoff valves can be activated two ways to allow
zone flow. The active failure mode of concern would be uncommanded opening
of the valves. This failure is hazardous only in conjunction with a stuck-
open A/B fuel metering valve. Because this situation is a combination of
two rare failure modes, it was not included in the reliability models.
Perfect failure detection was assumed for the light off detectors. Full
operation is possible as long as one detector remains functional. If both
detectors fail, afterburner control sequencing is impossible, causing loss
of afterburner capability. Similarly, one ignitor will allow full
afterburner operation. If both fail, afterburner capability is lost. In
all situations involving loss of afterburner capability, the system
performance is reduced to the normal level.
The nozzle control functional block includes the thrust vectorlng/reversing
flaps and the convergent nozzle. Fixed operation for the convergent nozzle
is assumed to lead to normal capability for the system with no afterburner
thrust capability. The assumption for a jammed nozzle area device is loss
of normal performance capability.
Fixed operation for the vectoring/reversing flaps results in centerline
thrust capability only. This would reduce the engine capability to the
normal performance level. Because jammed vectoring/reversing flaps could
have a severe effect on attitude and speed control, the assumed fault
reaction is an engine shutdown with a loss of normal performance
capability.
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Communication Devices
All of the major control functions in the three groups of the candidate
system depend on data transfer provided by network operation. Communication
device failures primarily affect sensing and actuation functional blocks.
That is, their primary function of sensing the environment or moving
actuators for the control function is interrupted by the communication
failures. The following subsection presents details on the consequences of
communication device failures.
Table 3.4.2-3 summarizes a high-level failure effect study for the elements
composing an I/O network. Two generic failure modes are considered, the
active mode generally having a more serious affect on network operation.
Communications device failures can affect sensors and actuators on one DIU,
a subset of the DIUs, or all of the DIUs on a network. The effect depends
on the device failure mode and the location of the failure in the active
network. All sensors and actuators affected by the failure are unusable
until network repair action restores communication. Communication failures
can have permanent as well as temporary effects on system operation. When
elements llke nodes or DIU links fail, it causes a permanent loss of the
sensors and actuators dependent on them for connection to the system.
Network redundancy management is challenging because it is difficult to
identify specific failures with the information available after an
unsuccessful chain of transactions. Many of the failures have similar
effects when observed from the FTP. Repair attempts based on the most
likely failure or the most easily repaired failure are made to localize the
problem. Failure modes not included in the table exist that present
especially difficult problems to the network redundancy management.
Particularly bad are those that look like other failures and cause the
resulting repair action to come to a halt at an inopportune time during the
repair sequence. Current techniques to handle such failure modes employ
special time-consuming tests at each step in the repair to ensure success.
These tests drastically increase the repair time and must be custom
designed to catch each and every unique failure mode.
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Table 3.4.2-3. Communication Device Failure Summary
Dewce type
Network node
Network link
Fault type
Passive
Fault effect
Loss of comm to all downstream
devMces
Nw unusable
Actwe Node does not obey
reconfiguration command
Loss of comm to/from all
Passive downstream devices
Active
Root link Pass#ve
Active
Network interface Passive
Active
DtU LI n k Passive
Active
DIU Passive
Active
NW unusable or loss of comm to
all downstream devices
Repair act=on
Rebudd network around failed
node
Rebuild network around failed
node
Rebuild path around failed link
Rebudd path around faded link
NW unusable Switch to alternate root hnk
Switch to alternate root
NW unusable link/reconfigure old root node
to disable old root link
NW unusable Switch to alternate root link
NW unusable
Loss of comm to DIU and all
serviced devices
NW unusable
Loss of comm to OIU and all
serviced devices
NW unusable
Actuator
Command values corrupted
Sensor values corrupted
Switch to alternate root
link/disable old root link at old
root node
Disable OlUlinkatservlcmg
node
Disable DIUlinkatservicing
node
8O
While the network is being repaired, system operation must continue using
the remaining accessible sensors and actuators. This includes those
devices on the remaining good network and any devices that can still be
reached on the network with a failure.
There are several ways network operation during network failure recovery
can cause system failure. The three most significant have been termed (i)
temporary exhaustion, (2) nearly coincident network-sensor/actuator
recovery, and (3) nearly coincident dual network recovery. Temporary
exhaustion failures occur when previous device failures leave the system
without enough devices to safely fly during a subsequent network repair
period. This is shown in figure 3.4.2-1 for the candidate architecture
situation with quadruple sensors. In the scenario presented by the figure,
both sensors on one network have previously failed to make the system
vulnerable. A subsequent failure on the other network will disrupt
communications with the remalning devices, putting the system out of
control until the repair is completed. Normal operation is possible after
communications are restored, but if the repair period is too long, it will
be too late to save the system. Hence, the name temporary exhaustion.
A nearly coincident network-sensor recovery situation is shown in
figure 3.4.2-2. Normally, the bad data from a faulty sensor is prevented
from disturbing the system by the voting redundancy management process.
Because of normal sensor mismatches, the process needs time to reliably
exclude the faulty sensor data from further consideration. In this
coincident network recovery situation, the voting process is temporarily
without enough good sensors to outvote the faulty sensor. Bad data is
assumed to propagate to the control function, causing loss of safety.
Surface actuation for the primary control surfaces is also vulnerable to
nearly coincident network recovery. As a consequence of the dual network
configuration, an actuation channel will disengage the actuator a few
cycles after losing command updates. Disengagement is necessary to allow
the channels on the other network to provide control during network outages
or communication device failures. The nearly coincident situation occurs
when an actuator channel has an undetected failure that is causing a force
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Figure 3.4.2-1. Temporary Exhaustion
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Figure 3.4.2-2. Nearly Coincident Network---Sensor Recovery
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fight vlth the good channel at the same time a network fault occurs. In
this situation, the central actuator management fault reaction commands the
surface to passive operation. If a network fault interrupts
communications, the safe command cannot reach the good actuator channel.
The channel with an undetected failure may therefore drive the surface
hardover when the good channel disengages due to lost communications.
The final situation is nearly coincident dual network recovery. This is a
straightforward case in which both networks undergo repair at the same
time. Because there are only two networks, all affected redundant sensing
and actuation is lost during the mutual repair period. All three of these
network operation situations are assumed to lead to loss of safety because
of the effect on safety-crltlcal sensing and actuation.
Some of the communication elements have active failure modes that directly
affect sensing and actuation performance. One example from the table is a
postulated active DIU failure mode that corrupts the actuator command while
satisfying the DIU-actuator protocol. The problem will be detected by the
central actuator management process and will result in central safing
action. This significant active failure mode was included in the
reliability models to assess the possible hazard.
Another significant communication failure mode would be a bad NI that
continues to send valid messages containing outdated actuator commands.
This would cause channels on the bad network to oppose channels on the good
network thereby freezing the surfaces. However, it was assumed that this
situation would be detected and terminated within a few application
execution cycles, and so it is not included in the reliability models.
Central Pover Distribution
Two central systems are used extensively by elements of the candidate
architecture: the hydraulic power distribution and the electric power
distribution systems. In this study, the details of the secondary power
configuration, which includes the engine, accessory drive, and emergency
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power unlt_ were considered part of basic airframe system. Only the
distribution elements were considered part of the IAPSA II system to be
analyzed.
Hydraulic power is supplied to the actuators of both the flight control
group and the propulsion control group by two independent aircraft
hydraulic systems. All system actuators have two control valves operating a
dual tandem power ram. Loss of one hydraulic system is assumed to result in
a passive loss of one of the two hydraulic channels. All actuators can
continue full operation with the remaining channel. If both hydraulic
channels fail, all control devices fail passive, resulting in loss of the
aircraft.
There are many two-failure situations leading to a passive loss of an
actuation device. The loss of a hydraulic system makes all devices
vulnerable to a failure in the other actuator channel. The actuator
redundancy management processes must operate correctly during hydraulic
system failures or anomalous performance situations that might occur during
peak demand periods or operation after loss of one system. For this
evaluation, it was assumed that actuator redundancy management performs
perfectly and that hydraullc failures lead to passive channel failures.
The electrical power distribution for the architecture was based on an
approach for fault-tolerant electric power presented in reference C.
Critical power is provided to the IAPSA elements through four electrical
load management centers. The candidate architecture assumption is that each
system element is connected to a single power source. It was assumed that
the connection was organized so that loss of a single power source could
not reduce the redundancy of any sensing, computing, or actuation device by
more than one level. With this assumption, safety is not affected by a
sequence of electrical source failures until the loss of three eliminates
the computing function and body motion sensing.
There are many three-failure loss of safety situations and two-failure loss
of mission situations involving electric power sources. Because the
communication devices and the dependent devices use the same power source
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in a single connection system, redundancy management in the FTP sees the
effect of a power loss as a known loss of communications with one-fourth of
the system devices. A detailed electrical connection plan was not developed
for the candidate architecture analysis. More detailed modeling of the
electric power distribution was performed for the refined architecture
described in section 5.
3.4.3 Reliability Modeling
The functional block organization of the system elements used for failure
analysis was also used for reliability modeling. Each of the reliability
models covers a section of the system containing key sensing or actuating
or computing elements. Data transfer elements are included in the section
models where their failure has a permanent effect. Table 3.4.3-1 shows the
elements included in each of the flight control section models. The same
information for the propulsion control elements on a single propulsion
system is presented in table 3.4.3-2.
The reliability models are used to estimate the likelihood of the failure
situations identified during the failure analysis. Each section model
includes the local effect of hydraulic system, electrical power system, and
network failures. The element failure rates and other related information
used in the evaluation are shown in tables 3.4.3-1 and -2.
These tables also show the failure rates assumed for the system components.
Other parameters assumed for the reliability models are also shown in the
tables. Included are the coverage values used for the critical self-test
processes described in section 3.4.2. For example, the self-test hardware
is assumed to detect 99 percent of the surface actuator position feedback
sensor failures as a baseline. Therefore 1 percent of the failures lead to
undetected failures and a resulting surface shutdown. There are also
entries for components with significant active failure modes. In these
cases, the table shows the fraction of total device failures assumed to be
"active" failures.
To simplify the reliability evaluation, some conservative assumptions were
made about the temporary effects of network element failures. The goal was
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Table 3.4.3-1.
Cock pit
Sensors
Air
Fcom
Name
Pit (2 surfaces)
Devices
Pttchstick sensors
Rollstick sensors
Rudder pedal sensors
Cockpit nodes
Cock pit PlUs
Body rate gyros
Body accelerometers
Sensor nodes
Sensor DIUs
Total pressure sensors
Static pressure sensors
Angle of attack sensors
Angle of sideslip sensors
Sensor nodes
Sensor DIUs
FTP channels
Root link/root node
NW interface
Actuator processor
Actuator position sensor
Valve drive group
Control valve
Canard PlUs
Canard nodes
Electrical load
Management center
Hydraulic power supply
Notes:
AFF - active failure fraction
COV - coverage fraction
Section Models - Flight Control
Failure rate
Number (X10.6/hr)
4 10
4 10
4 10
4 15
4 15
8 50
8 30
4 15
4 15
4 20
4 20
4 33
4 33
4 15
4 15
4 200
6 20
6 20
4 50
4 10
8
4 15
4 37.5
4 37.5
Comments
COY = 95
COV = .99
AFF == 333xI0 -_
4 2O
2 20
C-2- 
87
Table 3.4.3-2. Section Models- Propulsion
tntet
Face
Engine
Fuel
Ecom
After
Nozzle
Prop
Name Devices
PSo sensor
PTNs sensor
PSNs sensor
Inlet nodes
Inlet DIUs
Upper ramp actuator
Inner ramp actuator
Bypass ring actuator
PT2 sensor
TT2 sensor
Fan guide vane actuator
Compressor guide vane actuator
Engine nodes
Engine DIUs
N1 sensors
N2 sensor
PT4 sensor
FTIT sensors
PT6 sensors
Engine nodes
Engine DIUs
Main fuel metering actuator
Fuel flow sensor
Main fuel shutoff
Main fuel pump
Engine nodes
Engine DIUs
FTP channels
Root link/root node
NW interface
Zone fuel metering actuator
Zone fuel shutoff solenoid
A/B lightoff detector
Engine nodes
Engine DIUs
A/B Dgmtors
Upper flap actuator
Lower flap actuator
Convergent actuator
Nozzle nodes
Nozzle OIUs
Fail passive electronics
Actuator position sensor
Control valve
Engage solenoid
Notes:
Control valve jam
2 Power ram jam
AFF - active fadure fraction
COV - coverage fraction
Number
2
2
2
2
2
1
I
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
4
4
5
10
2
2
2
2
I
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
Failure rate
(X 10-61h r)
15
15
15
37.5
37.5 AFF = .05
Comments
15
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37.5
37.5 AFF = .05
50
50
4O
100
4O
37.5
37.5 AFF = .05
40
11 AFF = .01
100
37.5
37.5 AFF = 05
200
2O
20
11 AFF = .01
5
37.5
37,5 AFF = 05
80
375
37 5 AFF = 05
15 COY = gg
I0 COY = gg
15 AFF 1 = 0333
AFF2 = 333 x 10 `4
11 AFF = .01
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to use the evaluation results to indicate potential problems with the
network operation. All network element failures, regardless of failure
mode, were assumed to cause loss of all devices on the entire network
during the repair period. To scope the hazard, it was assumed that all
repair periods are 1 second long.
A special failure analysis concern was the hazard associated with active
DIU failure modes. To assess the potential problem, a fixed fraction of
all DIU faults were assumed to be active failures.
Two models were created for some of the sections, one version to predict
the probability of loss of flight safety and one to predict the probability
of loss of full mission capability. There were two reasons for this.
First, the evaluation tool only provides the probability of reaching the
model absorbing states that correspond to either a loss of safety or a loss
of mission capability. Second, it turned out to be more convenient
(especially during the refined configuration evaluation effort) to build
separate models so that failure condltlon-peculiar model reduction
techniques could be used.
The overall probability of system failure was estimated by combining the
results from the individually solved section models. If the sections are
completely independent, the system failure results from each section are
added together to provide a good first order estimate for total
unreliability. Higher order correction terms are missing, but the answer is
adequate for highly reliable systems. On the other hand, combining section
results must be done very carefully for the candidate system because the
sections are not totally independent. Some of the common elements affect
the state of more than one section. Therefore, certain failure sequences
appear in more than one section model. Also, some section failure states
need to be considered together to determine system success or failure. For
example, two sections may have failure conditions with a level of
performance that is not safety critical when considered one at a time.
However, the coexistence of the degraded states in both sections may result
in system failure. It should be noted that these kinds of problems can be
minimized by careful grouping of the elements into sections.
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The section models were developed in an Iterative manner in the candidate
evaluation effort. Usually, the first version of the section model covered
Just a few of the failures and failure modes. A relatively complete
section model was built containing all possible failure states, regardless
of likelihood. The model was then evaluated and simplified to eliminate
unimportant characteristics. Next, a more detailed version was created by
adding more failure situations to the model and repeating the evaluation
and simplification cycle. Early in the evaluation, certain failure
sequences were seen to dominate the unreliability of the candidate
configuration. Because configuration changes were necessary, the analysis
was not carried to completion. Once it was clear that the dominant failure
sequences had been determined, the modeling effort was terminated. Some
specific points about the resulting section models are discussed in the
remainder of this section.
Flight Control Models
The flight control section models are shown in table 3.4.3-1. These models
were built to evaluate the loss of safety failure conditions, vlth the
exception of the PIT model. During model development and evaluation, it
became clear that the mission failure likelihood would be dominated by
single-failure situations. Because none of these were identified in the
failure analysis for most of the flight control functional blocks, a
mission failure version of the model was not built.
The COCKPIT model was based on the safety-critlcal components, nodes, and
associated DIUs of the pilot command sensing functional block. The model
captures sensor exhaustion failures, dependency on communication elements,
and nearly coincident sensor failures. Also included were the temporary
exhaustion and nearly coincident network recovery failure situations.
The body motion sensing functional block was evaluated with the SENSOR
model. All of the failure situations covered in COCKPIT are included,
except for nearly coincident like sensor failures. As described
previously, nearly coincident sensor failures are not a threat with eight
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devices until two sensors have failed. However, the model includes the
nearly coincident network-sensor failure situation because it is still a
problem.
The AIR model was based on the airflow sensing functional block. This
model treated the quadruple-redundant static and total pressure sensors as
though they were safety critical. This was a conservative approach because
the defined manual control function does not require them. This inclusion
had no significant effect on the model results. The model includes all of
the failure situations covered in the COCKPIT model.
Two FCOM models were built based on the flight control computing functional
block. One of the models evaluates the loss of safety failure condition.
Another model was defined to evaluate the likelihood of permanent loss of
either network. In such a situation, the subsequent failure of any safety-
critical sensor is catastrophic. The evaluation confirmed the assumption
that the permanent failure of a single network in the candidate system was
not a part of any of the significant system failure sequences.
The PIT model treated the failure behavior of a pair of control surfaces
based on the canard control functional block. As mentioned previously, two
versions of PIT were built, one to the safety criteria and one to the
mission criteria. The safety model included the following failure
situations: (I) a single surface jammed or hardover, (2) a pair of passive
critical surfaces, and (3) a dual hydraulic failure. Additionally, the
temporary exhaustion and nearly coincident actuator-network recovery
failure situations were covered. The mission model only included the
dominant failure sequences, all of which cause a single passive surface.
The results of these two PIT models were extended to estimate failure
contributions due to the four primary surface pairs. A weakness of the
candidate architecture results is that the dual passive surface failure
situations did not account for passive surface combinations on different
axes. For example, the likelihood of system failure due to a passive canard
and passive flaperon was not calculated. It should also be noted that the
contribution to mission failure from the secondary flight control devices
was not evaluated.
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Propulsion Control Models
The section models for the propulsion system are shown in table 3.4.3-2.
These models were built to evaluate the likelihood of a single system
losing either full or normal performance capability. In accordance with
the general failure analysis ground rules presented earlier, loss of full
performance on either engine causes loss of mission. Loss of vehicle
safety occurs when both engines have less than normal performance.
Temporary exhaustion situations are included in many of the propulsion
control models to quantify their likelihood. It was not clear whether
propulsion control functions could be designed to tolerate temporary
exhaustion situations. In any case, the numerical results showed that such
failures were not slgnlflcant. The following discussion provides
additional information about the specific models.
The INLET model includes elements from both the inlet sensing and inlet
control functional blocks. Loss of full performance capability is the
model failure condition because that is the result of most inlet element
failures. The model includes sensor and actuator channel exhaustion
failures and dependency on comuunication elements. Inlet device control
valve jams are incorporated as a significant active failure mode. Inlet
device jams, leading to a loss of normal capability, are modeled and
visible in the section results.
The inlet flow model was assumed to be fully operational for redundancy
management. Total loss of one of the necessary sensors results in either
loss of normal performance capability or flxed-inlet operation. In either
case this means that the flow model is available when needed. The only
situation that might violate the assumption is the nearly coincident
failure of two sensors covered by the inlet flow model. Because this
unlikely situation cannot contribute significantly to system failure, it
was not treated in the model.
The fan face pressure and temperature sensors from the fan face sensing
block and the fan and compressor guide vanes from the vane control
functional block are included in the FACE model. This model was built to
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evaluate the likelihood of element failures causing loss of normal
performance capability. The same failure situations included in INLET are
covered in FACE.
The ENGINE model includes just the engine sensors from the engine core
sensing functional block. The model failure condition was loss of data
from two or more types of core sensors. This is a loss of normal
performance failure condition. ENGINE also included the nearly coincident
sensor-network recovery situation and temporary exhaustion failure
situation. In addition, ENGINE modeled the likelihood of nearly coincident
failures among the five sensor types.
Most of the elements in the main fuel control functional block are
contained in the FUEL model. The exception is the dual fuel pump that was
modeled separately. The model failure condition was loss of normal
performance capability. One special situation for this model is that there
are no undetected position sensor failures in the main fuel metering
actuator. Also, active fuel shutoff valve failures that cause uncommanded
engine shutdown are modeled.
FCOM models the behavior of a triplex FTP that performs the propulsion
system computing for a single system. Two versions of FCOM were built.
The failure condition for one version was loss of normal performance
capability. The second version included loss of a single network as a
special failure condition. This version verified that failures associated
with single network operation are not significant contributors to system
failure.
Most of the elements from the afterburner fuel control functional block are
handled in the AFTER model. The exceptions are the ignitors and light off
detectors, which are modeled separately. AFTER models device failures that
cause the system to lose full performance capability. This model includes
exhaustion failures, dependency on communication elements, device jam,
control valve jam, and temporary exhaustion.
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NOZZLE includes the devices from the nozzle control functional block. Most
nozzle element failures reduce system performance to the normal level. The
model includes nozzle device jam failures that lead to a worse condition,
loss of normal performance. NOZZLE contains all the failure" situations
included in the AFTER model.
3.4.4 Reliability Results
The most important benefit of early system evaluation is that it provides
indications of the system's strengths and weaknesses. The reliability
results available to the system design team must be detailed enough to be
used for making improvements. The system failure probabilities should be
categorized by specific failure situation to assist the reliability
evaluation. This information should provide insight into the operation of
the fault-tolerant system, which can then be used to guide necessary system
design changes.
A fault-tolerant system can fail in several ways. Redundancy exhaustion is
the most obvious failure mechanism. When enough of the redundant devices
fail, the function can no longer operate. For highly reliable systems,
imperfect performance of the redundancy management processes becomes
important. In this study, nearly coincident like sensor failures were
identified as a cause of early system failures. Because this failure
mechanism is related to the duration of the failure recovery process,
reliability modeling is necessary to specify a requirement for the system.
This study also defined several failure mechanisms involving operation of
the I/O network. The detailed results show whether or not the specific
building block configuration is satisfactory for the IAPSA II system.
The design also incorporated elements that were subject to postulated rare
active failure modes or failure modes that could not be detected by simple
redundancy management processes. One evaluation question is whether the
simpler, lower performance processes can support the system requirements.
If not, more complicated hardware and software is needed. Therefore, the
detailed results must quantify the contribution of these special failures
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to system unreliability. A complication is that the input failure mode
data is generally not available for devices early in the design process.
Good quality data of this kind is usually the result of detailed failure
analysis of inservlce equipment failures.
Likewise, failure data to support the evaluation of the undetected failure
mechanism is difficult to obtain. To determine good coverage values for
the processes used in the candidate system definition, a full redundancy
management performance analysis must be performed using device failure
characteristic data. Again, information at this level of detail is usually
not available for early concept development work. The approach taken for
this study is to use assumed values to indicate the magnitude of the threat
associated with the respective failure mechanism. These results must then
be treated as having a much higher than normal level of uncertainty.
Design concept results containing sequences with a lot of uncertainty must
be evaluated carefully. Different designers will interpret the same
results very differently. There are several options available for design
concepts whose reliability is dominated by failure sequences with a high
degree of uncertainty. One option is early prototype development of the
devices and redundancy management processes in question. Evaluation of the
prototypes would provide accurate data for assessment and improvement of
their design and performance. Alternatively, compatible design concepts
could be developed in parallel to be available as a backup if the original
concept turns out unsatisfactory after undergoing detailed development.
The program benefit of the rough evaluation of these more complicated
failure mechanisms is the early warning provided for specific areas of
possible development risk.
The model results for the loss of safe flight and landing capability are
shown in table 3.4.4-I. The safety data are based on mission time of 3
hours. The results are divided into functional blocks, which show how the
loss of specific functions contribute to the loss of safety. These results
come from the flight control models for COCKPIT, SENSOR, AIR, FCOM, and PIT
(safety condition).
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Table 3.4.4- I. Safety Reliability
Funct#onal block
FC sensing
Probability x 10 .7
Pilot .0023
Body motion 5.08
Airflow .0078
FC computing .012
FC surface control
Pttch .19
Roll 38
Yaw .19
Hydraulic power .036
Dual propulsion control .0076
Total 5.g
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The contribution to loss of safety from the propulsion system was based on
situations where failures cause one system to have less than normal
performance capability. The FACE, ENGINE, and FUEL models were evaluated
for a 3 hour period to establish this probability. Additionally, the small
contribution due to jam failures in the INLET and NOZZLE models was
included in the single system value. This value was then used to estimate
the likelihood of the unsafe situation where both systems have less than
normal performance.
Before combining the results from the separate models, it was necessary to
eliminate the double counting of communication element failure sequences.
For example, the ENGINE and FUEL models both contaian the engine
nodes/DIUs. Identical dual failure sequences are contained in both models.
The probability sums were adjusted where necessary so that common sequences
were only counted once.
A few failure sequences dominated the safety reliability for the candidate
architecture, preventing it from meeting the system requirement. The
predominant sequence was loss of body motion sensing in a temporary
exhaustion failure situation. This two-failure sequence occurs when a node
or DIU fails, leaving the system vulnerable to subsequent repair on another
network. When the subsequent network element failure causes the other
network to shutdown for repair, only two good sensors are accessible
instead of the three needed to estimate the three axis states. A key
assumption in temporary exhaustion failure modes is that the network repair
exceeds the time the system can tolerate loss of control. Another
assumption affecting the likelihood of this failure sequence is that all
network element failures lead to a long repair period.
The other dominant loss of safety sequences are associated with surface
control. The first situation is a jammed or stuck single surface. The two
most common failure sequences are (1) a mechanical jam of the power ram and
(2) a detected failure-undetected failure sequence in the two actuator
channels for one surface. The second dominant surface control situation is
a pair of critical surfaces failing passive. The most common cause of this
situation is an undetected actuator channel failure on one surface leading
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to central safe action, followed by an undetected failure on a channel of
the second surface. It should be noted that the contribution to loss of
safety from passive pairs is understated in table 3.4.4-1 because the
probability was calculated for pairs on the same control axis. Passive
surface pairs on different axes were not included.
The element failure modes that take part most often in surface control
failure sequences are undetected actuator channel failures and mechanical
jam failures. Undetected failures include actuator processor or position
sensor faults not covered by the local redundancy management as well as
active DIU faults. There is a large uncertainty associated with the
probability of these failures. Mechanical jam of the power ram, for
example, is usually considered to fall in the extremely improbable
category. The other channel failures were characterized by a coverage and
active failure fraction in the reliability model. As mentioned earlier,
these values are not well known early in the system life cycle; however,
for the nominal values used in this analysis, the surface control failure
sequences were significant to aircraft safety.
The full mission capability reliability for the system is shown in
table 3.4.4-2. All of the propulsion control models were used in the
mission evaluation. The models were evaluated using a mission time of
1 hour. Any failure reducing a single propulsion system below full
performance capability causes a loss of full mission capability. Active
DIU failures were not incorporated directly in the propulsion control
models. The effect was calculated separately assuming that inlet and
nozzle active DIU failures caused loss of FMC capability due to fixed
operation, while active engine DIU failures cause loss of normal
performance capability for the engine.
With the exception of the surface control devices, elements from the flight
control group were not included in the mission capability evaluation. The
flight control models described earlier covered safety critical elements
that lose mission capability at the same time they lose safety. These
elements therefore don't affect mission reliability until the third
failure. Early evaluation results showed that only one and two failure
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Table 3.4.4-2. Mission Capability Reliability
Functional block
ii i
FC surface control
Pitch
Roll
Probability x 10 -4
i
.t8
36
.18Yaw
Propulsion system (per engine)
Fixed inlet 046
Fixed guide vanes 031
Engme core sensing 00066
Core fuel metering .016
Afterburner metering .076
Fixed nozzle 045
Engine corn putation 0015
Propulsion DlU active fault* .11
Aircraft total 1,4
"Not in models
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sequences contributed significantly to loss of mission capability for the
candidate architecture. Of all of the flight control models described
earlier, only PIT had a loss of mission capability at the one-failure
level. Therefore only the mission capability version of the PIT model,
which evaluates the likelihood of a single passive surface, was used for
the loss of mission capability evaluation.
The mission success likelihood was unsatisfactory based largely on failures
requiring central actuator management action to safe actuation devices.
These are all cases in which full mission capability is lost at first
failure. The specific failures consisted of active DIU failures,
undetected actuator controller faults, and propulsion actuator control
valve Jams. Like the flight control actuation safety situation, all of
these failures are modeled vlth parameter values that have a large range of
uncertainty.
Several aspects of the candidate architecture were not completely modeled;
however, the results were carried far enough to show the need to change the
design concept to better meet the reliability requirements. The key safety
concern is that certain two-failure sequences cause loss of capability.
Similarly, certain single failures can cause loss of mission capability.
The specific situations and the resulting design refinements are discussed
in section 5.
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4.0 CANDIDATE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Thls section details the performance analysis of the IAPSA II candidate
system architecture. The performance evaluation steps shown in figure 4.0-
1, are described in reference 5. An overview of the key methodology steps
is presented in the following paragraphs.
Application Performance Requirements
Performance requirements deal with allowable update rates and time
parameters associated with the defined control functions. These
requirements were defined in section 3. After the control functions have
been mapped onto an architecture configuration, the configuration must be
evaluated to guarantee that the control function performance requirements
are met.
This effort defines the digital implementation timing characteristics
needed to satisfy the mission and safety requirements. These timing
requirements include control law update rates; allowable end-to-end time
delay between sensor reads and resulting actuator commands; and limits on
the frame-to-frame variability of control cycle actions (jitter).
Architecture Description
The performance analysis is based on an architecture description that
defines how the timing of the key application functions is to be
controlled. These key sequencing and control details must be defined
whether the architecture is based on a custom design or on a building-block
approach, such as that used for IAPSA II.
Synthesize Candidate Architecture
This step maps the control functions onto the candidate configuration and
details the operation of the sequencing and control functions. Simple
101
L
Syn_e4ize
carN:lidato
mrchi-
tecture
Candidateaccepted
for
rejection
Specie/
syst_
architec-
lure
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timing charts are used to organize the application computing, application
I/O, and system processes. This step may eliminate many configurations
using these simple timing charts. During this step the underlying system
or executive functions may need definition (specification).
Identify Critical Validation Issues
In addition to the normal performance requirements, the performance model
should be able to be used for early evaluation of any critical validation
issues related to timing. In general, these include situations in which
stringent timing needs must be met for safe operation of the system.
Identification and evaluation of these issues early in the system design
phase will greatly enhance the development and validation effort.
Define Experiments
Experiments are defined for evaluation of the candidate under normal
performance and failed conditions. In addition, the critical validation
issues are investigated. The experiment definition includes the key input
and output variables, the technique to control the experiments, and also
the number of runs needed to assess the statistical variations in the data.
Build Model
A simulation model is developed to investigate the critical system
behavior. The simulation is normally composed of high-level, low-fldelity
functional models of the key application processes, together with models of
the associated sequencing and control functions. The decision about what
functional behavior should be included or how much detail needs to be
modeled is based on the data needed to support the defined experiments.
The simulation can be updated as the detailed design is developed. This
expanded simulation model can then be used in future development phases to
verify the correct implementation of the hardware and software. Finally,
the detailed simulation model can be used as part of the supporting
deliverable data for validation.
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Collect Data and Rvaluate
The simulation model is used to perform the experiments defined to study
normal performance and the critical validation issues. The data results
are evaluated in terms of the application performance requirements. Based
on the data evaluation, four possible decisions can be made, as shown in
figure 4.0-1: (1) reject the candidate architecture, (2) accept the
candidate architecture, (3) refine the architecture, and (4) identify new
critical issues.
The candidate architecture is acceptable when all application performance
requirements are satisfied. Refinement actions modify the implementation
concept, vhlch will require changes in the simulation model. As a result
of the insight gained during the evaluation, new critical issues may become
apparent. This wlll require changes in the set of evaluation experiments.
Furthermore, as more detail of the configuration is added, additional
requirements will be generated.
The following sections describe in detail how the performance evaluation
process was applied in the IAPSA II work.
4.1 Synthesize Candidate
4.1.1 Application Performance Requirements
The purpose of the IAPSA II study is the design and validation of a control
system architecture for a twln-engine fighter with significant coupling
between the airframe and engines. Thls section describes the application
performance requirements adopted for the IAPSA II reference configuration.
The control law design effort defines the necessary timing requirements for
each function. The control function is implemented with a repetitive
timing cycle that reads the sensors, updates the control law variables, and
commands the actuators. The design effort defines the necessary update
rate needed for satisfactory performance of the control function. The
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fundamental performance requirement is then to perform all the computing
and I/O activity defined by the design effort in the available update
period.
The system specification also requires that the application activity have
100 percent growth capability. In general, growth capability is difficult
to measure because of the system complexity. In this study, a simple
measure of growth capability was used indicating how much the application
activity can increase before reaching system throughput limits.
Control law performance is affected by the end-to-end time delay between
the reading of a sensor and the start of the resulting actuator movement.
This time delay interval is illustrated in figure 4.1.1-1 for a specific
sensor-actuator pair. The effect of time delay on control law performance
ranges from imperceptible to rough handling characteristics to loss of
control in extreme cases. Specific performance-related time delay limits
were not available for the IAPSA II control functions; a time delay value
of one control cycle period or frame was assumed to be the criterion for
satisfactory performance.
The control law design is usually based on a sampled data approach that
implicitly assumes uniform sampling periods (regularity in the control
cycle repetition rate). The important control cycle actions with respect
to lack of regularity or jitter, are the reading of sensors and commanding
of actuators (fig. 4.1.1-1). As with time delay, specific performance
requirements were not available for control cycle jitter. Small variations
with respect to the update period are acceptable, while large variations
are unsatisfactory.
4.1.2 Reference Configuration Analysis
This analysis develops the high-level system performance data that will be
used to evaluate the candidate architecture. The focus is on how hardware
and software elements of the candidate architecture perform the application
functions. In this analysis, the performance of each major group (flight
control and engine control) is treated separately. Ultimately a separate
simulation model is created for each group.
105
AppIi-o=,o°I _ I
system
0 ms
Legend:
Input
Output
H H
10 ms 20 m=
Figure 4.1.1.1. Example Application - Update Rate 100 Hz
30 ms
106
The performance model was developed in three distinct, sequential phases.
The three phases were (I) the initial timing, (2) initial AIPS timing, and
(3) revised AIPS timing. In these phases the application timing data are
built up and organized manually using simple timing charts. Situations
involving variable timing needs or contention for shared resources are
deferred to the simulation model development for promising configurations.
4.1.3 Initial Timing
The organization of the application activity follows the computing
subfunctlon allocation defined in section 3. All functions within the same
update rate are lumped into a single rate group. The computing and IlO
activities for all the functions in the same rate group are combined.
Therefore, if more than one function needs to communicate with the same
DIU, the DIU is accessed only once, obtaining all data needed by the
functions in that rate group. This consolidation of message traffic
reduces the I/O demands of the application.
The initial timing assumes that the control cycle for each application rate
group starts with the input IlO activity needed by the rate group, followed
by the compute activity, and finally by all output I/O activity. This
particular organization of the I/O activity is referred to as separated
IlO. The input I/O activity for each application rate group supplies all
data from the sensors, actuator positions, etc., requested by all functions
during the current control cycle update. The compute activity performs any
sensor and actuator redundancy management and updates the control law
variables. The output activity consist of sending position and redundancy
management commands to all the necessary actuators via the DIUs. This
organization of I/O activity and computing activity is shown in figure
4.1.1-i for a single application rate group.
The initial timing development phase considers a single I/O network that
must be shared by all rate groups. The input I/O activity starts each
control cycle. I/O activity is nonpreemptable; once started it runs to
completion. A sequencing and control function is assumed that operates
each rate group in order of priority, with the fastest rate first.
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In contrast to the single shared I/O netvork, the computing for each
application rate group is assumed to have its own dedicated processor.
Once the input I/0 activity for a rate group is completed, the computing
activity begins. At the conclusion of the computing activity the control
function starts the output I/0 activity. When the output activity for that
rate group is completed, the control function starts the next rate group
scheduled for that minor frame. Note that this assumes that a rate group
does not relinquish the network for lower priority activity until the
completion of its output I/0 activity. The final control assumption is
that all rate groups are scheduled for initial execution at the very first
minor frame.
The remaining initial model assumptions deal with the I/O activity
duration. The two major elements are DIU processing and the duration of the
command and response messages. The first element to be discussed is DIU
processing. The system operates in a command-response mode. The
application rate group sends an I/O message containing a unique operation
code to each DIU in sequential order. If appropriate, the DIU returns a
response message. The command message and response message (optional) pair
that is the basis for communication with devices on a single DIU is termed
a transaction. The unique operation code sent in the command message
causes a sequence of simple DIU operations that reads sensors or actuator
status registers or writes to actuator command registers. Additionally,
the DIU formats any resulting sensor data into a response message and
transmits it as needed. The DIU requires some overhead processing time to
decode and verify the message and prepare the response message. The times
assumed for all operations in the timing estimate are illustrated in figure
4.1.3-i.
The second major I/O activity element is the duration of the command and
response messages sent on the IlO network. The transmission rate on the
I/0 network is 2 megabits per second. A primitive format assumed for these
messages is illustrated in figure 4.1.3-2. The input I/0 activity for a
rate group consists of a sequence of transactions with all its DIUs. Each
transaction consists of a sensor command frame followed by DIU processing
as described above and finally a sensor response frame. The output I/O
108
Operation
Sensor read
Actuator command
Actuator safe command
Actuator status read
Actuator position read
DIU overhead
Execution time/
operation (p.s)
15
5
5
5
15
10
Figure 4. 1.3-1. DIU Operation Times
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B - Byte
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Figure 4.1.3-2. Primitive DIU Command Response Assumptions
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activity consists of a sequence of output-only transactions for all the
appropriate DIUs. These output-only transactions contain only an actuator
command frame. The equations describing the duration of input and output
I/0 activity are detailed in figure 4.1.3-3.
Flight Control Major Group
The sensor and actuator data transfer requirements for the flight control
group are illustrated in figure 4.1.3-4 (DIU names are shown In flg.
3.2.1-1). This figure lists the specific number of words required by each
DIU within each rate group for the application functions allocated to the
flight control group. Evaluation of I/O activity duration data yields the
results summarized in figure 4.1.3-5. The computing duration is based on
execution of the allocated control subfunctions on a 3 mips processor. The
mean computing workload for each control function (less the allowance for
growth) was taken from section 4 of reference A. A timeline for the
application activity during a major frame is illustrated in figure 4.1.3-6.
Figure 4.1.3-6 shows an overlap in the application computing between the
I00 Bz rate and the 25 Ez rate. Thls indicates that the rate groups will
contend for the computing processor in this organization. The major
characteristics of time delay for this organization can also be seen in the
figure. The values are clearly a fraction of a single minor frame, thus
well below the update rate period criterion.
Engine Control Group
The sensor and actuator data transfer requirements for each engine control
group are illustrated in figure 4.1.3-7. The resulting input and output
I/O activity duration along with the computing duration are shown in figure
4.1.3-8. A timeline for the application activity by rate during a major
frame is illustrated in figure 4.1.3-9.
It is clear that the engine control group is very lightly loaded by the
application when compared to the flight control group. No timing problems
are apparent at this stage of the performance development.
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(Eqn 1) input = time to transmit sensor command frames + time to execute sensor command frames +
time to transmit sensor response frames
(Eqn 2) output, time to transmit actuator command frames + time to execute actuator command frames
Time to transmit sensor command frames:
= # input command frames X time to transmit word X words/input command frame
Time to execute sensor command frames:
- # input command frames X DIU overhead + total # of sensor reads X sensor read time +
total # of actuator status reads X actuator status read time + total # actuator position reads
X actuator position read time
Time to transmit sensor response _rames:
. total # words in all sensor response frames X time to transmit word
Time to transmit actuator command frames:
. ((# actuator command frames X overhead words/actuator command frame) + total # of
actuator commands + total # of actuator safe commands) X time to transmit word
Time to execute actuator command frames:
- # actuator command frames X DIU + (total # of actuator commands X actuator command
time + total # of actuator safe commands X actuator safe command time
Figure 4.1.3-3. Input-Output Activity Execution
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Figure 4.1.3-4. Flight Control Computer Estimated Application Timing
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Rate
100
50
25
Inputs (ps)
9O7
778
98
Compute (ps) Outputs (Izs)
1723 288
3016 340
7100
Resulting utilization:
Application computing
Application I/O
F_jure 4.1.3-5.
50.06%
14.83%
Flight Control Computer Estimated Application Timing - Rate Values
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115
Rm
100Hz
SOHz
23Hz
DIU operabone
SR AC ASC AS AP
3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
7 8 8 8 8
Senior command
fnmw (wolfe)
Overhead Dsm
11/2
11/2
1 1[2
Sensor response
tm_o (vw-ds)
OverhoaKI Data
1/2 9
1/2 23
Actuator command
frame (wo_)
Overhead Data
I I/2 6
1 1/2 6
1 I/2 16
L_ond:
SR - Sensor re_l
AC - Aclua_' command
ASC - Actuax _fe command
AS - AcaJa_Orstatus
AP - Actuator poeition
F_jure 4.1.3-7. Er_gine Control Computer Estimate Application 77ruing
116
Rate Input 0_s) Compute (ps) Output 0J_)
100
50
25
213
120
475
158
94
1293
100
100
230
Resulting utUlzatlon:
Application computing
Application I/O
Figure 4.1.3-8.
5.28%
6.17%
Engine Control Computer Estimated Application Timing - Rate Values
11"_
Appli-
cation
_J1F-] I1
,ILJI,,,,, =n,==,,== =, ,rll,,,,,,,, ,n,, ,
I '''''''I I '' ' I'',,,,,, : I,, :, :I III I
0 mll 10 mll 20 roll 30 mil 40 ms
'' ' :1 , ,,,,,,,,I,,,,:, : _:1,,,, , : : :1 !system I ''' ' _
FDIR 100Hz 50Hz 25Hz
Figure 4.1.3-9. Engine Control Timing - Estimated Application Timing
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4.1.4 Initial AIPS Timing
The next phase in the performance model development adds more detail to the
modeling of the I/O activity. The elements of the AIPS-based candidate
configuration are shown in figure 4.1.4-1. One aspect o£ AIPS operation is
the exact voting of output data and the source-congruent voted exchange of
input data across FTP channels. The model of I/O activity duration
presented in the previous section is expanded to include this voting
process, in which the IOP uses the data exchange.
The I0P executes some preprocessing and postprocessing functions for the
I/O activity. The IOP prepares each command frame for execution by loading
the input/output sequencer (IOS). Similarly, the IOP completes processing
of sensor response frames (input data) by unloading the IOS. Before
sending actuator command frames, the IOP votes all of the associated data
while loading the IOS. Similarly, after all sensor response frames are
received the data are distributed to all PTP channels via the data
exchange. Since the sensor command frames for the input activity do not
change from cycle to cycle, it is assumed that the IOP does not vote the
associated data. Once loading is complete, the IOS sends command frames to
the DIU and receives any response frames, executing without IOP involvement
until all the transactions in the chain are completed. The IOS is assumed
to require 10 microseconds for overhead processing between consecutive
network transactions. This is called transaction turnaround time.
In this phase, each rate group is now assumed to have its own CP and IOP.
The rate group computing is explicitly allocated to the CP. The assumed
sequencing and control function must now arbitrate between the rate groups
for the use of the single network. The extra system loading due to the
output voting and input distribution causes some additional delay in the
completion of lower priority output I/0 activity due to more urgent high
priority input I/O activity.
The speed of the data exchange used to calculate the duration of I0P
involvement in the I/0 activity was 6 microseconds per word for loading the
IOS and 8 microseconds per word for unloading the IOS. There were two
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further changes to the modeling of the I/O activity in this initial AIPS
timing phase. First, the actual AIPS network protocol is used for data
transfer over the network (fig. 4.1.4-2). This figure also indicates the
amount of data that must pass through the data exchange for each actuator
command frame and sensor response frame. Second, the DIU fixed overhead
tlme was increased to 20 microseconds. The overall I/O activity tlme
equations for the initial AIPS timing estimate are illustrated as equation
3 and equation 4 in figure 4.1.4-3.
Flight Control Group
The phasing of activity in the flight control group was altered slightly by
changing the initial scheduling of the 25 Hz rate group. Rather than start
all three rate groups in the very first minor frame, the activity for the
25 Hz is offset by starting It in the second minor frame. The sensor and
actuator data requirements for the flight control group are updated to
reflect the data exchange usage and the more extensive high level data link
control (HDLC) frame formats, as illustrated in figure 4.1.4-4. The
resulting timing data are summarized in figure 4.1.4-5. A timeline of this
information is illustrated in figure 4.1.4-6.
Two problems are observed in figure 4.1.4-6. First, there is an overlap in
the second and fourth minor frame between the i00 Hz input activity and the
50 Hz output activity in the IOP. Second, there is overlap between the
100 _z application processing and 25 Bz application processing in the CP.
This indicates that contention for the processor will occur with this
initial AIPS organization. Time delay is still well within the one update
period criteria.
Engine Control Group
The sensor and actuator data requirements for each engine control group are
updated and shown in figure 4.1.4-7. A summary of the resulting I/O
activity duration data is presented in figure 4.1.4-8. A new timeline is
illustrated in figure 4.1.4-9. There are no apparent timing problems.
121
B B B
Actuator command frame
Sensor command frame
W W W W W W
OPSEQ DO1 DO2 DDN check FCS
V
Plus count byte - Output packet (Data exchange during load)
J
B
Sensor response frame
B B B W W W W W W
I I" I ° I °°,1°,1 Ioo !so0check FCS
J
V
Plus 5 byte transaction status data. Input packet (Data exchange during load)
Legend:
F ° HDLC flag
A - HDLC address
C - HDLC control (used to check address)
W - 16 bit work
OPSEQ - Commanded operation sequence
DD - Device data
FCS - HDLC frame check sequence
B - 8-bit byte
F_ure 4.1.4-2. HDLC Protocol - DIU Command Response Frame
B
122
(Eqn3)input - timetotransmitsensorcommandframes+timetoexecutesensorcommandframes+
timetotransmitsensorresponseframes+timetounloadsensoresponse
(Eqn4)output-timeto load actuator commands + time to transmit actuator command frames + time to
execute actuator command frames
Time to transmit sensor command frames:
- # input command frames X time to transmit word X words/input command frame
Time to execute sensor command frames:
= # input command frames X DIU overhead + total # of sensor reads X sensor read time +
total # of actuator status reads X actuator status read time + total # actuator position reads
X actuator position read time
Time to transmit sensor response frames:
- total # words in all sensor response frames X time to transmit word
Time to unload response:
- total # of response words in all sensor response frames X data exchange unload rate
Time to load actuator commends:
- total # of actuator commands to load X data exchange load rate
Time to transmit actuator commend frame:
- (# actuator command frames X overhead words/actuator command frame) + (total # of
actuator commands + total # of actuator safe commands) X time to transmit word
Time to execute actuator command frame:
- # actuator command frames X DIU + (total # of actuator commands X actuator command
time + total # of actuator safe commands X actuator safe command time
Figure 4.1.4-3. Input-Output Activity Timing for/nitia/A/PS Timing
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4.1.5 Revised kIPS Timing
In the revised AIPS timing phase of the performance model development the
overall I/O activity is reorganized by grouping the sensor read input I/0
activity and actuator command output I/O activity into a single network
activity per rate group. This I/O organization is referred to as grouped
I/O. In this strategy, all sensor read operations and actuator write
operations within a single DIU are combined into one transaction per rate
group. The transmission of the actuator commands from the previous control
cycle is combined with the transmission of the sensor read commands for the
current control cycle. This reduces the loading on the I/O network because
DIUs that have both sensors and actuators are now only accessed once per
application cycle. As a consequence, control law time delay will increase.
The equation used to calculate the duration of the IlO activity is shown in
figure 4.1.5-1. The sequencing and control function now only keeps track
of one I/O activity per rate group. A control cycle begins with the
grouped I/O activity that transmits the commands from the previous cycle
and requests sensor data for the current cycle. Since the I/O activity
starts with loading actuator commands, the lOP activity is usually the
first action in a control cycle.
The final change to the model is the assumption of a single CP and I0P that
must be shared by the different rate groups. It is assumed that the
control function allocates the CP or the IOP to the fastest rate group
needing service.
Flight Control Group
The sensor and actuator data requirements for the flight control group,
reflecting the new I/O organization, are illustrated in figure 4.1.5-2.
Note that the data that previously appeared in the actuator command frame
now appears in the sensor command frame column. Also the total number of
frames is reduced by the number of actuator command frames. The revised
I/O activity duration data are summarized in figure 4.1.5-3. A timeline is
presented in figure 4.1.5-4 for the flight control group. The effect of
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(Eqn 5) network activity = time to load actuator commands + time to transmit grouped sensor/
actuator commands + time to execute grouped sensor/actuator command
frames + time to transmit response frames + time to unload sensor responses
Time to load actuator commands:
- total # of actuator commands to load X data exchange load rate
Time to transmit grouped sensor/actuator commands:
- ((# command frames X words/command frame) + total # actuator commands + total number
actuator safe commands) X time to transmit word
Time to execute grouped sensor/actuator command h'ame:
- # command frames X DIU overhead + Total # sensor reads X sensor read time + total #
actuator command X actuator command time + total # actuator safe commands X actuator
safe command time + Total # actuator status reads X actuator status time + total # actuator
positions X actuator position time
Time to transmit response frames:
- ((total # command frames X words/response frame) + total # actuator positions + total #
actuator status + total # sensor) X time to transmit word + total # command frames X
transaction turnaround time
Time to unload response:
= total # of response words to data exchange X data exchange unload rate
Figure 4.1.5-1. Input-Output Activity Execution
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the change to grouped I/0 is to reduce somewhat the network use and to
increase the system time delay. As a result of the change, the time delay
is nov approximately one update period.
The performance data developed will be used to form the basis for the
simulation model. Other details of the application timing requirements
must now be considered. The basic detail of the applicatlon workload has
been determined, but certain key interactions due to resource contention,
fault processing, etc., require more sophisticated analysls methods. At
this point in the development we are ready to build a simulation model.
But first, based on the initial assessment of the architecture
configuration, we must address critical areas for validation and what
experiments will be run with the simulation.
4.2 Critical Validation Issues
This section describes some high-level critical performance-related
validation issues for the candidate architecture. These critical issues
involve ways in which timing performance can prevent safe operation.
Special situations or operating circumstances can be a key factor. These
critical validation issues are identified to drive the development of the
simulation model so that they can then be studied early in the design cycle
when the cost benefit impact of improvements is very favorable.
Two performance-related issues are to be studied in this effort. The first
is the effect on performance of the relative phasing of the application
activity and the system failure detection, identification and
reconfiguration (FDIR) activity. The second is the effect on the
application activity of the I/0 network repair actions.
4.2.1Application/FDDg Coordination
The execution of the application cycle (computing processes in the CP and
I/0 activity processing in the 10P) will be affected by the execution of
the system FDIR processes. FDZR protects the computing integrity of the
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FTP channel. Certain FTP failures are catastrophic if not handled within a
few application cycles. FDIR executes at the rate of the fastest
application cycle to guarantee rapid fault reaction. Each FTP channel has
a watchdog timer for failure protection; FDIR must reset this timer within
narrow tolerances. In temporary application overload situations, then,
FDIR has the most stringent timing requirement and must therefore have
priority over the application processing. The concern to be analyzed is
whether certain phasings between scheduled application execution and the
FDIR process can degrade performance unacceptably. If performance can be
significantly affected, a mechanism to control the relative phasing will be
required.
4.2.2 IlO Network Repair
Each major group in the reference configuration has two reconfignrable I/O
networks. The sensors and actuators are distributed between these networks
for fault-tolerant operation. Nhen a failure brings down one network, the
application continues using the sensors and actuators accessible via the
other network. The major concern is the interactions between the repair
activity and the application activity.
Application I/O activity is terminated on the faulty network for the
duration of the repair activity. The system is therefore vulnerable if a
fault occurs on the second network before the first network is repaired.
The likelihood of this catastrophic event is dependent on the duration of
the network repair. Thus the network repair duration is a critical issue.
The repair activity interacts with the nominal execution of the application
functions. The repair algorithms involve many processing and I/O activity
steps using the IOP and the network. Timely execution of repair is
affected by the application's need to communicate over the unfaulted
network, which also involves IOP processing. The timing performance of the
application must be acceptable during the repair activity. Because of the
complexity of the interaction of the repair activity and the application,
the duration and effect of the repair activity is addressed most
effectively with simulation techniques.
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Two I/O network repair strategies are evaluated: one-shot and full regrov.
The one-shot strategy is characterized by rapid diagnosis and specific
repair actions. Full regrov is the same process used to grow the I/O
network at power on. It uses a robust sequence of steps to grow a path to
all good devices reachable with the unfailed network elements.
In the one-shot repair strategy, when a communication fault occurs, a chain
that accesses all the nodes on the failed network is executed. Based on
the nodes that did not respond, the network manager assumes that an I/O
llnk has failed and attempts to repair the failed link by enabling a spare
llnk that is connected to the lost nodes. If communication has been
restored to all the lost nodes, the link failure assumption was correct and
the network is returned to service. However, if some of the lost nodes
remain unreachable, the link failure assumption was wrong and a process
associated vlth a node failure hypothesis is invoked. If at any point in
the one-shot process it becomes clear that progress is impossible, for any
reason, a robust regrow algorithm is begun. It should be noted that the
repair algorithm implemented in the model for the current experiments does
not support the repair of a node failure or the reversion to a regrov
strategy.
The full regrow repair strategy makes no attempt to determine the type of
failure; it uses a robust algorithm to establish a new I/O network topology
as if the power had just been applied. Unlike the one-shot repair
strategy, the regrow algorithm can establish a path to all reachable nodes
(and therefore DIUs) regardless of the type of failure.
4.3 Define Experiments
This section describes the experiments to be performed with the IAPSA II
simulation model. It should be noted that experiment 1 was conducted
earlier in the program to develop a common experimentation interface.
Therefore the experiment numbering for the preliminary simulation
experiments begins with experiment 2.
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4.3.1 Experiment Configurations
The reference configuration comprises three major groups: a flight control
group and an engine control group for each engine. The composition of
these groups is described in section 3. The experimental concept is to
perform experiments on two separate models: a model of the flight control
group and a model of the engine control group. This allows comparison
between a large, heavily loaded system and a relatively small, lightly
loaded system.
4.3.2 Experiment Procedure
The variability of the processing needs of the application and the system
services was captured by modeling elements as stochastic processes. To
address the statistical characteristics of the reference configuration,
multlple samples of the experiment variables were collected. The
experiment data were then plotted on histograms to assess the statistical
aspects of the system behavior. Data from 100 major frames were used to
evaluate the general characteristics of the application's behavior.
The I/O network repair runs were intended to determine how the
application's behavior changes during the repair of a fault. Fifty runs of
each failure case were conducted to randomly cover the time of fault
occurrence.
4.3.3 IIO Hetvork Repair Tim (Experimt 2)
The objective of experiment 2 was to measure the time needed to
successfully return a network to service after it experiences a network
fault. This experiment also evaluated the effect of the additional network
repair processing on the timing performance of the application. This
experiment evaluated both configurations, flight control and engine
control. Each active link in the network was failed passively in this
experiment. The link is failed at a random time during the second major
frame and the experiment run terminated one major frame after the
completion of the I/O repair activity.
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The experiments were run with both the rapid one-shot repair strategy and a
full regrov repair strategy. This scoped the minimum and maximum possible
repair times for single faults. Each link failure case was repeated 50
times with the fault occurring at a random time with respect to the major
frame. This allowed a coarse assessment of the relationship between fault
occurrence time and network repair time.
4.3.4 I/0 Scheduling (Rxperinent 3)
The purpose of experiment 3 was to evaluate the effect of the I/O
scheduling mechanism on the performance of the application during normal
operation. The system services software has two mechanisms available to
the application designer to schedule the application I/O activity,
scheduled I/O and on-demand I/O. In on-demand I/O, at the beginning of
each cycle, the application executing in the CP makes an I/O request and
then suspends itself. When the I/O has completed, the application process
resumes. In scheduled I/O, the system software executing in the IOP makes
the I/O request periodically. The application computing in the CP is
scheduled every cycle by the completion of the I/0 activity.
Two I/O activity organization schemes were also considered: separated IlO
and grouped I/O, which were briefly discussed in section 4.1. In separated
I/O, the I/O activity for the rate group is separated into two parts, the
input I/O activity and the output I/O activity. In the grouped IlO scheme,
all of the I/O activity is grouped together and performed at the same time.
This experiment evaluated the effect of these options on the application
performance. There is a single experiment run for each of the IlO
scheduling mechanism and I/O activity organization combinations. The
duration of each run was 102 major application frames.
4.3.5 FDIR/Application Phasing (Experiment 4)
The objective of experiment 4 was to evaluate the effect of the relative
phasing of the application activity and the system FDIR process. The FDIR
and application demands were evaluated during normal operation. The system
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tlme scheduler assumed for this study has a granularity of one millisecond.
That is, time-scheduled tasks can only be specified to the nearest even
millisecond. The i0 specific relative phasing situations possible because
of the 10 millisecond minor frame period were analyzed. In each simulation
It is assumed that the independent FDIR processes in the CP and the IOP are
scheduled to run at the same time. The experiment was defined for both the
flight control and engine control configurations, for both I/O scheduling
mechanisms, and for both I/O activity organizations.
4.3.6 CP, IOP, I/0 System, I/0 Network Utilization (Experiment 5)
The purpose of experiment 5 was to estimate the use of the key candidate
system resources during normal operation. Major areas of resource
contention were modeled for this experiment. This includes contention
between the different application rate groups, as well as the previously
described contention between the application rate groups and the time-
critical FDIR function. A preemptive priority sequencing and control
algorithm Is modeled to control processor allocation. Accounting for
contention produced a more realistic growth capability estimate and allowed
an evaluation of the effect of execution variability. Measurements
representative of each of the application performance requirements defined
in section 4.1 are made for normal operation and the network failure cases.
The application performance data for failure cases are only collected
during the fault recovery action. Thus comparison of failed and non-failed
cases will show how the operation changes during the fault recovery
process.
4.3.7 Experiment Execution Strategy
The experiment configurations for data collection are illustrated in table
4.3.7-1. The experiments were performed in the following order: (I) FDIR/
application phasing (experiment 4); (2) I/O scheduling mechanism
(experiment 3); and (3) I/O link repair (experiment 2). The CP, IOP, I/O
system, I/O network utilization experiment 5 data were collected during the
running of the previous experiments. Table 4.3.7-2 defines the number of
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Table 4.3. 7-1. Experiment Configuration
Expedmenl
No. Configuration ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
]
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Layout
Flight control
Flight control
Flight control
Flight control
Flight control
Flight control
Engine control
Engine control
Engine control
Flight control regrow
repair strategy
Flight control one-shot
repair strategy
Engine control regrow
repair strategy
Engine control one-shot
repair strategy
Engine control
Engine control
Engine control
FDIR Coordination
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
I/0 Scheduling
On demand
On demand
Scheduled
On demand
On demand
Scheduled
On demand
On demand
Scheduled
Scheduled
Scheduled
On demand
On demand
On demand
On demand
Scheduled
I/O Grouping
Gmuped
Separated
Grouped
Gmuped
Separated
Gmuped
Gmuped
Separated
Gmuped
Gmuped
Gmuped
Gmuped
Gmuped
Grouped
Separated
Grouped
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Table 4. 3. 7-2.
Experiment ID
4
Configuration ID
6
14
15
16
10
11
12
13
Configuration for Experiment Execution
No. of phase
or faults
10
10
10
10
18
18
4
4
Range of run IDs
1,.,50
1..50
1..50
1..50
Total run potential
I
10
10
10
10
900
900
200
200
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of possible faults or relative FDIR phasings considered for each experiment
configuration, as well as the number of repetitions for each link fault
experiment.
An actual application's demands will not necessarily grow uniformly across
all the system resources. Therefore, to assess growth capability
utilization was measured for four key resources: the CP, IOP, I/O system,
and I/O network. The CP utilization measures its use in computing the
application control laws and the system FDIR. The IOP utilization measures
its use in the loading and unloading of application I/O activity, network
manager processing and system FDIR. The I/0 system utilization measures
the end to end operation of the I/O networks for application activity. The
I/O system utilization starts when an application I/O request is made and
ends when all application activity is complete and the system can
immediately respond to a new request. This utilization figure is intended
to measure the ability of the I/O system to handle additional I/O requests.
The I/O network utilization measures the time from the beginning to the end
of IOS execution of I/O activity.
Deadline margin is a figure of merit that indicates how yell the system is
meeting its periodic control cycle requirements, that is, how close the
system is to missing a time-critical action. The critical actions include
updating an input or an output set of I/O data to complete the processing
for one control cycle before the scheduled starting time for the next
cycle.
The time delay figure of merit is an overall indicator of time delay for a
particular rate group. The value is computed as the difference between the
start of an I/0 activity in one cycle and the conclusion of an I/0 activity
in the next cycle. Deadline margin and time delay were illustrated in
figure 4.1.1-1.
4.4 Build Hodel
This section describes the development of a simulation that models the
behavior of an implementation concept for the reference configuration.
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4.4.1 Performance Tool
Several tools were evaluated for developing the IAPSA II performance model.
A major shortcoming of most tools evaluated yam their inability to
represent algorithms. This capability is necessary since it allows some
key timing parameters to be established using prototype algorithms.
Boeing Advanced Systems selected the Discrete Event Network (DENET)
simulation language for the development of the simulation model for the
IAPSA II reference configuration. DENET was developed at the University of
Wisconsin's computer science department by Dr. Miron Livny. It is a
discrete event simulation language based on the Discrete Event System
Specification modeling methodology. Thls methodology Is complemented vlth
the MODULA II programming language, which results in a simulation language
capable of developing modular system simulations at any level of detail.
This feature allows the DENET tool to represent algorithms.
DENET simulations are composed of discrete event modules (DEVM) and arcs,
which connect outputs of one DEVM to inputs of another. Each DEVM is
programmed to contain some function of the system; the function can be
either a hlgh-level abstraction or a very detailed emulation. DEVMs
receive input and generate output through ports. The ports of DEVMs are
interconnected with arcs. A simulation model consists of a group of DEVMS
connected together with arcs. Each instance of a DEVM is characterized
with input parameters. The input parameters allow the module to
parameterize the specific DEVM's behavior so that modular building blocks
can be supported.
Discrete Event Nodule
A fundamental feature of a DEVM is its connections with other DEVMs. The
connections are implemented with input ports and output ports. A port is
created on a DEVM when a connection is made to another DEVM with an ARC.
The orientation of the ARC defines whether a port is an input port or an
output port. DEVM ports are associated with either an INPUT event or an
output variable. Each INPUT event and OUTPUT variable has an associated
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data type for transferring information when the variable is assigned. The
data type can be a simple Boolean or an integer, or can be a composite type
such as a record. Output from a DEVM is generated with an assignment
statement to an output variable. The output port is generally connected to
an input port on another DEVM. At the time an output is assigned, an input
event is triggered in the destination module. The input event is the
mechanism by which the modeler controls the processing in the DEVM. The
resulting processing can change the state of the DEVM based on the received
data, perform a complex algorithm, and/or schedule an output port
assignment to take place at a defined future time.
An example of an input event and output variable for a DEVM that models an
AIPS node (AIPSNODE) is shown in figure 4.4.1-I. The input event has the
name NodeCommandFrame and the output variable is named NodeResponseFrame.
When an input event occurs, the AIPSNODE processing is initiated. An
example of the event-drlven processing is shown in the following AIPSNODE
DEVM description. The first action taken, if the input event message
corresponds to an enabled node port, is to assign the received message to
the output variables corresponding to all other enabled node ports. The
second action is to examine the message to see if it contained a command
for that specific node. If true, the directed action is taken, and a
response message is generated and assigned to the NodeResponseFrame output
variables corresponding to the node's enabled ports.
ARC Definition
An ARC definition is used to connect output variables of a DEVM to the
input events of other DEVMs, as illustrated in figure 4.4.1-2. This figure
shows half of the connection between two AIPSNODE DEVMs in a network. The
ARC definition, NodeToNode, defines the output port NodeResponseFrame to be
connected to the input port NodeCommandFrame.
Parameter Characterization
The parameters of a DEVM are used to fully characterize the behavior of a
DEVM. One use is the definition of a specific instance of a generic DEVM
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AIPSNode
InputEvent
NodeCommandFrame I
Output Event
NodeResponseFrame I
Figure 4.4.1-1. DEVM I/0 Definition for AIPS Node
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NodeCornrnandFrarne)
(,NodeResponseFrarne
NodeToNode = Node connections
Figure 4.4.1-2. ARC Definition for Inter-AIPS
such as the definition of an AIFSNODE illustrated by figure 4.4.1-3. The
generic AIPSNODE DEVM has five parameters| the first two integer values,
NetworkID and NodeNumber, are used to define the specific I/O network node
Interconnections. The SequencerTimeUpper and SequencerTimeLower parameters
are real numbers that define the limits of the uniform distribution that
the AIPSNODE uses to determine the time interval between the reception of a
valid command and the transmission of a response. The InltialConflguration
parameter is used by the AIPSNODE to set the configuration of its ports at
simulation initialization time.
Simalation Topology File
The DENET simulation is set up with a topology file that defines DEVMs,
their parameter values, and their interconnections. An example topology
file illustrating each of these features is shown in figure 4.4.1-4. The
top section indicates that there are five instances of AIPSNODE in this
simulation and that their DEVM numbers are 70 through 74. The next section
shows the Inter-DEVM connections with the NodeToNode ARC definition. An
input/output port combination is created for each connection made with an
ARC connection. Finally, the configuration parameters of each AIPSNODE are
shown. By implementing other functions in DEVMs and defining ARC
definitions, a complete simulation of the reference configuration was
developed.
4.4.2 Simulation Model
The follovlng paragraphs describe the functionality of the DEVMs used in
modeling the reference configuration.
Some problems were encountered during the development of the models for the
AIPS elements because the architecture implementation concept was still in
development. As the model development progressed, certain assumptions were
made about how functions were implemented and how much time each required.
The intent in these cases was to err on the optimistic side. This has
resulted in simulation models that are AIPS-like in overall behavior nut
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AIPSNode
NetworklO
NodeNumber
SequenceTtrneLower
SequenceTimeUpper
InitialConfiguration
Figure 4.4.1-3. Parameter Definitions for AIPS Node
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70..74:= AIPSNode; creates 5 nodes
[70171,72]: • NodeToNode;
[71170,72,73]: = NodeToNode;
[72t70,71,74]: = NodeToNode; Defines internode connections shown above
[73171,74]: • NodeToNode;
[74172,73]: = NodeToNode;
70: = {2 1 0.000315 0.000385
71: = {2 2 0.000315 0.000385
72: = {2 3 0.000315 0.000385
73: = {2 4 0.000315 0.000385
74: = {2 5 0.000315 0.000385
{TTTTF}};
{TTTTF}};
{T T T T F }};Assignsvaluestoparameters ofeach node
|TTTTF}};
{TTTTF}};
Figure 4.4. 1-4. Example Topology File
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not guaranteed to match any current or future AIPS implementation. Before
describing the specific DEVMs, the steps involved in accomplishing an
application I/O request will be reviewed.
Application I/O Activity
Application I/O activity involves the interaction of many system elements.
The process resulting from a request made by the application computing is
illustrated in figure 4.4.2-1. The figure shows the significant activity
by system element. The IOP responds to the I/O request by loading the
necessary data and transferring control to the IOS. The IOS sends the
individual command frames to the DIUs over the network and collects the
response frames from the DIUs. When the IOS is finlshed, the IOP collects
the DIU responses and makes them available to the CP via the data exchange.
The application can then process the DIU responses. An overview of the
interaction of the DEVMs is provided by the following description of how
this sequence is implemented in the simulation model.
The DEVMs that model the above sequencing are illustrated in figure
4.4.2-2. One application rate group is modeled by one instance of the
application DEVM. When it is time for the application to execute, it makes
a request to the processor DEVM representing the CP. The processor
notifies the application when the application's processing is complete for
the current cycle. The application may then make an IlO request to the I/O
service DEVM, as illustrated in figure 4.4.2-1.
To execute the I/0 request, the I0 service must acquire the IOP to load the
data needed for the current I/O cycle. The IO service then makes a
processing request to the instance of the processor DEVM that models the
IOP sequencing and control function. The processor notifies the IO service
when it has completed the IO service's processing request. At this point
the IO service commands an IOS for each network to execute the I/O
activity.
The IOS DEVM sends messages to the network and collects the responses. All
the DEVMs modeling the network (nodes and DIUs) receive the command frames.
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Figure 4.4.2-2. Example Application Simulation Topology
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The DEVM addressed in the command frame transmits a response to the
network. When the IlO activity is complete, the IO service makes another
processing request to the processor DEVM to unload the networks. When the
IO service Is notified that the IOP has completed its request, the IO
service notifies the application DEVM that its I/O request has been
completed.
At this point the application DEVH has sensor data to process. It makes a
request to the instance of the processor DEVM modeling the CP control
function for the appropriate processing time. The following sections
describe these DEVMs in detail.
Processor
Each FTP channel is composed of two CPUs: an I/O processor (IOP) and a
computational processor (CP). All CPs and all IOPs in an FTP execute in
instruction synchronization. This organization is depicted in figure
4.4.2-3(a). For the defined experiments, it can be assumed that the CPs
and the IOPs remain in synchronization. With this assumption, a multiple-
channel FTP can be modeled as a single-channel FTP, as illustrated in
figure 4.4.2-3(b). This modeling simplification is critically dependent on
the operation of multiple IlO networks and the process that ensures that a
multiple-channel FTP remains in synchronization.
As depicted in figure 4.4.2-2, two different instances of the processor
DEVM support the processing requirements of the IlO system and the
application. The key processor DEVM characteristics are listed in figure
4.4.2-4. The processor DEVM models the sequencing and control functions
that execute on either the CP or IOP. This sequencing is based on a
preemptive priority model in which the highest priority process ready for
execution acquires the processor and retains it until it completes or until
a higher priority process becomes ready. The processor maintains a
priority queue of processes waiting to use the processor. When a process
completes, the first element of this queue acquires the processor. If a
process makes a request to use the processor, it is inserted into this
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Figure 4.4.2-3. FTP Model
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Figure 4.4.2-4. Processor DEVM
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priority queue if its priority is not higher than the process currently
running on the processor. If its priority is higher, it acquires the
processor and the currently running process is inserted into the queue.
Each application process is assigned a priority, with the faster rates
having higher priority. The FDIR process is assigned a priority higher
than the application processes and executes at the rate of the fastest
application. In the IOP, the processing related to an application I/O
activity is assumed to have the same priority as the application computing.
Again, the FDIR is assigned a higher priority than all the application
priorities and executes at the fastest application rate. The processes
related to the repair of the I/O network are assigned a lower priority than
all the application priorities.
Efficiency is a concern for all system services functions. Overhead
processing is required In preemptive priority systems to handle the
different processes. This overhead can dominate a processor's activity,
depending on the sequence in which processes become ready to execute and
the amount of time needed to switch processes. A value of 0.300
millisecond was used to model the time needed for sequencing and control
overhead In the processor DEVM. A process switch is assumed to be an
unlnterruptable operation. In some situations a process can become ready
while another context switch is in progress. In this case the processor
performs two switches. At the completion of the first, the system
recognizes the new higher priority request and immediately switches
processes again.
IO Service
The IO service DEVM models the software functions that execute primarily in
the IOP. This software communicates with the I0S DEVM and the application
DEVM. The key IO service DEVM characteristics are listed in figure
4.4.2-5. The model focuses on the software that controls the sequencing of
pre- and post-processing activity in response to an I/O request. Some IO
service functions reside in the CP for interface reasons. These were
assumed to take negligible processing time in the model.
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Figure 4.4.2-5. IOService DEVM
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The I0 service process depicted in figure 4.4.2-6 controls access to the
I/O networks. This model was developed as a result of initial simulation
efforts and differs from the preliminary AIPS design. There are 4 steps to
the execution of an I/O request: load command frame data, start IOS, I/O
completion poll, and unload the response frame data. The IOSs execute the
individual transactions of the I/O activity without IOP involvement. Note
that the IO service was modeled as separate tasks, one dedicated to each
application rate group and one for the network manager. Thls model was
created when a previous version, based on a preliminary AIPS concept, could
not satisfy the flight control application update requirements. The
separate task model allowed some preemptive activity on the IOP without
affecting the IOS execution.
A semaphore was employed to protect the execution of the application IOS
activity. The I/0 network is protected when the IOSs are commanded to
start and released after the I/O completion poll. The modeled approach
minimizes the time that the I/O networks are in a nonpreemptable state and
relies on the preemptive priority scheduler to resolve the contention
between I/O requests from the different application rates and the network
manager. Assigning high priority to faster application rate groups allows
the application activity with the closest deadline to be serviced first.
In the I0 service model the lOP is free for lower priority processing after
it starts the IOSs. The IO service schedules an I/O completion poll using
the underlying system time schedule function. The I/O completion poll
checks for the completion of the network activity for an I/O request and
begins to unload the collected data. Each I/O request has a defined
completion poll interval that guarantees that the activity is complete when
the I/O networks are operating normally. The I/O completion poll occurs at
integer milliseconds of system time. Thls is due to the assumed underlying
system time scheduling granularity of one millisecond.
An example of the contention between application rates in the IO service is
shown In figure 4.4.2-7. The situation is that the 50 Hz rate has an I/O
request that has progressed to its execute state. At this point, the
i00 Hz rate initiates an I/O request. Because the 10P is free, it can
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process the 100 Hz I/O request until it is time to start the IOSs. The
100 Hz I/O request is then suspended, because the 50 Bz I/O process
controls the semaphore. When the 50 Hz I/O completion poll occurs, the
50 Hz I/O process releases the semaphore making 100 Hz I/O process ready.
The i00 Bz IlO process starts the I0S with the 100 Hz activity, schedules
its own completion poll, and relinquishes the IOP. The 50 Hz data is then
unloaded from the network interfaces because it is the highest priority job
waiting for the IOP.
The IOS execution of network manager I/O activity can take place at the
same time as application IlO activity. When a communication fault occurs
on a network, no further application I/O activity takes place on that
network until the I/O network manager repairs the fault. Thus, during
failure recovery, the application I/O activity will be restricted to one
network and the network manager activity will be restricted to the other
network. There will be contention between the application and the network
manager for the IOP, but the network manager I/O activity is unconstrained
on the network being repaired.
Application
The application is a generic DEVM that models the functionality of a single
application rate group. The application DEVM, whose key characteristics
are listed in figure 4.4.2-8, can be configured to perform the workload of
any flight control or engine rate group. Its execution sequence can be
configured for either on demand or scheduled I/O. The DEVM models data-
dependent processing requirements using a normal workload distribution for
the needs of each application cycle.
Input/Output Sequencer
The I0S DEVM executes chains requested by the IO service DEVM and collects
data resulting from chain execution. It provides the IO service with a
status variable that corresponds to the state of IOS execution. This
status variable indicates whether the I0S has completed the chain it is
executing. The IlO service also has the ability to stop the IOS's
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Figure 4.4.2-8. Application DEVM
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execution of a chain at anytime. When commanded to start a chain, the IOS
DEVM sends command frames to the adjacent node and waits for the response
frames as needed until the IIO activity is finished. Its key
characteristics are listed in figure 4.4.2-9.
Node
The I/O network node is the element used to construct the mesh conflgurable
network. During normal operation, the AIPSNODE DEVM node acts a
rebroadcast element. Any activity received on an enabled port is
immediately retransmitted out all the other enabled ports. The AIPSNODE
responds to reconfiguratlon commands addressed to it by changing its port
configuration and then sending a response frame that contains the node's
status. This allows detailed modeling of the network repair activity
directed by the network manager to reconfigure around faults. A null
command to a node results in the node transmitting its status. AIPSNODE
DEV_4s interface with other AIPSNODE DEVMS, IOS DEVMs, or DIU DEVHS. Their
key characteristics are listed in figure 4.4.2-10.
DIU
The DIU DEVM models the network device to which the application sensors and
actuators are connected. The DIU DEVM models the receipt of messages from
the application. The DZU model schedules the transmission of a response
message at a time that reflects the DIU processing time described in
section 4.1. The DIU DEVM, whose key characteristics are listed in figure
4.4.2-11, models the statistical variation of the duration of DIU
processing time.
Netvork Nanager
The network manager is responsible for maintaining communications between
the application process and the DIUs. The 10 service DEVM notifies the
network manager DEVM when the application process encounters a
communication fault. From this point on, the IO service does not execute
any application chains on the faulty I/O network until the network manager
notifies the IO service that the repair is complete.
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The network manager DEVM implements two different types of strategies for
repairing I/O network faults, one-shot and regrow. Prototype algorithms
for both of these strategies are implemented in the DEVM, whose key
characteristics are listed in figure 4.4.2-12. A configuration item in the
IO service DEVM dictates which type of strategy will be used in the current
experiment to repair the I/O network. This allows a common DEVM to be used
for both sets of experiments.
4.4.3 Development Problems with Performance Model
The IO service DEVM presented extreme difficulty during the development of
the simulation model. This was primarily due to the complex functionality
of this process. Modeling difficulty early in the development is probably
a good sign of impending difficulty in the implementation phase. The IO
service was not only a complex function but also had demanding performance
requirements. Performance problems in the early simulation steps led to the
separate task structure for IO service shown in figure 4.4.2-6. As
improbable as it seems, this structure was actually simpler than the
original design. This structure still has some remaining adverse
performance characteristics. This is a good example of the benefit of
performance modeling in exposing concept difficulties early in the design
cycle.
4.4.4 Simulation Input Values
The values used by Boeing for certain simulation timing input parameters
are shown in figures 4.4.4-1 through 4.4.4-3. The AIPS parameters that do
not vary with simulation configuration are illustrated in figure 4.4.4-1.
Most of these parameters relate to time needed by system overhead functions
to support the application activity. Parameters unique to the flight
control configurations are shown in figure 4.4.4-2. Parameters unique to
the engine control configurations are shown in figure 4.4.4-3.
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Applicationcomputing
i) 100Hz
ii) 50 Hz
iii) 25 Hz
Normal _ = 1723, o = 86)
Normal (jz= 3016, o = 150)
Normal 0z = 7100, o = 355)
DIU command execution
Grouped I/O
100Hz
50Hz
25 Hz
$1 90 + Uniform (0, 10)
$2 90 + Uniform (0, 10)
OR. 45 + Uniform (0, 10)
OFR 45 + Uniform (0, 10)
IFL 60 + Uniform (0, 10)
IFR 60 + Uniform (0, 10)
TEL 45 + Uniform (0, 10)
TER 60 + Uniform (0, 10)
$1 30 + Uniform (0, 10)
$2 30 + Uniform (0, 10)
CPI 45 + Uniform (0, 10)
CP2 45 + Uniform (0, 10)
COL 30 + Uniform (0, 10)
(:;OR 30 + Uniform (0, 10)
RL 30 + Uniform (0, 10)
FIR 30 + Unifomt (0, 10)
N 30 + Uniform (0, 10)
LER 90 + Uniform (0, 10)
$1 15 + Uniform (0, 10)
CP1 15 + Uniform (0, 10)
Chain loading time (2 networks in service)
i) 100Hz 396
ii) 50Hz 444
iii) 25Hz 0
End of chain processing time (2 networks in service)
i) 100Hz 1232
ii) 50Hz 1296
iii) 25Hz 208
Transaction transmission time
100Hz Command
$I 40 88
$2 40 88
OFL 56 64
OFR 56 64
IFL 56 72
IFR 56 72
TEL 56 64
TER 56 72
50Hz
$1 40 56
$2 40 56
CP1 40 64
CP'2 40 64
COL 56 56
CI_ 56 56
RL 56 56
RR 56 56
N 56 56
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25Hz
$1 40 48
CP1 4O 48
Response
Figure 4.4.4-2. Flight Control Time Elements (#s)
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Applicationcomputing
i) 100Hz
ii) 50Hz
iii) 25Hz
Normal(p.- 175,o= 9)
Normal (Iz- 100, o - 5)
Normal (p.= 1300, c ,, 65)
DIU command execution
Grouped I/O
i) Inlet
ii) Nozzle
iii) Engine
135 + Uniform (0, 10)
90 + Uniform (0, 10)
325 + Uniform (0, 10)
Separated I/O (input only)
i) Inlet
ii) Nozzle
iii) Engine
105 + Uniform (0, 10)
60 + Uniform (0, 10)
265+ Uniform (0, 10)
Chain processing time (2 networks in sen/ice)
i) 100Hz 114
ii) 50 Hz 114
iii) 25 Hz 186
End of chain processing time (2 networks in service)
a) 100Hz 232
b) 50Hz 184
c) 25Hz 456
Transaction transmission time
Grouped I/O
Command Response
Inlet 88 112
Nozzle 88 88
Engine 136 224
Separated I/O
Input Output
Command Response Command Response
Inlet 40 88 88 -
Nozzle 40 112 88 -
Engine 40 224 136 -
Figure 4.4.4-3. Engine Control Time Elements (p.s)
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4.5 Bvalua t e
This section presents a hlgh-level discussion of the results obtained from
each experiment using DENET. The steps taken to analyze the simulation
data from each experiment are discussed individually. The conclusions
drawn from these results are discussed in section 4.6.
4.5.1 FDIR/&pplication Phasing (F_q_erimnt 4)
This experiment evaluates the effect of the relative phasing of the high-
priority system FDIR process and the application activity. For each
configuration shown in table 4.3.7-I, data were collected from execution of
100 major frames.
Flight Control Group
For two of the configurations (4 and 5), the application was unable to meet
any control cycle deadlines. These two unsuccessful configurations
correspond to the on-demand IlO scheduling option and the separated IIO
configuration options for the flight control group. The simulation result
showed that the flight control group was overloaded to the point that the
application could not perform its function using either of these
organization options. Consequently, configuration 4 and configuration 5
were eliminated as possible candidates.
A summary of the experimental data for configuration 6 (scheduled grouped
$/0 organization) is presented in table 4.5.1-I. The minimum deadline
margin is a strong indicator of how close the application timing demands
are to being violated. (The minimum value in the table is the smallest
value observed during the experiment runs.) The 50 Hz rate group misses
computing deadlines with five of the ten possible phasings (phase i, 2, 3,
7, and 8), which is unacceptable. Examination of the data reveals that the
deadline margin distribution is very close to zero for the five
unacceptable phasings. Furthermore, the data indicated that these cases
correlated with frames having somewhat larger than average 50 Hz computing
demands. (Recall that application computing demands vary from frame to
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Table 4.5.1-1. Experiment 4 Configuration 6 Summary - Flight Control Group
100 Hz
minumum
deadline
margin(ms)
50 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)
25 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)
CP
utilization
Missed 7
deadlines
lOP
utilization
I/0 system
utilizationPhase/ID
o 2.934 7.007 15.538 86% 72% 80% 28%
1 2.704 10.188 72% 93% 28%
10.188
1
10.188
Missed 7
deadlines
I/O network
utilization
ii
Missed 7
deadlines
2.704
86%
86% 72% 88% 28%
i
86% 72% 83% 28%3 2.704
4 3.370 0.319 10.320 86% 75% 78% 28%
ll|l
5 0.508 1.287 10.267 86% 84% 28%
7.848
Missed 7
deadlines
0.653
9
9.896
10.188
10.188
11.529
0.551
0.651
86%
86%
86%
86%1.905
75%
i
75%
75%
72%
73%
Missed 7
deadlines
79%
92%
91%
87%0.625
28%
28%
28%
28%
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frame as the loop duration times are modeled with a normal distribution.)
In the other frames, the 50 Hz rate deadline is being met with a very small
margin, illustrating how sensitive the specific bad relative phasing
situations are.
Of the remaining cases, phase 4 has the largest deadline margin for the
100 Hz rate. However, the 50 Hz rate is very close to missing a deadline.
While this configuration may meet the minimum acceptable requirements, the
other configurations indicate that the overall performance can be improved.
A desirable goal is to improve the minimum deadline margin for the 50 Hz
rate without a significant reduction in the 100 Hz minimum deadline margin.
The best improvement for the least reduction seems to occur with phase 0.
The reduction in minimum deadline margin for the 100 Bz rate is less than
0.5 milliseconds. Additionally, the 50 Hz rate's minimum deadline margin
has increased nearly 7 milliseconds and the 25 Hz rate has increased nearly
5 milliseconds.
The time delay and I/0 Jitter data for the phase 0 case are illustrated in
figure 4.5.1-1. Two spikes, separated by 20 microseconds, are observed in
the i00 Hz jitter. The two peaks are a result of the completion of the
processing related to the unloading of the network interfaces for the 50 Hz
rate in minor frames 1 and 3. This unloading completes nearly at the
beginning of minor frames 2 and 4, causing a double context switch at the
beginning of these frames that slightly delays the execution of the 100 Hz
activity every other frame. However, the resulting 100 Hz rate Jitter is a
fraction of the update period. There is no variation in the start of the
I/O activity from frame to frame for either the 50 Hz or 25 Hz rate groups.
The effect of the jitter at the start of the i00 Hz I/O activity is
observable in the time delay statistics. It should be pointed out that the
DIU response time is modeled as a statistical process that results in some
variation in the I/O completion time and therefore contributes to the time
delay statistics. The first contribution to the I00 Hz time delay is the
variation for the start time of the 100 Hz I/O. The two distinct peaks are
a result of the two distinct starting times for the 100 Hz IlO. The I/O
activity for the 100 Hz rate is composed of eight transactions. Each
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transaction is modeled as a statistical process with uniform distribution
ranging in value between 0 and 10 microseconds. The overall contribution
of these eight sources in the model contributes to the bell-shaped
distribution about the two peaks in the figure. The time delay for the
50 Hz and 25 Hz rates exhibits no unexpected behavior.
The application sequencing for one major frame of the preferred
configuration (phase 0) is illustrated in figure 4.5.1-2. This figure
illustrates how the application activity aligns with the FDIR to provide a
configuration that has better performance than the others evaluated in this
experiment. In phase 0, the FDIR is scheduled to execute 1 millisecond
into the minor frame. This allows a small degree of parallel activity in
our model because the 100 Bz I/O activity can be executing using the IOSs
and DIUs while the FDIR is executing on the lOP.
Engine Control Croup
The workload on the engine control group Is substantially less demanding
than that on the flight control functions. Consequently, the engine
control computer Is able to meet the deadlines of the engine control
functions in all the I/O scheduling and I/O grouping alternatives. Details
for each configuration will be presented in the following paragraphs.
Configuration 14 (On Demand Grouped I/0 Organization). The deadline
margins and utilization values for configuration 14 are illustrated in
table 4.5.1-2. The minimum deadline margin data from this experiment
indicates that all the phasing options have adequate reserve margins.
These values are significantly better than those of the flight control
group, reflecting the difference in the workload demands.
No configuration has clearly superior performance characteristics.
Therefore, the phase 4 case is selected as the preferred configuration
based on the largest minimum deadline margin for all the application rates.
The I/O jitter and time delay characteristics for this configuration are
illustrated in figure 4.5.1-3. The 100 Hz rate exhibits what appear to be
uniformly varying start times over an approximate range of 15 microseconds.
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Table 4.5.1-2. Experiment 4 Configuration 14 Summary
100 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)
50 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)
25 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)Phase/IO
0 5.657 13,598 31.941 51%
i
2
4
6.440
6.440
6.440
7.140
7.140
7.140
7.140
4.540
4.840
6
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14.898
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15.560
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i
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7
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utilization
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This is characteristic of the uniformly distributed models for the response
to an interprocessor event used in the on demand I/O option. This
characteristic is not visible in either the 50 Hz or 25 Hz I/O because the
100 Hz I/O is executing when these requests are made. The time delay data
for the preferred configuration are acceptable.
A timeline of one major frame for the phase 4 case is illustrated in figure
4.5.1-4. Note that the 50 Hz or 25 Hz IlO activity is loaded during the
I0P Idle time before unloading the 100 Hz data during the appropriate minor
frames. This "preloading" does not occur in the preferred flight control
configuration because the FDIR executes during the 100 Hz IOS execution.
The phase 4 case could have problems when future growth is considered. In
this situation, the FDIR executes at the end of every minor frame, after
the completion of all application activity. The simple minimum deadline
margin figure of merit of 7.140 milliseconds may be misleading in this
situation. Because the FDIR executes after the application activity, the
application cannot expand to fill the 7.140 milliseconds without being
preempted by the FDIR. A more sophisticated measure of deadline margin
might be necessary to allow better comparison in such situations.
Configuration 15 (On Demand Separated I/O Organization). The deadline
margins and utilization values for configuration 15 are shown in table
4.5.1-3. No data are available for phases 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 because a
simulation error prevented correct modeling of the overrun policy. The
minimum deadline margins for this configuration are smaller than those from
configuration 14.
The phase 6 case is selected as the preferred configuration based on the
criterion that it maximizes the minimum deadline margin for all application
rates. The jitter characteristics for the input and output I/O activity
and the time delay data are shown in figure 4.5.1-5.
The output jitter histogram for the 100 Hz rate shows two peaks separated
by approximately 3 milliseconds. Unlike previous situations, the variation
is a significant portion of the minor frame period. A closer look at each
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Phase/ID
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deadline
margin(ms)
| =1
Table 4.5.1-3.
50 Hz
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deadline
margin(ms)
i
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Experiment 4 Configuration 15 Summary
25 Hz
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deadline
margin(ms}
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19.867
CP
utilization
i
51%
lOP
utilization
84%
I/O system
utilization
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No data available
i
93%
I/O network
utilization
I i
7%
4 5.146 9.889 29.037 50% 87%o _o
i
5 6.144 11.647 28.612 51°/o 860/0 94% 7%
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7
i
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29.337
i
86%
i
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peak of the i00 Hz output jitter is shown in figure 4.5.1-6. The first
peak reduces to what appears to be a uniform distribution with a range of
16 microseconds. This shape and range are attributed to the system being
idle when this IlO request is made. This situation happens most often in
minor frame 4, when only the 100 Hz process executes. A more detailed
investigation of the second group shows that it is composed of two separate
distributions. One distribution is clustered at 7.600 milliseconds and the
other appears to be uniformly distributed between 7.715 milliseconds and
7.731 milliseconds. The first cluster is associated with IlO requests that
have been preloaded, while the second distribution is associated with I/O
requests that are serviced by an idle I/O system. A tlmeline of the
selected configuration is shown in figure 4.5.1-7.
Configuration 16 (Scheduled Grouped I/O Organization). The deadline
margins and utilization values for configuration 16 are shown in table
4.5.1-4. These values do not differ significantly from the on demand-
grouped IIO configuration. One minor difference is in the minimum deadline
margins for phasing cases 1, 2, and 3. These values are i millisecond or
more larger than the on demand grouped If0 configuration. Thls is because
the start of frame occurs In the IOP instead of the CP. Thls eliminates
the extra overhead step of waking up the CP just to start the IlO activity
in the IOP. The earlier start of the I/O activity causes the I/O
completion poll to be scheduled 1 millisecond earlier in the frame.
The phase 3 case is selected as the preferred configuration because it has
the lowest IO service utilization. The IlO jitter and the tlme delay
characteristics for the phase 3 case are illustrated in figure 4.5.1-8.
The IlO jitter and the time delay histograms reveal nothing unexpected.
The timeline for one major frame of the preferred configuration is
illustrated in figure 4.5.1-9.
Experiment 4 shows that the phasing of the FDIR and the application is
critical, especially in heavily loaded cases. An implementation technique
will be needed to control the relative execution phasing of the FDIR
process and the application. Additionally, the simulation showed that the
185
4O
2O
f 14 16
! i i v v v m |
'_. . _. _._. _.,_ _. _.
100 Hz output JlUer I Minimum wlue Ires11 4.416 J
Maxlmum value (ms)l 7.731 ]
eanvalue (m=)l8.796 1
Standard cleviatJon (ms} 1 1.454 I
100 Hz
2OO
100
100
000000 O0
• _ _
100 Hz 100 Hz
92
: 1
100 Hz
14
u
100 Hz
Figure 4.5.1-6. Detailed View of 100 Hz Output Jitter
186
CP !],,,, Id,,,  Jll, ! p
0 ms 10 ms 20 ms 30 ms 40 ms
Netwod_ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' ' ' _ ' ' I * ' ' ' ' ' _ ' ' I
Legend:
FDIR 100Hz 50Hz 25Hz
Figure 4.5.1-7. Experiment 4 Configuration 15 Phase 6 Case
187
Phase/ID
| i
o
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Table 4.5.1-4. Experiment 4 Configuration 16 Summary
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system loading vas more severe than indicated by the manual estlmates,
vhich could not cover resource contention and neglected task sequencing and
control overhead.
4.5.2 Utilization (Experlnmnt 5)
The utilization of four key resources vas measured during the experiment
4 runs. The resources vere the CP, IOP, I/O system, and the I/O netvork.
In this ray the objectives of experiment 5 vere met vithout making any
dedicated experiment runs. Before discussing the results, some
peculiarities of the I/0 system and the I/0 network utilization parameters
are described in greater detail.
The I/0 system utilization is a measure of the availability of the I/0
system to accommodate additional I/0 demands. The I/O system values can
vary somewhat according to how utilization is accounted for. Some FOIR
application phasings result in scheduling an I/0 completion poll (see
section 4.4.2) at the same time the FDIR is scheduled to execute. Vhen
this happens the FDIR executes in the lOP, because it has higher priority.
The I/0 completion poll processing is delayed until the completion of the
FDIR, vhich results in busy time counted against the I/0 system even though
no I/0 activity is being accomplished. With slightly different phasing
alignments this I/O completion delay does not occur and is not counted as
utilization.
The I/O netvork utilization measures the time that the netvork is dedicated
to performing application I/0. This includes the time from the beginning
of the transmission of the first transaction in the I/0 activity until the
I0S has completed processing the last transaction in the activity. The
IAPSA study results revealed that a small utilization value for the I/0
netvork is not necessarily a good indicator of spare I/0 capacity. This is
because the I/O netvork use is only a small portion of the end-to-end time
requirement for performing an I/0 request. The I/O system utilization
value appears to be a better indicator of the effect of the application
vorkload on the I/0 resources for this implementation.
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Flight Control Group
The utilization of the system elements for configuration 6 is shorn in
table 4.5.1-1. The values are generally high, vith the exception of the
I/0 netvork. The utilization of the CP is 86_. The utilization of the lOP
is betveen 72Z and 75_. The utilization measures for the preferred
candidate (phase O) do not meet the 100_ grovth capability requirement.
Engine Control Croup
Configuration 14 (On I)emand Grouped I/0 Organisation). The utilization
figures are shorn in table 4.5.1-2. Three phasing cases result in the
lovest CP utilization (phase 1, 2, and 3). This is because these phastngs
have one less process svttch per minor frame than all the other phasings.
The IOP utilization ranges from 53g to 38Z. As the scheduled time for FDIR
moves through the minor frame, different sequences of processing occur.
The vide range in I/0 system utilization is attributed to the accounting
method characteristics described previously. That is, if the FDIR
interferes vith the processing for I/O activity, the FDIR processing time
is counted against the I/O system. The I/O netvork utilization is well
vithtn the system capacity limits.
Configuration 15 (On Deland Separated I/O Organization). The data for this
configuration are presented in table 4.5.1-3. The utilization of the CP ts
essentially unchanged from other configurations. Hoverer, the 1UP
utilization has jumped significantly. The cause is the separation of the
I/O activity into tvo activities per rate group per control cycle, b-hen
the I/O is divided into tvo activities per rate group, the overhead
associated vith I/O request execution doubles. This has an adverse effect
on I/0 system utilization resulting in essentially no reserve capacity
remaining in this configuration.
Configuration 16 (Scheduled Grouped I/O Organization). The utilization
values for configuration 16 are shorn in table 4.5.1-4. Because the start
of frame event occurs in the IOP, the CP utilization values are smallor
than in the on demand grouped I/0 configuration (configuration 14).
192
4.5.3 I/O Se..hedultng (Experiment 3)
The purpose of thls experiment is to evaluate the effect of the I/O
scheduling mechanism on the performance of the application during normal
operation. In addition a single representative configuration rill be
selected for the engine and flight control groups to serve as a baseline
for the I/O link fault experiments. No special runs were made to obtain
data for this experiment, all needed information was gathered during
experiment 4 runs.
Flight Control Group
As discussed in section 4.5.1, only the scheduled grouped I/O organization
option (configuration 6) could support the workload of the flight control
group. The resulting performance for the preferred phasing option is
summarized in table 4.5.3-1.
Engine Control Group
The performance of the preferred configurations for the engine control
group from experiment 4 are summarized in table 4.5.3-1. All engine
control configurations appear to have adequate deadline margin. The CP
utilization is satisfactory in all configurations. The IOP utilization is
satisfactory except for the on demand separated I/O option (configuration
15). For experiment 2, a representative single configuration is chosen for
the engine control group. The on demand grouped I/0 option (configuration
G4) is selected as the I/O scheduling mechanism for the engine control
computer.
4.5.4 I/O Link Failure (Experiment 2)
The purpose of experiment 2 is to measure the time needed to successfully
return a faulty network to service. In addition, the experiment evaluates
the effect of the repair processing on application performance. The
out-of-service time measures the time between a network being taken
out-of-service for repair and the time the network manager returns a
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Table 4.5.3-1. Summary I/0 Scheduling
Engine Control Computer
On demand/grouped
On demand/separated
Scheduled/g rouped
100 Hz
Minimum
Deadline
MaJgin(ms)
7.140
6.140
7.440
50 Hz
Minimum
Deadline
Margin (ms)
15.598
11.998
16.115
25 Hz
Minimum
Deadline
Margin (ms)
33.941
29.337
34.492
CP
Utilization
51%
51%
42%
lOP
Utilization
58%
86%
55%
VO
System
Utilization
39%
95%
42%
Flight Control Computer
Scheduled/grouped
100 Hz
Minimum
Deadline
Margin (ms)
2.934
50 Hz
Minimum
Deadline
Margin (ms)
7.007
25 Hz
Minimum
Deadline
Margin (ms)
15.538
CP
Utilization
86%
lOP
Utilization
72%
I/O
System
Utilization
80%
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network to service, b key concern in this experiment is the change in the
application timing characteristics due to the I/O network repair activity.
Second, the out-of-service time must be compared to the 1 second fault
recovery period used in the initial reliability analysis. Experiment 2
faults were inserted at a random tlme relative to the major frame for each
rtm. For each link the experiment was repeated 50 times.
One-Shot Repair Strategy Experiments
Flight Control Group (Configuration 11). The I/0 network out-of-service
time distributions for this experiment are summarized in figure 4.5.4-1.
Two factors drive the resulting distribution. First, the detection of a
fault is dependent on the topology of the network. Second, the detection
of the fault by the application I/O activity is dependent on the time of
application I/O execution. The network topology aspect is illustrated in
figure 4.5.4-2. Network 2 is shown as it is grown at power-up with no
faults. The stars contained in each node indicate the application I/O
activity rate groups that are dependent on the inboard link on that node.
Note that several of the link failures can be detected by communication
faults appearing in more than one application I/O activity. This is
because either the attached DIU or the downstream DIUs are accessed by more
than one application rate group's I/O activity. One example is DIU CP3,
which is accessed by both the 50 Hz rate and the 25 Hz rate I/O activity.
Another example is DIU RR, which is accessed by the 50 Hz rate, while its
downstream node, TER, is accessed by the 100 Hz I/O activity. Therefore,
when the link that connects RR to FC4 fails, either the 100 Hz I/O or the
50 Hz I/O activity will result in communication failures.
There are seven application I/O completion polls per major frame for the
grouped I/O organization configurations. Therefore there are seven
discrete times in a major frame that a fault can be detected. A particular
fault may only be discovered by the 50 Hz I/O activity and thus have only
two opportunities for detection per major frame. A fault that is detected
by both the 100 Hz and the 50 Hz I/O activities has six detection
opportunities per major frame.
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Network repair activity consists of a sequence of processing and I/O
request steps to repair a passive IlO link failure. The network manager is
responsible for implementing the repair strategy. It executes in Idle time
on the lOP since its priority is less than the application IlO activity.
The application activity in the IOP is relatively constant; the idle time
slots therefore align themselves to positions in the major frame. The
repair steps are accomplished during these idle periods. The I/O
completion poll activity that detects the communication fault determines
the initial phasing of the I/O repair activity relative to the major frame.
The initial phasing, coupled with the sequence of idle time slots available
in the IOP control, governs the out-of-servlce time.
The number of distinct out-of-service times depends primarily on the unique
combinations of initial phasings and sequences of lOP idle time.
Variability of lOP processing can also have an effect. A link failure
between node 75 and 76 is only detected by the 100 Hz I/O activity. There
are four unique repair times corresponding to faults detected by 100 Bz I/O
activity. However, there is only one unique time, longer than any of the
100 Hz repair times for link failures detected by the 50 Hz rate. This is
seen in the histogram for link failures between node 71 and node 72 on
sheet 1 of figure 4.5.4-i. There is also a unique repair time, shorter
than any other, for failures detected by the 25 Hz activity.
The llnk failures that are detected by more than one I/O activity result in
out-of-service times that are a combination of the results for the
individual rates. This is observed in the data for link failures between
nodes 71 and 75, which are detected by the 100 Hz and 50 Hz application I/O
activity, and failures between nodes 87 and 86, which are detected by the
50 _z and 25 Hz I/O activity. This discussion illustrates that the results
of the random testing can often be related to the details of system
operation.
A summary of the application performance measures for each link failure
sequence is illustrated in table 4.5.4-i. The CP utilization is not
included in the summary because it is not affected by the network repair
activity. In addition, the I/0 network utilization is not included because
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it Is not affected on the "good" network, while the repair activity has
exclusive use of the failed network. Some significant differences are
observed when comparing table 4.5.4-1 to the normal flight control group
results in table 4.5.3-1. First, the minimum deadline margin of the 50 Hz
rate has been reduced from more than 7 milliseconds to approximately
2.5 mllllseconds. Second, the utilization of the IOP has increased
slightly while the 1/O service utilization has been reduced from 80 percent
to 68 percent.
Figure 4.5.4-3 is a timeline of processes for the CP, IOP, and I/O networks
as they occurred in the 33 repetitions of the experiment simulating a link
failure between nodes 72 and 73. The second major frame shown in the top
part of the figure illustrates the alignment of processes durlng normal
operation. At 67.1 milliseconds the link between nodes 72 and 73 is
failed. This link is used exclusively by the 50 Hz IlO activity. The
failure occurs during the second 50 Hz IlO activity in this major frame but
after the transaction that uses the failed link, so the failure is not
[discovered until the next 50 Bz I/O activity.
The IIO llnk failure is detected in the third major frame illustrated in
the bottom part of the figure. Network 2 is taken out of service when the
50 Bz IIO completion poll processing discovers the communication faults.
The effects of this action are immediately observed in the second minor
frame. The load time for the I/O activity is reduced by 50 percent because
network 2 is out of service. When a network is taken out of service, the
reduction in pre- and post-processing needs in the IOP results in a new
alignment application I/O processing.
As a result of network 2 being taken out of service, the 25 Hz I/O activity
starts on the network earlier. This earlier start has two causes. First,
loading activity for the 25 Bz data rate fits into the new idle time slot
just before the FDIR processing (preloading). Second, the 100 Hz I/O
activity unloading time is reduced.
At approximately 95 milliseconds, the first IOP idle slot occurs and the
repair activity for network 2 starts. The first step in this process is to
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attempt communication with all the nodes in network 2, as seen by the long-
duration I/O activity on the network 2 line.
The reduced minimum deadline margin for the 50 Hz rate group is a result of
the new Idle time slot in the IOP after the completion of the I00 Hz I/0
loading. When this new Idle time slot occurs in the third minor frame, the
50 Hz data loading starts during the gap. The deadline for the 50 Hz rate
group is the start of I/0 data loading. One effect of taking the network
out of service is a forward shift of the 50 Hz computing deadline by
5 milliseconds.
The overall 50 Hz deadline margin effect is a reduction for the one
transition frame when the deadline moves earlier by 5 milliseconds. The
new minimum deadline margin is 2.5 milliseconds for the 50 Hz rate group.
However, because the computing completion immediately moves forward as the
activity in the CP adjusts itself to the new alignment of events in the
IOP, the deadline margin jumps to a larger value for the remainder of the
repair period. Thus the minimum value sample occurs in the transition
frame in all of the failure simulations.
The repair activity in the IOP and on the network continues throughout the
remainder of this major frame and completes in the first minor frame shown
in major frame 4. The last processing element of the repair activity
returns network 2 to service during the execution of the 50 Hz I/0. When
network 2 is returned to service, the processing elements in the I0P
realign to the positions they occupied before the fault. The return of
these processing elements to their former positions triggers a new CP
processing alignment which returns the processing elements to their
positions before the network failure.
Figure 4.5.4-4 illustrates the other two application performance measures
during I/O network repair. Data are presented for all 50 repetitions of
the experiment. The data for both measures include samples when both
networks are in service as well as when only one network is in service.
Some of the I/O jitter samples reflect the earlier start of activity when
only one network is in service. The time delay data include samples from
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the transition frames when a network is taken out of service and is put
back in service. In both situations the relative frame time of the I/0
activity event shifts, resulting in an unusually large or small value for
time delay for the transition frame.
Engine Control Group (Configuration 13). The I/O network out of service
times for this configuration are shown in figure 4.5.4-5. Network 2 is
illustrated in figure 4.5.4-6 as it is grown with no link failures. The
out-of-service times for this configuration are approximately
20 milliseconds with the exception of root link failures which take less
than 10 milliseconds. These times are faster than the flight control
configuration because there is more idle IOP capacity to perform repair
activity.
A summary of the deadline margin and utilization data for each link failure
is shown in table 4.5.4-2. One difference in the data for this
configuration and the flight control computer is that the minimum deadline
margins were not significantly affected by the I/O network repair activity.
When a network is taken out of service, the application processing elements
do not significantly realign. One reason for this is that the processing
demands on the IOP are very light. A timeline of the repair activity from
the 21st repetition of link failure between node 70 and 71 is shown in
figure 4.5.4-7.
The remaining application performance measures
illustrated in figure 4.5.4-8.
during repair are
Regrow Repair Strategy Experiments
The one-shot repair strategy is able to diagnose and repair only a few
active network failures. A check is made to uniquely identify failures
such as an inboard babbling port and to select the proper repair actions.
However, other failures such as an outboard babbling link will have the
same symptoms as a passively failed link. The repair of an outboard
babbler that is diagnosed as a passive link failure changes the babbler's
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orientation to inboard, causing loss of communication with the entire
network. The inability to correctly identify this failure results in
wasted repair actions and prolonged out-of-service times.
This experiment measures the duration of network repair activity when a
full regrow strategy is invoked. This is a reasonable approximation of the
repair time for active failures, because repair sequences that do not show
progress must be abandoned and a more time-consuming regrow action used to
guarantee a working network.
Flight Control Group (Configuration I0). The I/O network out-of-service
times for this experiment are shown in figure 4.5.4-9. The significant
difference between this repair strategy and the one-shot strategy is that
the out-of-service times are substantially larger. The repair times for
this experiment slightly exceed the 1 second value used in the reliability
analysis.
Some application performance measures are summarized in table 4.5.4-3, and
the I/O jitter and time delay data are shown in figure 4.5.4-10. The shift
in performance characteristics during repair is similar to those occurring
in the one-shot experiment. The number of values in the bins corresponding
to ongoing repair are greater because of the long duration of the full
regrow repair.
Engine Control Group (Configuration 12). The out-of-service times for this
experiment are shown in figure 4.5.4-11. The full regrow strategy requires
significantly more time than the one-shot repair strategy for the engine
control group. A summary of the application performance is presented in
table 4.5.4-4. Histograms of the I/O jitter and time delay data are shown
in figure 4.5.4-12.
4.6 Experiment Observations
During performance analysis a sequence of experiments is performed to
evaluate normal and failed operation of a candidate system and to evaluate
critical performance issues. The order of experiments is determined by the
performance analyst and depends on factors such as modeling detail needed
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Table 4.5.4-3. Experiment 2 Configuration 10 Summary
Failed link
28-70
100 Hz
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deadline
margin(ms)
50Hz
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deadline
margin(ms)
I
2.582
25 Hz
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deadline
margin(ms)
lOP
utilization
I/O system
utilization
2.995 11.124 79% 68%
70-71 2.691 2.703 10.914 78% 68%
70-79 2.893 2.584 11.206 78% 68%
70-87 2.928 2.560 11.257 78% 68%
71-72 2.905 2.603 11.328 78% 68%
r
71-75 2.742 2.723 10.887 78% 68%
79-78 2.965 2.342 10.964 78% 68%
i i
79"80 2.868 2.667 11.291 78% 68%
87"83 2.928 2.597 11.571 79% 68%
87"86 2.779 2.561 10.930 78% 68%
ii
72-73 2.977 2.432 11.167 78% 69%
75-74 2.916 2.456 11.103 78% 69%
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100 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)
50 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)
25 Hz
minimum
deadline
margin(ms)
lOP
utilizationFailed link
28-70 7.141 15.598 34.022 59% 39%
70-71 7.040 14.749 33.076 63% 38%
70-72 7.142 15,595 33.989 64% 38%
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for the experiment, how close the candidate is to satisfying the
application requirements, time available to pursue alternate design
options, etc. It is expected that during the evaluation of a candidate,
some performance requirements will not be satisfied and refinements or a
new design vili be needed. Our approach in this situation was to complete
the entire set of experiments and use all results before modifying the
system.
It was obvious at the conclusion of experiment 4 that the candidate
architecture could not meet the growth capability performance requirement.
However, experiment 2 was completed before refining the candidate design to
obtain insight into the candidate's operating characteristics under
failure.
As discussed earlier, one characteristic of the io service model developed
during the performance modeling, is that lover priority IIO data can be
preloaded when higher priority IlO activity is being executed by the IOS.
It is not clear whether the overall effect was beneficial. Additional
complexity in the I/O system service software is required to support this
capability. It was thought that preloading might improve application
performance for heavily loaded configurations such as the flight control
computer.
However, preloading did not occur during normal operation in the selected
flight control configuration. It happened only when a network was taken
out of service for repair. As a result, the deadline margin for the 50 Hz
rate was substantially reduced for one cycle because preloading occurred in
the new Idle time slot before FDIR execution. Here the preloading effect
was negative. Since the interactions can be subtle, there is a definite
benefit to a detailed simulation when considering sequencing and control
alternatives in a candidate architecture.
Preloadlng was used during normal operation of the selected engine control
configuration. However, it was "lightly" loaded and the performance
benefit was minimal.
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The modeled priority scheme for the IO service processing in the IOP may
inhibit better application performance in some configurations. There are
several configurations in experiment 4 in which lower priority output data
was preloaded before execution of a higher priority I/O completion poll,
Since the preloaded I/O request is lower priority, the high-priority I/O
data are unloaded before starting the preloaded I/O request, This occurred
in the engine control group at the 100 Hz I/O completion poll, with a
preloaded 50 Hz I/O request, Since the time to unload the 100 Hz data was
approximately 1.4 milliseconds, the 50 Hz I/O execution was delayed by this
amount,
An alternative policy would be to start the preloaded I/O activity and then
begin to unload the higher priority I/O data. This would delay the
unloading of the I00 Bz data by one task process switch and the time needed
to start IOS execution, but would begin the execution of the 50 Hz I/O
nearly 2 milliseconds earlier. This rule allows additional concurrency and
would significantly improve the 50 Hz rate group deadline margin with
minimal impact on the 100 Hz rate group. This illustrates the benefits of
the performance simulation in that the direct effects and any unintended
side effects on the application of operating rule changes can be determined
easily. Furthermore, the interaction between the application and system
features can be tuned early in the design cycle.
During normal operation, the preemptive priority scheduler proved useful by
ensuring that the processor was allocated to the task with the smallest
execution deadline. Additionally, during I/O network repair the preemptive
priority scheduler allowed the IOP to perform network repair activity when
no application activity was ready. This has the effect of coordinating the
processing associated with the IlO network repair with the application-
related processing on an as-needed basis.
One concern with preemptive priority schedulers that surfaced during the
experiments is that they can introduce variability in the execution of some
10P processes whose effects propagated to other parts of the system. This
occurred during repair in both the flight control computer and the engine
control computer. The variability arose when two processes became ready to
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execute at nearly the same time and caused a double context switch. The
variations did not cause any serious operational anomalies in the
application in the selected flight control configuration or the engine
control configuration. However, it did make the difference between meeting
deadlines and failing in one of the marginally overloaded flight control
configurations. This points out the need to thoroughly evaluate the
interaction of the stochastically varying workload and the specific
scheduler rules in all unusual system operating situations (failure
recovery, temporary overload etc.) to ensure no unexpected side effects.
The results presented in this report present an optimistic picture of the
candidate architecture performance. The system was assumed to operate near
certain hardware limits. When more realistic values for the system
overhead functions are available from proof-of-concept testing, the
performance measures will probably suffer. Furthermore, some key
performance interactions were not modeled in the performance simulation.
These include ic network operation and the operation of the shared bus in
each FTP channel.
The application sends time-critical data across the IC network. One
concern is the ability of the IC network to meet the time-critical end-to-
end data transfer requirements of the application during normal operation.
Since the IC network operates with unsolicited messages, the network must
be periodically polled to determine whether any communication has been
received. This IC communications process executes on the IOP, which is
also responsible for the application I/O operation. Therefore, another
concern is the effect of IC network communications on the application IlO
activity.
For the application to complete its I/O activity and IC activity, it must
transfer data from the cp to the IOP through a shared bus. The shared bus
has two states, locked and unlocked. When the shared bus is locked, access
to other users is blocked. A major concern is whether a lack of
coordination between the system processes in the CP and IOP can lead to
shared bus utilization problems. This is a potential cause of serious
degradation in the application performance.
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5.0 REFINED AECHI_ DESIGN
The candidate system evaluation effort described in section 3 for
reliability and in section 4 for performance demonstrated that the
candidate was not capable of meeting the system requirements. The
predicted safety and mission reliability values exceeded the system
constraints. Furthermore, the predicted timing needs of the major control
functions did not leave adequate growth capability. The flight control
group workload strained the system capacity in both computing and IlO
activity. As a result, the IAPSA II candidate system concept was refined
to improve its performance and reliability.
Three approaches were taken to refine the candidate architecture to better
match the system needs. The first approach was to balance the computing
and I/O workload between the engine and flight control groups. The
preliminary timing estimates showed that the flight control group was
heavily loaded, whereas the opposite was true for the engine control group.
Shifting the system workload from the flight control group to the engine
control groups should reduce the growth constraint problem.
The second approach was to improve the system failure protection. The
reliability results for the candidate architecture show that the dominant
safety failure sequences such as temporary exhaustion of body motion
sensors involved two failures. A goal for the refined configuration, then,
is to maintain flight safety with all two failure sequences. In the
mission reliability area, the candidate architecture suffered from too many
single failure situations. Again, the goal for the refined system is to
maintain full mission capability with all single failures. Steps taken to
achieve these goals will be discussed later in this section.
The final approach for refining the architecture was to reduce the number
of communication elements in the system. Large networks have several
disadvantages when compared to small networks. The preliminary DENET
simulation experiments showed how the size of the individual networks
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dramatically affected the time needed to regrov a network. Another
negative characteristic of large networks is that the probability of
network repair action increases wlth the number of elements. Finally, from
a performance standpoint, when a fixed number of sensors and actuators are
spread across fewer interface devices, the number of transactions needed to
access them is reduced. Because the transaction overhead time is a big
contributor to I/O activity duration, reducing the number will decrease the
I/O workload. In summaryp reducing the number of communication elements
should improve both the performance and reliability aspects of the system
concept.
The resulting refined configuration is shown in figure 5.0-1. The most
significant change is the organization of system components into two major
groups instead of three. This configuration is physically similar to one
of the options considered for the candidate architecture in reference I.
The two engine control groups of the candidate architecture are collapsed
into one. Functions are reallocated to better balance the system. Details
of these and other changes are presented in sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. A
reliability evaluation of this architectural concept is discussed in
section 5.4, and some timing estimates are made in section 5.5.
5.1 Function Allocation Changes
The application computing functions were reallocated because the
performance analysis showed that the flight control site was overloaded
while the engine control sites were underused. This meant splitting the
functions included in the flight control group in a way that did not cause
communication bottlenecks on the system networks. Another consideration
was the redundancy level match between the computing sites. In a system
without function migration, critical functions that must tolerate two
failures to meet reliability requirements must execute on quadruple
redundant sites. Therefore, in order to move any critical functions, the
destination site must be quadruple redundant.
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Consideration must also be given to the awkwardness of adapting the
candidate architecture configuration to a single-engine aircraft. With one
engine, one site is responsible for flight-critical thrust control. Loss
of that site is safety critical. Therefore, the engine control site must
be quadruple redundant.
Rather than change the redundancy level of one of the two engine control
sites, the refined configuration has two quadruple-redundant computing
sites. This means that each site is suitable for safety-critical functions
and that the function reallocation process can be relatively unconstrained.
Furthermore, this new configuration will be more adaptable to a single
engine vehicle.
The first step in changing the computing allocation was to combine the
control for both propulsion systems in site B (fig. 5.0-i). The
preliminary timing estimates indicated that this computing load could be
easily handled by one site. Next the high-workload trajectory-following
function was allocated to site B. This offloaded the application computing
in site A. Since it has a relatively slow update rate, the relative time
delay associated with any data transfer over the IC network is smaller than
for the other flight control functions. Finally, the air data functions
were moved to site B. The inlet control function has always required the
highest update rates for air data; the associated move of the air data
sensors to group B also helped to reduce the congestion on the group A I/O
network. The disadvantage of the move was that it introduced some
additional time delay in the air data for the manual control function. As
a result of these changes, the refined system has more evenly loaded sites.
The configuration and functionality of the candidate propulsion system were
reevaluated during the refined configuration effort. Some changes were
made as a result of this study. The changes ranged from device
nomenclature adjustments to revised ground rules for the mission capability
and safety effects of propulsion subsystem failure conditions. The
following subsection provides a brief overview of the differences in the
refined propulsion system.
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The nomenclature changes for the refined configuration reflect some
mechanization changes assumed for the propulsion control functions. These
changes for the most part had only a minor effect on the system
configuration. The more significant changes were in the analysis of failure
effects on the operational performance of the aircraft.
In the inlet, a forward ramp actuator, an aft ramp actuator, and an inlet
bypass door are controlled instead of the upper ramp, lower ramp, and
bypass ring assumed in the candidate system. The inlet sensors provide
roughly the same measurements as in the candidate system except that the
terminology now refers to forward ramp No. 3 static pressure sensor instead
of duct static pressure sensor. The functionality changes for these
sensors are reflected in the failure analysis results, which is summarized
later.
A different actuation concept assumed for the nozzle devices leads to new
nomenclature. The device that controls engine exit area is now called the
nozzle area actuator instead of the converging nozzle actuator. The
remaining two actuators now control thrust reversing and thrust vectoring
separately instead of jointly. The new devices are the thrust reversing
vane and thrust vectoring flap actuators, replacing the upper and lower
nozzle actuators.
In the candidate system, the fuel flow meter was used along with fuel
metering valve position in a fuel flow model. This model was assumed to
allow perfect identification of all first failures and perfect detection of
all second failures. The flow meter was not used in the refined
configuration propulsion control concept.
The afterburner fuel control mechanization was changed for the refined
configuration. The candidate system concept had a single flow metering
valve that controlled fuel flow to five zones through zone flow control
229
valves. The refined configuration had two metering valves, the afterburner
core and duct metering valves controlling flow to the five afterburner fuel
nozzles. Flow to the different zones was turned on and off in order by
action of an afterburner segment sequence actuator.
5.2 Data Distribution
There are many possible alternatives to the candidate architecture data
distribution approach. These alternatives range from minor changes in the
candidate to entirely different concepts. Only two data distribution
options were looked at in detail during the refinement effort. One of
these incorporated a minimum change to the candidate data distribution
concept, and the other replaced the mesh network with a set of buses. Even
in the bus option the data distribution interface changes were minor. The
candidate system data distribution problems will be discussed before these
options are presented.
The first problem is that the IlO system growth capability for the flight
control group is inadequate. The simplified estimates generated before the
simulation experiments showed that the flight control group was slightly
overloaded, while the engine groups easily satisfied the growth capability
requirement. The more detailed estimates provided by the simulation
experiments showed that the actual growth capability was much worse.
A timeline of the flight control I/O activity showed that there were three
major time users. The biggest time requirement was due to the need to run
the input and much of the output data through the data exchange hardware.
The performance estimate assumed that data would be put through the data
exchange at the hardware speed limit. (Our performance modeling assumes
that the respective system software is extremely efficient.) Successful
data exchange operation is tied intimately to fault-tolerant clock
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operation. It is also used to indicate whether the redundant channels are
in instruction synchronism. For these and other reasons there are physical
and conceptual limits to increasing speed in this area with the current FTP
operating principles.
Bus activity and DIU turnaround time were the next largest time users for
I/O activity. Bus activity refers to the time spent transmitting data on
the bus, and DIU turnaround refers to the time used by the DIU to interpret
incoming bus messages, take appropriate action, and begin the bus response
message. Here again there are limits to the improvements possible. Bus
speed could be increased easily by going to more advanced techniques, but a
"new node hardware concept may be required if virtual bus operation is to be
maintained. Similarly, faster DIU response time requires either more
powerful DIU hardware or a different system operational concept. Current
operating assumptions are that all device activity (reading sensors or
commanding actuators) takes place in response to command messages over the
network from the FTP.
The time spent waiting to begin postprocessing in the IOP after the IOS has
executed the chain of transactions is also a potentially large user of
time. Since the chain execution occurs without 10P involvement, the
mechanism it uses to detect when activity is completed can be important.
The simplified timing estimate assumed that this time was zero, but a
fairly coarse polling policy was modeled in the DENET simulation
experiments, which showed this area to be a potential problem.
The I/0 activity overload problem was addressed by reducing the number of
transactions on the flight control network. The first step, moving the air
data sensors off the flight control network, has already been mentioned.
The next step, consolidating the system DIUs, will have several beneficial
effects. From a performance standpoint, fewer DIUs means that fewer
transactions are needed to communicate with the system sensors and
actuators. The remaining DIUs are connected to more devices. The amount
of data transferred that is directly associated with the devices is not
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changed. However, the data associated with each transaction (transaction
overhead) is reduced. Since this transaction overhead data must go through
the data exchange and be transmitted over the bus, a reduction helps in two
of the big tlme-user categories.
There are reasons other than performance for reducing the number of
communication elements in the system. One disadvantage of large networks
is that there are more elements to fail. A system vlth many elements will
have to undergo repair much more often than a system with only a few
elements. Another disadvantage pointed out by the DENET simulation
experiments is that larger networks have exponentially longer regrow repair
times than smaller networks. The sheer size of the larger network can add
to repair computation complexity and time. For these reasons, reducing
network size provides a benefit in reducing both repair frequency and
repair duration.
The candidate architecture uses two I/O networks per group, vlth the
redundant elements divided between them. Having two networks allows the
application to continue operating while one of the networks is being
repaired. An interesting observation is that as the number of IlO networks
increases the compelling need for reconfiguration decreases.
If all the system devices are located on a single network, communications
must be reestablished very rapidly after network failures with at least a
critical set of the devices. The time allowed to restore communication to
this critical subset is limited by how long the application can be safely
interrupted. For these types of systems, the network reconfiguration
action naturally takes priority over the application computing. If the
network repair can't be accomplished in the allowable safe interruption
time, then a single network is unacceptable. In this situation a single
failure can cause loss of safety.
A system with two networks is different in that a critical subset of
devices is unaffected by the network loss, and therefore the repair time
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deadline is much less constrained. In the candidate system the constraint
is set by the likelihood of nearly coincident faults that jeopardize
safety. The repair action and continued application computing priority
situation is reversed. Because network repair does not have to be
completed to communicate with a critical subset of the sensors and
actuators, it must have lower priority than the application function
required for safe flight. It is allowable for network repair to take
longer than the safe function interruption time. The reversal of priority
means that the repair activity is accomplished in the application Idle
time, which causes its completion to be delayed.
As the number of networks increases, further dividing the redundant system
devices, there is eventually no need for inflight repair. The aircraft can
suffer the loss of an entire set of redundant devices and still meet system
reliability requirements. For this reason only two options for data
distribution were considered in the refined configuration study. These two
options are shown in figure 5.2-I. The natural redundancy in the system
tends to separate the sensors and actuators into four groups. Reliability
concerns will keep redundant electronics elements in separate enclosures.
Figure 5.2-I shows how two sets of quadruple-redundant enclosures would be
connected with the mesh network and the linear bus data distribution
alternatives. The assignment of devices to enclosures is presented in
tables 5.2-1 and 5.2-2. In the mesh network the devices are connected via
two networks, whereas in the bus option they are connected by four linear
buses. The key difference is that the mesh network has spare elements to
allow reconfiguration, whereas the bus does not. These two options are
discussed in more detail in the following sections.
5.2.1 I/O Netvork Option
The mesh network data distribution option is very similar to the candidate
architecture. The key changes are the consolidation of network nodes and
DIUs and the reallocation of system devices. There are still two networks
per major group. Figure 5.2.1-1 shows the layout of one of the group A I/O
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Figure 5.2-1. Mesh Network and Linear Bus Options
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Table 5.2-1. Sensor Actuator Computer Connection--Group A
Node/DIU assignments
Device
Body accelerometers
Body gyros
Pitch stick
Roll stick
Rudder pedal
Flap lever
Pitch trim
Roll trim
Yaw trim
Left canard
Right canard
Nosewheel
Leading edge
L outboard flaperon
R outboard flaperon
L inboard flaperon
R inboard flaperon
L TE flap
R TE flap
L rudder
R rudder
L outboard wing accel
R outboard wing accel
L midwing accel
R midwing accel
L inboard wing accel
R inboard wing accel
FTP channels
(group A)
I I I I
I I I 1
1 I I I
I I I
I I I
I 1 I
I I I
1 1 1 1
Mid
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1
Right wing
1
1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
Left wing
I I
I I
I I
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
Tail
1 1
1 1
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Table 5.2-2. Sensor Actuator Computer Connection--Group B
Dev_e
Angle of attack
Angle of sideslip
Static pressure
Total pressure
Total temperature
Left throttle
Right throttle
Forward ramp
Aft ramp
Inlet bypass door
Forward ramp 3 static pressure
Normal shock totat pressure
Normal shock static pressure
Nozzle area
Thrust reversing vane
Thrust vectoring flap
Fan face static pressure
Fan face temperature
Fan speed
Compressor speed
Burner pressure
Fan turbine inlet temperature
Afterburner pressure
Fan guide vane
Compressor vane
Fuel metering valve
Afterburner core metering valve
Afterburner duct metering valve
Afterburner segment sequencer
Afterburner light off detector
Main fuel shutoff
Air
,1 131,
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
Node/DIU assignments
I I
Inlet
uJmJLaJPa
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
Nozzle
Ell Rll L21R2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
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Abbreviations:
F forwardarea
M midarea
RWrightwing
LW leftwing
T tailarea
Figure 5.2.1-1. Group A I/0 Network Layout
Legend:
-_ Deviceinterface
unit
Node
channel
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networks. Group A has two networks of 10 nodes and DIUs each. This is a
reduction of eight nodes and six DIUs compared to the flight control
network of the candidate architecture. The resulting allocation of devices
to DIUs is shown in the reliability model section. There is one DIU per
network node in the group A networks. There are no dedicated root nodes in
this option; root links are connected to nodes that service DIUs.
The group B I/O network layout is shown in figure 5.2.1-2. Group B also
has two networks, each containing eight nodes and DIUs. Each group B
network is connected to elements on both engines. There is no reduction in
the total number of nodes and DIUs compared to the candidate architecture,
although they are now consolidated into two networks. Devices are
allocated differently than the candidate architecture. The air data
sensors and the throttle command sensors have been moved from the flight
control networks to group B. Like group A, group B has no dedicated root
nodes.
The number of transactions sent over the group A networks has been reduced
due to the consolidation of DIUs. For comparison, the new 100 Bz rate
group has six transactions per network versus the eight transactions of the
candidate architecture. There are six 50 Hz transactions in the refined
design compared to 10 in the candidate architecture. The 25 Hz
transactions have been eliminated. However, the reallocation of devices
and the placement of both engines on the same networks increases the number
of transactions on the group B networks. Group B now has four 100 Hz
transactions, two 50 Hz transactions and four 25 Hz transactions. In the
candidate architecture each engine control rate group had a single
transaction. Thus the relatively overloaded flight control networks have
had a traffic reduction, while the use of the lightly loaded engine
networks has increased. A performance assessment of these changes is
discussed in section 5.5.
One change in the network configuration is due to the dominant reliability
problem found in the candidate architecture. Recall that the layout of the
candidate architecture had each device connected to only one DIU and one
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Abbreviations:
A air data
RI right inlet
RE right engine
RN right nozzle
LI left Inlet
LE left engine
LN left nozzle
Figure 5.2.1-2. Group B I/0 Network Layout
Legend:
'_ Deviceinterface
unit
Q Node
_---_ FTP channel
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node. The reliability evaluation showed that this simple "brlckwalled"
scheme easily satisfied system requirements, with the exception of the body
motion sensors. In the refined I/O network option, the critical body motion
sensors are connected to both group A networks via dual-port DIUs. This is
shown in figure 5.2.1-3. The purpose of this is to ensure that two
failures are required before the system is vulnerable to temporary
exhaustion failures. A critical design requirement generated by the
cross-connection approach in the refined configuration is to ensure that no
single failure in the dual-port DIU can cause simultaneous repair
activities on both networks. Note that the cross connection is only used
for the MID DIUs, where the reliability analysis showed it was required.
There are several system operation alternatives for this cross-connected
configuration. The first alternative is to use the cross-network links
always, transmitting the device data over both networks during normal
operation. This is advantageous because it doesn't require any special
operating modes to avoid temporary exhaustion vulnerability, but it causes
additional transactions on networks that are already heavily loaded.
There are two operational alternatives if the cross-network links are used
only when reacting to a fault. One alternative requires a fast reaction to
a fault, while the other alternative can tolerate a much slower fault
reaction.
The fast reaction alternative would take no action until temporary
exhaustion is imminent. For example, a DIU or node fails followed by a
failure, causing repair on the other network. In the fast reaction
alternative no action is taken until the second failure. The situation
must be recognized by the application and action taken to use the
cross-connection link before a critical time period elapses. Th_ need for
special action must be discerned from the error information provided by the
I/O system services. The special action would consist of (I) selecting
transactions in the existing I/O request that are normally off to
communicate with the devices over the cross-network links, (2) using an
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alternative I/O request for the remaining good network that contains the
additional transactions for cross-network link communication, or (3) making
an additional, emergency I/O request containing only the special
transactions every compute cycle for the duration of the network repair.
Each of these special action alternatives has certain drawbacks with the
current version of I/O system services. It seems prudent, therefore, to
plan an alternative with a non-time-critical fault reaction.
A slow fault reaction strategy only requires the application to recognize
when the system is vulnerable to a subsequent failure causing temporary
exhaustion. This means that the cross-connection links would be used after
the first applicable failure instead of the second. In this case the
action taken by the application Is not time critical. The vulnerable
situation is conveniently indicated when data from only two sensors are
being sent on one of the networks due to previous failures. When the
application detects this vulnerability it can change the I/O traffic
loading via transaction selection to ensure that a subsequent network
repair will not cause temporary exhaustion. Although this action seems
straightforward, the application must react to a large number of possible
situations (some of which cannot be corrected). This solution does require
a substantial new application redundancy management process.
5.2.2 Redundant Bus Option
An alternative data transfer system outlined earlier consists of four non-
reconfigurable linear buses. The number and arrangement of enclosures,
DIUs, and devices is unchanged. All of the redundant devices are divided
evenly across the four buses. Since the bus is not reconflgurable there
are no network nodes in the system. Communication over the bus system is
carried out just at it is over the mesh network. Recall that the mesh
network operates like a virtual bus, with each device receiving all bus
activity at approximately the same time. The same command/response
protocol is assumed for the bus option. The data distribution interface
and the IO system services are therefore assumed to be identical in this
comparison.
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The bus option illustrates the limiting case in which the number of
networks in a system is increased to the point that reconfiguration after
communication faults is not necessary. A major benefit of this step is the
elimination of the complex I/0 redundancy management software. Typically,
validation of large, complex software processes is difficult and costly.
Although this is a problem for the building block system provider to solve,
the application designer must have confidence that validation is
achieveable by the time the system is scheduled for first flight. Because
the bus option does not include any of the network reconfiguration
functionality, it sidesteps any associated validation issue.
To allow a more straightforward comparison between the mesh network and bus
options, some configuration aspects were kept constant in both. Only four
connections to the If0 devices were used in both options. This means that
in the bus option each bus is singly connected to an FTP channel, whereas
the mesh network option uses only one root link per FTP channel. Neither
of these may be acceptable as a final configuration choice, but it keeps
the comparison on more even terms. One implication of the bus option is
that an active DIU failure can lead to the permanent loss of the entire bus
and all connected devices. The normal I/0 network recovery action will
disable the DIU link and restore communications in such a situation on the
mesh network. Special design precautions could be taken to make an active
DIU failure unlikely for the bus option. Because this would result in an
unsymmetrlc comparison, the same DIU design will be assumed for both
options.
5.2.3 Electric Power Distribution
The candidate architecture analysis did not consider the details of the
electrical power distribution. In the refined system study more attention
was paid to the implications of the power distribution connection. The
Fault Tolerant Electric Power (FTEP) system study configuration (reference
3) was used as a baseline for IAPSA If. In that study four distributed
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load centers (ELMC) provided electric power to the critical users. Main
aircraft power buses were connected to the ELMCs, which monitored the
airplane source and switch when necessary. Each load center had an
uninterruptible battery bus for dc users that was tied to one of two
aircraft batteries.
The simplest connection alternative for a system that is primarily
quadruple redundant would have one ELHC source per enclosure. This
alternative was broadly evaluated with satisfactory results in the
candidate architecture reliability study. Each enclosure has a single
local power supply that satisfies the bulk of all enclosure needs. Nith
this single connection organization care must be taken when assigning
electrical connections. All elements that have a dependency relationship
(devices, DIUs, buses, FTP channels) must be connected to the same Ethic
source. This guarantees that when a single source is lost only one level
of redundancy for any device is affected. Otherwise, loss of a single
source could bring down more than one redundant device via a dependency
relationship. For example, a source could affect a DIU (and all attached
devices) on one bus and a device of the same type on another bus.
The single power source alternative presents some special concerns for the
mesh network option that were not evaluated in the candidate architecture
analysis. When one power source fails, one fourth of the nodes fail. As a
consequence, power source loss is another cause of network repair action in
a singly connected system. The most general fix is regrovth of the
network. In a two-network system, regrov must be restricted to a single
network so that the application can continue operation with devices
connected via the other network. Additionally, the power connection layout
must ensure that the half of the network remaining after a power source
loss is a viable configuration, with no isolated nodes.
Rather than accepting single power source losses as a cause of temporary
I/O network failures, the refined design incorporated a dual power
connection scheme. As a minimum, this delays any I/O network effect until
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the second electrical failure. The specific configuration is shown in
figure 5.2.3-1. Two of the four power sources service all of the elements
on a specific network. Each network node is connected to both of the
network power sources. When both network power sources fail, it is
unimportant that the nodes are lost since all serviced devices on that
network are also lost. With this configuration, power source losses are
irrelevant to I/O network operation.
Another power connection concern is surface control. A hard requirement is
that no two failures can cause degraded capability on more than one control
axis. Otherwise this would be a dominant loss-of-safety situation for the
refined configuration. For single power connection configurations this
means that no two BLMC failures can be allowed to cause passive surfaces on
more than one axis. In the baseline power configuration, each surface is
driven by two channels, each of which is powered by a single source. If
symmetrical flaperon pairs are connected identically, six surface types
must tolerate both failure situations with only one surface-type failure.
These are the right canard, right rudder, inboard flaperons, outboard
flaperons, left canard and left rudder. Because there are six possible
combinations of the four power sources taken two at a time, this seems
feasible.
For the bus option the surface connection constraint can be met with no
problems. However, in the mesh network option, the surface control
constraint conflicts with the node power concept developed earlier. The
node power concept basically means that all devices on one network are
powered by the same two sources. Without a special fix, satisfying both
constraints would mean that both actuation channels on some surfaces would
be signaled over the same network. Thus, during temporary network outages
for repair, that surface would switch to a passive operating mode. This
would violate the network connection ground rule established during the
candidate architecture layout. The solution used in the refined
configuration is shown in figure 5.2.3-2. Instead of the single power
source connection, the MID DIU is connected to two power sources.
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Thus in the mesh network option there are several exceptional
characteristics about the MID DIU and its devices. Its network cross
connection and dual power sources are unique. This makes comparison with
the bus option somewhat awkward. However, this comparison would be much
more difficult if cross connection and dual power sources were used for all
enclosures in the mesh network option.
5.3 Actuation Changes
One area of concern in the candidate architecture reliability study was
surface actuation. The problems included two failure situations resulting
in a loss of safety and single failure cases that caused loss of mission
capability. Two major contributors were undetected actuation channel
failures and active DIU failures.
The first contributor, undetected channel faults, was addressed by
increasing the redundancy of the actuator processor and associated position
sensor. The operating concept was changed to require two-processor
agreement to drive the surface. The actuator channel nov relies on
comparison for failure detection rather than the self-test hardware and
software. When the processors disagree, the channel must fail passive.
This additional redundancy leads to fail-operatlonal/fail-off capability
for each surface.
Several candidate configurations were examined to define the
Interconnection of the actuator channels to the IlO network. Concepts
where the actuation was invulnerable to temporary exhaustion and did not
require dedicated cross actuator channel data paths were favored. The
straightforward scheme used in the refined configuration requires that the
concept be protected from active DIU faults.
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The second major factor, active DIU faults, was addressed by changing the
actuator communication concept. In the candidate architecture, the DIU has
the responsibility for ensuring message integrity for its serviced devices.
The postulated active failure mode causes the DIU to continue meeting the
interface protocol while corrupting the commands sent to the actuator. The
change for the refined configuration is the reassignment of responsibility
for ensuring message integrity. The actuator processor now verifies the
message that contains its position command. This end-to-end check
guarantees that a good actuator channel will not use a corrupted command.
This solution has the disadvantage of requiring additional verification
processing in the actuator processor when the actuator position command is
updated. In addition, the DIU must handle the transfer of a larger amount
of data to each actuator interface. It must store the entire command
message upon receipt and then write it to each actuator. Therefore DIU
processing requirements are also increased.
5.4 Reliability Bvaluation
The two data distribution options for the refined configuration, mesh
network and bus, were evaluated to verify that the changes allow the system
to meet its reliability requirements. The reliability measures evaluated
included safe flight and landing, full mission capability, and sustained
operational capabillty. The first two measures were used in the
rellabillty evaluation of the candidate system described in section 4. The
new sustained operational capability measure is described in the following
paragraphs.
The sustained operational capability measure was used to compare the two
options, emphasizing their ability to operate with failures. A key benefit
of reconfigurable systems is their ability to restore operational
performance after failures. The major Air Force emphasis in reliability
and maintainability is operational performance over time. Maintenance
aspects are very important in longer term measures, but they are beyond the
scope of the IAPSA II study. Therefore a measure was needed that did not
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involve maintenance activity. The selected measure was based on a forward
base operating scenario. The scenario involves rapid deployment to a
forward base followed by iuediate initiation of combat operations without
any integrated control system spares. The combat scenario envisioned
relaxed operating rules intended to maximize combat availability.
Sustained operational capability is the probability that an aircraft can
continue to fly combat missions without maintenance on any of the control
system elements. Two conditions were assumed necessary for combat mission
dispatch. First, the system must have full mission capability, and second,
it must be able to absorb one more failure and continue to a safe landing.
The assumed operating rules are subject to discussion. In any case, this
is a somewhat realistic measure of the two systems' abilities to operate
with failures. The duration of this operational scenario is 50 operational
hours. This reflects about a week of intensive operations. The results are
the probability that a specific aircraft would be unable to maintain combat
operations for the 50-hour period because of control system failures.
Some different reliability modeling techniques were used in the refined
system evaluation. The first technique was explicit truncation of the
models at a specified number of failures. Truncation greatly simplifies
the reliability models. The technique is based on the fact that the
dominant system failure sequences involve a small number of element
failures. Contributions to system unreliability from sequences with a
greater number of failures are less likely and therefore not significant.
This allows all system states having a greater number of element failures
to be modeled in an approximate manner. For our study, safety model
truncation at the third failure level captured the dominant system failure
sequences. The mission and sustained capability models were truncated at
the second failure level.
The baseline truncation technique is shown in figure 5.4-1. The technique
is based on the CSDL approach described in reference 4 used for the
Computer Aided Markov Evaluator (CAME) program. The system states are
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categorized by how many failures have occurred in the system and whether
the system is operational or failed. The number of distinct states in each
category rises dramatically with failure level. In the figure 5.4-1
example, the dominant system failure sequences involve three or fewer
element failures.
Model construction is exact up to the third failure level. That is, all
state information and all transition rates are exact for all sequences
leading to the third failure level. The first simplification step is to
aggregate all operational states that have three failures into a single
state. All the state information is lost as a result of this aggregation.
Next a conservative transition to the next failure level is built from the
aggregated operational state. This transition is conservative because it
is larger than the sum of the actual transition rates that it replaces.
The destination of this conservative transition is the upper bound state,
which represents all the system states that have four or more failures.
The upper bound state is conservatively treated as a system failure state
even though it contains many operational states. When evaluated, the upper
bound state provides a conservative estimate of the error introduced by the
truncation technique. Viewed another way, an upper bound on the
probability of system unreliability is provided by the sum of the
probability of the system failure states and the upper bound state. A
lower bound on the system unreliability is provided by the sum of the
system failure states containing three or fewer failed elements.
Further simplifying techniques were used that amounted to modification of
this baseline truncation technique. The justification for these techniques
is that the relative likelihood of certain key system failure sequences is
important to the evaluation of a system's strengths and weaknesses.
Therefore it is not usually necessary to know the specific failure
situation probability with more than one or two digit accuracy. The
resulting simplifying technique ignores some sequences that contribute to
the system's dominant failure situations when they contain more than a
certain number of failures.
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For example, failure of both hydraulic systems causes loss of safety. A
large number of three-failure sequences involve failure of both hydraulic
systems and an unrelated element. Taken together, the probability of all
three-failure sequences is much smaller than the dominant two-failure
sequence. Leaving out the three-fallure sequences introduces only a small
error in the likelihood of the specific sequence, and reduces the system
lower bound for unreliability. The benefit is a much smaller model in
terms of states and transitions.
Another simplifying technique was used with common element failures.
Common elements are those that affect the functional success of many other
system elements. Examples include communication elements, such as nodes
and DIUs, and power sources such as hydraulic systems or ELMCs. From a
reliability modeling standpoint the other elements are dependent on the
common element. The dependency simplifying technique models only the most
damaging transitions. These are the transitions that affect all the
dependent elements. The transitions that are left out of the model are
those that might occur after a previous failure has affected one or more of
the dependent elements.
For example, if a common element affects two sensors, A and B, the most
damaging transition will fail both sensors. If B has previously failed_
however, the subsequent common element failure will only reduce the
redundancy of the A elements. With the above simplifying techniques, the
later transition would not be included in the reliability models. In this
case the destination state of the unmodeled two-failure sequence has the
same capability as the destination state of a much more likely
slngle-failure sequence.
In all cases where this dependency simplifying technique was applied in the
refined configuration evaluation, the unmodeled transitions would have
taken the system into the aggregated operational state. In other words,
none of the unmodeled transitions would have appeared in any of the
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dominant system failure sequences. This technique greatly reduces the
number of transitions that must be modeled. However, the major advantage
is the reduced effort needed to generate ASSIST statements to cover all the
posslble transitions. Effort is still required to derive the correct
ASSIST expression for the remaining transition as a function of system
state. A correct transition rate is needed to ensure that the system
failure rates involving common element failures are correct.
As a final consequence of the dependency simplification, the states
involving unmodeled transitions will not appear in the aggregated
operational state of the baseline truncation model. Ultimately, the
computed probability" of the upper bound state will now be too low. It
should be noted that the upper bound state is also low because of splitting
the system into separate section models. The baseline truncation technique
assumes that all system elements are included in the model. This is not
true in our separate section approach. Other techniques are needed to
estimate a usable probability for the upper bound state. For the refined
configuration study, the lower reliability bound values were used to
evaluate the system.
5.4.1 Critical Assumptions
The system elements in each physical enclosure were treated together for
modellng purposes. This includes the local power supply and
communicatlon-related elements. A separate section model was created for
each type of enclosure. The key system functions performed by the section
model elements are shown in table 5.4.1-1. Three separate versions of the
section models were created for this evaluation. These versions covered
the safety, mission, and sustained operational capability failure
conditions. Additionally, some of the section models had a version for
each of the data distribution options, mesh network or bus.
The refined configuration models treated four new situations that were
different than the candidate architecture. One difference in the mesh
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Table5.4.1-1. Section Modeling AIIocation
Section
Forward
Mid
Tail
Right
wing
System function Loss effect
Pitch command sensing
Roll command sensing
Yaw command sensing
Flap command sensing
FTP A computing
Body rate sensing
Body acceleration sensing
Canard actuation
Leading edge actuation
Nose wheel actuation
Rudder actuation
Flaperon actuation
Trailing edge flap
actuaticn
Outboard wing acceleration
sensing
Mid wing acceleration
sensing
Inboard wing acceleration
sensing
Safety
Safety
Safety
Mission
Safety
Safety
Safety
Sa_ety
Mission
Mission
Safety
Mission
Mission
Mission
Mission
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network option was the likelihood of system failures involving single
network operation. The refined configuration has fewer root links than the
candidate system. Thus the probability of a permanent loss of an entire
network is much higher than it was in the candidate architecture. Once an
entire network becomes inoperative, failure of a critical sensor or a
communication device on the remaining network causes a loss of safety. In
the first case the two remaining sensors disagree, and in the second case
no critical sensors or actuators are accessible during the subsequent
network repair.
All of the elements involved in the single network operation are
conveniently contained in the FORWARD model (table 5.4.1-I). The
connection paths to the network depend on the FTP channels, the Nl/root
links, the root nodes, and the electric power sources. The failure of any
one of these elements will affect one of the connections to the two
networks. Certainly two-failure sequences will therefore eliminate an
entire network. The probability of single-network operation is determined
exclusively with the FORWARD model.
Another new modeling situation was operation of the mesh network system
with MID enclosures cross connected to each network. The purpose of the
cross connection is to allow the skewed sensors to be accessed from the
other network to eliminate vulnerability to temporary exhaustion. It was
assumed that I/O activity was reconfigured by the application immediately
after failures, which made the system vulnerable to temporary exhaustion.
With this kind of fault reaction in operation only a few two-failure
conditions leave the system vulnerable to motion sensor temporary
exhaustion. These situations occur when certain pairs of MID nodes or node
and DIU combinations have failed. The MID section models handle these
situations explicitly.
The mesh network option MID area enclosures are also unique because they
are connected to two electrical power sources. Therefore power source
failures have no effect on MID area devices until both sources for a set of
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DIUs are lost. However, when this happens redundancy is dramatically
reduced. For the mesh network power connection layout, this event
coincides with the loss of a single network. Power source failures leading
to this special situation are the only important ones for the MID devices.
Therefore only electrical failures that fall in this category are modeled.
The final new situation involves changes in the surface actuator
configuration and operation. The additional redundancy and interface
operation changes were intended to produce fail-operatlonal/fail-off
capability for each surface. This means that the controller and
communication device failures cannot affect safety until the fourth failure
level except for temporary exhaustion situations. Similarly, these
failures can't affect mission capability until the second failure level.
The refined configuration modeling effort assumed that this fail-
operational/fail-off capability was perfect and took advantage of model
truncation at the third failure level to greatly simplify the safety
models.
Propulsion system device criticality assumptions were different for the
refined configuration. Some of the differences were due to the
configuration changes between the candidate system and the refined
configuration, while other differences were due to the functionality
changes made during the propulsion system review effort. The following
subsection outlines the major differences.
One change in functionality occurred in inlet sensing. The candidate
evaluation assumed that a loss of inlet sensors reduced performance to the
normal level as defined in section 3. For the refined evaluation, loss of
the sensors degrades supersonic performance somewhat but supersonic
operation is still possible. The assumption is that the system failure
condition resulting from the degraded supersonic performance falls in the
full mission capability category.
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Another change was in the engine sensing area. In the candidate system,
full performance capability was available with four of the five sensor
types. The missing sensor value could be satisfactorily synthesized from
the remaining sensor values. In the refined evaluation, the fan speed, the
burner pressure, and the afterburner pressure are needed to provide normal
performance capability. Compressor speed and fan turbine inlet temperature
provide capability at the full performance level. The analytic redundancy
method is still used for failure detection and identification among the
engine core sensors.
The assumed consequences of guide vane actuation failures were different in
the refined configuration. Loss of fan or compressor guide vane actuation
led to loss of normal capability in the candidate evaluation. The same
situation in the refined evaluation results only in a loss of full
performance capability, which is less serious.
The failure assumptions for the nozzle area control actuator are changed
for the refined evaluation. The candidate evaluation assumption was that
failure resulted in normal capability, but in the refined evaluation
failure reduced performance to the low capability level. Thus, nozzle area
control is more critical in the refined evaluation.
Not all of the changes in the group B section models are due to the
propulsion system reevaluation. In the refined configuration the group B
FTP controls both engines. Failure of three of the four channels therefore
leads to loss of safety. Failure of two of the four channels is a cause
for loss of sustained operational capability. Because it accesses the
safety-critical air data sensors, the group B network is vulnerable to the
single network failure situation. It should be noted that in the refined
evaluation the static and total air pressure sensors were explicitly
modeled as mission critical instead of safety critical.
Another difference in the refined evaluation was that the propulsion
devices and sensors were assumed to be invulnerable to mesh network
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temporary exhaustion. This means that the propulsion system control laws
are mechanized so that commands can be interrupted for short periods. As a
result, loss of commands to the propulsion actuators during network repair
causes at most a slight hesitation in engine acceleration or deceleration.
This is different from the flight control assumption, in which interruption
of control commands to the unstable aircraft causes loss of safety.
5.4.2 Results
The results of the safety model evaluation are summarized in table 5.4.2-1.
The loss of safety probability is dominated by group A device failures.
Elements in group B have a smaller effect on safety. For this reason bus
option versions were not created for several group B safety models.
Nevertheless, the table shows that both refined option configurations meet
the system safety requirement. Failure situations involving rare
mechanical actuator jams and loss of both hydraulic systems are the largest
contributors to unreliability. These results differ from those of the
candidate architecture because of the absence of the special surface
control failure sequences and a large reduction in the likelihood of body
motion sensor temporary exhaustion. This is expected because the changes
to the system are an attempt to alleviate precisely those problems.
For the mesh network option, the two largest contributors to unreliability
are temporary exhaustion failure of the primary surface actuator channels
and loss of FTP channels. (The FTP channel failure sequence has the same
likelihood in both options). Both of these situations involve
three-element failure sequences.
The new single network operation failure situation is not negligible, but
doesn't appear to be a significant problem. As mentioned previously, it
would be very easy to add a few root link connections to improve the
network access redundancy.
network option was to
Nevertheless, the system
requirement.
The main reason for four connections in the
facilitate comparison with the bus option.
as defined easily satisfies the reliability
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The table shows that the bus option is not vulnerable to any of the special
network failure modes such as temporary exhaustion or nearly coincident
sensor-network recovery. On the other hand, certain functional blocks In
the bus option did have higher unreliability due to failure sequences
Involving permanent bus failures. These include the FORWARD area sensors
and the MID area sensors.
The comparison between MID sensors in table 5.4.2-1 is affected by more
than just the central bus failure dependency. The mesh network values are
also better because of the dual power source connection to each DIU and the
cross connection of each DIU to both networks. These special features
further enhance the benefit of the mesh network option compared to the bus
option in the table.
The unreconfigurable bus introduces a new central dependency aspect to the
reliability model. However, note that even though the unreliability of
some functional groups is worse in the bus option, the system requirement
is still easily satisfied. The elements that play a role in the central
bus reliability are the FTP channel, the FTP bus interface, the bus media
(wires, production break connectors, etc.), and the individual DIUs. Of
these elements, the bus media unreliability is insignificant. The key
Individual contributor to central bus failures is the FTP channel. Its
unreliability overshadows the other elements. As mentioned previously,
additional bus interfaces could be added to other FTP channels, just as
additional network interfaces could be added in the mesh network option.
This would greatly reduce the likelihood of central bus failures.
The DIUs or bus interface units (BIU) connect the devices to the central
bus. Without special design features, certain single DIU failures will
bring the entire bus down. An active DIU failure mode was modeled for the
bus option, which causes the loss of all devices connected over that bus.
Because of this hazard, practical bus designs for critical systems have
special design features to make central failures very unlikely. However,
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Table 5.4.2-I. Safety Mode/Results ( x 10 -7), 3-hr Flight
Sequence Two network Four bus
Exhaustion
• Forward sensors
• Mid sensors
• FTP
• Surface jam
• Hydraulic supply
• Air sensors
• Engine-out throttie
• Both engines
• Surface pair safe
Nearly coincident
• Like sensor
• FTP
• Sensor network
• Dual network
Temporary exhaustion
• Forward sensors
• Mid sensors
• Surface controllers
• Air sensors
Single network
0.00034
0.00040
0.034
0.24
0.18
0.0012
0.0072
0.0016
0.00014
0.00027
0.000144
0.0058
0.0034
0.00083
0.00012
0.013
0.0012
0.0112
Total 0.501 *
° Not calculated
0.0032
0.029
0.034
0.24
0.18
Q
t
0.00014
0.00027
0.000144
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this study assumed no special design features in order to simplify the
comparison between the mesh network and bus option. To assess the
resulting hazard, a nominal value of 10 percent active DIU failures was
assumed In the models. A sensitivity study showed that the table 5.4.2-I
results were not significantly affected when the active fault percentage
was varied from 1 percent to 50 percent.
As mentioned earlier, group B elements have a small effect on system
safety. The largest group B contributor is the failure of the FTP. This
three-failure sequence results in a total loss of thrust control. An
interesting failure condition is listed in the table as engine-out -
throttle. This sequence is the shutdown of an engine for some reason
followed by the failure of one of the two remaining throttle position
sensors. The engine-out - throttle situation also results in a loss of
thrust control. It should be noted that the group B network contributes to
the single network failure situation. These kinds of failure conditions
occur when access to an entire network is lost followed by a failure of one
of the safety-critical airflow sensors.
The contribution to loss of safety due to failures in both engines was
estimated by combining the results of several section models. The results
of the separate section models that computed loss of normal performance
capability in one engine were carefully combined to provide this figure.
Correct combination of results was very difficult because much effort was
required to adjust the section model results to cover only mutually
exclusive situations. (Of course, the error introduced by ignoring this
adjustment step turned out to be insignificant.)
The results of the full mission capability evaluation are presented in
table 5.4.2-2. Unlike the loss of safety situation, the mission
unreliability is dominated by the group B elements. Comparison of the mesh
network and bus options shows that the network does better in mission
reliability but that both systems meet the system requirements. A key
assumption in this evaluation is that the mission can be continued after
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Table 5.4.2-2. Mission Model Results (x10 -4), 1-hr Flight
Sequence Two network Four bus
Forward sensing
Mid actuation
Tail actuation
Wing actuation/sensing
Air sensing
Inlet actuation
Nozzle actuation
Engine devices
Electric power supply
Hydraulic power supply
Single network
Central bus failure*
O.00022
0.0009
0.0015
0.0076
0.00016
0.099
0.099
0.205
0.00015
0.00002
0.0015
Total 0.415
0.00059
0.0038
0.0027
0.014
0.00038
0.100
0.100
0.212
0.00002
0.0061
0.4'40
* Includes electric power and FTP channel
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one of the two hydraulic systems fail because all actuators are dual. If
loss of a single hydraulic system is a mission-abort condition, hydraulic
supply failures would dominate the mission criteria.
The predominant mission failures were special single-failure situations
involving the propulsion actuators. Specific causes were control valve
jams and uncovered position sensor and valve drive failures. These
failures prevent device control and result in the loss of full performance
capability for its propulsion system.
A key assumption reflected in these results is that a mission can be
continued after two "safety-critical sensors or two FTP channels are lost.
The system is still able to perform all functions, but, as in the hydraulic
system situation, one more failure causes loss of the aircraft. If these
situations are cause for mission abort, several more two-failure sequences
will contribute to mission unreliability. The central effect of bus
failures is more apparent in this model than in the safety model. Like the
safety evaluation, the special features of the MID configuration make the
network option MID sensors more reliable.
Table 5.4.2-3 summarizes the results of the sustained operational
capability evaluation for the refined configuration options. The network
option also has the advantage in this comparison. The dominant failure
sequence, given the assumed operational rules described in section 5.4.1,
is loss of a single hydraulic system. With only two systems, a second
hydraulic failure causes loss of the aircraft. Therefore the aircraft
requires maintenance before dispatch on another combat mission. This
single failure situation masks somewhat the effects of other system failure
sequences.
The ground rules for dispatch in this sustained capability model make the
safety-critical sensors and FTP channels play a direct role. Unlike the
mission model, failure of either two FTP channels or two safety-critical
sensors is a system failure condition. It should be pointed out that in
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Table 5.4,2-3. Sustained Capability Results (x10"2), 50 hr
Sequence Two network Four bus
Forward sensing
FTP
Mid sensing/actuation
Wing sensing/actuation
Tail actuation
Air sensors
Inlet actuation
Nozzle actuation
Engine devices
Hydraulic power supply
Single network
Central bus failure
(A only)
0.019
0.184
0.022
0.190
0.037
0.033
0.102
0.102
0.304
0.450
0.015
0.053
0.184
0.108
0.350
0.066
NC
NC
NC
NC
0.450
0.024
Total 1.46 NC
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the sustained operational capability results the FTP channel and electric
power failure combinations are listed as FTP failure sequences, whereas in
the mission model they are shown as central bus failures. The central bus
failure entry in the sustained capability table includes all failure
sequences resulting in loss of two buses except for FTP channel and
electric power source combinations.
S_.nsitivity Study
A limited study was performed to assess the sensitivity of the reliability
evaluation results to the model parameters. The dominant failure sequences
in the safety models and the mission models were examined to see how model
parameters such as component failure rates, active failure fractions,
uncovered failure fractions, etc., entered into the system unreliability.
The limited assessment made use of the fact that the group A elements
dominate the safety reliability and that the group B elements are most
important to mission capability.
To judge whether a parameter was critical, its value was increased by an
arbitrary multiple and the section model(s) recalculated to provide the
effect on reliability. If the resulting change in reliability exceeded the
system constraint the parameter was critical. The multiple assigned to the
parameter was based on how well it was known. Parameters such as component
total failure rate were increased by a factor of two. When the parameter
was not as well known, such as an active failure fraction or percentage of
uncovered failures, it was increased by an order of magnitude. Finally,
for certain very unlikely failure modes, such as the probability of rare
mechanical jams, the likelihood was increased by two orders of magnitude.
The intent was to vary the parameters in a way that reflected the amount of
uncertainty in the parameters. If variation in the model parameters causes
a violation of reliability constraints, small variations in better known
values are cause for the same level of concern as larger variations in less
well known values.
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A look at the most likely safety sequences using the above criteria showed
two significant parameters. One was the fraction of surface actuation
failures leading to a Jammed surface. The assumed equivalent nominal
failure rate for this mode corresponds to an extremely improbable event. A
nominal value of one event in lOE+9 hours was used. The sensitivity study
shoved that this value could be increased by only a factor of 3 before the
safety constraint was violated. This margin seems low for such a rarely
occurring parameter.
The other critical parameter for safety was the failure rate of the
hydraulic power system. There are two hydraulic power systems on the
• aircraft. The sensitivity study shoved that the safety constraint was
violated if the failure rate was increased by a factor of 2. The reduced
margin on this parameter would indicate a need for close monitoring of the
development of the system or perhaps alternative design provisions.
An analysis of the most likely mission failure sequences also pointed out
two critical parameters. Both parameters contributed to the propulsion
system single-failure situations. The first parameter was the fraction of
propulsion actuator control valve failures leading to a Jammed valve. Such
a failure caused central redundancy management to safe the actuator. A
nominal value for this failure mode was one event in lOE+6 hours. The
sensitivity study showed that an increase in the value by a factor of 3.5
was enough to violate the mission capability criterion. Again this appears
to be insufficient margin for a parameter that is not well known.
The second critical mission parameter was coverage of the actuator
elements. A nominal coverage value of 0.99 was assumed for the position
sensor and the drive elements. If this value were reduced below 0.95 the
mission capability constraint criterion would be violated. Because this
does not provide an order-of-magnitude margin, this parameter is therefore
critical to the mission success for the refined configuration.
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5.4.3 Transient Threat
The reliability evaluation described to this point deals only with the
effects of permanent faults. Another concern for highly reliable systems
is the effect of transient failures. A transient failure is characterized
by faulty behavior of an element for some finite time followed by
fault-free operation. The effect of a transient may persist after the
fault disappears, for example, in an erroneous data value. For redundant
systems, transients are primarily a redundancy management concern. If the
effect of the transient failure were contained by the redundancy management
process, the ideal action would be to wait for the transient to disappear.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to tell whether a fault is transient or
permanent.
The reaction of a specific redundancy management process to a transient is
design peculiar. A major problem encountered when designing for transients
is characterization of the threat. Because they disappear after a short
time, solid operational data on transient rates and duration are scarce. A
limited, parametric evaluation of the transient threat was performed during
the refined configuration study. A benefit of this kind of transient study
is that it shows the system designer the effectiveness of the redundancy
management processes, including the effect of certain internal process
parameters.
Sensor and actuator redundancy management processes must handle normal
device mismatches to satisfy stringent missed alarm, false alarm, and
failure transient criteria. Complex filtering processes are commonly used
for this purpose. These characteristics make these processes less
vulnerable to transients. On the other hand, the computing redundancy
management requires the redundant channels to maintain strict instruction
synchronism and bit-for-bit output agreement. For this reason computing
transients were modeled in this limited evaluation of the IAPSA II system.
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Since the evaluation revolves around the redundancy management behavior,
some key features of the FTP FDIR process were modeled. These key features
include exact voting of all redundant channel outputs every computing
cycle, maintenance of instruction synchronism in all redundant channels,
and periodic self-tests that ensure that each channel's memory agrees with
the others. A key study assumption is that the transient affects only one
of the redundant channels. If more than one computing channel is affected
by the transient event, it is not possible to prevent errors from
propagating to the rest of the system. The result is catastrophic system
failure.
The transient fault-FDIR interaction model is shown in figure 5.4.3-1. A
state diagram for the system as it responds to the transient event is shown
at the top of the figure. A timeline showing when the FDIR processes take
place during cyclic execution of the application is shown at the bottom of
the figure. The transient event modeled in this study causes an error that
does not disappear by itself. A transient event that changes a memory
value corresponding to a program constant would cause this kind of
behavior.
The model in figure 5.4.3-1 shows three possible transitions after the
transient event occurs. The transition marked "scrub" indicates return to
normal operation, which occurs if the periodic background FDIR process
corrects the error before its use in the system computation. There are two
possible outcomes if the error is used by the computation before this
"memory scrub." One transition models the case in which the affected
channel produces an output that disagrees with the other channels, while
the other transition models a loss of synchronization by the affected
channel. There is a big difference in the effect of these transitions on
the system.
Loss of synchronization is critical for the IAPSA system because of the
intense time-critical workload. The normal FTP FDIR reaction is to
activate a resynchronization process. The resynchronization process brings
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the channels back into instruction synchronism and then aligns all volatile
memory by voting it through the data exchange. This last step guarantees
that the execution state of the channel being promoted is identical to that
of the other channels.
The problem is that memory alignment must be completed before application
execution can resume. Rough calculations indicate that even with very
optimistic assumptions, such as data exchange operation at the hardware
limit and a minimum system RAM implementation, the time required for
channel restart is a major fraction of the IAPSA II minor frame. Thus it
is assumed that channel restart cannot be accomplished in the available
time. Loss of synchronization in a channel is just llke a permanent
channel fault for the rest of the flight. Resynchronization might be
possible using a strategy of terminating the mission-critical functions at
pilot discretion before attempting resynchronization. Sequential restart
of the mission-critlcal functions might then be possible after
resynchronization. This strategy and the resulting reliability trades
between mission capability and safety were not investigated further.
The transient study therefore assumes that the recovery action for a lost
synch fault is to retire the channel. Before recovery, the quad system is
vulnerable to a nearly coincident fault in the same way that a channel is
vulnerable while recovering from a permanent fault. System sensitivity
data were generated using the percentage of faults that cause a loss of
synch as a parameter. The other transient faults were assumed to cause
output disagreement.
The modeled recovery sequence is different for faults that cause output
disagreement. First, the "soft" fault may take longer to diagnose than
loss of synch. During this period before disabling the channel, the system
is vulnerable to another nearly coincident transient or permanent fault.
Once the channel is disabled, the FDIR process periodically checks to see
if the channel is still producing errors. If not, the channel is restored
to operation. In our model the channel is restored once the periodic
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background process has corrected the error, ghen three FTP channels remain
in operation and one of them is waiting for transient restoration, the
system is vulnerable to a transient or permanent fault. This situation,
termed transient exhaustion, results in a disagreement between the two
voting channels. Since FDIR is unable to determine which channel is at
fault, system loss is assumed.
The transient model for the loss of safety failure condition was evaluated
using ASSIST and SURE. The model transitions were all approximated using
exponential distributions. This is a fairly coarse but reasonable
simplification for this sensitivity study. The nominal assumptions for the
transient model are as follows. The mean time between the transient and
the use of the corrupted data in the computation is 5 milliseconds. A
nominal value of 50 percent of transient faults lead to a loss of
synchronization. The ratio of the memory scrub period to the memory use
period was 8. The mean channel recovery time was 20 milliseconds. Note
that with these nominal model parameters, the probability of loss of safety
due to FTP failures is significantly larger than the value shown in figure
5.4.2-1.
The sensitivity to the rate of transient faults is shown in figure 5.4.3-2.
The figure shows that transients having the characteristics of our model
can become the dominating failure sequence if their rate of occurrence is
high. Figure 5.4.3-3 presents the sensitivity of the system to the fraction
of transient faults that cause a channel to go out of synch. Failures that
cause a loss of synch are naturally more critical because the channel is
potentially lost for the remainder of the flight.
The effectiveness of the modeled memory scrub process is shown in
figure 5.4.3-4. This process corrects the faulty data before they are used
in the system computation. The results imply that the process is not very
effective until its cycle rate approaches the cycle rate of the using
process. This is a reasonable result, but the ability to achieve high
background process cycle rates in a reasonably loaded system is highly
questionable.
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274
1E-7
1E-8
1E-9 L I I I I I
0.0156 0.0625 0.25 1.00 4.00 16,0 64.0
Memory use rate scrub rate
Figure 5.4.3-4. Relative Scrub Rate Sensitivity
275
Based on the nominal conditions assumed for the study, figure 5.4.3-5 shows
that the increased likelihood of nearly coincident failures does not
significantly affect overall unreliability until recovery times exceed
about 1 second. (The figure shows the result for soft faults; the data for
loss of synch faults are similar.) It should be noted that these results
assume that the failed channel is not sending bad data on one of the two
networks. The system can tolerate the latter situation for only a few
application cycles.
These parametric results point out the need to characterize the transient
environment and FDIR interaction in the system. Because the transient
environment in flight operation is critical, this characterization will
require inflight measurements on flight-type hardware. The study shows
that certain key parameters dramatically affect system results. These key
parameters values must eventually be measured in the system. With good
environment data, more detailed modeling of the system FDIR processes could
be used to more accurately define the threat. Determination or
verification of the key parameters of the resulting models will be a
difficult task.
5.5 Timing Prediction
In addition to the reliability analysis, a simplified performance estimate
was made for the refined configuration. This estimate allows evaluation of
the success of the changes made to the candidate architecture to improve
growth capability. Ideally, a performance simulation such as that
described in section 4.2 would be conducted for the refined configuration.
However, time did not allow such an effort to be accomplished in this
study.
The timing estimate is dependent on how the application computing and I/0
activity is organized by the designer. Ideally, the application would be
organized to keep the application functions independent. This independence
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eases development and verification effort, especially when the control
functions are separated into less critical and more critical functions.
This independence will, however, cause duplication of some of the
processing when sensors or actuators are shared between functions. For
this reason processes such as sensor redundancy management and computed
state estimates are shared between functions. Preliminary timing estimates
showed that further compromises were needed to meet the heavy loading needs
of the IAPSA II application workload.
Certain ground rules were used to organize the application activity to
minimize the effect of its demanding requirements on the candidate
architecture. First, all the activity with a common execution rate
requirement was grouped together in a rate group. This included both
computing activity and I/O activity. Next the I/O activity for a single
rate group was grouped into a single request containing both the input
commands and output commands for a single cycle. As a result, there was an
end-to-end time delay of approximately one cycle period from sensor read to
actuator write. By comparison, when the I/O activity is organized into
separate input and output requests, the time delay can be less than a cycle
period, but the number of transactions per cycle, and hence I/O loading,
nearly doubles.
A key problem was the limited II0 activity concurrency possible. Once
execution of an IlO request reaches a certain point, it becomes impractical
to suspend it for a higher priority request. Care must therefore be taken
so that a low-priority request does not delay a higher priority request. A
maximum of two IlO requests can be accomplished in each minor frame based
on the preliminary estimates. For this reason, the activity in each minor
frame of application execution was overtly organized so that any requested
IlO activity would complete before the next request by a fast hign-priority
task. This was accomplished by controlling the initial phasing of the
slower rate groups with respect to each other. For example, the medium
rate group was started in minor frame one and repeated every other minor
frame while the slow rate group started in minor frame two and repeated
every fourth minor frame.
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The organization ground rules used for the candidate system were used for
the refined configuration. Although steps were taken to reduce the
application loading, the demands on the system were still large. Key
timing data for this configuration are shown in table 5.5-1. The changes
in this data compared to the candidate architecture are due to fewer DIUs
and the reallocation of computing and I/0 activity between groups. Some
minor changes were assumed in the command and response frame formats to
slightly reduce bus overhead traffic and data exchange loading. On other
hand, the DIU time required for sensor and actuator interface functions was
increased slightly, to more realistic values. The results of these changes
are shown in table 5.5-2.
Comparison of results with those generated manually for the candidate
architecture shows that the changes were successful. For comparison, the
candidate values were 59 percent for computing and 76 percent for I/O
activity. It should be noted that these timing results are based on the
same simplifying assumptions used in the candidate system estimate. Key
assumptions are: (1) no chain completion delay, (2) slower rate processes
can be evenly split into independent separate processes, and (3) growth
capability measures how much the activity can expand uniformly before
timing constraints are violated. Assumption 1 ensures that there is no
time wasted between completion of the I/O activity on the network and the
start of chain postprocessing in the IOP. Assumption 2 ignores the
application-specific problems inherent in dividing up an application
process.
Experience with the DENET simulation showed that the task switching
overhead resulted in a big decrease in growth capability. The timing
estimate produced previously was therefore adjusted in a simple way for the
resulting overhead if the system utilization were increased to nearly 100
percent. This included an estimate of the effect of the task switches in
the CP and the IOP that would occur in a system that was nearly fully
loaded. The results shown in parentheses in table 5.5-2 were obtained when
a fixed time of 0.3 milliseconds was allowed for this task switching.
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Table 5.5- I. Refined Configuration 77ming Data
Group Rate, Hz
100.0
50.0
12.5
100.0
50.0
25.0
No. of
transactions
6
6
w
4
2
4
Computing time,
p.sec
99O
4,7931
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1,050
94
9,687 2
Organization ground rules like reference configuration
1
Manual control fully active
2 Trajectory following active
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6.0 SN£LL-SC&LE SYSTENTEST_
This section outlines the objectives and presents experiment definitions
for the small-scale system testing effort. The small-scale system embodies
key features of the IAPSA II design that will be evaluated In a limited
experimentation effort. The limited effort will explore a set of critical
aspects of the IAPSA II reference configuration architecture.
The small-scale system consists of a triple-channel FTP interfacing with a
local I/O network made up of two subnetworks. Experimental data will be
obtained for two purposes. First, certain performance estimates obtained
during the detailed design effort will be verified. Performance simulation
results will be directly compared with applicable measurements made on the
small-scale system. Second, certain timing characteristics critical to
successful operation in normal and faulted situations will be measured
experimentally. A limitation of this small-scale system, of course, is
that system level interactions (e.g., communication between the flight
control group and the engine groups) cannot be tested.
The small-scale system effort is feasible because of the availability of
fault-tolerant processors (FTP), network nodes, and interconnecting links
in the hardware area as well as system services packages in the software
area. A goal of this effort Is to ensure that validation issues defined in
the design/validation concept report and uncovered during the detailed
design effort are evaluated fully.
The rest of this section contains a discussion of the small-scale system
testing objectives, followed by a definition of experiments. The test
configurations are described along with the test control strategy. The
section concludes with a description of the data collection and analysis
approach.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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6.1 Testing Objectives
The general objective of this testing is to characterize the timing
performance of the small-scale system under normal and faulted conditions.
The resulting performance measurements, together with low-level time
elements measured by the building block developer, will allow evaluation of
the performance capability of the IAPSA II reference configuration.
Application computing and I/0 activity workload simulation is used to
evaluate the small-scale system. Preliminary workload estimates developed
during the performance modeling effort are used in conjunction with the
selected sequencing and control mechanisms to define a suitable application
workload simulation for the small-scale system.
The simulated workload approach requires only a representative test system
I/0 environment. This means that the test facility need not perform a
high-fidelity aircraft or engine simulation to support the experiments
envisioned for the small-scale system. This greatly reduces the test
facility requirements.
The experimental objectives fall into two major categories. The first
category covers measurements dealing with the performance of key system
services operations; the second category measures the overall performance
of the application. The detailed objectives of the experiments are
presented in the following subsections.
6.1.1 System Timing Characterization - Normal Conditions
The timing characteristics of the small-scale system will be measured while
it executes the defined application workload. The application workload
corresponding to the flight control configuration of the IAPSA II reference
configuration is used to characterize key system timing behavior.
Input/Output Request Timing. The time needed to execute the application
I/O activity is a key component of a control cycle. The performance model
estimates may have been optimistic because they were based on operation
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near the hardware limit. The small-scale system measurements will provide a
more realistic end-to-end time for this activity. One measurement will
determine the total time required to perform the I/O activity. Time is
measured from the beginning of the system call that starts the I/O activity
until the data is available. This measures all intervening system overhead
processing time.
Another set of measurements will capture the system overhead time needed to
transfer output data in preparation for an I/O request or to transfer input
data obtained as a result of an I/O request. These timing elements were
not included in the performance model. Time is measured from the beginning
of the system calls that starts the data transfer until the system function
is complete and the data is available. The amount of data transferred by
these calls will correspond to the reference configuration flight control
I/O traffic.
Control Cycle Overhead. The total end-to-end system processing time needed
to support the cyclic application execution will be measured. The
measurement will be made in a controlled execution environment to determine
allowable frame rates for slow-time testing. The key service operations
are processing of I/O requests, scheduling and dispatch actions, and fast
FDIR processing. The I/O request time components discussed previously are
contained in this time. I/O processing will be measured in two situations:
(1) when the application does no detailed error checking and (2) when the
application checks the error status of every transaction.
Laboratory Environment Errors. The objective is to characterize the
small-scale system testing environment in terms of its potential for
naturally occurring errors. If the background environment causes errors in
data transferred or voted via the data exchange, system FDIR actions will
result. Similarly, naturally occurring errors due to noise, and so forth,
in data transferred over the I/O network will cause I/O network manager
actions. Unless errors of both types are very rare, they will interfere
with small-scale system testing. These measurements will characterize only
the normal execution environment in the laboratory. The critical issue of
naturally occurring errors or transients in the flight environment can only
be addressed by flight testing.
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6.1.2 System Timin E Characterization - Fault Conditions
Input/Output Network Faults. The time to recover from a fault on the I/0
network will be measured from fault insertion until the network is back in
service. While the network is being repaired, the application does not
have access to half of the reference configuration sensors and actuators.
In addition to the passive link failures run during the simulation model
experiments, active link failures and active and passive node failures will
be investigated. In addition, the AIPS network repair strategy has been
further defined since the simulation experiments were defined. As a
result, the small-scale system will incorporate a sophisticated repair
strateR_ that combines some of the aspects of the strategies modeled in the
simulation experiments. The network growth time predicted by the
performance model will be compared to the small-scale system results
allowing for improvements due to the more sophisticated strategy.
Fault-Tolerant Processor Faults. The recovery time from FTP faults is
measured from fault insertion to reconfiguration completion. Rapid
reconfiguration is important for two reasons. First, an FTP is vulnerable
to a nearly coincident fault on another channel during an FTP channel
failure-recovery period. In this situation, a failure that would otherwise
result in a fully operational system leads to system failure. This special
vulnerability to subsequent faults disappears after reconfiguration.
Second, certain pathological channel failures can cause erroneous data to
be sent over a network. In the IAPSA II design, the result is that all
actuators will "freeze" near the last commanded position. It is therefore
important for the FDIR to disable a faulty channel's outputs as soon as
possible. A small set of FTP failures will be used to exercise this
process.
6.1.3 Application Timing Characteristics - Normal Conditions
The key application timing requirements will be assessed using the
small-scale system executing the application workload simulation. The
three normal measurement categories are execution variability, time delay,
and deadline margin.
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Execution Variability. These execution variability measurements
characterize the frame-to-frame regularity of key computing and I/O
activity events. This will permit evaluation of the regular timing
performance of the system scheduling and dispatch functions and the I/O
system services processes.
Time Delay. Time delay measurements characterize the key application
end-to-end timing performance. The performance of each major application
function is affected by the overall time delay involved in one control
cycle. Times representative of the sensor read and actuator write events
at the device interface unit (DIU) will be recorded for each of the
different application rate groups.
Deadline Margin. The deadline margin data indicate how well the system is
keeping up with the periodic demands of the different application rate
groups. The deadline is the latest time that the activity in one control
cycle can complete and still satisfy the control cycle timing requirement.
The time from the end of control cycle activity in one frame to the start
of control cycle activity in the next frame marking the deadline will be
measured.
6.1.4 Application Timing Characteristics - Input/Output Network Fault
Conditions
The application timing measurements previously described will be made in
the simulated failure experiments to see if the additional demands made on
the system due to fault recovery adversely affect the continued application
execution. The I/O network faults to be simulated in this testing are
defined in section 6.4. The number of control cycles that the application
processes must operate without access to the full complement of sensors and
actuators will be recorded. Each application frame without full data due
to repair actions will be marked.
Transaction Selection (Optional). This significant action eliminates any
vulnerability to the temporary exhaustion system failure condition.
Temporary exhaustion described in section 3 was the critical failure
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condition for the reference configuration. The refined configuration
strategy for dealing with this threat requires the application to first
determine that this special action is needed. Next, the application must
make the appropriate transaction select and transaction deselect system
calls to eliminate the vulnerability. The time from the simulated fault
until execution of the reconfigured chain is the important parameter in
this action.
6.1.5 Application Timing Characteristics - Fault-Tolerant Processor
Fault Conditions
The application timing measurements described in section 6.1.3 will be made
in the simulated failure experiments to see if the demands made on the
system to handle faults adversely affect the continued application
execution. In addition, the system is vulnerable if a faulty channel can
send incorrect output commands over an I/O network. This measurement will
determine how long it takes the system to disable a faulty channel's
outputs. This will verify a key assumption that a bad channel is disabled
and communication responsibility is transferred to a good channel within a
few application cycles.
6.2 Experiment Descriptions
This section contains general descriptions of the small-scale system
experiments. It should be noted that the experiment numbering begins with
I0 to differentiate from the DENET experiments. Two different application
organization options will be used in the testing; on-demand I/0 and
periodic I/O. These options refer to how the application control cycle is
scheduled and organized. The periodic option starts the I/O requests each
period using the IO service timing function in the IOP. The application
computing executes when the I/O request completion is signalled.
The on-demand option starts the application computing cycles using the
system services timing function in the CP. Input/output requests are
executed when explicitly directed at the completion of the application
computing activity. It should be noted that this organization is different
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from the on-demand option modeled in the simulation because the I/O
activity occurs at the end of the computing instead of at the beginning.
Additionally, there is only one cross processor (IOP - CP) event per
control cycle instead of the two in the simulation model version. The
simulation version effectively minimized the I/O activity jitter at the
expense of additional overhead processing.
Experiment 10: Fault-Tolerant Processor Execution Environment
Characterization. A special version of the pseudoapplication program will
be run in a controlled environment to measure the time required by some key
operations. A single application task will be executing in the FTP with no
I/0 activity. The key process to be timed rill be executed a large number
of times. Processes to be measured in this experiment include (I) the read
and assign real-time clock value, (2) the background self-test FDIR, and
(3) the application workload loop. The first measurement will characterize
the overall impact o£ making timing measurements from the psuedoappllcation
program. The second set of measurements vlll enable an assessment of the
effectiveness of the background FDIR process. This is because the
effectiveness is dependent on how often it executes. The final set of
measurements are needed to tailor the timing needs of the psuedoapplication
so that the desired timing load can be simulated in the small-scale system.
Experiment Ii: System Overhead Characterization. A special version of the
pseudoapplication program rill be used to time the end-to-end system
overhead requirements. The total overhead for each applicatlon rate group
rill be stimulated in a controlled execution environment. A special test
executive will control the execution of each application rate group
activity to produce a sequence identical to that of an ideal major frame
resulting from an on-demand scenario.
The special executive will wait for the I/O request completion flag to
measure the time needed to complete the I/O activity before scheduling the
next rate group. The experiment will be run for a large number of major
frames to ensure adequate overhead assessment. The test will be run with
and without error checking of each application transaction to determine the
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limits of its effect. The sequence will be run with and without the
tlme-critical FDIR process to measure the additional overhead.
Experiment C/P lOP FDIR Phasing Investigation. In this experiment, a
limited set of computational processor (CP) and I/0 processor (IOP) FDIR
phasing combinations will be run to assess the effect on key application
timing parameters. The set of combinations will be run for each
application scheduling option. This will be an all-up run with full
operation of all system service processes and pseudoapplication processes
except for the background FDIR self-test. Cyclic execution of application
rate groups will be controlled by the defined system timing functions. The
computing workload and the application group execution rates will be
adjusted to produce a slow-time scenario for this test.
Experiment 13: Input/Output Network Faults. In this experiment, link
faults will be inserted to simulate certain network element faults. After
a few major frames of normal operation, a fault will be inserted at the
desired network location at a predefined point in the test. Traffic on the
good network and the faulty network will be monitored to evaluate the
effect of the network repair activity. The FTP system services logs will
be consulted to correlate the time of failure detection and return of the
network to service. A passive failure mode and a special active failure
mode will be simulated for both links and network nodes.
Experiment 14: Fault-Tolerant Processor Faults. At a predefined point in
the test, the pseudoapplication program will perform special operations to
cause faulty behavior in one FTF chan_el. Faults that result in output
miscompares and faults that cause a channel to lose synchronization will be
simulated. Network traffic and pseudoapplication task timing will be
monitored for anomalous behavior during the failure recovery. Faults will
be simulated in a channel driving a network and in a channel not driving a
network. The system services logs will be consulted to correlate the time
of failure detection and recovery to duplex operation. Power failure
faults for a channel will be simulated using hardware methods and will be
accomplished in a manner similar to the I/0 network faults.
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Experiment 15: Transaction Selection (Optional). This experiment will
simulate a transaction selection scenario. It will cover the end-to-end
application process from detection of the problem to reconfiguration of the
application chains. A special version of the psuedoapplication program
will contain code for the communications check and the fault-reaction
process that selects and deselects transactions. This experiment wlll also
use special chain definitions with an additional transaction that will be
initially deselected. A fault will be simulated in the appropriate DIU
link and the time of first execution of the reconfigured chains noted.
After reconfiguration, the chains on one network will execute with one less
transaction due to deselection, while the chains on the other network will
run one extra transaction due to selection.
The detailed experiment needs will be defined in detailed test plans (DTP)
before running any experiments. These DTPs will guide the actual execution
of the experiments on the test facility. The DTP must describe the test
sequence of events, the data configuration for the experiment, and the
schedule for data acquisition by the test facility. Data acquisition
includes the identification of parameters to be monitored and the
applicable frequency and simulation time spans for data collection.
6.3 gxperi.mnt Test Configurations
The test configuration for the small-scale system experiments is shown in
figure 6.3-1. This section describes the hardware and software elements of
the test configuration organized into two categories, the system under test
(SUT) and the test facility. The system-under-test elements represent
components that ultimately are part of the flight system. Test facility
elements are the hardware and software elements that enable the SUT
operation to be simulated in the laboratory and that provide the
development and analysis capabilities necessary to support testing.
6.3.1 System Under Test Elements
Fault-Tolerant Processor. The FTP is an AIPS triplex general purpose
computer (GPC). The FTP version used in the small-scale system testing
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uses two Motorola 68010 microprocessors running at 8 MHz. One is used as
an IOP while the other is used as a CP. The CP is primarily used for
application software execution. Each FTP channel has a shared bus, a data
exchange interface, an interstage, and IlO network interface hardware.
Operation of the FTP during experiment activities is controlled via the FTP
test port that interfaces with the _icroVAX experiment host.
Fault-Tolerant Processor Operational Test Program. The fault-tolerant
processor test program (FTPOTP) consists of two major elements, the
pseudoapplication software and the AIPS system software. The
pseudoapplicatlon software has the responsibility for providing a
computational and I/O activity workload simulation, collecting data in the
FTP execution environment, and implementing the FTP test control function
during the experiment runs. The system services building block elements
are linked with the pseudoapplication elements to form the loadable FTPOTP.
Advanced Information Processing System Input/Output Network. Two advanced
information processing system (AIPS) serial I/O networks are used to
provide communications between an FTP and the sensors and actuators. The
network is composed of prototype reconflgurable nodes and pairs of data
links that support full duplex communications. The communications elements
uses a modified BDLC protocol. The small scale system is configured to
model the flight control group of the IAPSA II reference configuration.
Network i is fully configured with all the nodes and simulated DIUs that
would be used in the reference flight control configuration. All I/O
network faults will be simulated on Network I. Network 2 is simulated with
two nodes interfacing with a full complement of DIU simulators. During
operation, it behaves just like a fully configured network supporting the
full I/0 traffic load.
6.3.2 Test Facility Elements
The test facility must be able to establish the test conditions in the
system-under-test elements to provide a representative I/O environment to
the small-scale system during exp,_.rimen_ runs and to collect experiment
data from the system during the tests. In addition to these runtlme
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activities, the test facility must support downloading of software into the
system under test, debugging of the experimental setup, and analysis of the
experimental data.
Simulation Host. The simulation host is a VMEbus-based system containing a
16.7 MHz 68020 CPU (referred to as the VME simulation computer), 16 MB of
RAM for dat_l storage, several intelligent serial I/O interface boards
(referred to as VME DIU simulators), custom I/O network interface boards, a
parallel I/O interface board for communications, and a fault insertion
panel. During experiment runs, the simulation host is responsible for: (1)
maintaining an experiment time reference, (2) providing a real-time DIU
simulation capability, (3) controlling I/O network fault injection
hardware, and (4) collecting data from I/O network activity.
VME Operational Test Progral. A VME operational test program (VMWOTP)
running on the VME simulation computer handles the test setup,
initialization, test control, and runtime data collection functions for the
simulation host. The VMEOTP fault control function commands the state of
the I/O network fault insertion panel during experiment runs in accordance
with a predefined fault script. This capability allows a wide range of
network faults to be simulated. In cooperation with the DIU simulators, it
manages the temporary storage of the I/O network activity data collected
during experiment runs. Finally, in its test control function role, it
coordinates the start of the experiment run with the FTP and the orderly
termination of the experiment with _:he other simulation host elements.
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Device Interface Unit Simulator Operational Test Program. In an actual
system, DIUs connected to the I/O network provide an interface between
application software executing in an FTP and the aircraft sensors and
actuators. The small-scale system uses DIU simulators to support the I/O
network transaction load representative of an actual system. The
transactions contain dummy data u_;ed for test purposes and do not have
values representative of actual se_,sors or actuators. The DIU simulator
operational test program (DIUOTP) :_s responsible for initializing the DIU
simulator hardware, checking the command frames received, collecting data
about each command frame, generating any necessary response frames, and
starting and stopping DIU operation during experiments.
MieroVAX Rxperimt Host. The HicroVAX experiment host computer controls
the FTP using the VAX resident FTP interface program (VRIP) and the FTP
resident AIPSDEBUG program. During experiment operations, the experiment
host is responsible for (I) download of the FTP operational test program
before experiment runs, (2) setup of the run peculiar data configuration in
the FTP before experiment runs, and (3) start of the experiment run. The
experiment host is also responsible for upload and temporary storage of the
raw data collected in the simulation host and the FTP after experiment run
termination.
The experiment host is also used to develop, compile, and link the FTP
operational test program. The host contains the AIPS system services
software library. When the pseudoappllcation software is ready, this
machine compiles and links the loadable FTP operational test program. The
microvax experiment host converts the raw experiment data from the VME
simulation host and the FTP to a common data analysis format. It supports
data analysis and the archiving of processed experiment data. The MicroVAX
II stores the VMEOTP and the DIUOTPs and downloads them to the VME
simulation computer and the VME DIU simulators before running the
experiments.
V&Xstatlon Development Host. The VAgstatlon 2000 is used to develop the
software and firmware targeted for the VME simulation host elements. This
includes the VMEOTP and the DIUOTPS. The software elements are transferred
to the experiment host for downloading into the simulation computer.
Laboratory Communication Links (Non-Runtime)
An Ethernet link provides a connection between the MicroVAX experiment host
and the VAXstation development host. The link will be used to transfer
developed VME operational test programs during software development.
A custom link is used to connect the FTP test port and the test port
controller in the MicroVAX experiment host. This link is used to download
the FTP operational test program before experiment runs, to start the
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operational test program in the FTP, and to upload raw experiment data
after experiment runs.
A custom parallel interface connects the experiment host and the simulation
host. It is used to download programs to the simulation host and to upload
raw data after experiment runs.
Test Control Links. Three discrete links connect the FTP and the
simulation host. Two links are used to coordinate the two main simulation
elements at the start of the experiment run. The links also allow the time
references in the simulation host to be synchronized at the start of the
experiment in the FTP. A test clock link is used to distribute a common
time reference between the FTP and the simulation host elements.
Experiment Peculiar Configurations. Most of the significant differences
between the element configurations used for each experiment are in the
operational test programs in the FTP and the VMEbus simulation computer.
These differences are due to the different fault simulation needs, data
collection needs, and simulated computing workload needs between the
experiments. An exception is that only the FTP and the MicroVAX experiment
host hardware elements are needed in experiment I0. The hardware
configuration for the rest of the experiments is very similar.
6.4 Fault Insertion
The performance measurement under fault conditions is a key part of the
small-scale system testing. Active and passive failures will be simulated
in the following I/O network elements: (i) network links, (2) network
nodes, (3) root links, and (4) DIU links. Passive faults will be simulated
by a stuck logic 0 signal on the links while active faults will be
simulated by a stuck logic 1 signal on the link. A node failure will be
simulated by inserting the respective fault on all active node links
simultaneously. Faults will also be simulated on the FTP. Special code in
the FTPOTP will be used to force a CP channel out of sync or an lOP channel
out of sync. Another version will be used to cause CP channel output
disagreement. A final FTP channel failure will be loss of channel power.
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6.4.1 General
The key elements involved in fault insertion are the I/O network link fault
insertion panel, the VME operational test program, and the FTP operational
test program. Patch cables to the I/O network link fault insertion panel
provide the capability of inserting stuck logic 0 or stuck logic 1 signals
into an I/O network link. The simulation host controls the introduction of
I/0 network faults via the I/O network fault insertion panel. The VME
operational test program commands the fault insertion panel to initiate or
terminate fault behavior.
FTP fault behavior is simulated in the FTP under control of the FTP
operational test program. At the appropriate time in an experiment,
special failure simulation code is used to cause the appropriate fault
reaction from the AIPS FDIR process.
6.4.2 Experiment-Peculiar Strategy
Input/Output Network Faults. To set up an experiment 13 run, the specific
links to be failed must be physically routed through the I/O network fault
insertion panel hardware. The test system hardware and software must be
set up in accordance with the fault script defined in the detailed test
plan. This fault script defines the specific fault occurrence time, fault
type, and fault insertion channel configuration used for the test.
Before an experiment 13 run, a fault setup subprogram running on the VME
CPU in the simulation host sets up the fault insertion hardware. At the
appropriate time during the experiment start, the fault insertion
subprogram sends the appropriate control word to the I/O network fault
insertion panel hardware. At the conclusion of the experiment run, the
fault insertion panel is reset to its unfaulted state.
Fault-Tolerant Processor Faults. To set up most experiment 14 runs, a
specific fault scenario must be defined to the FTP operational test program
as defined in the fault script. The pseudoapplication program will
incorporate a high priority one-shot task (higher than all tasks except
897
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FDIR) that will be scheduled to execute at the defined fault occurrence
time. The fault control task will execute special code designed to cause
the specific fault behavior to occur. This method will be used for the
loss of synchronization and output disagreement faults. The power fail
fault will be accomplished using special hardware connected to the fault
insertion panel. Power fail simulations will be setup and controlled in a
similar manner to the I/O network faults previously described.
6.5 Test Control Strategy
The experiment run is coordinated via two test control discretes used to
synchronize the experiment in the FTP and the simulation host. While
either machine is being set up for a run, the sync discretes are set to the
STOP state. When the simulation host has been set up for an experiment and
the run time software has been started, the VME sync discrete is set to the
RUN state. The simulation host then waits for the FTP test control
discrete to change to the RUN state.
When all associated equipment is ready for experiment operation, the FTP
operational test program is started via the VRIP interface. On completion
of initialization, the FTP samples the VME sync discrete. If the input
line is in the RUN state, the test control function in the FTPOTP schedules
the application tasks and starts cyclic operation. At the appropriate
time, it changes the FTP sync discrete to the RUN state.
All time reference clocks in the simulation host begin counting when the
FTP sync discrete goes to the RUN state. On completion of an experiment
run, the FTP sets the FTP sync discrete to STOP. The simulation host
responds by terminating data collection, recording experiment ending time
and changing the state of the VME sync discrete to STOP. Both computers
are then free to transfer experiment raw data and set up for the next
experiment.
The real-time clock in the FTP, the VME simulation computer time reference
clock, and the VME DIU simulator time-reference clocks are synchronized at
the start of an experiment. A common test clock with a 4.125 microsecond
period drives all of the time reference elements in the system.
6.6 Data Collection and Analysis
The DIU simulator collects data about the I/0 network transactions in real
time. The raw data consists of information about all command frames sent
by the FTP and processed by each DIU simulator. The information includes
command frame error status information such as HDLC error, sumcheck error,
etc. In addition to the error status information, the collected
information includes an identifier, transmitted frame count, and the time
of DIU simulator processing.
Data regarding FTP operation are collected during experiment runs by the
pseudoapplicatlon program and stored in CP and IOP local memory. After run
completion, data are extracted from the FTP using the FTP test port
interface and VRIP/AIPSDEBUG software and stored in raw data files on the
MicroVAX experiment host. Data collected by the pseudoapplicatlon includes
the real time clock value at significant application events, indicators for
certain I/O system and FTP errors, and the background program workload
count at the beginning of each minor frame.
In addition to the data visible to the pseudoapplication, system services
data are necessary to fully document some experiment runs. This
information is recorded by system services in special logs that can be
accessed via CRTs connected directly to the FTP coprocessors. The
significant data from these logs are manually recorded in the experiment
log after each experiment run.
The raw data generated after each experiment run will be transferred to the
MicroVAX experiment host for analysis. The raw data is converted to a
common format before use by the data analysis program. The FTP data
recorded in the experiment log is entered manually for use by the data
analysis program.
6.6.1 Standard Statistical Data
The data analysis program has a statistics package that generates a
standard set of statistics for certain data sets. The standard set of
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statistics includes the mean, the standard deviation, and the extreme
values found in the data set. The package also creates a histogram to
display the data set values. The histogram range and number of intervals is
set by default based on the extreme values in the data set and the number
of data samples. The user can also manually set the histogram display
parameters.
For all of the following statistical data requirements, the number of data
points included in the statistical summary will be listed. Data samples
associated with any abnormal frames are not included in the statistical
summary. These abnormal frame conditions are defined in the event summary
description.
Execution Variability Data. The statistical data in this category
indicates the frame-to-frame variability of the application execution.
Execution variability statistics are based on the frame relative time of a
specific application event. The frame relative time of each occurrence of
the event is based on the ideal frame start time for each application
frame. This is determined based on the ideal start time of the very first
frame and the frame repetition period.
Duration Data. Statistics in this category are produced on data derived
from the raw application event information. The data are based on the
difference in time of occurrence between two application events. Two
examples are time delay and deadline margin.
Time delay data are indicative of the sensor-to-actuator time delay for
each application update rate. A transaction used by a specific rate group
is used as representative of the sensor read and actuator write events.
The difference between the transaction time in one frame and its occurrence
in the subsequent frame is recorded as the time delay value.
Standard statistics data are generated for the time delay data sets. The
time delay values for abnormal frames, such as missed I/O update or frame
overrun situations, are not used in the subsequent statistical analysis.
Similarly, if there is an extraordinary case of long time delay because of
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a missing frame, the value is not used. The number of frames for which no
time delay value was recorded due to exceptional conditions should be
listed in the statistics output.
Deadline margin data indicates how close the system is to not satisfying
the regular update requirements of the application processes. The
processed data is derived based on the time the final activity completes in
one frame and the deadline for that activity occurs in the subsequent
frame. The final activity and the deadline are different depending on the
selected scheduling mechanism.
For periodic I/O configurations, the deadline event occurs near the start
of the IlO request processing in the IOP when the output data buffer is
accessed. The final activity in a control cycle is the updating of the
output data for the next I/O cycle. The final activity completes just
before the end of the application computing.
For on-demand I/O configurations, the deadline is the reading of the input
data from the preceding I/O cycle. This takes place just after the
beginning of the the computing activity for a control cycle. The final
activity in the frame is the completion of the update of the input data by
the I/O request processing.
A problem for deadline margin measurements in the small-scale system is
that one of the events cannot be recorded directly unless the system
services software is instrumented. This was not done for these
experiments. Therefore, another event closely related to the actual
deadline or final activity is used. This will introduce a bias in the
processed deadline margin values.
The statistical analysis is performed on the computed deadline margin data
sets. The deadline margin values for abnormal frames such as those with
missed I/O updates or frame overrun cases will not be used in the
subsequent statistical analysis. The number of data samples rejected due
to abnormal frames will be shown in the statistics output.
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Time Reserve. Time reserve data will be produced for the CP. These data
are indicative of the demand placed on the system by the application and
the time critical system services (fast FDIR). The time reserve
information for experiment 12 characterizes the steady-state demands on the
system. For experiments 13 and 14, the data illustrates any change in the
demand on the system during the fault recovery period.
The time reserve data for one frame is determined by subtracting the
background counter value in a frame from its value in the subsequent frame.
The background count is incremented during the idle or reserve time when
there is no other processing to be run. The time reserve data sets will be
divided into four groups corresponding to the specific minor frame of the
major frame cycle (A,B,C, or D). Standard statistics are generated on each
group.
Fault Recovery. The fault recovery information indicates how long the
system takes to repair a fault for experiment 13 and 14 runs. Some of the
raw data is recorded from CRT displays of the system services log and so
must be manually entered for the data analysis program. The fault recovery
time is based on the fault occurrence time and a corresponding recovery
complete time for each run. The fault recovery times for all of the runs
having the same configuration and fault type form a data set for which
statistics are generated.
6.6.2 Event Summary Data
In addition to statistical data, the analysis program determines and
presents event summary data for the experiment run. The summary
information is based on data collected during each run as well as detailed
information about certain situations occurring during the runs being
evaluated. The summary is organized by run in the case of multiple-run
evaluation, with the events in each run listed in chronological order.
When an event is listed, associated data recorded with the event are
presented.
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The event summary for each run includes a run start entry and a run
termination entry. A brief description of the other significant situations
is presented in the following paragraphs.
An entry for the FTP fault insertion event is included for all experiment
13 runs. This entry will show all data associated with the specific fault
condition. Similarly, there will be an entry for the VME fault insertion
event for all experiment 14 runs. All data associated with the specific
fault condition will be presented.
Experiment 13 and 14 runs will also contain entries for the end fault
repair event. These entries will show the time that the system services
completed the reconfiguration actions taken to repair the fault.
There will be entries for each application frame that experiences
communication errors during I/O activity. These errors include (I) chain
error, (2) all transactions bad, (3) chain not complete, (4) chain did not
execute, or (5) network out of service. The entry will show the time,
frame count, and application rate group identifier.
Any command frame received at a DIU with errors will appear in the summary.
The command fame identifier, time, frame count, and error code will be
presented.
The partial data summary shows the number of frames in which communications
with the complete set of DIUs is interrupted because a network is out of
service. The application partial data summary will show for each run, by
application rate, the number of frames in which the application used a
partial set of sensor and actuator data because a network was taken out of
service.
The abnormal DIU data summary indicates when the DIU did not receive the
expected periodic update from the application process. This occurs when a
DIU command frame is repeated or skipped. For each DIU frame ID, the
number of occurrences of repeated command frames and skipped command frames
will be reported for each run.
3O3
Abnormal Frames. The abnormal frame entries document the occurrence of an
incorrect application cycle. The three specific situations are missed I/O
update, computing overrun, or IOR overrun.
Missed I/O updates occur when the I/O activity part of the control cycle
and the computing part of the control cycle do not keep up with each other.
In this situation, the deadline for the final activity in the frame is not
met. In the on-demand I/O case, the IO service activity does not finish
updating the input data buffer before the time it is read by the subsequent
frame computing activity. In the periodic I/O case, the application
computing does not complete updating the output data buffer before the
subsequent frame I/0 request.
A computing overrun refers to the situation in which the application CP
processing for one frame is scheduled to start while the application
process for the previous frame is still active. The system ignores the new
request in this situation.
An IOR overrun occurs when the I/0 system is unable to process a submitted
I/O request. In this case, the I/O activity for a new frame is scheduled
to occur before the I/O activity has completed for the previous frame.
Special system calls are used to collect data about the occurrence of
either type of overrun.
The analysis output data is determined based on the raw data from the
experiment runs. Data in the execution variability and duration categories
are based on a subset of the possible raw data produced. For experiment
12, 13, and 14, the analysis output data will be based on raw data from the
start of the third application major frame through the end of the run.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS
During the detailed design effort for the IAPSA II contract, a candidate
architecture design based on AIPS fault-tolerant system building blocks was
evaluated for its ability to meet the demanding performance and reliability
requirements of a flight-critical system. As a result of the preliminary
evaluations some refinements were made to the candidate architecture. The
refined configuration was evaluated for reliability and performance and a
set of experiments defined for testing critical performance aspects with a
small-scale system. This modeling effort provided several important
results described below.
The major result was that several weaknesses in the candidate architecture
became apparent as a result of using the prevalldatlon methodology. These
shortcomings were not evident in the initial performance and reliability
calculations. This is important because such concept weaknesses are often
not uncovered until late in the system life cycle, for example at hardware
and software integration. The IAPSA II effort shows that it is very
important to perform detailed evaluation of concepts based on
specifications before committing a project to a hardware and software build
phase.
The candidate architecture was unable to meet either the reliability or
performance requirements. Reliability was affected by uncovered element
failures (a common finding in critical systems), rare mechanical failure
modes, and an interaction of preexisting sensor failures with I/O network
repair activity. As a consequence, there were several two-failure
situations that resulted in loss of safety, and one-failure situations
resulting in loss of full mission capability.
The performance simulation showed that part of the candidate system was
overloaded and did not possess the needed growth capability. In fact, the
loading was such that special coordination was needed between the
application tasks and the time-critical system tasks to allow the
application workload to complete in the allowable time. Alternative
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organizations of the workload were evaluated and only the most efficient
could be fit into the allowable timeframe. However, even the optimum
organization had inadequate growth capability.
Changes were made to the candidate architecture to better balance the
workload, to improve the level of failure protection, and to reduce the
number of communication elements. Although the refined system was shown to
meet the reliability requirements, several concerns became evident during
the evaluation. Our modeling approach was based on separate models
reflecting the success of the key system functions. Modeling the
dependency of the system functions on the central elements such as
communication devices and electrical and hydraulic power distribution was
difficult. It was easy to miss the implications of system interconnection
alternatives, especially when the central elements also had dependency
relationships. This was very true in the special power connection
reliability concerns associated with the refined configuration mesh network
option.
A solution that would make these central dependencies explicit in a
large-system-level model still seems unattractive. A method is needed to
more formally organize the combining of the separate section model results.
The techniques used in the refined configuration analysis were more
effective and easier to justify than those used during the candidate
evaluation. However, the step of estimating error due to model truncation
when a problem is split into submodels needs further development.
A sensitivity study of the susceptibility of the system to transient faults
pointed out an area of concern. Because of the complex redundancy
management strategies, the handling of transients is always challenging for
flight critical systems. One problem is characterization of the transient
threat. Solid operational data on the likelihood and duration of transients
is scarce. In our limited study, the major concern was transients that can
cause a channel to go out of synchronization. Because of the heavy
application workload environment, there was not enough time for the system
to bring a channel back into synchronization and align its memory with the
remaining "good" channels. Therefore a transient that causes loss of
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synchronization has the same effect as a permanent failure. If the
transient fault rate is significant in operational circumstances, then
these failures will contribute significantly to system failure.
There were many situations in the study in which performance and
reliability were closely interrelated. The above resynchronization
situation is one example. Another was the strategy to eliminate
vulnerability to "temporary exhaustion" failures. Due to the heavy
application I/O workload, strategies of sending sensor and actuator data
redundantly over both networks were impractical.
The use of a discrete event simulation tool, like DENET, is new in the
analysis of a flight control system. Such tools appear very promising for
determining critical performance requirements, but much application work is
needed to define practical and effective modeling techniques. However,
attempting to develop complex system configurations with multiple
processing sites and intensive I/O needs without using such tools to
uncover bottlenecks seems foolhardy based on our experience.
The rebalancing of appllcatlon workload improved the overload situation
significantly compared to the candidate system. However, the preliminary
simulation results experiments indicates that the improvement is not
enough. Using a simplified adjustment for task overhead processing was
enough to show that the growth factor for the refined configuration is
below requirements. To make matters worse, the proof-of-concept testing
conducted before the small-scale system testing shows that the real system
is not operating anywhere near the hardware limit. Because our performance
models were based on very efficient operation, the small-scale system
testing is likely to show that performance needs cannot be met with the
current hardware and software design.
The AIPS building block hardware design is much more mature than the
software design; the functionality assigned to the system services software
is overwhelming. Validation of this complex software, which includes some
nondeterministic behavior, will be extremely challenging. Efficiency
considerations have only recently been addressed in the software
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development effort. Early in the IAPSA II design, performance calculations
were based on the original AIPS system performance goals as expressed in
the system specification. Bowever, since these goals were not reflected in
the performance requirements for the AIPS building blocks, a building block
redesign will probably be needed.
In our system study, a set of redundant buses provided nearly the same
general reliability as the reconfigurable I/O mesh networks. Because of
the system software complexity associated with the management of the
reconfigurable mesh I/O networks and the needed validation effort, the I/O
mesh network would be eliminated from further consideration at this time.
However, to meet the throughput needs of the application functions, an IC
network between computing sites is essential. The IC network has even more
demanding network management requirements than the I/O networks. The
characteristics of communications over the IC network also generate some
demanding performance needs. These needs and associated potential resource
contention problems were not evaluated in our study.
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APPENDIX A
SELECTED ASSIST MODELS
IAPSA II REFINED CONFIGURATION

(*** Forward Area Model - Safety Criteria - Network Option ***)(* GroupA *)
(* *)
SPACE = ( FWNOD :
FWKEC :
FWDIU:
PITSTK:
PITREC :
ROLSTK:
ROLREC :
YAWPED :
YAWREC:
FTP :
FTPREC :
ROOT :
ELMC :
ONKEC :
NFAIL :
0 .4 I
0 .2,
0 .4,
0 .4,
0 .2,
0 .4,
0 .2,
0 .4,
0..2,
0..4,
0..2,
0..4,
0..4,
0..2,
0..4);
(* FORWARD NODE * )
(* NETWORK RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* FORWARD DIU STATE INDICATOR *)
(* PITCH CO_/AND SENSOR *)
(* PITCH SENSOR RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* ROLL COI_MAND SENSOR *)
(* ROLL SENSOR RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* YAW COMMAND SENSOR *)
(* YAW SENSOR RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* FTP CHANNEL STATUS *)
(* FTP CHANNEL RECOVERY IND. *)
(* ROOT LINK STATUS *)
(* ELECTRIC POWER STATE *)
(* OTHER NODES IN A SINGLE NETWORK *)
(* NO. OF FAILED ELEMENTS *)
START = ( 4, 0, 4, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 4, 0, 0 );
PRUNEIF NFAIL > 2;
DEATHIF PITREC + FWREC + ONREC > 1 OR ROLREC + FWREC + ONREC > 1 OR
YAWREC + FWREC + ONREC > i;
DEATHIF PITSTK-PITREC < 1 OR KOLSTK-ROLREC < I OR YAWPED-YAWREC < i;
DEATHIF FTP - FTPREC < i;
DEATHIF FTP < 2;
DEATHIF ROOT < 3 AND ( PITREC > 0 OR ROLREC > 0 OR
YAWREC > 0 OR FWREC > 0 OR ONREC > 0 );
LIST = 2;
TIME = 3.0;
PRUNE = 1.0E-16;
ECHO = 0;
LAMPOS = 10.0E-6;
LAMNOD = 17.0E-6;
LAMDIU = 15.0E-6;
POSMEAN = 3.0E-4;
POSSTD = 1.0E-4;
NWMEAN = 3.0E-4;
NWSTD = i. 0E-4;
(* POSITION SENSOR FAILURE RATE *)
(* NODE FAILURE KATE - CONDITIONED *)
(* DIU FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED *)
(* RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
LAMPS = 10.0E-6;
LAMEL = 50.0E-6;
LAMFTP = 200.0E-6;
LAMROOT = 15.0E-6;
FTPMEAN = 5.0E-6;
(* LOCAL POWER SUPPLY RATE - CONDITIONED
(* ELECTRIC POWER CENTER FAILURE RATE
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURE BATE
(* FTP NETWORK INTERFACE FAILURE RATE
(* FTP RECOVERY TIME MEAN
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
A-I
FTPSTD = i. 0E-6;
LAMON = 289.0E-6;
(* FTPRECOVERYTIMESTDDEV
(* OTHERNODESONSINGLENWFAIL RATE
*)
*)
(* PITCH COMMAND SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF PITSTK > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 AND FWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR PITSTK = 2 THEN
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, PITREC=PITREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*LAMPOS;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN (* SINGLE NETWORK SUSCEPTIBILITY *)
TRANTO PITSTK=PITSTK-I, PITREC=PITREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2/3)*LAMPOS;
TRANTO PITSTK=PITSTK-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ((PITSTK - 2) + 4/3 )*LAMPOS;
ELSE
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*LAM_POS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT SENSOR-NETWORK *)
IF FWREC > 0 (* SAME NODE SET *)
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, PITREC=PITREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (PITSTK+I)*LAMPOS /2;
IF ONREC > 0 (* OTHER NODES *)
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, PITREC=PITREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*LAMPOS /2;
IF PITREC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TRANTO PITKEC = 0 BY < POSMEAN, POSSTD >;
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, PITREC=PITREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
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(* ROLL COMMAND SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF ROLSTK > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 AND FWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR ROLSTK = 2 THEN
TRANTO ROLSTK = ROLSTK-I, ROLREC=ROLREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROLSTK*LAMPOS;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN
(* SINGLE NETWORK SUSCEPTIBILITY *)
TRANTO ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, ROLREC=ROLREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2/3)*LAMPOS;
TKANTOROLSTK=ROLSTK-I,NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ((ROLSTK- 2) + 4/3 )*LAMPOS;
ELSE
TRANTOROLSTK= ROLSTK-I,NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROLSTK*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLYCOINCIDENT SENSOR-NETWORK *)
IF FWREC > 0 (* SAME NODE SET *)
TRANTO ROLSTK = ROLSTK-I, ROLREC=ROLREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (ROLSTK+I)*LAMPOS /2;
IF ONREC > 0 (* OTHER NODES *)
TRANTO ROLSTK = ROLSTK-I, ROLREC=ROLREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROLSTK*LAMPOS /2;
IF ROLREC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TKANTO ROLREC = 0 BY < POSMEAN, POSSTD >;
TRANTO ROLSTK = ROLSTK-I, ROLREC=ROLREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROLSTK*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* YAW COMMAND SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF YAWPED > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 AND FWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR YAWPED =2 THEN
TKANTO YAWPED = YAWPED-l, YAWREC=YAWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY YAWPED*LAMPOS;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN
(* SINGLE NETWORK SUSCEPTIBILITY *)
TRANTO YAWPED=YAWPED-I, YAWREC=YAWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2/3)*LAMPOS;
TRANTO YAWPED=YAWPED-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ((YAWPED - 2) + 4/3 )*LAMPOS;
ELSE
TRANTO YAWPED = YAWPED-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY YAWPED*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT SENSOR-NETWORK *)
IF FWREC > 0 (* SAME NODE SET *)
TRANTO YAWPED = YAWPED-I, YAWREC=YAWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+!
BY (YAWPED+I)*LAMPOS /2;
IF ONREC > 0 (* OTHER NODES *)
A-S
TRANTOYAWPED= YAWPED-I, YAWREC=YAWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY YAWPED*LAMPOS /2;
IF YAWREC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TKANTO YAWREC = 0 BY < POSMEAN, POSSTD >;
TKANTO YAWPED = YAWPED-l, YAWKEC=YAWKEC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY YAWPED*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* FORWARD AREA NODE FAILURES *)
IF FWNOD > 0 AND FWBEC = 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLKEC = 0 AND
YAWREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF PITSTK < 3 OR ROLSTK < 3 OR YAWPED < 3 THEN
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION FAILURE *)
TKANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, ROOT=ROOT-l,
FWREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY (2/3)*LAMNOD;
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION AVOIDED *)
TRANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ((FWNOD-2) + 4/3)*LAMNOD;
ELSE (* NO TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION VULNERABILITY *)
IF ROOT = 2 THEN (* SINGLE NETWORK VULNERABILITY *)
TRANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, ROOT=ROOT-l,
FWREC=FWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY (2/3)*LAMNOD;
TRANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-I, ROOT=ROOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ((FWNOD-2) + 4/3)*LAMNOD;
ELSE (* NO SINGLE NETWORK VULNERABILITY *)
IF ROOT > (FWNOD+ELMC-4) THEN
(* CHECK FOR TWO FAULTS ON SAME "CHANNEL" *)
TRANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, ROOT=ROOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ROOT* LAMNOD;
ELSE
(* FAULTS ARE ON SEPARATE "CHANNELS" *)
(* FORWARD NODE FAILURE AFFECTS ROOT LINK AND DIU *)
IF NFAIL = 0 THEN
TRANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-I, ROOT=ROOT-l, FWREC=FWP_C+I,
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NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY FWNOD* LAMNOD;
ELSE
TRANTOFWNOD=FWNOD-I,FWDIU=FWDIU-I,PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I,YAWPED=YAWPED-I,ROOT=ROOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+IBY ROOT*PITSTK*ROLSTK*YAWPED*I2LMNOD/
((FWNOD+ELMC-4)* FWDIU**2) ;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT NETWORK-SENSOR FAILURES *)
IF FWREC = 1 THEN (* SAME NODE SET *)
(* NETWORK RECOVERY *)
TKANTO FWREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
ENDIF;
IF PITREC = 1
TKANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWREC=FWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY
FWNOD*LAMNOD /2;
IF ROLREC = 1
TRANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWREC=FWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY
FWNOD*LAMNOD /2;
IF YAWREC = 1
TRANTO FWNOD=FWNOD-I, FWREC=FWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY
FWNOD*LAMNOD /2;
ENDIF;
(* OTHER NODE FAILURES *)
IF FWREC = 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND
YAWREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF PITSTK < 3 OR ROLSTK < 3 OR YAWPED < 3 THEN
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION VULNERABLE *)
TRANTO ONREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON/3;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN (* SINGLE NW VULNERABLE *)
ELSE
TRANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON/3;
ELSE
IF NFAIL = 0 TKANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY
2*LAMON;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* NEARLY COINCIDENT FAILURES- RECOVERIES *)
IF ONREC = 1
TKANTO ONREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
IF PITREC=I OR ROLREC=I OR YAWREC=I
TKANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON;
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ENDIF;
(* FORWARD DIU FAILURES *)
IF FWDIU > 0 AND FWREC = 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND
YAWREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I, ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=
YAWPED-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY PITSTK*ROLSTK*YAWPED*( LAMDIU + LAMPS ) /
FWDIU**2;
ENDIF;
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURES *)
IF FTP > 0 AND PITKEC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FWREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 THEN
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, FTPREC=FTPREC+I, ROOT=ROOT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY FTP*LAMFTP;
ELSE
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROOT*LAMFTP;
ENDIF;
ELSE
IF FTPREC > 0 THEN
(* FTP CHANNEL RECOVERY *)
TRANTO FTPREC=FTPREC-I BY < FTPMEAN, FTPSTD >;
(* COINCIDENT FAULT *)
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, FTPREC=FTPREC+I, ROOT=ROOT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY FTP*LAM_FTP;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* NETWORK INTERFACE FAILURES *)
IF ROOT > 2 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0
AND FWKEC = 0 AND ONREC = 0
TRANTO ROOT=ROOT-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ROOT*LAMROOT;
(*** ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION FAILURES ***)
IF ELMC > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0 AND FTPP_C = 0
AND FWREC = 0 AND ONKEC = 0 THEN
(* ELMC FAILURE AFFECTS DIU, FTP AND ROOT LINK *)
IF ROOT > (FWNOD+FTP-4) THEN
(* CHECK FOR FAULTS ON SAME "CHANNEL" *)
TKANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-I,
ELMC=ELMC-I,
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ELSE
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
NFAIL=NFAIL+IBY ROOT*LAMEL;
(* FAULTSONDIFFERENT"CHANNELS" *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-I, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-I,
ELMC=ELMC-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ROOT* PITSTK*ROLSTK*YAWPED*
LAMEL / ( (FWNOD+ELMC-4)* FWDIU**2 );
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(*** Mid Area Model - Safety Criteria - Network Option ***)
(* Group A *)(* *)
SPACE = ( MIDNOD:
MIDREC:
MIDDIU:
GYRO:
GYREC:
ACCEL:
ACCREC:
CNDV:
HYD:
ELMC:
ONREC:
NFAIL:
0 .4f
0 .2,
0 .4,
0 .8,
0 .2,
0 .8,
0
0
0
0
0
0
.2,
.4,
.2,
.4,
.2,
.4);
(* MID NODE *)
(* NETWORK RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* MID DIU STATE INDICATOR *)
(* GYROS *)
(* GZRO RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* ACCELEROMETERS *)
(* ACCEL RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* CND VALVE STATE *)
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM STATE *)
(* ELECTRIC SUPPLY SYSTEM STATE *)
(* OTHER NODES IN A SINGLE NETWORK *)
(* NO. OF FAILED ELEMENTS *)
START = ( 4, 0, 4, 8, 0, 8, 0, 4, 2, 4, 0, 0 );
PKUNEIF NFAIL > 2;
DEATHIF GYREC + ACCREC + MIDREC + ONREC > i;
DEATHIF GYRO-GYREC < 3 OR ACCEL-ACCREC < 3;
DEATHIF CNDV = 0;
LIST = 2;
TIME = 3.0;
PRUNE = 1.0E-16;
ECHO = 0;
LAMGYRO = 50.0E-6;
LAMACC = 30.0E-6;
LAMNOD = 17.0E-6;
LAMDIU = 15.0E-6;
GYRMEAN = 3.0E-4;
GYRSTD = 1.0E-4;
ACCMEAN = 3.0E-4;
ACCSTD = 1.0E-4;
(* GYRO FAILURE KATE *
(* ACCELEROMETER FAILURE RATE *
(* NODE FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED *
(* DIU FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED *
(* RECOVERY TIME MEAN *
(* RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *
(* ACC RECOVERY TIME MEAN *
(* ACC RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *
LAMC = 50.0E-6;
LAMPOS = 10.0E-6;
LAMV = 15.0E-6;
VJAM = 3.3333E-5;
LAMHYD = 45.0E-6;
(* PROCESSOR FAILURE RATE *)
(* POSITION SENSOR FAILURE KATE *)
(* VALVE GROUP FAILURE RATE *)
(* ACTUATOR JAM FAILURE FRACTION *)
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAIL RATE *)
LAMPS = 10.0E-6;
LAMEL = 50.0E-6;
NWMEAN = 3.0E-4;
h_STD = 1.0E-4;
LAMON = 289.0E-6;
(* LOCAL POWER SUPPLY - CONDITIONED *)
(* ELMC FAILURE RATE *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
(* OTHER NODES FAILURE RATE *)
A_
(* GYROSENSORFAILURESANDRECOVERIES*)
IF GYRO > 0 AND GYKEC = 0 AND ACCKEC = 0 AND MIDREC = 0 AND ONKEC = 0 THEN
ELSE
IF GYRO = 4 OR NFAIL = 0 THEN (* EXHAUSTION *)
TRA_NTO GYRO = GYRO-I, GYREC=GYREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY GYRO*LAMGYRO;
ELSE
TRANTO GYRO = GYRO-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY GYRO*LAMGYRO;
ENDIF;
(* GYRO FAILURE RECOVERY *)
IF GYREC = 1 TKANTO GYREC=0 BY < GYRMEAN, GYRSTD >;
(* NCF: GYRO - NETWORK *)
IF MIDREC = 1 OR ONREC = 1
TRANTO GYRO = GYRO-I, GYREC=GYREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY GYRO*LAMGYRO/2;
ENDIF;
(* ACCEL SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF ACCEL > 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 AND MIDREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
ELSE
IF ACCEL = 4 OR NFAIL = 0 THEN (* EXHAUSTION *)
TKANTO ACCEL = ACCEL-I, ACCREC=ACCKEC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+!
BY ACCEL*LAMACC;
ELSE
TRANTO ACCEL = ACCEL-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ACCEL*LAMACC;
ENDIF;
(* ACCELEROMETER FAILURE RECOVERY *)
IF ACCREC = 1 TRANTO ACCREC=0 BY < ACCMEAN, ACCSTD >;
(* NCF: ACCEL - NETWORK *)
IF MIDREC = 1 OR ONKEC = 1
TRANTO ACCEL = ACCEL-I, ACCREC=ACCREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ACCEL*LAMACC/2;
ENDIF;
(*** VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF CNDV > 0 AND GYREC=0 AND ACCKEC=0 AND MIDREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
TRANTO CNDV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY CNDV*VJAM*LAMV;
TRANTO CNDV=CNDV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY CNDV*(I.0-VJAM)*LAMV;
ENDIF; .
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURES *)
IF HYD > 0 AND GYREC=0 AND ACCREC=0 AND MIDREC = 0 AND
(HYD-NFAIL >= 0 ) AND ONKEC = 0 THEN
TRANTO CNDV=CNDV-2, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY CNDV*(CNDV-I)*LAMHYD / ( 2* (2*HYD-I) );
IF (2*HYD-CNDV) > 0
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TI_.NTO CNDV=CNDV-i, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
EY (2*HYD-CNDV)*2*CNDV*LAMHYD / I 2" (2*HYD-I) );
IF (2*HYD-CNDV) > 1
TRANTO HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2*HYD-CNDV)* (2*HYD-CNDV-I) *L__MHYD / ( 2* (2*HYD-I) ) ;
ENDIF;
(* MID AREA NODE FAILURES *)
IF MIDNOD > 0 AND MIDKEC = 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF ( MIDNOD=2 AND MIDDIU=4 ) OR ( MIDNOD=3 AND MIDDIU=3) THEN
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION FAILURE *)
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I,
MIDREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMNOD;
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION AVOIDED *)
TPANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I,-
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ( MIDNOD-I )*LAMNOD;
ELSE (* NO TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION VULNERABILITY *)
IF MIDNOD = 3 AND MIDDIU = 4 THEN
(* MID NODE FAILURE MIGHT AFFECT DIU *)
IF GYRO = 8 AND ACCEL = 8 THEN
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-2, GYRO=GYRO-4,
ACCEL=ACCEL-4, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY LAMNOD;
ELSE
IF GYRO < 8
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-2, GYRO=GYRO-3,
ACCEL=ACCEL-4, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY LAMNOD / 2;
IF ACCEL < 8
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-2, GYRO=GYRO-4,
ACCEL=ACCEL-3, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY LAMNOD / 2;
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-2, GYRO=GYRO-4,
ACCEL=ACCEL-4, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY LAMNOD / 2;
ENDIF;
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2*LAMNOD;
ELSE
IF MIDNOD : 2 AND ELMC = 2 THEN
(* ELECTRIC SUPPLY EXHAUSTION *)
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2,
ACCEL=ACCEL-2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY MIDNOD* LAMNOD;
ELSE
A-IO
(* MID NODE FAILURE CAN'T AFFECT DIU *)
IF NFAIL=0 THEN
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, MIDREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY MIDNOD*LAMNOD;
ELSE
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY MIDNOD*LAMNOD;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT NETWORK-SENSOR FAILURES *)
IF MIDREC = 1
(* NETWORK RECOVERY *)
TRANTO MIDREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
IF GYREC = 1 OR ACCREC = 1
(* COINCIDENT FAULT *)
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-I, MIDREC=MIDREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY
MIDNOD *LAMNOD /2;
ENDIF;
(** OTHER NODE FAILURES **)
IF MIDREC = 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF ( MIDNOD=2 AND MIDDIU=4 ) OR ( MIDNOD=3 AND MIDDIU=3) THEN
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION VULNERABLE *)
TKANTO ONREC = 2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON/2;
ELSE
IF NFAIL = 0 TRANTO ONREC = I, NFAIL=NFAIL+! BY 2* LAMON;
ELSE
ENDIF;
IF ONKEC = 1 (* NW RECOVERY *)
TRANTO ONREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
IF GYREC = i OR ACCREC = 1
(* NEARLY COINCIDENT FAULTS SENSOR - NETWORK *)
TRANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON;
ENDIF;
(* MID DIU FAILURES *)
IF MIDDIU > 0 AND MIDREC = 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 AND ONKEC = 0 THEN
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-2,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)*
(LAMDIU + LAMPS)/ ( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2);
IF 2*MIDDIU - GYRO > 0
TKANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-I, ACCEL=ACCEL-2,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2*GYRO* (2*MIDDIU-GYRO)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)*
(LAMDIU + LAMPS)/ ( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)*'2);
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ENDIF;
IF 2*MIDDIU - ACCEL > 0
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* 2*ACCEL* (2*MIDDIU-ACCEL)*
(LAMDIU + LAMPS)/ ( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2);
(**** ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION FAILURES ***)
IF ELMC > 2 AND MIDREC = 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF ELMC = 4 AND NFAIL < 2
TRANTO ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ELMC*LAMEL;
IF ELMC = 3 THEN
IF NFAIL = 1
(* TRANSITION TO SINGLE NW OPERATION *)
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-2, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-2, GYRO=GYRO-4,
ACCEL=ACCEL-4,
ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMEL;
IF MIDNOD = 3
(* TRANSITION TO ELECTRIC SOURCE EXHAUSTION *)
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-2, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-3, GYRO=GYRO-6,
ACCEL=ACCEL-6,
ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMEL/2;
IF MIDDIU = 3
(* TRANSITION TO ELECTRIC SOURCE EXHAUSTION *)
TRANTO MIDNOD=MIDNOD-2, MIDDIU=MIDDIU-2, GYRO=GYRO-4,
ACCEL=ACCEL-4,
ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMEL/2;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
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(*** Wing and Tail Area Model - Safety Criteria - Network Option ,3,)
(* Group A 3)
(* *)
SPACE = ( NWKEC: 0..2,
RWP: 0..4,
RWV: 0..4,
LWP: 0..4,
LWV: 0..4,
TLP: 0..4,
TLV: 0..4,
HYD: 0..2,
ELMC: 0..4,
ONKEC: 0..2,
NFAIL: 0..4);
(3 NETWORK RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* RW CHANNEL STATE *)
(* RW VALVE STATE *)
(* LW CHANNEL STATE *)
(* LW VALVE STATE 3)
(* TL CHANNEL STATE *)
(* TL VALVE STATE *)
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM STATE *)
(* ELECTRIC SYSTEM SUPPLY STATE *)
(* OTHER NODES FAILURE RECOVERY 3)
(* NO. OF FAILED ELEMENTS *)
START = ("0, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 4. 0, 0 );
PRUNEIF NFAIL > 2;
DEATHIF RWV = 0;
DEATHIF LWV = 0;
DEATHIF TLV = 0;
DEATHIF NWKEC + ONREC > i;
LIST = 2;
TIME = 3.0;
PRUNE = !.0E-16;
ECHO = 0;
LAMC = 50.0E-6;
LAMPOS = 10.0E-6;
LAMSD = 20.0E-6;
LAMV = 15.0E-6;
VJAM = 3.3333E-5;
LAMNODH = 42.5E-6;
LAMDIUH = 37.5E-6;
LAMHYD = 45.0E-6;
LAMPSH = 25.0E-6;
LAMEL = 50.0E-6;
NWMEAN = 3.0E-4;
NWSTD = 1.0E-4;
LAMON = 68.0E-6;
(3 PROCESSOR FAILURE RATE 3)
(* POSITION SENSOR FAILURE KATE *)
(3 SERVODRIVE GROUP FAILURE RATE *)
(* VALVE GROUP FAILURE RATE *)
(* ACTUATOR JAM FAILURE FPACTION *)
(3 NODE FAILURE KATE - HARSH *)
(* DIU FAILURE BATE - HARSH *)
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAIL RATE 3)
(3 LOCAL POWER SUPPLY RATE - HARSH 3)
(* ELMC FAILURE RATE *)
(* _# RECOVERY TIME - MEAN 3)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME - STD DEV *)
(3 OTHER NODE FAILURE RATE *)
(33, RW PROCESSOR GROUP / DIU FAILURE TRANSITIONS 3,,)
IF NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
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IF RWP > 0
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
THEN
TRANTO RWP=RWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
+ (LAMDIUH + LAMPSH) );
BY RWP* ( 2*(LAMC + LAMPOS)
(*** RW VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF RWV > 0 AND NWKEC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
TRANTO RWV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL_I BY RWV*VJAM*LAMV;
TRA}ITO RWV=RWV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWV*(I.0-VJAM)*LAMV;
ENDIF;
(* RW NODE FAILURES *)
IF NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF RWP < 3 OR LWP < 3 OR TLP < 3 THEN
ELSE
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION FAILURE *)
TRANTO RWP=RWP-I, NWREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY 2*LAMNODH /3;
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION NOT POSSIBLE *)
IF RWP > 0 THEN
IF NFAIL=0 THEN
TRANTO RWP=RWP-I, NWREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY RWP*LAMNODH;
ELSE
T.RANTO RWP=RWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+i
BY RWP*LA/v/NODH;
END IF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(*** LW PROCESSOR GROUP / DIU FAILURE TRANSITIONS ***)
IF NWREC : 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF LWP > 0 THEN
TRANTO LWP=LWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
+ (LAMDIUH + LAMPSH) );
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
BY LWP* ( 2* (LAMC + LAMPOS)
(*** LW VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF LWV > 0 AND NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
TRANTO LWV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LWV*VJAM*LAMV;
TRANTO L_:=LWV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LWV*(I.0-VJAM)*LAMV;
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ENDIF;
(* LW NODE FAILURES *)
IF NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF RWP < 3 OR LWP < 3 OR TLP < 3 THEN
ELSE
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION FAILURE *)
TKANTO LWP=LWP-I, NWREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY 2*LAMNODH /3;
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION NOT POSSIBLE *)
IF LWP > 0 THEN
IF NFAIL=0 THEN
TRANTO LWP=LWP-I, NWREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY LWP*LAMNODH;
ELSE
TRANTO LWP=LWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY LWP*LAMNODH;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(*** TL PROCESSOR GROUP / DIU FAILURE TRANSITIONS ***)
IF NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF TLP > 0 THEN
TRANTO TLP=TLP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
+ (LAMDIUH + LAMPSH) );
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
BY TLP* ( 2*(LAMC + LAMPOS)
(*** TL VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF TLV > 0 AND NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
TRANTO TLV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY TLV*VJAM*LAMV;
TRANTO TLV=TLV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY TLV*(I.0-VJAM)*LAMV;
ENDIF;
(* TL NODE FAILURES *)
IF NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF RWP < 3 OR LWP < 3 OR TLP < 3 THEN
ELSE
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION FAILURE *)
TRANTO TLP=TLP-I, NWREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY 2*LAMNODH /3;
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION NOT POSSIBLE *)
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IF TLP > 0 THEN
IF NFAIL=0 THEN
TRANTO TLP=TLP-I, NWREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY TLP*LAMNODH;
ELSE
TRANTO TLP=TLP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY TLP*LAMNODH;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* NEARLY COINCIDENT FAULTS - RECOVERIES *)
IF NWREC = 1 THEN
(* NETWORK RECOVERY * )
TRANTO NWREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
(* SAME NODE SET *)
TRANTO NWREC=NWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY 6*LAMNODH;
ENDIF;
IF ONREC = 1 THEN (* OTHER NODE SET *)
TKANTO NWKEC=NWKEC+I, _AIL=NFAIL+I
BY 6*LAMNODH;
ENDIF;
(** OTHER NODE FAILURES **)
IF NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF RWP < 3 OR LWP < 3 OR TLP < 3 THEN
(* VULNERABLE TO TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION *)
TRANTO ONREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON/3;
ELSE
IF NFAIL = 0
TRANTO ONREC = I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2*LAMON;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT NW FAULT *)
IF NWREC > 0
TRANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON;
IF ONREC > 0 THEN
(* NETWORK RECOVERY *)
TRANTO ONREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
(* NCF - OTHER NODES *)
TRANTO ONREC=ONREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON;
ENDIF;
END IF ;
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURES *)
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IF HYD > 0 AND NWREC = 0 AND ONKEC = 0
AND (HYD-NFAIL >= 0 ) THEN
TKANTO RWV=RWV-2, LWV=LWV-2, TLV=TLV-2, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY RWV* (RWV-I) *LWV* (LWV-I) *TLV* (TLV-I) *LAMHYD /
( 2* (2*HYD)**2 * (2*HYD-I)**3) ;
ENDIF;
(**** ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION ***)
IF ELMC > 0 AND NWREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
TRANTO RWP=RWP-I, LWP=LWP-I, TLP=TLP-I, ELMC=ELMC-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWP* LWP* TLP* LAMEL / (ELMC**2) ;
ENDIF;
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(***
(*
(*
Air Model - Safety Criteria - Network Option
Group B
***)
*)
*)
SPACE = ( AIRNOD:
AIRKEC:
AIRDIU:
AOA:
AOAREC:
AOS:
AOSREC:
THROT: 0
THROTREC: 0
FTP: 0
FTPREC: 0
ROOT: 0
ELMC: 0
ONKEC: 0
NFAIL: 0
0. 4 r
0. 3,
0. 4,
0. 4,
0. 2,
0. 4,
0 2,
4,
I,
41
2,
4,
4,
3,
4);
(* AIR NODE *
(* NETWORK RECOVERY INDICATOR *
(* FORWARD DIU STATE INDICATOR *
(* AOA SENSOR *'
(* AOA RECOVERY INDICATOR *
(* AOS SENSOR *
(* AOS RECOVERY INDICATOR *'
(* THROTTLE POSITION SENSOR *
(* THROTTLE FAILURE INDICATOR *
(* FTP CHANNEL STATUS *
(* FTP CHANNEL RECOVERY IND. *'
(* ROOT LINK STATUS *
(* ELECTRIC POWER STATE *
(* OTHER NODES IN A SINGLE NETWORK *
(* NO. OF FAILED ELEMENTS *'
START = ( 4, 0, 4, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 4, 0, 0 );
PRUNEIF NFAIL > 2;
DEATHIF FTP < 2;
DEATHIF FTPREC > I;
DEATHIF AOAREC > 1 OR AOSREC > i;
DEATHIF AOA-AOAREC < 1 OR AOS-AOSKEC < i;
DEATHIF THROT-THROTKEC < I;
DEATHIF AIRREC = 3 OR ONREC = 3;
DEATHIF AIRREC + ONREC > I;
DEATHIF AIRREC + AOAREC + AOSREC > I;
DEATHIF ONREC + AOAKEC + AOSREC > I;
DEATHIF ROOT < 3 AND ( AOAKEC > 0 OR AOSREC > 0 OR THROTREC > 0
OK AIRREC > 0 OR ONKEC > 0 );
LIST = 3;
TIME = 3.0;
PRUNE = 1.0E-16;
ECHO = 0;
LAMANG = 33.0E-6;
LAMPRESS= 20.0E-6;
LAMPOS = 10.0E-6;
(* FLOW ANGLE SENSOR FAILURE RATE
(* PRESSURE SENSOR FAILURE RATE
(* POSITION SENSOR FAILURE RATE
*)
*)
*)
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LAMNOD = 17.0E-6;
LAMDIU = 15.0E-6;
REC.MEAN = 3.0E-4;
KECSTD = I. 0E-4;
NWMEAN = 3.0E-4;
NWSTD = 1.0E-4;
LAMPS = I0.0E-6;
LAMEL = 50.0E-6;
LAMFTP = 200.0E-6;
LAMROOT = 15.0E-6;
FTPMEAN = 5.0E-6;
FTPSTD = 1.0E-6;
LAMON = 255.0E-6;
(* NODE FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED
(* DIU FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED
(* RECOVERY TIME MEAN
(* RECOVERY TIME STD DEV
(* NW RECOVERY TIME MEAN
(* NW RECOVERY TIME STD DEV
(* LOCAL POWER SUPPLY RATE - CONDITIONED
(* ELECTRIC POWER CENTER FAILURE RATE
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURE RATE
(* FTP NETWORK INTERFACE FAILURE RATE
(* FTP RECOVERY TIME MEAN
(* FTP RECOVERY TIME STD DEV
(* OTHER NODES ON SINGLE NW FAIL RATE
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
(* AOA SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF AOA > 0 AND AOAKEC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 AND AIRREC = 0 AND ONKEC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR AOA = 2 THEN
TRANTO AOA = AOA-I, AOAKEC=AOAREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOA*LAMANG;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN
(* SINGLE NETWORK SUSCEPTIBILITY *)
TKANTO AOA=AOA-I, AOAKEC=AOAREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2/3)*LAMANG;
TRANTO AOA=AOA-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ((AOA - 2) + 4/3 )*LAMANG;
ELSE
TRANTO AOA = AOA-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOA*LAMANG;
ENDIF;
ELSE
ENDIF;
(* NEARLY COINCIDENT SENSOR-NETWORK *)
IF AIRREC > 0 (* SAME NODE SET *)
TKANTO AOA = AOA-I, AOAREC=AOAREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (AOA+I)*LAMANG /2;
IF ONKEC > 0 (* OTHER NODES *)
TRANTO AOA = AOA-I, AOAREC=AOAREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOA*LAMANG /2;
IF AOAKEC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TRANTO AOAREC = 0 BY < RECMEAN, RECSTD >;
TRANTO AOA = AOA-I, AOAREC=AOAREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOA*LAMANG;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
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(* AOS SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF AOS > 0 AND AOAREC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0
AND FTPKEC = 0 AND AIKREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR AOS = 2 THEN
TKANTO AOS = AOS-I, AOSKEC=AOSKEC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOS*LAMANG;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN
(* SINGLE NETWORK SUSCEPTIBILITY *)
TKANTO AOS=AOS-I, AOSREC=AOSREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2/3)*LAMANG;
TRANTO AOS=AOS-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ((AOS - 2) + 4/3 )*LAMANG;
ELSE
TKANTO AOS = AOS-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOS*LAMANG;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT SENSOR-NETWORK *)
IF AIRREC > 0 (* SAME NODE SET *)
TKANTO AOS = AOS-I, AOSREC=AOSREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (AOS+I)*LAMANG /2;
IF ONREC > 0 (* OTHER NODES *)
TRANTO AOS = AOS-I, AOSREC=AOSREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOS*LAMANG /2;
IF AOSREC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TKANTO AOSREC = 0 BY < RECMEAN, RECSTD >;
TRANTO AOS = AOS-I, AOSREC=AOSREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY AOS*LAMANG;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* THROTTLE SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF THROT > 0 AND AOAREC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 AND AIKREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF THROT = 2 THEN
TRANTO THROT=THROT-I, THROTREC=THROTREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY THROT*LAMPOS;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN
(* SINGLE NETWORK SUSCEPTIBILITY *)
TRANTO THROT=THROT-I, THROTREC=THROTREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2/3)*LAMPOS;
TRANTO THROT=THROT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ((THROT - 2) + 4/3 )*LAMPOS;
ELSE
TRANTO THROT = THROT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY THROT*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* AIR AREANODEFAILURES*)
IF AIKNOD> 0 ANDAIRREC= 0 AND
AOAREC= 0 ANDAOSREC= 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF AOA < 3 OR AOS < 3 THEN
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION FAILURE *)
TRANTO AIRNOD=AIRNOD-I, AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I,
AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, THROT=THROT-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
AIRREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY (2/3)*LAMNOD;
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION AVOIDED *)
TRANTO AIRNOD=AIRNOD-I, AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I,
AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, THROT=THROT-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ((AIRNOD-2) + 4/3)*LAMNOD;
ELSE (* NO TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION VULNERABILITY *)
IF ROOT = 2 THEN (* SINGLE NETWORK VULNERABILITY *)
TRANTO AIRNOD=AIKNOD-I, AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I,
AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, THROT=THROT-!, ROOT=ROOT-l,
AIRREC=AIRREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY (2/3)*LAMNOD;
TRANTO AIRNOD=AIRNOD-I, AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I,
AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, THROT=THROT-I, ROOT=ROOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ((AIRNOD-2) + 4/3)*LAMNOD;
ELSE (* NO SINGLE NETWORK VULNERABILITY *)
(* IN THIS MODEL FAULTS ARE ON SEPARATE "CHANNELS" *)
(* FORWARD NODE FAILURE AFFECTS ROOT LINK AND DIU *)
IF NFAIL = 0 THEN
TKANTO AIRNOD=AIRNOD-I, AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I,
AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, THROT=THROT-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
AIRREC=AIRREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY AIRNOD* LAMNOD;
ELSE
TRANTO AIRNOD=AIRNOD-I, AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I,
AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, THROT=THROT-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ROOT* AOA*AOS* THROT* LAMNOD/
( (AIKNOD+ELMC-4)* AIRDIU**2 );
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT NETWORK-SENSOR FAILURES *)
IF AIRREC = 1 THEN (* SAME NODE SET *)
(* NETWORK RECOVERY *)
TRANTO AIRREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
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TRANTO AIRREC = 3, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2*LAMNOD;
ENDIF;
IF ONREC = 1
TRANTO AIRREC = 3, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2*LAMNOD;
IF AOAREC = 1 OR AOSREC = 1
TRANTO AIKNOD=AIRNOD-I, AIRKEC=AIR/_C+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY
AIRNOD*LAMNOD /2;
ENDIF;
(* OTHER NODE FAILURES *)
IF AIRREC = 0 AND
AOAREC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF AOA < 3 OR AOS < 3 THEN
(* TEMPORARY EXHAUSTION VULNERABLE *)
TRANTO ONREC=2, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON/3;
ELSE
IF ROOT = 2 THEN (* SINGLE NW VULNERABLE *)
ELSE
TRANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON/3;
ELSE
IF NFAIL = 0 TRANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY
2*LAMON;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* NEARLY COINCIDENT FAILURES- RECOVERIES *)
IF ONREC = 1 THEN
TRANTO ONREC = 0 BY < NWMEAN, NWSTD >;
TRANTO ONREC = 3, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON;
ENDIF;
IF AIRREC = 1
TRANTO ONREC = 3, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON;
IF AOAREC=I OR AOSKEC = 1
TRANTO ONREC=I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LAMON;
ENDIF;
(* FORWARD DIU FAILURES *)
IF AIRDIU > 0 AND AIRREC = 0 AND
AOAREC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
TRANTO AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I, AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, THROT=THROT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY AOA*AOS* THROT*( LAMDIU + LAMPS ) / AIRDIU**2;
ENDIF;
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURES *)
IF FTP > 0 AND AOAREC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0
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AND AIRREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 THEN
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, FTPREC=FTPREC+I, ROOT=ROOT-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY FTP*LAMFTP ;
ELSE
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROOT* LAMFTP ;
ENDIF;
ELSE
IF FTPREC > 0 THEN
(* FTP CHANNEL RECOVERY *)
TRANTO FTPREC=FTPREC-I BY < FTPI_EAN, FTPSTD >;
(* COINCIDENT FAULT *)
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, FTPREC=FTPREC+I, ROOT=ROOT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY FTP*LAMFTP ;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* NETWORK INTERFACE FAILURES *)
IF ROOT > 2 AND AOAREC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 AND AIRREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0
TRANTO ROOT=ROOT-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ROOT*LAI_OOT;
(*** ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION FAILURES ***)
IF ELMC > 0 AND AOAREC = 0 AND AOSREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 AND AIRREC = 0 AND ONREC = 0 THEN
(* ELMC FAILURE AFFECTS DIU, FTP AND ROOT LINK *)
(* IN THIS MODEL FAULTS ON DIFFERENT "CHANNELS" *)
TRANTO AIRDIU=AIRDIU-I,
AOA=AOA-I, AOS=AOS-I, FTP=FTP-I, THROT=THROT-I,
ROOT=ROOT-I, ELMC=ELMC-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY ROOT* AOA* AOS* THROT*
LAMEL / ( (AIRNOD+ELMC-4)* AIRDIU**2 );
ENDIF;
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(***
(*
(*
Forward Area Model - Safety Criteria - Bus Option
Group A
***)
*)
*)
SPACE
START
PRUNEIF
DEATHIF
DEATHIF
DEATHIF
= ( FWDIU:
PITSTK:
PITREC:
ROLSTK:
ROLREC:
YAWPED:
YAWREC:
FTP:
FTPREC:
ROOT:
NFAIL:
0 .4t
0 .4,
0 .2,
0 .4,
0 .2,
0 .4,
0 .2,
0 .4,
0 .2,
0 .4,
0 .4);
(* FORWARD DIU STATE INDICATOR *)
(* PITCH COF_AND SENSOR *)
(* PITCH SENSOR RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* ROLL COMMAND SENSOR *)
(* ROLL SENSOR RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* YAW COMMAND SENSOR *)
(* YAW SENSOR RECOVERY INDICATOR *)
(* FTP CHANNEL STATUS *)
(* FTP CHANNEL RECOVERY IND. *)
(* ROOT LINK STATUS *)
(* NO. OF FAILED ELEMENTS *)
= ( 4, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 4, 0 );
NFAIL > 2;
PITREC > i OR ROLREC > i OR
YAWREC > I;
PITSTK-PITKEC < 1 OR ROLSTK-ROLREC < 1 OR YAWPED-YAWREC < I;
FTP - FTPREC < i;
LIST = 2;
TIME = 3.0;
PRUNE = 1.0E-16;
ECHO = 0;
LAMPOS = 10.0E-6;
LAMNOD = 15.0E-6;
LAMDIU = 15.0E-6;
POSMEAN = 3.0E-4;
POSSTD = 1.0E-4;
NWMEAN = 3.0E-4;
NWSTD = 1.0E-4;
LAMPS = 10.0E-6;
LAMEL = 50.0E-6;
LAMFTP = 200.0E-6;
LAMROOT = 15.0E-6;
FTPMEAN = 5.0E-6;
FTPSTD = 1.0E-6;
LAMGYRO = 50.0E-6;
LAMACC = 30.0E-6;
LAMOD = 127.5E-6;
(* DIUACT = 0.I0; *)
(* POSITION SENSOR FAILURE KATE *)
(* NODE FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED *)
(* DIU FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED *)
(* RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
(* LOCAL POWER SUPPLY RATE - CONDITIONED
(* ELECTRIC POWER CENTER FAILURE RATE
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURE RATE
(* FTP NETWORK INTERFACE FAILURE RATE
(* FTP RECOVERY TIME MEAN
(* FTP RECOVERY TIME STD DEV
(* GYRO FAILURE RATE
(* ACCELEROMETEK FAILURE KATE
(* OTHER DIUS ON SINGLE BUS
(* DIU ACTIVE FAILURE FRACTION
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
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(* PITCH COMMAND SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF PITSTK > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR PITSTK = 2 THEN
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, PITKEC=PITREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*LAMPOS;
ELSE
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT FAILURES *)
IF PITREC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TRANTO PITREC = 0 BY < POSMEAN, POSSTD >;
TRANTO PITSTK = PITSTK-I, PITREC=PITREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* ROLL COMMAND SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF ROLSTK > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FTPKEC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR ROLSTK = 2 THEN
TRANTO ROLSTK = ROLSTK-I, ROLKEC=ROLREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROLSTK*LAMPOS;
ELSE
TRANTO ROLSTK _ ROLSTK-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROLSTK*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT FAILURES *)
IF ROLREC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TRANTO ROLREC = 0 BY < POSMEAN, POSSTD >;
TKANTO ROLSTK = ROLSTK-I, KOLKEC=ROLREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ROLSTK*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* YAW CO_ SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF YAWPED > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR YAWPED _ 2 THEN
TRANTO YAWPED = YAWPED-I, YAWREC=YAWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY YAWPED*LAMPOS;
ELSE
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TRANTO YAWPED = YAWPED-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY YAWPED*LAMPOS ;
ENDIF;
ELSE (* NEARLY COINCIDENT FAILURES *)
IF YAWREC > 0 THEN (* RECOVERY OR SYSTEM LOSS *)
TRANTO YAWREC = 0 BY < POSMEAN, POSSTD >;
TRANTO YAWPED = YAWPED-l, YAWREC=YAWREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY YAWPED*LAMPOS;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(*
(*
(*
*** FORWARD DIU FAILURES *** *)
PASSIVE FAILURE TRANSITIONS LISTED HERE. ACTIVE *)
FAILURE TRANSITIONS IN BUS AND INTERFACE FAILURE AREA. *)
IF FWDIU > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND
YAWREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0 THEN
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I, ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=
YAWPED-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY PITSTK* KOLSTK* YAWPED* ( LAMDIU*
(I.0-DIUACT) + LAMPS ) / FWDIU**2;
IF FWDIU > PITSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED PITSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=
YAWPED-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY (FWDIU-PITSTK)*ROLSTK*
YAWPED*(LAMDIU*(I.0-DIUACT) + LAMPS ) / FWDIU**2;
IF FWDIU > ROLSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED ROLSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I, YAWPED=
YAWPED-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY PITSTK*(FWDIU-ROLSTK)*
YAWPED*(LAMDIU*(I.0-DIUACT) + LAMPS ) / FWDIU**2;
ENDIF;
IF FWDIU > YAWPED (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED YAWPED *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I, ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY PITSTK*ROLSTK*(FWDIU-YAWPED)*
(LAMDIU*(I.0-DIUACT) + LAMPS ) / FWDIU**2;
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURES *)
IF FTP > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0
AND FTPREC = 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0 OR FTP = 2 THEN
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I, ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=
YAWPED-l, FTP=FTP-I, FTPREC=FTPREC+I, ROOT=ROOT-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY FTP*LAMFTP;
ELSE
(* FAILURE AFFECTS DIU, FTP AND ROOT LINK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-I, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY PITSTK*ROLSTK*YAWPED*
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LAMFTP / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > PITSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED PITSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWD IU- I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (FWDIU-PITSTK) *ROLSTK*YAWPED* LAMFTP /
( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > ROLSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED ROLSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
YAWPED=YAWPED-l, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*(FWDIU-ROLSTK)*YAWPED* LAMFTP /
( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > YAWPED (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED YAWPED *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK* ROLSTK*(FWDIU-YAWPED)*
LAMFTP / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF ROOT > FWDIU
(* AFFECTED CHANNEL HAS FAILED DIU *)
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (ROOT-FWDIU) * LAMFTP;
IF FTP > ROOT (* AFFECTED CHANNEL HAS FAILED ROOT *)
ELSE
ENDIF;
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (FTP-ROOT)* LAMFTP;
IF FTPKEC > 0 THEN
(* FTP CHANNEL RECOVERY *)
TRANTO FTPREC=FTPREC-I BY < FTPMEAN, FTPSTD >;
(* COINCIDENT FAULT *)
TKANTO FTP=FTP-I, FTPKEC=FTPREC+I, ROOT=ROOT-l, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY FTP*LAMFTP;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* BUS AND NETWORK INTERFACE FAILURES *)
IF ROOT > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWKEC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0
THEN
(* FAILURE AFFECTS DIU AND ROOT LINK *)
TKANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
KOLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-I, ROOT=ROOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY PITSTK*ROLSTK*YAWPED*
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ENDIF;
( LAMROOT + (LAMDIU + LAMOD) * DIUACT ) / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > PITSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED PITSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (FWDIU-PITSTK)* ROLSTK* YAWPED* ( LAMROOT +
(LAMDIU + LAMOD) * DIUACT ) / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > ROLSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED ROLSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
YAWPED=YAWPED-l, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK* (FWDIU-ROLSTK)* YAWPED* ( LAMROOT +
(LAMDIU + LAMOD) * DIUACT ) / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > YAWPED (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED YAWPED *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK* ROLSTK* (FWDIU-YAWPED)*
( LAMROOT + (LAMDIU + LAMOD) * DIUACT ) / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF ROOT > FWDIU
(* AFFECTED CHANNEL HAS FAILED DIU *)
TRANTO ROOT=ROOT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (ROOT-FWDIU)* ( LAMROOT + LAMOD*DIUACT );
(*** ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION FAILURES ***)
IF FTP > 0 AND PITREC = 0 AND ROLREC = 0 AND YAWREC = 0 AND FTPREC = 0
THEN
(* FAILURE AFFECTS DIU, FTP AND ROOT LINK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-I, FTP=FTP-I, KOOT=KOOT-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY PITSTK*ROLSTK*YAWPED*
LAMEL / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > PITSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED PITSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, YAWPED=YAWPED-l, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (FWDIU-PITSTK)*ROLSTK*YAWPED* LAMEL /
( FWDIU**2 );
IF FWDIU > ROLSTK (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED ROLSTK *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
YAWPED=YAWPED-l, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK*(FWDIU-ROLSTK)*YAWPED* LAMEL /
( FWDIU**2 );
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ENDIF;
IF FWDIU > YAWPED (* AFFECTED DIU HAS FAILED YAWPED *)
TRANTO FWDIU=FWDIU-I, PITSTK=PITSTK-I,
ROLSTK=ROLSTK-I, FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY PITSTK* ROLSTK* (FWDIU-YAWPED) *
LAMEL / ( FWDIU**2 );
IF ROOT > FWDIU
(* AFFECTED CHANNEL HAS FAILED DIU *)
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, ROOT=ROOT-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (ROOT-FWDIU) * LAMEL;
IF FTP > ROOT (* AFFECTED CHANNEL HAS FAILED ROOT *)
TRANTO FTP=FTP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (FTP-ROOT)* LAMEL;
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(***
(*
(*
Mid Area Model - Safety Criteria - Bus Option
Group A
***)
*)
*)
SPACE = ( DU_9_YI:
MIDDIU:
GYRO:
GYKEC:
ACCEL:
ACCREC:
CNDP :
CNDV:
HYD :
ELMC :
NFAIL:
0. Ir
0. 4,
0. 8,
0. 2,
0. 8,
0. 2,
0. 4,
0. 4,
0. 2,
0. 4,
0. 4);
(* MID DIU STATE INDICATOR
(* GYROS
(* GYRO RECOVERY INDICATOR
(* ACCELEROMETERS
(* ACCEL RECOVERY INDICATOR
(* CND CHANNEL STATE
(* CND VALVE STATE
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM STATE
(* ELMC STATE INDICATOR
(* NO. OF FAILED ELEMENTS
START = ( 0, 4, 8, 0, 8, 0, 4, 4, 2, 4, 0 );
PRUNEIF NFAIL > 2;
DEATHIF GYRO-GYREC < 3 OR ACCEL-ACCKEC < 3;
DEATHIF CNDV = 0;
LIST = 2;
TIME = 3.0;
PRUNE = 1.0E-16;
ECHO = 0;
POINTS = 6;
LAMGYRO = 50.0E-6;
LAMACC = 30.0E-6;
LAMNOD = 15.0E-6;
LAMDIU = 15.0E-6;
GYRMEAN = 3.0E-4;
GYRSTD = 1.0E-4;
ACCMEAN = 3.0E-4;
ACCSTD = 1.0E-4;
(* GYRO FAILURE RATE *)
(* ACCELEROMETER FAILURE RATE *)
(* NODE FAILURE RATE - CONDITIONED *)
(* DIU FAILURE KATE - CONDITIONED *)
(* RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
(* ACC RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* ACC RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
LAMC = 50.0E-6;
LAMPOS = 10.0E-6;
LAMV = 15.0E-6;
VJAM = 3.3333E-5;
LAMBYD = 45.0E-6;
(* PROCESSOR FAILURE BATE *)
(* POSITION SENSOR FAILURE RATE *)
(* VALVE GROUP FAILURE KATE *)
(* ACTUATOR JAM FAILURE FRACTION *)
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAIL RATE *)
LAMPS = I0.0E-6;
LAMEL = 50.0E-6;
NWMEAN = 3.0E-4;
NWSTD = I. 0E-4;
LAMON = 255.0E-6;
LAMFTP = 200.0E-6;
LAMROOT = 15.0E- 6;
LAMOD = 127.5E-6;
(* DIUACT = 0.i0; *)
(* LOCAL POWER SUPPLY - CONDITIONED *)
(* ELMC FAILURE BATE *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME MEAN *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME STD DEV *)
(* OTHER NODES FAILURE RATE *)
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURE RATE *)
(* BUS INTERFACE FAILURE RATE *)
(* OTHER DIUS ON BUS FAILURE RATE *)
(* DIU ACTIVE FAILURE FRACTION
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
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(* GYRO SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF GYRO > 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 THEN
IF GYRO = 4 THEN (* EXHAUSTION *)
TRANTO GYRO = GYRO-I, GYREC--GYREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY GYRO*LAMGYRO;
ELSE
TKANTO GYRO = GYRO-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY GYRO*LAMGYRO;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(* ACCEL SENSOR FAILURES AND RECOVERIES *)
IF ACCEL > 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 THEN
IF ACCEL = 4 THEN (* EXHAUSTION *)
TRANTO ACCEL = ACCEL-I, ACCREC=ACCREC+I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ACCEL*LAMACC;
ELSE
TRANTO ACCEL = ACCEL-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY ACCEL*LAMACC;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(*** ACTUATOR PROCESSOR GROUP FAILURE TRANSITIONS ***)
IF CNDP > 0 THEN
TRANTO CNDP=CNDP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
ENDIF;
BY 2*CNDP*(LAMC + LAMPOS);
(*** VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF CNDV > 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
TRANTO CNDV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY CNDV*VJAM*LAMV;
TRANTO CNDV=CNDV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY CNDV*(I.0-VJAM)*LAMV;
ENDIF;
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURES *)
IF HYD > 0 AND (HYD-NFAIL >= 0 ) THEN
TRANTO CNDV=CNDV-2, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY CNDV*(CNDV-I)*LAMHYD / ( 2* (2*HYD-I));
IF (2*HYD-CNDV) > 0
TKANTO CNDV=CNDV-I, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2*HYD-CNDV)*2*CNDV*LAMHYD / ( 2* (2*HYD-I) );
IF (2*HYD-CNDV) > 1
TRANTO HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2*HYD-CNDV)*(2*HYD-CNDV-I)*LAMHYD / ( 2* (2*HYD-I) );
ENDIF;
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(* MID DIU FAILURES *)
IF MIDDIU > 0 AND GYKEC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 THEN
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-2, CNDP=CNDP-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)* CNDP*
(LAMDIU + LAMPS)/ ( 2* (2*MIDDIU)*
(2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF 2*MIDDIU - GYRO > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED GYRO *)
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-I, ACCEL=ACCEL-2, CNDP=CNDP-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2*GYRO* (2*MIDDIU-GYRO)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)* CNDP*
(LAMDIU + LAMPS)/ ( 2* (2*MIDDIU)*
(2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF 2*MIDDIU - ACCEL > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED ACCELEROMETEK *)
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-I, CNDP=CNDP-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* 2*ACCEL* (2*MIDDIU-ACCEL)* CNDP*
(LAMDIU + LAMPS)/ ( 2* (2*MIDDIU)*
(2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
ENDIF;
IF MIDDIU - CNDP > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED CND PROCESSOR *)
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-1, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-2,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)* (MIDDIU-CNDP)*
(LAMDIU + LAMPS)/ ( 2* (2*MIDDIU)*
(2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
(* BUS CENTRAL FAILURES - NOT COMMON TO FOR MODEL *)
IF MIDDIU > 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCREC = 0 THEN
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-2, CNDP=CNDP-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)* CNDP*
( LAMKOOT+ (LAMOD)*DIUACT) /
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF 2*MIDDIU - GYRO > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED GYRO *)
T_O MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-I, ACCEL=ACCEL-2, CNDP=CNDP-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2* GYRO* (2*MIDDIU-GYRO)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)*
CNDP* ( LAMROOT+ (LAMOD)*DIUACT) /
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF 2*MIDDIU - ACCEL > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED ACCELEROMETER *)
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYKO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-I, C:DP=CNDP-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* 2* ACCEL* (2*MIDDIU-ACCEL)*
CNDP* ( LAMROOT+ (LAMOD)*DIUACT) /
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF MIDDIU - CNDP > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED CND PROCESSOR *)
TKANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-2,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)* (MIDDIU-ChUP)*
( LAMROOT+ (LAMOD)*DIUACT) /
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ENDIF;
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
(* CENTRAL FAILURES - INCLUDES ELEMENTS COMMON TO FOR MODEL *)
IF ELMC > 0 AND GYREC = 0 AND ACCKEC = 0 THEN
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO=GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-2, CNDP=CNDP-I,
ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)* CNDP*
( LAMFTP + nAiL ) /
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF 2*MIDDIU - GYRO > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED GYRO *)
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYRO--GYRO-I, ACCEL=ACCEL-2, CNDP=CNDP-I,
ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY 2* GYRO* (2*MIDDIU-GYRO)* ACCEL*
(ACCEL-I)* CNDP* ( LAMFTP + LAMEL ) /
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU');
IF 2*MIDDIU - ACCEL > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED ACCELEROMETER *)
TRANTO MIDDIU=MIDDIU-I, GYROsGYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-I, CNDP=CNDP-I,
ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* 2* ACCEL*
(2*MIDDIU-ACCEL)* CNDP* ( 12LMFTP + LAMEL ) /
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF MIDDIU - CNDP > 0 (* DIU HAS FAILED CND PROCESSOR *)
TRANTO MIDDIU--MIDDIU-I, GYRO--GYRO-2, ACCEL=ACCEL-2, ELMC=ELMC-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY GYRO* (GYRO-I)* ACCEL* (ACCEL-I)* (MIDDIU-CNDP)*
( LAMFTP + LAMEL ) /
( 2* (2*MIDDIU)* (2*MIDDIU-I)**2 *MIDDIU );
IF ELMC - MIDDIU > 0 (* CHANNEL HAS FAILED DIU *)
ENDIF;
TRANTO ELMC=ELMC-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY (ELMC-MIDDIU)*LAMEL;
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(***
(*
(*
Wing and Tail Area Model - Safety Criteria - Bus Option
Group A
***)
*)
*)
SPACE = ( DU_a_YI: 0
DUMMY2 : 0
RWP : 0
RWV: 0
LWP : 0
LWV: 0
TLP : 0
TLV : 0
HYD : 0
BUS : 0
NFAIL: 0
if
I,
4, (* RW CHANNEL STATE *)
4, (* RW VALVE STATE *)
4, (* LW CHANNEL STATE *)
4, (* LW VALVE STATE *)
4, (* TL CHANNEL STATE *)
4, (* TL VALVE STATE *)
2, (* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM STATE *)
4, (* CENTRAL BUS STATE *)
4); (* NO. OF FAILED ELEMENTS *)
START = ( 0, 0, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 4, 0 );
PRUNEIF NFAIL > 2;
DEATHIF RWV = 0;
DEATHIF LWV = 0;
DEATHIF TLV = 0;
LIST = 2;
TIME = 3.0;
PRUNE = 1.0E-16;
ECHO = 0;
POINTS = 6;
LAMC = 50.0E-6;
LAMPOS = 10.0E-6;
LAMSD = 20.0E-6;
LAMV = 15.0E-6;
VJAM = 3.3333E-5;
LAMNODH = 37.5E-6;
LAMDIUH = 37.5E-6;
LAMHYD = 45.0E-6;
LAMPSH = 25.0E-6;
LAMEL = 50.0E-6;
NWMEAN = 3.0E-4;
NWSTD = 1.0E-4;
LAMON = 60.0E-6;
LAMOD = 30.0E-6;
LAMFTP = 200.0E-6;
LAMROOT = 15.0E-6;
(* DIUACT = 0.I0; *)
(* PROCESSOR FAILURE RATE *)
(* POSITION SENSOR FAILURE RATE *)
(* SERVODRIVE GROUP FAILURE RATE *)
(* VALVE GROUP FAILURE RATE *)
(* ACTUATOR JAM FAILURE FRACTION *)
(* NODE FAILURE RATE - HARSH *)
(* DIU FAILURE RATE - HARSH *)
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAIL KATE *)
(* LOCAL POWER SUPPLY RATE - HARSH *)
(* ELMC FAILURE RATE *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME - MEAN *)
(* NW RECOVERY TIME - STD DEV *)
(* OTHER NODE FAILURE RATE *)
(* OTHER DIUS ON 1 BUS FAIL RATE *)
(* FTP CHANNEL FAILURE RATE *)
(* BUS INTERFACE FAILURE RATE *)
(* DIU ACTIVE FAILURE FRACTION *)
A-34
(*** RW PROCESSOR GROUP FAILURE TRANSITIONS ***)
IF RWP > 0 THEN
TRANTO RWP=RWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
ENDIF;
(*** RW VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF RWV > 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
ENDIF;
BY 2*RWP*(LAMC + LAMPOS);
TRANTO RWV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWV*VJAM*LAMV;
TRANTO RWV=RWV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWV*(I.0-VJAM)*LAMV;
(* RW DIU FAILURES *)
IF RWP > 0 THEN
TRANTO RWP=RWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWP*(LAMDIUH*
(I.0-DIUACT) + LAMPSH);
ENDIF;
(*** LW PROCESSOR SROUP FAILURE TRANSITIONS
IF LWP > 0 THEN
TRANTO LWP=LWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
ENDIF;
(*** LW VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF LWV > 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
ENDIF;
***)
BY 2*LWP* (LAMC + LAMPOS);
TRANTO LWV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LWV*VJAM*_;
TKANTO LWV=LWV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY LWV* (I.0-VJAM) *LAMV;
(* LW DIU FAILURES *)
IF LWP > 0 THEN
TRANTO LWP=LWP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
(I.0-DIUACT) + LAMPSH);
ENDIF;
BY LWP*(LAMDIUH*
(***
IF TLP > 0 THEN
TRANTO TLP=TLP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
ENDIF;
(*** TL VALVE GROUP FAILURES ***)
IF TLV > 0 THEN
IF NFAIL = 0
TRANTO TLV=0, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY TLV*VJAM*LAMV;
TL PROCESSOR GROUP FAILURE TRANSITIONS ***)
BY 2*TLP* (LAMC + LAMPOS);
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TRANTO TLV=TLV-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY TLV* (I. 0-VJAM) *LAMV;
ENDIF;
(* TL DIU FAILURES *)
IF TLP > 0 THEN
TRANTO TLP=TLP-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
(I.0-DIUACT) + LAMPSH);
ENDIF;
BY TLP* (LAMDIUH*
(* HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURES *)
IF HYD > 0 AND (HYD-NFAIL >= 0 ) THEN
TRANTO RWV=RWV-2, LWV=LWV-2, TLV=TLV-2, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY RWV* (RWV-I) *LWV* (LWV-I) *TLV* (TLV-I) *LAMHYD /
( 2* (2*HYD)**2 * (2*HYD-I)**3) ;
IF (2*HYD-RWV) > 0 THEN
TRANTO RWV=RWV-I, LWV=LWV-2, TLV=TLV-2, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY (2*HYD-RWV)*2*RWV*LWV*(LWV-I)*TLV*(TLV-I)*LAMHYD /
( 2* (2*HYD)**2 * (2*HYD-I)**3);
ENDIF;
IF (2*HYD-LWV) > 0 THEN
TKANTO RWV=RWV-2, LWV=LWV-I, TLV=TLV-2, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY RWV*(RWV-I)* 2*LWV*(2*HYD-LWV)* TLV*(TLV-I)*LAMHYD /
( 2* (2*HYD)**2 * (2*HYD-I)**3);
ENDIF;
IF (2*HYD-TLV) > 0 THEN
TRANTO RWV=RWV-2, LWV=LWV-2, TLV=TLV-I, HYD=HYD-I, NFAIL=NFAIL+I
BY RWV*(RWV-I)* LWV*(LWV-I)* 2*TLV*(2*HYD-TLV)*LAMHYD /
( 2* (2*HYD)**2 * (2*HYD-I)**3 );
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
(**** BUS CENTRAL AND ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION ***)
IF BUS > 0 THEN
TKANTO RWP=RWP-I, LWP=LWP-I, TLP=TLP-I, BUS=BUS-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWP* LWP* TLP* (LAMROOT+LAMFTP+LAMEL+
(LAMDIUH+LAMOD) * DIUACT) / ( BUS**2);
IF BUS - RWP > 0
TRANTO LWP=LWP-I, TLP=TLP-II BUS=BUS-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY (BUS-RWP)* LWP* TLP* (LAMROOT+LAMFTP+LAMEL+
(LAMOD) * DIUACT) / ( BUS**2);
IF BUS - LWP > 0
TRANTO KWP=RWP-I, TLP=TLP-I, BUS=BUS-l,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWP* (BUS-LWP)* TLP* (LAMROOT+LAMFTP+LAMEL+
(LAMOD) * DIUACT) / ( BUS**2);
A-36
IF BUS - TLP > 0
TKANTO RWP=RWP-I, LWP=LWP-I, BUS=BUS-I,
NFAIL=NFAIL+I BY RWP* LWP* (BUS-TLP)* (LAMROOT+LAMFTP+LAMEL+
(LAMOD) * DIUACT) / ( BUS**2);
ENDIF;
A-37
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BUSMESSAG
B-1
DEFINITION DEVM BusMossAq;
EXPORT BusMHsageType*, M_sageType, NodeComnandType,
PortNameTyp_, IOActivityChoice,
PortStateType, PortE_ableRogisterType,
NodeMes sagoCoumandType,
NodeMe s sageRo sports eType, D IUConmandType,
M_aborOfPorts PerNode, NumberOfNodes,
MakeNodoConfigurat ionComaand, MakeMonitorCoanand;
CONST _rOfNodes - 18;
Nu_berOfPortaPerNode - 5;
TYPE
NodeC_nandl_pe
Po_ane_pe
PortStateType
PortEnabloReg£ sterType
- (ChangoPortEnable, Null);
- [i . • NumberOfPortsPorNode ];
- (Enabled, Disabled);
- ARRAY PortNameTypo OF PortStateType;
NodeMessageCommandTypo - RECORD
CASE CoIBand : NodaCommandTyl_ OF
ChangePortEnablo :
PortEnableRogister : PortEnableRegisterType; i
Null :
END;
END;
NodeMQssageResponseType - RECORD
PortEnableRegister : PortEnableRegisterType;
END;
IOActivityChoice- (Input, Output, Grouped};
DIUCommandType - RECORD
Activity : 7OActivitychoice;
CoIBan_r : INTEGER;
END;
MessageType- (NodeInput, NodeOutput, DIUInput, DIUOutput};
BusMessageType - ENTITY
Address : INTEGER;
CASE Message : MessageType OF
Nodelnput :
Input
I NodoOutput :
Output
J DIUInput :
DIUCo_mand
I DIUOutput :
: N odeMes sageComman dType
: NodeMessageResponseType;
: DIUCommandType;
END;
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EI_);
(* This procedure generates a node configurtion command so that it
can be sent to the network to modify a node's port enable register. *)
PROCEDURE MakeNodeConfigurationCo®mand (NodeAddress : INTEGY_.,R;
Configuration : PortEnableRegistarType)
: BusMessageType;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure generates a node status command (i.s null comaand
to the node} to be used by the Network Manager to collect the
Network's Status. *}
PROCEDURE Mak_4onitorC_and (NodeAddress : INTEGER}
: BusMassagaType;
E_> BusMessag.
_3
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DEVM BusMessag;
EXPOSE
pROCEDURE MakeNodeConfi_urationCalland(NodaAddron : INTEGER;
Confi_ration : PortEnabl_isterType)
: Bus_s sageTy_;
V_ _d : Bus_ss_eType;
Portlndex : Port_4amoType;
BEGIN
NEW (C_mand) ;
C_mand ^ .Address :- NodeAddress;
Ccanand ^ .Message :- NodeInput;
C_a_d ^ .Input. Command :- ChangePortEnable;
FOR PortIndex :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
C_mnand ^.Input.PortEnableReglster [PortIndex] :- Configuration [PortIndex] ;
E_D;
RET_ (Co,mind) ;
END MakeNodeCon flgurationCo_mand;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE MakeMonitorCom,aand(NodeAddress : INTEGZR)
: BusMessageType;
VAR C_d : BusMessagoTypa;
BEGIN
NEW (Command) ;
Comaand ^ .Address :- NodeAcldress;
C_and^ .Message :- NodeInput;
C_a_d ^ .Input. Command :- Null;
RETURN (Command) ;
END MakaMonit orCommand;
************************************************************************
END;
BEGIN
END BusMessag.
_5
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DEFINITION MODULE TypeConst;
FROM BusMessag IMPORT PortNameType, NuaberOfNodes, NumberOfPortsPerNode;
EXPORT QUALIFIED NetworkElementType, ChannelIDType, PortArrayType,
NodeRecordType, PortRecord, NodeArra_rpe, StatusType,
PortConfigurationType, PortStatusRecord, PortStatusArray,
NodeStatusRecord, Ch_elStatusRecord, NodeStatusArray,
ChannelStatusArray, }hm_ezOfNotworks, NumberOf_OSPerChannel;
(* These decL1rations will need to be moved elsewhere when
a :ore appropiate home has been found for them. *)
CONST NuaberOfGPCS - 1;
NumberOfD IUS - 4;
NuaberOfNetworks - 2 ;
NumberOfIOSPerChannel - 3 ;
TYPE GPCAddressType - {I .. NumberOfGPCS] ;
ChannelIDType- (A, B, C);
DIUAddressType - [I .. NumberOfDIUS] ;
****************************************************************************
TYPE NetworEElementType- {GPC, Node, DIU, None);
NetworkElenentRocord - RECORD
CASE AdJacentElement : NetworkElementType OF
G_C:
G2CAddress : INTEGER;
Channel : ChannelIDType;
I Nods:
NodeNumber : INTEGER;
NodeAddress : INTEGER;
Por_ : PortNa_eType;
I DIU:
DIUAddress : INTEGER;
I None :
END;
END;
PortRecord - RECORD
Element : NetworkElementRecord;
END;
PortArrayType - ARRAY [1 .. NumberOfPortsPerNode] OF NetworkElementRecord;
NodeRecordType - RECORD
NodeAddress : INTEGER;
PortArray : PortArrayType;
END;
NodeArrayType- ARRAY 11 .. NumberOf_odes_ OF NodeRecordType;
************************************************************************
(* The types pertain to the Network Manager malntaining the status
of the Network. *)
StatusType- (Idle, Active, Failed};
_7
PortConfigurationType- (Inboard, Outboard);
PortStatusRecord - RECORD
CASE Status : StatusType OF
Active :
Direction : PortConfig_rationType;
J Idle, Failed:
END;
END;
PortStatusArray -ARRAY 11 .. NumberOfPortsPerNode] OF PortStatusRecord;
NodlStatueRecord - RECORD
Address : INTEGER;
Status : StatusType;
PortStatus : PortStatusArray;
E_;
ChannalStatusRecoEd - RECORD
_-_¢.Addzess : 1_1_'E_; (*_='_=CAdd=ess_.'ype;*)
ChannslID : ChannelIDTypQ;
Status : StatusType;
E_D;
NodeStatusArray - ARRAY (I .. NumberOfNodes] OF NodeStatusRecord;
ChannelStatusArray - ARRAY ChannellDType OF ChannelStatusRecord;
_onst.
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DEFINITION DEYM CentralDB;
FRON Bu_lag D_C_ PortNauoType, NumberOfPor_sPerNode, NumberOfNodes;
FRGM TypeConst IMPQRT NodeRecordTypa, NodeArrayType, NumberOfNetworks,
NumberOf 10SPerChannal;
EXPORT IOSConnactionType, _LateNodeData, Reac_odeInterConnections,
Finc_odeNumber, FindIOSConnections;
TYPE IOSConnectionRecord - RECORD
GPCAddree s : INTEGER;
NodeConnectedTo : INTEGER;
END;
IOSConnactionType - ARRAY [I .. NumberOfIOSPerChannel] OF IOSConnectionRecord;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure will update on element of the data that represents
the interelement connection of the I/O Network. *)
PROCEDURE UpdateNodeData(NodeNumber : INTEGER;
NetworkID : INTEGER;
Data : NodeRacordType) ;
***************************************************************************
(* The procedure will return the internal data structure that each
AIPS nod8 has initialized with its own data. *}
PROCEDURE ReadNodeInterConnectlons (NetworkID ' INTEGER;
VAR Noc_Connectiona : NodeArrayType) ;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure will search the Central Database for a node with
"Actress" as its node address and return its no_e number.
BEWARE: No check is done to see if the address given coressponda
to an address on youl network. If an address is given that
is not on your network, then the wrong number will he retruned. *)
PROCEDURE FindNodeNumber(Addrees : INTEGER} : INTEGER;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure will search the Central Database an return all the
lOS connections for a the indicated network. An lOS which is not
installed will have a zero ID. *)
PROCEDURE FindIOSConnections (NetworkID : INTEGER;
VAR ConnectionArray : IOSConnectionType);
****************************************************************************
TYPE NetworkDescriptionType - ARRAY [i .. NumberOfNetworks] OF NodeArrayType;
VAR NetworkDescription : NetworkDescriptionType;
END CentralDB.
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DEVM CentralDB;
FRGM BusMessag IMPORT PortNsmeType, NumberOfPortsParNode, NumberOfNode8;
FRCN TypeConst I_ORT NodoRocordType, NetworkEl_ntType, ChannelIDTypa,
NodeArrayTypo, NumberOfNotworks, NumborOfIOSPorChannel;
EXPOSE
************************************************************************
PROCXDURE UpdateNodQData (NodeNumber : INTEGER;
NetworkID : INTEGER;
Data : NodeRecor_Type) ;
VAR Portlndex : PortNameType;
NodeIndex : INTEGY_R;
CurrentNodoIndex : INTEGER;
Currant_Node : INTEGER;
BEGIN
W_TH NatworkDescription [NetworkID] [NodeN_mbar} DO
NodeAddrass "- Data.NodoAddres8;
FOR Portlndex :- i TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
CASE Data.PortArray [PortIndex] .AdJacentElmen_ OF
GPC:
PortArray[PortIndax] .AdJacantElomant :- G_C;
PortArrayIPortlndax] .G_CAddress :- Data.PortArray[Portlndex).GPCAddress;
PortArray[PortIndax] .Channel :- Data.PortArray(Por%Index] .Channel;
Node:
PortArray[PortIndex] .AdjacentElment :- Node;
PortArray[Portlndex] .NodeAddrass :- Data.PortArray[PortIndex] .NodeAddress;
PortArray[PortIndex] .Port :- Data.PortArray[PortIndex] .Port;
DIU :
PortArray[PortIndex] .AdJacantElemant :- DIU;
PortArray [Port Index]. DIUAddres s :- Data. Port.Array [Port Index]. DIUAddress;
None :
PortArray[PortIndex] .AdjacentElement :- None;
END;
END;
END;
(* Due to the nature of this DENET solution, the AIPS node numbers
of AIPS adjacent nodes cannot be sat when this proced_Lte
is called. To solve this probl _., the new information is entered,
(see above for loop) the database will be searchod and
correct node numbers entered. *)
FOR CurrentNodeIndex :- i TO NumberOfNodes DO
CurrentNoda :- NetworkDescriptionINetworkID] [CurrentNodeIndex] .
NodeAddress;
FOR NodeIndex :_ i TO NumberOfNodes DO
WITH NetworkDescription(NetworkID][NodeIndex] DO
IF (NodeAddress <> CurrentNode) THEN
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FOR PortIndQx :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNodo DO
IF (PortArray[PortIndex] .AdJacantElement -
Mode} AI_ (PortArray [Portlndex] .NodeAddress
- C_LrrentNode) TR_/
PortArray(Portlndex] .NodeNumber :-
CurrentNodeIndex;
END;
END;
END;
END;
DID;
PROCEDURE ReadNodelnterConnoctions (NetworkID : INTEGER;
VAR NodeCormections : NodeArral_pe);
VAR Nodelndex : INTEGZI%;
Portlndex : PortNameType;
BEGIN
FOR NodeIndex :- i TO N_ez'OfNodes DO"
NodoConnections (NodeIndex] .NodeAddress :-
NotworkDescription [NetworkID] [Nodelndox] .NodeAddress;
FOR Portlndex :- i TO N_mberOfPortsPorNode DO
WITH NetworkDoscription|NetworkID][Nodelndex].PortArray[PortIndex] DO
CASE AdJacentEl_nt OF
GPC:
NodeConn_tions[Nodelndex].PortArray[PortIndex].
AdJacentElment :- GPC;
N°deC°nnecti°ns[N°d°Index)'P°rtArray[PortIndex)'
GPC_idre88 :- GP_:l_ess;
NodeConnectlons(NodeIndex].PortArray(PortIndQx].
Channel :- Channel;
( Node:
NodoConnections[NodeIndex].PortArray[PortIndex].
AdJacenLElment :- Mode;
NodoConnectio.s(Nodelndex].PortArray(Portlndex].
NodoNumber :- NodeNumber;
NodoConnections[NodeIndex).Portkrray[Portlndex].
NodeAddress :- NodeAddress;
NodoConnections(NodeIndex].PortArrayIPortIndex].
Port :- Port;
I DIU:
NodeConnections[NodeIndex].PortArray{Portlndex].
AdjacentElment :- DIU;
NodeConnections(NodeIndex].PortArray(Portlndex].
DIUAddress :- DIU&ddress;
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I None :
NodoConnections [NodoIndex] .PortArray [Portlndex].
AdJacentElement :- None;
END;
END;
END;
E_;
E_ ReadNode InterConnect ion s;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE FindNodeNumber(Address : INTEGER) :INTEGER;
VAR NetworkIndex : INTEGER;
NodeIndex : INTEGER;
BEGIN
FOR NetworkIndox :- i TO NumberOfNetworks DO
FOR NodeIndex :- I TO NmlberOfNodes DO
IF NetworkDescription [NetworkIndex] [NodeIndex] .NodeAddress
- Address TH_
RETURN (NodeIndex} ;
E_D;
_D;
RETU-_ (0) ;
END FindNodeNumber;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE FindIOSConnections (NetworkID : INTEGER;
VAR ConnectionArray : IOSConnectionType) ;
VAR Nodld_umber : INTEGER;
Counter : INTEGER;
Index : INTEGER;
Pot tIndex : Pot tNameType;
BEGIN
Counter :- I;
NodeNumber :- i;
WHILE NodeNumber <- NumberOfNodes DO
WITH NetworkDescription (NetworkID] tNodeNumbor] DO
FOR PortIndex :- i TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
IF PortArrey[PortIndex] .AdjacentElement - GPC THEN
ConnectionArray[Counter] .GPCAddress :- PortArray[Portlndex].
GPC&ddress ;
ConnectionArray[Counter] .NodeConnectedTo :- NodeNumber;
Counter :- Counter + i;
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END;
NodeNumber :-NodeNumbor + I;
END;
END;
(* Set elements in connection array who do not have IOS's
conneatod to them to O. *)
IF Counter <- NumberOfIOSPerChannel THEN
FOR Index :- Counter TO NumberOfIOSPerChannel DO
ConnectionArray [Index] .GPCAddress :- 0;
END;
END;
END FindIOSConnections;
************************************************************************
END;
EVENT Dum.y : INTEGER;
VAR PortIndex : PortNemeType;
Node Index : INTEGER;
NetworkIndex : INTEGER;
****************************************************************************
BEGIN
(* Initialize the Network Description so that all nodes are
connected to no elements as an initial state. *)
FOR Networklndex :- I TO NumberOfNetworks DO
FOR Nodelndex :- 1 TO NumberOfNodes DO
NetworkDescription [NetworkIndex] [NodeIndex] .NodeAddress := NodeZndex;
FOR PortIndex :- I TO NunbarOfPortsPorNode DO
NetworkDescription [NetworkIndex] [NodeIndex] .PortArray [Portlndex] .AdjacentElement
:_ None;
END;
END;
END;
LOOP
WAITUNTIL EVENT
Dummy: ;
END;
END;
END CentralDB.
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DEVM AIPSNode;
FROM BusMossag REACH BusMossageTypo*;
FROM BusMossag IMPORT PortEnableRegisterType, PortNamoTypo,
NumborOfPortsPerNode, PortStateType, MossagaType,
FROM ContralDB I/_ORT UpdateNodeData;
FROM TypeConst IMPORT PortArraFType, PortRecord, getworkElmentType,
NodeRecordType, ChannelIDType;
(* This will allow the initialization of the database that will be
used by the notwork manager. The array im1_orted is from the
DENET Node Manager modulo, and it describes the intorconnections
of each instaaco of the DENET nodes. *)
FROM Node_4 IMPORT FindConnector;
INPUTS
EVENT NodoCcemandFrano : BusMessaqoTypo;
Reset : BOOLEAN;
PARA Net work_ID
NodLNunbor
SequenctrTimoLower
SoquancarT_U_r
InitialConfig_ration
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: REAL;
: REAL;
: ARRAY [I .. Numbeu_OfPortsPerNode] OF BOOLEAN;
END;
0_TPUTS
VAR NodeResponsaFrame : BusMossageType;
END;
VAR MessageFromNetwork : BusMossageType;
PortEnableRoglstor : Pot tEnableRegist erTypo;
Port : Pot tNameTypo;
NodeData : NodeRecordType;
PortIndax : Pot tN_eType;
AdjacentNodeID : INTEGER;
AdjacentNodoType : _;
InPort : INTEGER;
OutPort : INTEGER;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure ks responsible for transmitting traffic to the
network from the sequencer.
It consults the port activity register to determine if a port is
enabled, if it is, the message is transmitted to the network
fr_ that port. *)
PROCEDURE Transmit (Message : BusHess&ge_¥pe) ;
VAR StreAm : INTEGER;
SequencerTime : REAL;
Portlndax : PortNaaeTypo;
BEGIN
Stream :- 1;
(* Compute the Sequencer Response Time for this message. *)
SequencerT/me :- Randy(Stream, SequencerTimeLower, SequencerTimeUpper);
FOR Portlndox :- 1 TO OutArcs DO
(* Chock to see if this port is enabled. *)
IF PortEnableRegister[Portlndax] - Enabled THEN
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AFTER SequencerTime outport [PortIndex] ^ .NodoResponseFrane <- Message;
END;
Eh_;
END Transn/t;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure is responsible for processing network traffic received
on a port of this node and formatting a response for transnission
if one i8 required. *)
PROCED_ Sequencer (Command : BusMessageTypo);
VAR CcmaandRosponseFrame : BusMessageType;
Port Index : PortNameType;
BEGIN
(* Begin processing message. *)
(* Check to see if message is addressed to this node. *)
IF Coemand^.Address - MyNodeID THEN
(* Execute the command. *)
CASE Command^.Message OF
NodeInput : (* This is a cclmand from the
Network Manager. *)
(* Determine what the cowaand is. *}
CASE Command ^ .Input .Colnand OF
ChangePortEnable :
FOR PortIndex :- i TO NumberOfPortsPerNodo DO
PortEnableRegister [PortIndox] :-
Conand ^ .Input. PortEnableRogister [PortIndex] ;
END; I
Null: (* This is a do nothing command. *)
END;
NEW (CommuandRosponseFrame) ;
(* Format the response message. *)
WITH CoamandRasponseFrame ^ DO
Address :- MyNodeID;
Message :- NodeO_tpu_;
FOR PortIndex :- 1 TO N_u_berOfPortsPerNode DO
Output. Per t EnableRegister [Perr Index] :-
Per tEnableRegister [PortIndex] ;
END;
END;
(* Transmit the Node Resposne to the Network. *)
Transmit (CommandResponseFrame} ;
ELSE (* No node output message will ever be addressed
to a node. *)
END;
ELSE
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Sequencer;
****************************************************************************
BEGIN
(* Initialize Port Array variable to all ports having no connection.
The InitiallzeDB EVENT will fill with the proper data. *)
FOR Port :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNodQ DO
NodeData.PortArray [Port] .AdJacentElment :- None;
END;
(* Initialize the Database for the Network Manager that
describes the network interconnections for this node. *)
NodeData.NodeAddres$ :- MyNodeID;
FOR Port :- 1 TO OutArcs DO
AdjacentNode ID :- GetOutNode (Port };
IF CheckNodeType(AdJacentNodeID, "IOS", TRUE) THEN
NodeData.PortArray[Port].AdJaoentElement :- GPC;
NodaData.PortArray[Port] .GPCAddreas :- AdJaoantNodeID;
NodeData.PortArrayIPort] .Channel :- A;
ELSIF CheckNodeType(AdJacentNodeID, "AIPSNode", TRUE) THEN
NodeData.PortArray (Port]. AdJacentElanent :- Node;
NodeData.PortArrayIPort] .NodeAddress :- AdJacentNodeiD;
GetInOutPort {AdjacentNodeID, MyNodeID, OutPort, InPort) ;
NodeData.PortArray[Port] .Port :- OutPort;
ELSIF CheckNodeType(AdjacentNodeID, "DIU", TRUE) THEN
NodeData.PortArray[Port] .AdJacentElment :- DIU;
NodeData. PortArray [Port]. DIUAddress :- AdJacentNodeID;
ELSE
WriteString (ParamOur, "invalld node" );
WriteLn (ParamOut) ;
END;
END;
(" Send the data to the database. *}
UpdateNodeData(NodeNl_mber, NetworkID, NodeData);
(* Load port enable register with intial configuration. *)
FOR PortIndex :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
IF Init/a/ConfigurationIPortIndex] THEN
PortEnableRegister [Portlndax] :- Enabled;
ELSE
PortEnableRegister [Portlndax] :- Disabled;
END;
END;
****************************************************************************
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LOOP
WAITUNTIL EVENT
NodeC_amandFrame •
MessageFrcaNetwork :- ActivePort^.NodoCommandFrame;
(* First check to see if this port i8 enabled, if so
then send traffic to other ports on this ,ode.
A digression from the AIPS Network Node has been
taken at this Point in the implementation.
The traffic is only sent to the ports on this node
that are enabled. This shifts the responsibility of
the Port to check to see if it is enabled before
transmitting, to the sender of the traffic. *)
(* Check to sea if the port the traffic ks received on
is envied. *)
IF PortYmableRegisterIActivePort^.index] - Enabled THEN
(* Send traffice to all other Ports on this node. *)
FOR Port :- i TO OutArcs DO
(* Do not retransmit on port which traffic
was rocievod *)
IF ActivLPort^.indox <> INTEG_R(Port) THXN
(* Transmit message beck to the network
only if the port is enabled. *)
IF PortEnablaRegistor[Port] - Enabled THEN
NOW outport [Port] ^.NOdeROsponseFr_ <-
Mes sageFromNetwork;
END;
END;
END;
(* Send message to Sequencer for Processing. *)
Sequencer (MessageFromNetwork) ;
I Reset :
(* Reload port enable register with intial configuration.
FOR PortIndox :- I TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
IF InitialConfiguration[PortIndex] THEN
PortEnableRegister [Portlndex] :- Enabled;
ELSE
PortEnabloRegister [Portlndex] :- Disabled;
END;
END;
END;
END;
END AIPSNode.
,)
B-20
DIU
B-21
DEVM DIU;
FROM BusMenag REACH Bus_ssageType*;
FROM BusMessag IMPORT MessageType, DIUCaamandType, IOActivityChoice;
nqPUTS
EVENT
DIUCommandFrame : BusMessageType;
PARA OverheadTime : REAL;
C_dTimes : ARRAY[I .. 3] OF REAL;
END;
OUTPUTS
VAR DIURosponsoFrame : BusMessageType;
END;
VAR Comnand : BusMossageType;
Response : BusMessageType;
DIUCo_teTime : REAL;
DIUEnd_ransmissionTimo : REAL;
BEGIN
LOOP
WAITUNTIL EVENT
D IUC_andFramo :
Cculand :- kctiviPort ^ .DIUComhand_Eame;
IF Conmand^.Addross - MyNodeID THEN
WITH Ccamand^.DIUCo,.nand DO
IF Activity - Input THEN
DIUComputeTime :- CumJ_andTimos [Command_] ;
ELSIF Activity - Output THEN
DIUComputeTime :- 0.0;
ELSE (* Actvity - Grouped *)
DIUComputeTime :- CommandTimes [Cc_mandNumber] ;
END;
END;
IF Com_Ind^.DIUCom_and.Activity o Output THEN (* no response for a write *)
NEW (Response) ;
WITH Response ^ DO
Address :- MyNode ID;
Message :- DIUOutput;
END;
DIUEndTransmissionTime :-DIUComputeTime + OverheadTime
+ Random(l, 0.0, 0.000010);
AFTER DIUEndTransmissionTimo outport I1]^ .DIUResponseFrame <- Response;
END;
END;
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END;
END;
END DIU.
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DEFINITION DE_ IOS;
FRCM BusMessag REACH BusMessageType*;
FRCM TypeConst D_ORT NumberOflOSPerChannol, NuaberOfNetworks;
EXPORT IOSRecordType, I_SRecordTypePolnter, ChalnTypo*,
TimeOu t IndicatorType, TransactionQuouoType,
TransactionType*, InputFrameOue.oType,
InputYraaeType*, ChalnStatusData*, TransactlonTurnAroundTimo;
TYPE lOSRecordType -RECORD
NetworkID : INTEGER;
IOSID : INTEGZR;
Number : INTEGER;
END;
IOSRecordTypePointer - POINTER TO lOSRecordType;
TineOutIndicatorType- _ormalcaapletion, TimedOut);
TranaactionType - _TITY
Identifier : INTEGER;
TimeOutValue : REAL;
OutputYraae : BusMessageType;
END;
TransactionQueueType - Q_TEUE OF TransactionType;
ChainType - ENTITY
Chainldentifler : _;
NtmberOfTransactions : _;
NetworkToBeExecutedOn : INTEGER;
TtansactionOuoue : TransactionQueueType;
FrameCount : INTEGER;
E_D;
InputFrameType - ENTITY
Transactionldentifier : _;
Mess ageAddress : _;
CASE TransactionTimeOutlndicator : TimeO_tIndicatorType OF
NormalComplotion :
InputFrame : BusMessageType;
1 TiledOut :
END;
Eh_;
InputFrauoOueueType - QUEUE OF InputFrameType;
ChainStatusData - ENTITY
ChainTimeOutIndicator : ThaeOutIndicatorType;
AllFailed : BOOLEAN;
AnyFailed : BOOLEAN;
InputFrameQueue : InputYrameQueueType;
END;
CONST TransactionTurnAroundTime - 0.000010;
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ZI_ IOS.
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DL_'M I05;
FROM _sMAss&g _ BusKIssageT_e*;
FRCM BusMessag IMPORT Porr/qameType, MossageType, lOActivityChoice,
NodeCommandTy_, NumberOfPor tsPerNode;
FROM Controls REACH SysteaProbe, NumberOfProbes;
FROM Senddata IMPORT WrlteDataElamentType, DataZlementType,
FrequencyType, CyclicDataType, CyclicVariatlonType,
NonCyclicVariat ionType, ChainStateType;
INPUTS
EVENT inputTransaction : BusMessageType;
ChainToProcass : ChainTypm;
St opChain : BOOLEAN;
Roset : BOOLEAN;
ProbeResot : BOOLEAN;
PARA NetworkID : INTEGER;
RootNodeID : _;
IOService ID : INTEGZR;
NodeComnandBitsOnBua : REAL;
NodeRosponseBit sOnBus : REAL;
DIUIBitsOnBus : REAL;
ApplicationTransmitBits : ARRAY[1 .. 3], I0 .. 9] Cf REAL;
AppllcationRespons_Bits : ARRA¥[I .. 3], [0 .. 9] OF REAL;
ProbeNmnber : INTEGER;
END;
OUTPUTS
VAR OutputTransactlon : BusMusageType;
lOChainReaponse : ChainStatusData;
ChainFi,ished : BOOLEAN;
END;
EVENT
EndIOActivity : BOOLEAN;
TransactionTimeOut : BOOLEAN;
DIUWritten : BOOLEAN;
CONST DataExchangeQuantity
VAR
- 2.0; (* bytes per exchange *}
Trans&ctionT%trnAroundTime - 0.000010;
Max TransactioneInChain - I0;
ChaisUnderExecution : ChainType;
TransactionOnderExecution : TransactionTypo;
ResponseChain : ChainStatusData;
NetworkInput : InputFrameType;
BitTimeForResponse : REAL;
NumberOfTransactions : INTEGER;
TransactionTimeOutNotice : EventPointer;
NetworkPort : INTEGER;
IOServicePort : INTEGER;
TiapTime : REAL;
Start IODataElement : DataEl_ntType;
EndIODataElement : DataElmontType;
ChainStatus : ChainStateType;
PROCEDURE ComputeTransmissionBitTime(Transaction : TransactionType;
ChainID : INTEGER} : REAL;
VAR BitTime : REAL;
BEGIN
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WITH Transaction ^ DO
CASE OutputFrane ^ .Message OF
NodaInput:
BitT/me :- NodeCcamandBitsOnBus;
DIUInput :
IF OutputFrame^.DIUCcumand.Activlty <> Input THEN
BitTine :- ApplicatlonTraneaitBlts [ChainID, (Identifier MCO Max_TransactionsInChaln) ] ;
ELSE
BitTime :- DIUIBitsOnBus;
END;
END;
END;
RETURN (BitTine) ;
END ComputeTran 8sissionBitTi_o;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ComputeRosponsoSltTime (Transaction : TransactlonType;
ChainID : INTEG_) : REAL;
VAR BitTime : REAL;
BEGIN
WITH Transaction ^ DO
CASE OutputFrame ^ .Message OF
Node Input:
BitTime :- NodeResponseBitsOnBus;
I DIUInput :
BitTime :- ApplicationResponsaBits [ChalnID, (Identifier MOD __TransactionsInChain} ];
END;
END;
RETURN (BitTimo) ;
END ComputeRespons oBit Time;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure _akos the next transaction from the Chain Currently
Executing and sends it to the network. It also d6cra-onts the
transactions left to execute for this chain counter, and schedules
the timeout event for this transaction. *}
PROCEDURE ProcessTransaction (PreviousTransaction : BOOLEAN;
Previous InputFr ame : InputFramaType;
Chain : Cha/nType;
VAR TransactlonExecutlng : TransactlonTypo;
VAR TraneactlonsLeftToExocute : INTEGER;
VAR ResponseBitTiBe : REJLL};
VAR Next_ssageBitTime : REAL;
TransactionOutputTime : REAL;
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BEGIN
(* Calculate the bits on the bus t/me for the previous transaction. *)
IF PreviousTransaction THl_q
(* Cc_ute the noxE transaction, s_d it to the network and
schedule its timeout event. *)
TraneactionExecuting :- QSucc (TransactionExecuting, Chain ^ .TransactionQueue) ;
(* Bit Time to transmit the next message. *)
Nex_MessageBitTime :- ComputeTransmissionBitTimo (TransactionExecuting,
(Chain ^ .ChainIdentifier MOO 4)} ;
TransactionOutputTime :- ResponsoBitTime + TransactionTurnAroundTime +
NextMessagaBitTime;
ELSE
(* C_ute the next transaction, send it to the network and
Jchedule its timeout event. *)
Tra_actlonExecuting :- FirstQ(Chain ^.TransactiouQueue) ;
Nex_lqes sagoBitT/me :- ComputeTransmis sionBitTime (Transact ionExecut ing,
(Chain ^ .Chainldentifier MC_ 4}} ;
TransactionOutputTime :- NextMessageBitTime;
E_D;
(* Decr_nt transactions left to process counter. *)
TransactionsLeftToExecuto :- TransactionsLeftToExocute - I;
WITH TransactionExocuting ^ DO
REPORT "%d" Identifier TAGGED "Transaction started Execution.";
AFTER TransactionOutputTime outport [NetworkPort] ^.OutputTransaction <- Outputlrrame;
IF (OutputFrame^.Message- DIUInput) AND
(OutputFramo^.DIUComm_nd.Activlty = Output) THEN
AFTER NextMessageBitTime DIUWritten <- TRUE;
ELSE
(* Schedule Transaction timeo_t. *}
ResponseBitTime :- ComputeResponseBitTime (TransactiorLExocuting,
(Chain ^.Chainldentifier MOO 4) );
AFTER (TimeOutValue + TransactionOutputTime) TransactionTimeOut <- TRUE;
TransactionTimaoutNotice :- CurrentNotice;
END;
END;
_D ProcessTransaction;
****************************************************************************
BEGIN
NetworkPort :,- GetO_tPort (RootNodeID) ;
IOServicePort :- GetOutPort (iOServiceID) ;
LOOP
NAITUNTIL (ChainToProcoss, ProbeReset, Reset)
********************************************************************
(* This event handles the Chain Loading mechanism from
the I/O Request Processing. First it sets Chain Finished
to FALSE and the pointer to the first input frame to nil,
then it a¢cumalates some time
to represent the loading of the chain into the IOS,
B-30
schedules the chain tiaeout event, initailzos the
Network Chain Data so that the Input Frames can be
processed as they are received, sends the first
transaction to the not_ork, and schedules the
transaction tiaeout for the first transaction. *}
ChainToProcess :
IF NetworkID - 1 TEEN
SAMPLE 1.0 WITH SysteaProbe[ProbeNumber] ;
(* Create memory for local copy of the responses
for this chain. *)
NEW(ResponseChain) ;
ResponsoChain^.AllFailtd :,, TRUE;
ResponseChain^.AnyFailed :- FALSE;
ResponseChain ^ .InputFrameQueue :- InitQ ("InputFrameQueue", FALSE, 0) ;
(* Make the response available to the I/O Syste_ Service.
This makes the chain response data immediately availablo
by keeping the data on the port.
This will allow the I/O System Service to start reading
the Ins when a chain has timed out. *)
NOW outport [IOServicePort] ^.IOChainResponse <- ResponseChain;
ChalnUnderExecution :- ActivePort^.ChainToFrocoss;
(* Record start I/O activity data collection event.
Increaent the proper frame counter. *)
StartI_)ataEleaent. SimulationTime :- clock;
IF ChainUnderExecution^.ChainIdantifier < 20 THEN
Start IODataEl-sent. Frequency :- Cyclic;
Start1ODa_Element.CyclicData.FrameCount :- ChainUnderExecution^.FrameCount;
CASE ChainUnderExecution^ .ChainIdentif ier OF
i:
StartIODataElamant.CyclicData.C_Variation :- StartNWiIOActivity;
Start IODataElement. Event ID :- 7;
2"
Start IODat_iElament. CyclicData. C_Variation :- StartNWl lOActivlty;
Star t IODataElement. Event ID := 8;
3'
StartIODataElament.CyclicDate.C_Variation :- StartNWlIOActivity;
StartIODataEleaent.EventID :- 9;
StartIODataElement. CycllcData. C_Varlation :- StartNWl IActivity;
StartIODataElement.EventID :- 16;
StartlODataElament.CyclicData. CVarlatlon :- StartNWl IActivity;
Star tIODataElement. Event ID :- 17;
7:
Start1ODataElement.CyclicData.C_Variatlon :- StartNWIIActivity;
StartIOOat_sEleJent.EventID :- 18;
9"
StartIODataElament.CyclicData.C Variation := StartNWlOActivity;
St art iODataElement. Event ID :- 22;
I 10:
StartIOOataElement.CycllcData.C Varlatlon :- StartNNiOActivity;
Start IODataElement .Event ID :- 23;
i 11:
StartIODataElement. CycllcData. C_Variation :- StartNWlOActivity;
Star t IODataElement .EventID :- 24;
END;
ELSIF (ChainUndarExecution*.Chainldentifier >- 300) AND
(ChainUnderExocution^.ChainIdentifier <- 310)
Start IOOataEl_ent. Frequency "- NonCyclic;
StartIC_ataEl_ent.NonCyclicData.N_Variation :- ReconfigIOActivity;
Start IODataE l-_ent. Event ID :- 30;
IF (_etworkID- I} AND
(Cha/nUnderExecution ^.ChainIdentifier <- 20) )
((NetworkID - 2} AND
(ChainUnderExecution^.ChalnIdentifier >- 300)) THEN
WriteDataElementType (Start IODataElement) ;
EMD;
REPORT "%d" ChainUnderExecution^.ChainIdentifier
TAGGED _Chain started Execution.";
TransactionUnderExecution :- FirstQ(ChainUnderExecution ^.
TransactionQueue) ;
NumberOfTransactions :- QSize (ChainUnderExecution ^.
TransactionQueue) ;
(* Initialize IOS to I/O Request processing so that
I/O Request does confuse previous chain completion
with this chain ccapletion on its first 2ms poll,
it this chain has not ccapleted. *}
NOW outport (IOServicePort] ^.ChainFinished <- FALSE;
(* Send out the first transaction. *)
ProcessTransaction(FALSE, NIL,ChainUnderExecution,
TransactiongnderExecution, NumberOfTransactions,
BitTimeForResponse};
LOOP
WAIT_IL (InputTransactlon, TraneactionTimeOut,
StopChain, DIUWritten, Reset, EudIOActivity, ProbeReset)
************************************************************
(* This event handles the Input Frames from the I/O Network.
It places the Input Data in the Input Frame, cancels the
the transaction timeout for this transaction, checks for
more frames to be processed for this chain, if so the
next transaction is sent to the network and the and the
transaction timeout is scheduled for the next transaction.
If no more transaction are to be processed for this chain,
the Chain Timeout event is canceled for this chain,
and then Chain Finished is set and the Network Chain Data
is sent to I/O Request Processing. *)
InputTransaction:
ResponseChain^.AllFailed :- FALSE;
NEW(NetworkInput};
(* Put Network Data in Input Frame. *)
B_2
(*
*)
WITH Notworklnput ^ DO
TransactionIdentifier :- TransactionUnderExecution ^ .
Identifier;
MessageAddres8 :- TransactionUnderExecution ^ .
OutputFramo ^. Address;
Tra_sactlonTimeOutIndicator :- NormalComplotion;
InputFr ane :- ActivoPort ^. InputTransaction;
END;
REPOItT "%d" Networklnput^.TransactionIdontifier
TAGGSD "Transaction c_pleted normally.";
INSERT Networklnput LAST IN ResponsoChain^InputFrameQueue;
QIneert (NetworkInput, RuponseChain ^ .InputFrameQuoue, FALSE) ;
(* Cancel Transaction Timoout for the just completed
transaction. *}
CANCEL TrensactlonTimeOutNotice;
(* Check for more transactions to process. *}
IF Nu_erOfTransactions - 0 THEN
ChainStatm8 :- CcapletedNor_ally;
(* Set ccapletion flaq of the I/O System
service.. *}
AFTER BitTiueForResponse + TransactionTurnAroundTime
EndIOActivity <- TRUE;
ELSE
ProcessTransaction (TRUE, NetworkInput,
ChalnUnderExecution,
TransactionUnderExecution, NumberOfTransaotions,
BitTimeForResponse);
END;
************************************************************
(* This event will handle the transaction ti_eout event.
It assigns transaction t/mecut in the Network Chain
data correspond/_g to this transaction. A check will
then be made for more transactions to bo processed for
this chain, if so the transaction timoout is scheduled
for the next transaction. If no more transactions are to
be processed for this chain, the Chain Ti_ecut event is
canceled for this chain, and then Chain Finished is sot and
the Network Chain Data is sent to the I/O Request Processing. *)
J TransactionTimeOut:
BitTimeForRosponse :- 0.0;
ResponseChain^.AnyFailod :-TRUE;
NEW(Notworklnput);
(* Put data in !nput Frame for this transaction indicating
that the current transaction ti_ out. *)
WITH NotworkInput ^ DO
TransactionIdentifier :- TransactionUnderExocution ^.
Identifier;
MessageAddross :- TransactionUnderExecution ^ .
OutputFrame^.Addroes;
TransactionTimeOutIndicator :- TimodOut;
END;
REPORT "%d" Networklnput^.TransactionIdentifier
TAG_ "Transaction timed out.";
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*)
(*
*)
(* Put Input Frlme on response queue. *}
INSERT NetworkInput LAST IN ResponseCha/n^.InputFrameQueue;
QInsert (NatworkInput, ResponseChain A. InputFrameQuoue, FALSE) ;
(* Check for more transactions to process. "7
IF NumberOfTransactions - 0 THEN
(* Set completion flag of the I/O System
service.. '7
ChainStatus :- CompletedNormally;
AFTER BitTimeForResponse + TransactionTarnAroundTime
EndIOActivity <- TRUE;
ELSE
Proces sTransaction (TRUE, Networklnput,
ChainUnderExecution,
TransactionOnderExecutlon, NumberOfTransactions,
BitTimeForResponse );
END;
********************************************************
(* This event handles a stop chain from the I/O System
Service when a chain ha,- timed out. This process
a_rk# the current transaction as tiled out and
prepares to receive the next chain. *}
I StopChain :
NEW (NetworkInput } ;
(* Put data in Input Frame for this transaction indicating
that the current transaction timed out. *}
WITH Networklnput ^ DO
TransactionIdentifier :- TransactionUnderExecution ^.
Identifier;
MessageAddress :- TransactionUnderExocution ^ .
Out-'putFzeme ^ . Address;
TransactionTimeOutIndicator :- TimedOut;
END;
{* Put Input Frame on response queue. *)
INSERT NetworkInput LAST IN ResponseChain ^ .InputFrameQueue;
QInsert (NetworkInput, ResponseChain ^.InputFrameQueue, FALSE) ;
ChainStatus :- timedout;
EXIT;
EndIOActivity:
IF NetworkID - i TH_N
SD_PLE 0.0 WITH SysteaProbe[ProbeNumber] ;
END;
NOW outport [IOServicePort ]^.ChainFinished <- TRUE;
RE_ORT "%d, " ChainUndarExecution^.ChainIdentifier
TAGGED "End I/O Activity.";
(* Record end I/O activity data collection event. *)
EndIODataElement. SimulationTime :- clock;
IF ChainUnderExecution^.ChainIdentifier < 20 THEN
End IODat aE lament. Frequency :- Cyclic;
B_4
EndICOataElment.CyclicData.Fr_Count :- ChainUnderExecution ^ .FrameCount;
CASE ChainUnderExecutlon ^.ChainIdentifler OF
i:
XndIODataElement. CyclicData. C Variatlon :- EndNWI IOActivity;
Ym dI ODat aEluen t.Even t ID :- I0;
XndIODataElemmt.CyclicDat_x. 10ChainStatus :- ChainStatus;
12:
EndIODataElement. CyclicData, CVariatlon :- EndNWI IOActivity;
EndIODataEltment. Event ID :- 11;
EndIOOataElemeat .Cy¢licData. IOChainStatus :- ChainStatus_
13:
EndlODataElement.CyclicData. C Variation :- E_dNWlIOActivity;
EadIOOataElement .EventID :- 12;
E_dIODataElement. CycllcData. IOChainStatus :- ChainStatus;
15:
EndIODataElement. CyclicData. C Variation :- EndNWI IActivity;
EndIODataElement .EventID :- 19;
EndIODataElement.CyclicData. IChainStatus :- ChainStatus;
16:
EndIODataElement. CyclicData, C Variation :- Enc_lIActivlty;
EndlODataElement. Event ID :- 20;
EndIODataElement.CyclicData. IChainStatus :- ChainStatus;
17:
KudIODat aElement. CyclicOata. C_Var iation :- EndNWI IActivity;
EndIODataElement.EventID :- 21;
EndIODataElement.CyclicData. ICha/nStatus :- ChainStatus;
Jg:
EadIODataElement.CyclicOata.CVarlatlon :- Enc_qWIOAc tivlty;
EndIODataElement .EventID :- 25;
I i0:
EadIODataElement'CyclicOata'CVariati°n :- Enc_W10Aativity;
EndIODataElement. Event ID :- 26;
I ii:
EndIODataElement. CyclicData. C_Varlatlon :- EndNWIOActivity;
EndlODataElement .EventID :- 27 ;
END;
EL$IF {ChaiaUnderExecution^.ChainIdentifier >- 300) AND
(ChainUnderExecution^.Chainldentifier <- 310} THEN
EndIOOataElement. Frequency :- NonCyclic;
EndICOar_xE1ement.NonCyclicData.N_Variation :- ReconfigIOActivity;
EndIODataElement. Event ID :- 31;
END;
IF ((NetworkID - I} AND
(ChalnUnderExecution^,ChainIdentifier <- 20}) OR
((NetworkID - 2} AND
(ChainUnderExecution^.Cha/nIdentifier >- 300)) THEN
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END;
I ProbaP_set :
WritaDataElmaentType (EndIODataElement) ;
END;
EXIT;
DIUNritten:
REPORT "%d" TransmctionUnderExecutlon ^ .IdQntlfier
TAGGED "DIU Output Transaction oomploted normally.";
(* Check for more transactions to process. *)
IF lqu_erOfTransaction8 - 0 TH_
REPORT "%d" ChainUnderExecution^.ChainIdantifier
TAGGED "O_tput Chain has c_letod execution.";
ChainStatus :- C,--pletedNormally;
IF NetworkID - I TH_
SAMPLE O.0 WITH SystemProbe [ProbeNu_r] ;
END;
(* Set completion flag of the I/O System service.. *}
AFTER TransaotlonT_rnAroundTime EndIOActivity <- TRUE;
ELSE
TransactionUnderExecution :- QSu¢c(TransactionUnderExecution,
ChainUndorExecution ^ .TransectlonQueue };
DEC (Nu®berOfTransmctlono };
WITH TransectionUnderExecution ^ DO
(* Hit T/me to transmit the next message. *)
TmepTimo :- ApplicationTransmitBits [ChainUnderExecutlon ^ .Cha/nIdentifier,
(Identifier MOO Max_TransactionsInChain} ] ;
REPORT "%d" Identifier TAGGED "Transaction started Execution.";
AFTER TempTime outport INetworkPort ] ^.OutputTransaotion <- OutputFrame;
AFTER TempTime DIUWritten <- TRUE;
END;
END;
Reset :
EXIT;
ProbeRaset :
IF NetworkID - I THEN
ClearProbe (Syst_robe IProbeN_r ] );
SAMPLE I. 0 WITH SystamProbe [ProbeNumbor] ;
El_);
IF NetworkID - i THEN
ClearProbe (Syste_Probe [ProbeNumber ]);
SAMPLE 0.0 WITH Systam2robe [ProbeNumber] ;
END;
J Reset:
8_6
END;
END;
_D IOS.
r
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DETINITION DEVM Processor;
(* 1/27/88 PRB ack_d import of LONGREAL *)
FRQM Utll IR_C_T LONGREAL;
EXPORT ProceesingUnlt*;
(*
* a processing unit is an entity that contains information about processes
* which c_ete for the Processor.
*)
TYPE
ProcessingUnlt - ENTITY
Priority • INTEGER;
ProcessingRequired : REAL;
ProcessID : ARRAY 10 .. 31} OF CHAR;
Frame : INTEGER;
WrltoData : BOOLEAN;
ProcssngAfterBlock : REAL;
Data : ADDRESS;
ProcessingLeftToDo : REAL; (* don't touch *)
(* 1/27/88 PRB changed Started to type LONGREAL from REAL *)
StartQd : LONGREAL; (* don't touch *}
SendBackOutThisPort: INTEGER; {* don't touch *)
DataHritten : BOOLEAN; (* don't touch *)
m_D;
END Processor.
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DEVMProoessor;
(* 1127188 PRB imported DFLoatReal *)
FRC_ Conversions IMPQRT DFloatToReal;
FROM Controls REACH SystemProbe, NumberOfProbes;
(* forces the denet compiler to read controls.ddef
FROM Senddata IMPORT WriteDataElementType, CyclicDataType, DataElementType,
CyclicVariationType, FrequencyType;
INPUTS
(* NOTICE that this is a REACH and not and I_ORT - this *)
*)
EVENT
SubaltProcos8 : ProcessingUnit; (* submit a process to the processor *}
StartSystam : BOOLEAN; (* start the system process running *)
Reset : BOOLEAN;
ProbeRaset : BOOLEAN;
PARA
SystemPriority : INTEGZR;
SystemProcessingNeodod : REAL;
Syst_mFrequency : REAL;
ContextSwitchTime : REAL;
ProcessorRoportLevel : INTEGER;
ProbeNu_ber : INTEGER;
(* priority of system process *)
(* amount of processing needed to
* oxoc_to the system process *}
(* how often the system needs
* to run *)
(* context switching time *}
(* report parameter *)
(* which system probe to use *)
(* When a process has completed, it
* is returned to the caller *)
(* check for completed procesaes *)
(* system needs to run *)
END;
OUTPUTS
VAR
Completed : ProcessingUnit;
END;
EVENT
ProcessComploted : BOOLEAN;
Run System : BOOLEAN;
TYPE
(* processes waiting for processing *)
(* process that comes in on a port *)
(* process that has the processor *}
(* the system process *)
ProcossingQueue - QUEUE OF DESCENDING ProcessingUnit;
CO_qST
ContextSwitchPriority - 12345678; (* big number *_
VAR
RoadyQ_eue : ProcossingQ_eue;
CurrentProoes8 : ProcassingUnit;
ExacutingProcoss : ProcessingUnit;
Syste_Process : Process ingUnit;
ContextSwitchProcess : ProcessingUnit; (* process which represents the context switch time *)
CcmpletionNotice : EventPointer;
ProcossSwitchlngTo : ProcessingUnit; (* process that the cpu is switching to *)
OutputDataElmment : DataElementType;
PROCEDURE BoglrLExocutionOfProcess(DesiredProcess : ProcessingUnit};
BEGIN
ExecutingProcess :- DesiredProcess;
841
(* 1/27/88 PRB changed clock to longclock *)
ExecutingProcess^°Started :- 5ongClock;
AFTER ExecutingProcess ^.Processin_LeftToDo Proces$Co_leted <- TRUE;
CompletionNotice :- CurrentNotice;
REPORT(ProcessorReportLevel] "%s" ExecutingProcess^.ProcesslD TAGGED "Started";
Eh_ Begi_ecutionOfProces $;
BEGIN
NEW(SysteaProcess);
WITR SysteaProcess* DO
Priority :- Syste_riority;
ProcassingLeftToDo :- SystemProcessingNeeded;
ProcessID :- 'Systemt;
DataWritten :- TRUE;
END;
NEW (ContextSwitchProcess) ;
WITH ContextSwitchProcess ^ DO
Priority :- ContextSwitchPriority;
ProcessingLeftToDo :- ContextSwitchTime;
ProcemsID :- 'Context Switch';
DataWritten :- TRUE;
END;
ExecutingProcans :- NIL;
LOOP
_/T_NT IL EVENT
Su_itProceas : (* process is ready to use the processor *)
CurrantProcess :- Activ_Port ^ •S_tProcess;
(*
• Fibre out who sent the process to you, so that you can
• send it back to them once the process has completed.
*)
CurrantProcess^. SendBackOutThisPort :- GetOutPort (GetInNode (
ActivaPort ^ .index} } ;
CurrentProcess ^.ProcessingLeftToDo :- CurrentProcess ^ .ProoessingRequired;
CurrantProcess ^,DataWritten :- NOT CurrentProcess^.WriteData;
REPORT(ProcessorReportLevel] "%s" CurrentProoess ^.PrOcessID TAGGED "Su_itted";
IF ExecutingProcess - NIL THEN
INSEP,T CurrentProcess IN ReadyQueue;
BeginExecutionOfProcess (ContextSwitchProcess) ;
ProcessSwitchingTo :- CurrentProcess;
SA_LE 1.0 WITH SystemProbe(ProbeNumber];
ELSIF CurrentProcess^.Prlority > ExecutingProcess^.Priority THEN
CANCEL CompletionNotice;
(* 1/27/88 PRB Changed calculation to double precision *)
ExecutingProcess ^.ProcessingLeftToDo :- ExecutingProcess^.ProcessingLeftToDo -
DF1oatToReal (LongClock - ExecutingProcess ^.Started} ;
REPORTIProcessorReportLeval] "%s, %10.6f" ExecutingProcess ^.ProcessID,
ExecutingProcess ^.ProcessingLeftToDo TAGGED "Preempted";
INSERT ExecutingProcess IN ReadyQueue;
INSER_ CttrrentProcess IN ReadyQueue;
BeginExecutionOfProcess (ContextSwitchProcess) ;
ProcessSwitchingTo :- Current.Process;
ELSIF ExecutingProcess ^.Priority - ContextSwltchPriority THEN
INSERT CurrsntProcess IN ReadyQueue;
(* 1/27/88 PRB Changed calculation to double precision *)
IF ExecutingProcess ^ .Started - LongClock THEN
ProcessSwitchingTo :- FirstQ(ReadyQueue} ;
END;
ELSE
INSERT CurrentProcess IN ReadyQueue;
END;
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I Proce_sCcmpleted : (* check for completed processes *)
REPORT[ProcessorReportLevel] "%s" ExecutingProcess^.ProcassID TAC_ "Finished";
IF NOT ((Exec_tingProcess^.Prlorlty - SystemPrlority) OR
(ExecutingProcess ^ .Priority - ContextSwitchPriority) ) THEN
NOW outport [ExecutingProaess^.Send_ackOutThisPortJ ^.Completed <- ExecutlngProcoss;
END;
IF ExecutingProcass^.Priorlty <> ContoxtSwitchPriorlty THEN
BoginExocutionOfProcess (ContextSwitchProces s };
IF QSiza(RaadyQueua} <> 0 THEN
ProQessSwitchingTo :- FirstQ (ReadyQue,e) ;
ELSE
ProcessSwitchingTo :- NIL;
END;
ELSIF QSiza(ReadyQueue) <> 0 TH_
IF ProceesSwltchingTo - FirstQ(ReadyQueua) THEN
R_VE FIRST Currant.Process FRCM ReadyQueue;
IF (MyNodeID - 45) AND (NOT CurrnntProces8 ^ .DataWritten} THEN
CurrentProcess ^ .DataWrltten :- TRUE;
Out_utDataElament. SimulationT/me :- clock;
OutputDataElameDt.Frequency :- Cyclic;
OutputDataElament. CyclicData.FrameCount :- CurrentProcess ^.Frame;
Out_utDataElament. CycllcData. C_Varlation :- StartComputing;
OutputDataE lament. CyclicDat a. Pr oce8 singNeedodThisFrame :-
CurrentProcessa.ProcessingReq_ired + CurrentProcess^.ProossngAfterBlock;
CJ3E CurrentProcess^.Priority OF
10: Outp_tDat_lElement.EvontID :- 1;
l 9 : OutputDataElement.EventID :- 2;
J 8: OutputDataElenent.EventID :- 3;
END;
WritnDataElamentType (OutputDataElament) ;
ELSIF (MyNodeID - 46} AND (NOT Curren_Procoss^.DataWritten) THEN
CurrontProcess^.DataWritten :- TREE;
Out_utDataElamont. SiuulationTine :- clock;
O_tputDataElament. Frequency :- Cyclic;
O_tputDataElament.CyclicData.FraneCount :- CurrentProcoss^.Frame;
O_tputDataElament. Cyc I _cData. CVariation :- StartChain;
CASE CurrentProcess^.Priority OF
i0: OutputDataElemont.EventID :- 13;
I 9: OutputDataElonent.EventID :- 14;
l 8 : OutputDataEleJ_ent.EventID :- 15;
END;
WriteDataElamantTy_ (OutputDataEloment} ;
END;
EeginExecutionOfProcoss (CurrentProcess) ;
ELSE (* process of higher priority arrived during context switch *)
EeginExecutionOfProcess (ContextSwitchProcess) ;
ProcessSwit chingTo :- FirstQ (ReadyQueue) ;
END;
ELSE
ExecutingProcess :- NIL;
SABLE 0.0 WITH Syst0mProbe[ProbeNumber] ;
END;
J RunSystam : (* system process needs to run *)
INSERT SystemProcess IN RoadyQ_eue;
REPORT[ProcessorReportLev_l] "%s" SysteZ,Process^.ProcessID TAGGED "Stt_itted";
IF (ExecutingProcess <> NIL) _ ((Exec_tingProcess^.Priority - Co,textSwitchPriority) AND
(QSize(ReadyQueue) - i) ) THEN
(*
* Trying to sub, it the process during a context switch to the background process. This requires
* a second context switch to occur before the system process can run.
*)
ProcessSwitchingTo :- NIL; (* has effect of causing another context s_ritch *}
ELSIF ExecutingProcess - NIL THEN
EeginExecutionOfProces8 (ContextSwltchProcess) ;
ProcessSwitchingTo :- SystenProcess;
SAMPLE 1.0 WITH Syst_robe(Pro_Number] ;
ELSIF ExecutingProcess ^.Priority <> ContextSwitchPriority THEN
CANCEL CompletionNot ice;
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(* 1/27/88 PRB Chan_ed calculation to double precision *)
ExecutingProcess ^ .Process_ngLe_ToDo :- ExecutingProcees^.ProcessingLeftToDo -
DFloatToReal (LongClock - ExecuttngProcess ^. Started) ;
I_SF_T ExecutingProcoss IN Ready.sue;
REPOP_T(ProcessorReportLevel] "%s" ExecutingProcess^.ProcessID TAGG_ "Preempted";
BeglnExecutionOfProcoss (ContaxtSwitchProcess };
ProcessSwitchingTo :- SysteaProcess;
END;
AFTER SystemFrequency RunSystem <- TRUE;
StartSystem : (* Start the syst_ pro_ess r_in.lng periodically *)
NOW RunSyst-- <- TRUE;
Resot :
IF (ExocutingProcess <> NIL) AND ((ExecutingProcess^.Priority <> SystemPriority) AND
(ExeoutingProcoss ^.Priorlty <> ContextSwitchPriority) ) THEN
DISPOSE (Exoc.tingProcess) ;
END;
(*
* Clear the queue
*)
FC_CH ExecutingProcess EN P_adyQ_aeue DO
P_VE FIRST ExocutingProcess FR_ ReadyQueue;
IF (ExecutingProcoss^.Priority <> SystlnPriority} AND
(ExecutlngProcess^.Priority <> ContextSwitchPrlorlty) T_
•DISPOSE (ExecutingProcess) ;
END;
Eh_;
ExecutingProcess :- NIL;
ProboRiset :
ClearProbe (SystemProbe [ProbeNumber ] };
IF ExecutingProcess 0 NIL THEN
SAMPLE 1.0 WITH SystemProbe(ProbeNumber] ;
ELSE
SAMPLE 0.0 WITH SystemProbe(ProbeNu_ber) ;
END;
END;
_D;
END Processor.
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DEFINITION MOIX_LE Math;
EXPORT _ALIFIED RealMod;
PROCEDURE RealMod(X : REAL;
Y : REAL) : REAL;
END Math.
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IMPLEMD;TATION MCOULE Math;
FROM MathLib0 IMPORT rood;
PROCEDURE RealMod(X : REAL;
Y : REAL)
BEGIN
RETURN (rood(X,y) );
END RealMod;
END Math.
: REAL;
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DEFINITION DEVM IOService;
FROM IOS REACH ChainType*, ChainStatusData*;
FROM TypeConst IMPORT N1mberOfNatworks ;
EXPORT IORequestType*, IOResponsaTyp@*,
IOActivityTyp@, RequestActivityType, Respons.ActivityType,
Networ kMa_ &gerAct ivityType,
NetworkR_nagerServiceRequest *, NetworkHealthType,
ChalnStatu sType, NewNet workSt ataType *,
ChainExecu tedWit hou tError, Re lea seCha/nRespon seMemory;
TYPE NetworkReal_hType- {InService, OutOfServlce);
IOActivityTyp@ = (ApplicationRequest, NetworM_anagarRequest,
MonitorForFault, )4_plicat io_%es_ons a,
NetworkManagerResponse, FaultMonltorResponsa} ;
Request&ctlvityType - [ApplicationRequest .. MonitorForFault] ;
Respons-mctivityType - [ApplicatlonResponse .. FaultMoaitorResponsa];
NetworkManaqarActivityType- (GrowNetwork, RapairFault, awitchRootLink);
ChainStatusType - (NoFa_its, CcmmunicationFault,
NotExecuted} ;
NewN@tworkStateType - ENTITY
NatworkID : INTEGER;
State : NetworkHaalthType;
MonitorChain : ChalnType;
ICRequestType - ENTITY
Priority : INTEGER;
identifier : INTEGER;
RequestTimeoutValue : REAL;
OnD_and : BOOLEAN;
Frame : INTEGER;
RImponseExpect ed : BOOLEAN;
CASE RequestType : RequestActivityT_ OF
ApplicationRequ est :
ChainArray : ARRAY [I .. NumberOfNetworks] OF ChainType;
[ NatworkManagerRequest, MonitorForFault:
Chain : ChainType;
END;
E_D;
IOResponsaType - ENTITY
Identifier : INTEGER;
CASE ResponsaType : ResponseActivityTypa OF
AppllcationResponsa :
Frame : INTEGER;
ChainStatus : ARRAY (1 .. NumberOfNetworks] OF ChainStatusTyp@;
ResponseAzray : ARRAY [i .. NumberOfNetworks] OF ChainStatusData;
J NetworkManagerResponse, FaultMonitorResponse:
Response : ChainStatusData;
END;
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END;
NetworkManagerServiceRequest - ENTITY
CASE SorvicoRoquest : N_workMauagorActlvityTypo OF
Growf4etwork:
Activel_ootLink : INTEGZR;
J RepairFa.lt •
MonitorChalnResponse : IOResponseType;
L SwitchRoot Link:
FailodRootNode : INTEGER;
_ewRoo_lo8_ : INTEGER;
****************************************************************************
pROCEDURE ChainExecute_ithoutError (Chain : ChainStatusOata) :BOOLEAN;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ReloasoChalnResponseM_ory(VAR Rosponse : ChainStatusData);
*****************************************************************************
END IOService.
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********************************************************************************
(* 1/27/88 This change supports implements:
a) Waiting until all higher priority processing is completed
before su_itting a pending I/O Request.
b) When a pending I/O request is aade, the semaphore is
marked busy when the pending I/O processor request is made. *)
********************************************************************************
DEYM IOService;
FRCN IOS REACH ChainType*, ChainStatmsData*,
InputFrameType*, TransactionTypo*;
FRC84 Processor REACH ProcessingUnit*;
FRGM Controls REACH SystemProbe, NumberOfProbes;
FRet4 CentralDB I_ORT IOSConnoctionType, FindIOSConnections,
R6adNode In ter Connection s;
FROM IOS II_PORT _imeOutlndicatorType;
FRCt4 GrowNet IMPORT MakoMonitorRoquest;
FROM Utilities IMPORT ManagerChainUnloadTime, ComputeChainTimeout;
FRCt4 TypeConst IMPORT StatusType, NumberOfNetworks, NumberOfIOSPerChannel,
NodoArrayTypo;
FRet4 BusMessag IMPORT MessageTypo, IOActivltyChoice;
FROM Senddata I_4PORT DataElementType, FrequencyType, NonCyclicVariationType,
NonCyclicDataType, Writ eDataElomentType;
FRCe4 Math IMPORT RealMod;
IMPORT SYSTEM;
IMPORT QueueM;
EXPOSE
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE chainExecutedNithoutError (Chain : ChainStatusDeta) :BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
RETURN NOT((Chain^.AnyFailed) OR (Chain^.AllFailed) OR
(Chain ^ .ChainTiaeOutlndicator - TimedOut) } ;
END ChainExecutodWithoutError;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ReleaseChainResponsei4emory(VAR Response : ChalnStatusData) ;
VAR Frame : InputFrameType;
ElamentCounter : INTEGER;
NumberOfElements : INTEGER;
BEGIN
IF Response <> NIL THEN
N_mberOfElements :- QSize (Response ^ .InputFrameQueue) ;
FOR ElementCounter :- I TO NumberOfElements DO
Frame :- QRomove (Response ^ .InputFrameQueue, TRUE) ;
_$3
IF Frame^.TransactionTimeOutIndicator " NormalCo_letlon THEN
DISPOSE (Frame ^ .InputYrame) ;
END;
DISPOSE (Frame) ;
END;
QOispose (Response*. InputFrameQueue, SIZE (Frame) } ;
DISPOSE (Response} ;
ELSE
WrlteLn (ParamOut) ;
WriteString(ParamOut, "Tried to DISPOSE a NIL Chain Response.");
WriteLn (ParamOur) ;
END;
END;
EVENT IOServiceReques t
R_nNetworkTo Service
ProcessorResponse
M/s sedDeadLine
R_et
ProbeReset
: IOR_estType;
: NewNetworkStateType;
: ProcessingUnit;
: INTEGER;
: BOOLEAN;
: BOOLEAN;
VAR
PARA
DataFr_IOS : ChainStatusData;
ChainCcmpleted : BOOLEAN;
Manager IDNetwork2 : INTEGER;
ApplicationID : ARRAY [I .. 3] OF INTEGER;
IOPIdentifier : INTEGER;
Controls Identifier : INTEGER;
StratQgyForReconfigur ation : INTEGER;
ChalnProcessing100Hz : REAL;
ChainProcessingSOH z : REAL;
chainProcessing25H z : REAL;
EndOfChainProcessingl00Hz : REAL;
EndOf ChainP rocessing50Hz : REAL;
EndOfChainPr ocessing25H z : REAL;
EndOf ChainProces s ingMonit or : REAL;
ProbeNumber : INTEGER;
END;
OUTPUTS
VAR Cha/nToIOS
_pl icationResponse
IOManager2Response
ManagerServiceRqst
Proces sorRequest
ServiceAvailable
stoplOS
END;
TYPE IOServiceStateTy_e - RECORD
Executingl00Hz : BOOLEAN;
ExecutingSORz : BOOLEAN;
Executing25Hz : BOOLEAN;
: ChainType;
: IOResponseType;
: ChainStatusData;
: NetworkMa.nagerServiceRequest;
: ProcessingUnit;
: BOOLEAN;
: BOOLEAN;
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NetworEEealth : ARRAY{I .. NumberOfNetworks] OF NetworkHealthType;
ActiveRootLink : ARRAY[I .. NumbetOfNetworks] OF INTEGER;
E_D;
NetworkConnectionType - RECORD
NetworkConnections : IOSConnectlonType;
ConnectionStatus : ARRAY [I .. NumberOfIOSPerChannel] OF Stat_sType;
END;
IOServiceNetworkConnectionsType - ARRAY [I .. NumberOfNetworks] OF
Net workCon nec tionT1rpe;
Req_estExec%;tionStatus - ENTITY
Req_es t : lORequestType;
CASE RequestType : IOActivityType OF
ApplicationRequest:
ExecatinqOn : ARRAY [1 .. NumberOfNetworks] OF BOOI/_N;
PortArray : ARRAY [1 .. NumberOfNetworks] OF INTEGER;
I NetworMManagerRequest, MonitorForFault:
Port : INTEGZR;
END;
E_D;
SemaphoreType - ENTITY
Priority : INTEGER;
ExecutionStatus : RequutExecutlonStatus;
END;
SemaphoreQueueType - QUEUE OF DESCenDING SemaphoreType;
AlgorithmType- (PowerUp, IORequestSchedule, IOResponseSohedule,
OutputResponseSohe_le, StartPendlngIO, NetworkRepair,
StartFaultMonlt or) ;
UnloadRequestType - RECORD
Response : IOResponseType;
CASE ResponseType : IOActivityType OF
NetworkManagerResponse, Fault.MonltorRe spo 9s e :
ManagerID : INTEGER;
END;
END;
DataType - RECORD
CASE Function : AlgorithmType OF
PowerUp:
I IORequestSched_le:
IORequest : IORequestType;
IOResponseSchedule:
E_S5
IOResponse : IOResponseType;
OutputRQspo.seSchedu IQ •
Rate : INTEGER;
StartPondlngIO:
(* 1/27/88 *) RoquestStatus : RequestExecutionStatus;
StartFaultMonitor:
NetworkRepair:
RopairData : NetworkManagerServlceRequest;
END;
END;
DataPointer - POINTER TO DataType;
EVENT IOCompletionPoll : RoquestExocutionStatus;
InltializeService : BOOLEAN;
CONST IOSystemSorvicePriority
NotworkID2
= i;
-2;
Power_plntialize - 0.000100;
RequestProcessing - 0.000025;
ResponsoCompletionProcossing - 0.000025;
ChainProcossing_v_rhead - 0.000050;
EndOfCha/nProcossingOverhead - 0.000050;
ChainProcossinglTransaction - 0.000018;
ChainProcessing2Transactions = 0.000036;
EndOfChalnProcossinglTransaction - 0.000052;
EndOfChainProcessing2Transactions - 0.000104;
SwitchRootLinkProcessing - 0.000025;
SemaphoroGrantod - -i;
SemaphoreNotGranted - -2;
NoPendingReq_est - -3;
VAR FaultMonitor2
servic_d_uest
RequostToService
ResponseData
NewNQtworkState
IOServicoState
Pe.d/ngRequest
PendingStatus
IOSystemStatus
ServicoNotworkRequost
IONetworkConnections
InterfaceID
NotworkOutOfServiceTimo
TimeNotworkOutOfServico
RoquestTime
OnDemandRoquos tDelay
T im$To_n loa_oques t
Failed_ootNumbor
NetworkCountor
InterfacoCounter
: IORequostType;
: IORequostType;
: Reques tExocution Status;
: UnloadReq_estType;
: NewNetwor kStateType;
: IOServiceStateType;
: SemaphoroType;
: INTEGER;
: BOOLEAN;
: NQtwor k_4anagerServiceRe_fuest;
: IOServiceNet workConnectionsType;
: INTEGER;
: ARRAY [1 .. NumberOfNetworks] OF REAL;
: REAL;
: REAL;
: REAL;
: REAL;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
Processinglnformation
PowerUpProcessing
NetworkData
ProcessRoquest
PendingIOProcossing
ResponseDataProcessing
RootLinkSwitchProcesslnq
: DataPointer;
: DataPointer;
: DataPointer;
: DataPointor;
: DataPointer;
: DataPointer;
: DataPointer;
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RepairNetworkProce8 8ing
p owerUpRoquest
ProcossResponse
p roces singOut_utRosponse
p roce8 8 ingStar tPendingIO
P rotes singNetworkRepair
DataColloctionRocord
: DataPolntar;
: Processin_nit;
: ProcessingUnlt;
: ProcossingUnit;
: ProcessingUnit;
: Procossin_nit;
: DataEl_ntTypo;
NetworkManager 2Port : INTEr;
AppllcationPort : ARRAY [i .. 3] OF INTEGER;
IOPPort : INTEGER;
ControlsPort : INTEGER;
Notwork2Connections : NodakrrayType;
****************************************************************************
MODULE S_maphore;
FROM SYSTEM IMPORT ADDRESS;
FROM QueueM I_OItT InitQ, PrQInsert, QSize, QRemove, FirstQ,
QSucc, carrier;
IMPORT S_phoreType, SemaphoreQueueType, SemaphoreGranted,
SemaphoreNotGranted, NoPondlngRoquost;
I_ORT WriteString, WritoLn, ParmOut;
I_ORT cbnoasure, Syste_Probe, ProbeNumbor;
EXPORT Request, Release, NoxtReque|t, SomaphoreIdle, SotSe®_phoroldle;
VAR Idle : BOOLEAN;
SenaphoreQuouo : SemaphoreQuouoType;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE Request(Semaphore : S_phoreType) : INTEGZR;
VAR Status : INTEGER;
BEGIN
IF Idle THEN
Status :- SemaphoreGranted;
Idle :- FALSE;
ELSE
Status :- SemaphoreNotGrantod;
INSERT Semaphore IN SemaphoreQ_euo;
END;
RETURN (Status) ;
END Request;
************************************************************************
(* This function returns the priority of the highest priority pending
request. If no request i8 waiting the seaaphore is set to idle
and No pending request is returned. *)
PROCEDURE Release (VAR Status : INTEGER);
VAR PendlngReq_est : Sem_horeType;
BEGIN
Idle :- TRUE;
IF QSize(SeI_aphoreQ_euo) <> 0 THEN
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P_d/ngRequest :- FirstQ (S4maphoreQueue) ;
Status :- Pond/ngRequest^.Priority;
ELSE
Status :- NoPendingReq_est;
END;
END Release;
************************************************************************
PRf_URE NextRe_est (VAR Request : SemaphoreType} ;
BEGIN
IF QSize(SMu&phoreQueue} > 0 THEN
R_OVE FIRST Request FRCI4 Se-u_phoreQ_eue;
Idle :- FALSE;
SABLE I. 0 WITH SystemProbe [Probm_umber] ;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "Problem with semphore logic.");
WriteLn (ParemOut) ;
WriteString(ParemO_t, "Trying to remo_ SE_HC_ FROM EMPTY QUEUE.");
WrlteLn (ParamOut) ;
END;
E_ NextRequest;
************************************************************************
PROCEDUP_ SqmaphoreIdle(VAR Status : BOOLEAN} ;
BEGIN
Status :- Idle;
END SemaphoreIdle;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE SetSemaphoreIdle;
BEGIN
Idle :- TRUE;
END SetSemaphoreIdle;
************************************************************************
BEGIN
Idle :- TRUE;
EA_ Semaphore;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE SubmitRequestProcessing(Request : DataPointer;
WriteTheData : BOOL_;
Fr ameCount : INTEGER;
Processing : REAL;
ProcessPriority : INTEGER);
: ProcessingUnit;VAR P rocessRequest
BEGIN
_S8
VAR ProcessRequest
BEGIN
NEW (ProcessRequest) ;
NEW (Proces sRequest) ;
WITH ProcessRequest ^ DO
Priority :- ProcessPriority;
ProcesmingRequlred :- Processing;
WriteData :- WriteTheData;
Frame :- FrameCount;
ProcessID :- 'Req_eetProcessing' ;
Data :- Request;
END;
NOW out_ort [lOPPcrt] ^ .ProcessorRequest <- ProcessRequest;
END $ubl/tReques tProcessing;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE Su_itUnloadIORequest(ServiceResponse : DataPointer;
Processing : REAL;
ProcnssPriority : INTEGER);
: ProcessingUnit;
WITH ProcessRequest ^ DO
Priority :- ProcessPrlority;
ProcessingReq_ired :- Processing;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'UnloadIORequest' ;
Data :- ServiceRasponse;
END;
NOW outport [IOPPort] ^ .ProcessorRequest <- ProcessRequest;
END Submi_UnloadIORequest;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ResponseCompletion (Response : 10ResponseType) ;
VAR ChainCounter : INTEGER;
BEGIN
WITH Response ^ DO
IF ResponseType - ApplicationResponse THEN
FOR ChainCounter :- I TO NuaberOfNetworks DO
IF ChainStatus [ChainCounter] <> NotExecuted THEN
IF (RasponseArray [ChainCounter] ^ .AnyFailed) OR
(ResponseAr ray [ChainCounter ]^.AllFailed) THEN
ChainStatus [ChainCounta: ] :- C_unicationYault;
ELSE
ChainStatus [ChainCounter] :- NoFaults;
END;
ELSE
(* Chain not executed so nothing to process. *)
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END;
END;
ELSIF (ResponseType- NetworkManagerResponse} OR
(ResponseType - FaultMonitorResponse) THEN
(* Network Manager is responsible for processing
these I/0 responses. *)
END;
END;
RuponseCompletion;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure marks a root link on Network 2 failed. *)
PROCEDURE FailRootLink (VAR RootLinkStatus : NetworkConnoctlonType;
RootLink : INTEGER} :INTEGER;
VAR RootLinkCounter : INTEGER;
FailedNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
FOR RootLinkCounter :- I TO NumberOfIOSPerChannel DO
IF RootLinkStatus .NetworkConnoctions [RootLinkCounter] .GPCAddress
- RootLink THEN
RootLinkStatus.ConnoctionStatus [RootLinkCounter] :- Failed;
FailodNmnber :- RootLinkCounter;
END;
Eh_;
RETURN (FailodNumber) ;
END FailRootLink;
****************************************************************************
PROCZDURE SwitchRootLinks (VAR RootLinkStatus : NetworkConnectionType;
NetworkID : INTEGER;
FailedNumber : INTEGER) : INTEGER;
VAR RootLinkCounter : INTEGER;
NewRoot Link : INTEGER;
BEGIN
WITH RootLinkstatus DO
RootLinkCounter :- 1;
LOOP
IF ConnectionStatus [RootLinkCou_tor] - Idle THEN
(* A new root link has been found. *)
ConnectionStatus {RootLinkCounter] :- Active;
NewRootLink :- NetworkConnections [RootLinkCounter] .GPC_x_Iress ;
EXIT;
ELSIF RootLinkCounter < NumberOfIOSPerChannel THEN
RootLinkCounter := RootLinkCounter + i;
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ELSE
(* A good root link cannot be found. *)
NewRootLink :- 0;
EXIT;
END;
END;
_D;
RETURN (NewRootLink) ;
END SwitchRootLinks;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ComputeIOLoadTime (IORequest : IORequestType;
ServiceState : IOServiceStateType} :REAL;
VAR LoadTime : REAL;
************************************************************************
(* This function looks at the first transaction in chain i of
application IORequest to determine if the request is an separated-I
reqeust. If so, TRUE is returned, otherwise, FALSE is returned. *)
PROCEDURE SeparatedIRequest(Chain : ChalnType) : BOOLEAN;
VAR Transaction : TransactlonT},pe;
BEGIN
Transaction :- FirstQ(Cha/n^.TransactlonQueue) ;
IF (Transaction ^.OutputFrame^.Message - DZUInput) AND
(Traasaetion ^ .O_tputFrame^.DIUCommand.Activity- Input) THEN
RETUEN (TRUE) ;
ELSE
RETURN (FALSE} ;
END;
END SeparatedIRaquest;
************************************************************************
BEGIN
IF IORequest^.RequestType - ApplicationRequest THEN
(* Need to check for type of request, Grouped, Separated-I,
Separated-O. Separated I has different loading time. *)
IF SeparatedIRequest(IORequest^.ChainArray[l]) THEN
LoadTime :- 2.0 * ChainProcessingOverhead;
ELSE
CASE IORequest ^ .Identifier OF
i00:
LoadTime :- (2.0 * ChainProcessingOverhead) + ChainProcessingl00Hz;
J 50:
LoadTime :- (2.0 * ChainProcessingOverhead) + Cha/nProcesslngSOHz;
I 25:
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LoadTimQ :- (Z.0 * ChainProcessingOverhQad} + ChainProcessingZSHz;
END;
END;
WITH ServiceState DO
IF NOT ((Network_ealth[l] - InService) AND (NetworkHealth[2]
- InService) } THEN
(* Cut load time in half since only one network
is in service. *)
LoadTime :- 0.5 * LoadTime;
END;
END;
ELSIF IORequest ^ .RequestType = NetworkManagerKequest THEN
CASE IORequest^.Chain^.NumberOfTransactions OF
i:
LoadTime :- RequestProcessing + ChainProcessingOverhead
+ ChainProcessinglTransaction;
J2:
LoadTime :- RequestProcessing + ChainProcesslngOverhead
+ ChainP roces s ing2 Transactlons;
I 4, 18:
(* This hanc[le talker o_t of t%Lrn request d_ring
network growth. *)
LoadTime :- Req%_estProcessing + ChainProcessingOverhead;
END;
ELSIF IORequest^.RequestType - MonitorForFault THEN
LoadTime :- 0.0;
END;
RETURN (LoadTime) ;
END ComputeIOLoadTime;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ComputelfX/nloadTime (IOResponse : IOResponseType) :REAL;
VAR UnloadTime : REAL;
BEGIN
IF IOResponse ^ .ResponseType -ApplicationResponse TH_N
CASE IOResponse^.Identifier OF
I00:
UnloadTime :- (2.0 * EndOfChainProcessingOverhead) + EndOfChainProcessingl00Hz;
I 50:
UnloadTime :i (2.0 * EndOfChainProcessingOverhead) + EndOfChainProcessing50Hz;
I 25:
84_
UnloadTime :- (2.0 * EndOfChainProcessingOverhead) + EndOfChainProcessing25Hz;
END;
WITH IOResponse ^ DO
IF NOT ((ResponseArray[l] O NIL) AND (ResponseArray[2] <> NIL)) THEN
(* Out unload time in half since only one network
is in service. *)
UnloadTim, :- 0.5 * UnloadTime;
Eh_;
ELSIF IOResponsa^.ResponseType - NetworkManaqerResponse TH_
CASE QSize (IOResponse ^ .Response*. InputFrameQueue) OF
i:
UnloadTime :- EndOfChainProcessingOverhead + EndOfChainProcessinqlTransaction;
12:
UnloadT/me :- EndOfChainProcessingOverhead + EndOfChainProcessing2Transactions;
I 4, 18:
(* This handle talker out of turn request during
network growth. *}
UnloadTime :- EndOfChainProcesslnqOvorhead + EndOfChalnProcessing_6onitor;
END;
ELSIF IOResponse ^ .ResponseType - FaultMonitorResponse THEN
UnloadTime :- EndOfChainProcessingOverhaad + EndOfChainProcessingMonitor;
END;
RETURN (UnloactT/me + ResponseCompletionProcessing) ;
END ComputeIOUnloadTime;
****************************************************************************
(* Check to make sure chain on network 2 executed without error. If not,
take the network 2 out of service and schedule a monitor for fault chain
if the reconfig_ration strategy is one shot repair, otherwise have
the network manager regrow network 2. *)
PROCEDURE CheckNetworksForFault (Response : IOResponseType;
VAR ServiceState : IOServiceStateType);
VAR FaultCheckRequest : DataPointer;
DataCollectionRecord : DataElementType;
RegrowNetworkRequest : NetworkManager ServiceReq_est;
Faul tMonit orProcessing : DataPointer;
ProcessinqFaultMonitor : ProcessingUnit;
RegroWNetworkProcessing : DataPointer;
ProcessingRegrowNetwork : ProcesslngOnit;
BEGIN
IF (ServiceState.NetworkBealth[2] - InService}
AND (Response ^.ChainStatus [2] -
C_unicationFault } THEN
ServiceState.NetworkHealth[2] :- OutOfService;
NetworkOutOfServiceTime [2] :- clock;
REPORT "%12.8f" clock TAGGED "Network Out of Service at ";
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REPORT "%d" NetworkCounter TAGGED "The network with the failure is ";
DataCollectionRecord. Event ID :- 28;
DataCollectionRecord. SimulatlonTime :- clock;
DataCol lec tionRecord. Frequency :- NonCyclic;
DataCollectionRecord.NonCyclicData.N_Varlation :- NetServiceChange;
DataCollectlonRecord, NonCyc licData ,Netwo rkID :- 2;
WriteDataEl_ntType (DataCollectionRecord) ;
IF StrategyForReconfiguration - 0 TH_
REPCR_ "%12.8f" clock TAGGED "Application Chain Fault";
NEW (FaultMonitorPro cos sing );
FaultMonitorProcessing^.Function :- StartFaultMonitor;
NEW (ProcesslngFaultMonitor };
WITH ProcessingFaultMonitor ^ DO
Priority :- IOSyst iServicQP riority;
ProcessingRequired :- Req_estProcessing + ChainProcessingOverhead;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'Fault MonitorProcessing' ;
Data :- FaultMonitorProcessing;
END;
NOW out'port (In, Port ]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcesslngFault_4onitor;
ELSE
IOServiceBtate.ActiveRootLink[2] :- IONetworkConnections[2].
NetworkConnections [2 ].GPCAddress;
NEW (RegrowNotworkRequest } ;
NEW (RegrowNetworkRequest) ;
WITH RegrowNotworkRequest ^ DO
ServiceRequest :- GrowNetwork;
ActiveRootLink :- IOServiceState .ActiveRootLlnk [2 ];
END;
IONetworkConnections (2] .ConnectionStatus (2 ] :- Active;
NEW (RegrowNetworkProces sing );
RegrowNetworkProces sing^. Function :1 NetworkRepair;
RegrowNetworkProcessing^.RepairData :- RegrowNetworkRequest;
NEW (ProcessingRagrowNetwork) ;
WITH ProcessingRegrowNetwork ^ DO
Priority :- IOSys t_nServiceP riorit y;
ProcessingRequlred :- 0.0;
Mr iteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'Regrow Network Processing' ;
Data :- RegrowNetworkPr oces sing;
END;
NOW outport [IOPPort ]^ .ProcsssorRequest <- ProcessingRegrowNetwork;
END;
ELSIF (ServiceState.NetworkHealth[1] - InService)
AND (Response*.ChainStatus (i] - CommunicationFault} THEN
WriteString(ParamOut, "Unexpected fault found in network I.");
WriteLn (ParamOur} ;
ELSE
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END;
(* Either the network is already out of service, or no
communication faults oecured. In either case there is
no_hing to do. *)
END CheckNetworksForFault;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure camputes the time to load the Z/O request on the
network(s) that are in service, starts the chains, and schedules
the I/O completion poll. *)
PROCEDURE ExecuteApplicationRequest (IORequest : IORequestType;
ServiceState : IOServiceStateType);
VAR S_aphore : SaeaphoreType;
SaaaphoreStatus : INTEGER;
InterfaceID : INTEGER;
NetworkCounter : INTEGER;
LoadReq_es t : Req%lestExecu tionSt atu s;
BEGIN
NEW(LoadRequest);
LoadReq_est^.Req_est :- IOReq_est;
LoadRequest^.Req_estType :- ApplicatlonRequest;
FOR NetworkCounter :- I TO N_mberOfNetworks DO
IF (ServiceState.NetworkHQalth[NetworkCounter] - InService) THEN
(* Determine the active interface for the network that this
request will execute on. *)
InterfaceID :- ServiceState.ActivaRootLink[NetworkCounter);
LoadRequest^.PortArray[NetworkCounter] :- GetOutPort(InterfaceID);
(* Mark network loaded with a chain. *)
LoadRequest^.ExecutingOn[NetworkCounter] :- TRUE;
ELSE
(* Mark network not loaded with a chain. *)
LoadRequest^.ExecutingOn[NetworkCounter] :- FALSE;
FleD;
END;
(* Make a request for the I/O systea semaphore, if the semaphore
is idle, the request will be executed. Otherwise, if no other
request of the same priority is waiting, the current request
will be pended for later execution. If a request of the same
priority is waiting, the currant request will be ignored. *)
NEW(Semaphore);
Semaphore^.Priority :- IOReq_est^.Priority;
Samaphore^.ExecutionStatus :- LoadRequast;
SemaphoreStat_s :- Request(Semaphore);
IF (S_aaphoreStatus - SamaphoreGranted) THEN
StartIOSs(LoadRequest, ServiceState);
DISPOSE(Semaphore);
END;
END ExecuteApplicationRequest;
PROCEDURE ExecuteManager2Request(IORequest : IORequestType;
ServiceState : IOServiceStateType);
S_5
CON_ Notw_r_ _ - 2 ;
V_R TimeToLoadRequest : REAL;
Inter faceID : I_TEGER;
ExecutionReques t : RequestExecutionSt atu s;
LoadIOProcessing : DataPointer;
BEGIN
(* This must is a request for a network that Is out of service,
NetwDrk Manager chain or Monitor for fault chain. The status
of the network is assumed out of service and no other chain
is pending on this network. *)
(* DetermJma the active interface for the network that this
request will execute on. *)
InterfaceID :- ServiceState. Act iveRootLink INetwork2 ID ];
(* Compute the time to load this request in the DPM through
the Data Exchange. *)
TimeToLoadRequest :- ComputeIOLoadTime (iORequest, ServiceState) ;
NEW (ExocutionA_luest) ;
Execu tionReques t ^.Request :- lORequest;
ExecutionRequest^.RequestType :- IORequest^.RequestType;
ExecutionRequest ^.Port :- GetOutPort (InterfaceID) ;
StartIOSs(ExecutionRequest, ServiceState);
END ExecuteManagor2Request;
PROCEDURE UnloadResponse(RequestToService : RequestExecutlonStatus;
ServiceState : lOServiceStateType;
VAR Data : UnloadRequestType);
VKRNetworkCounter : INTEGER;
InterfaceID : INTEGER;
BEGIN
NEW (Data. Response) ;
IF KequestToService^.Request^,RequestType - ApplicationRequest THEN
Data.ResponseType :- ApplicatlonResponse;
Data.Response^.ResponseType :- ApplicatlonResponse;
Data.Response^.Identifier :- RequestToService^.Request^.Identifier;
Data.Response^.Frame :- RequestToService^.Request^.Frame;
(* Only unload those network(s) executi,g a request. *)
FOR NetworkCounter :- 1 TO NumberOfNetworks DO
IF RequestToService^.ExecutingOn_NetworkCounter] THEN
(* This is set to force Request Completion processing
to process this chain. Request completion
processing will set this to the proper value. *)
Data.Response^.ChainStatus[NetworkCounter] :- NoFaults;
(* Determine the active interface for the network
that this request was executing on. *)
InterfaceID :- ServiceState.ActiveRootLink[NetworkCounter];
WITH Data.Response ^ DO
ResponseArray[NetworkCounter] :- inport[GetInPort(
InterfaceID)]^.DataFromIOS;
IF inport[GetlnPort(InterfaceID)]^.ChainCompleted TH_
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(* Chain Co_leted normally. *)
Response^tray [NetworkCounter ]*.ChainTimeOut Indicator
:- NormalCompletion;
ELSE
(* Chain has timed out. Command IOS to stop
execution and unload chain. *)
Respons eArray [Networ kCounter ]^ .ChainTimeOut Indicat or
:- T_medOut;
NOW outport [GetOutPort (InterfaceID) ]^ .StopIOS <- TRUE;
END;
END;
ELSE
Data.Response ^.chainStatus [NetworkCounter] :- NotExecuted;
Data. Response ^ .ResponseArray (NetworkCounter ] :- NIL;
END;
Eh_;
ELSE
IF RequestToService ^ .RequestType - NetworkManagerRequest THEN
Data.ResponseType :- NetworkManagerRespons e;
Data.Response* .ResponseTypo :- NetworkManagerRosponse;
ELSE
Data. ResponseType :- FaultMonitorRe spon se;
Data. Response ^.ResponseType :- FaultMonitorResponse;
Eh_;
(* Unload the request *)
Interface ID :- ServiceStats. ActiveRootLink [NetworkID2 ] ;
Data,Response ^.Response :- /nport [GetInPort (InterfaaeID) ]*.DataFromIOS;
IF inport [C_tInPort (InterfaceID) ]^.Chaincompleted THEN
Data. Response ^.Response ^.ChainTimeOut Indicator :- Nor_ICompletion;
ELSE
Data.Response^.Response^.ChainTi_eOutIndicator :- TimedOut;
NOW outl_ort [GQtO_tPort (InterfaceID) ]^ .StopIOS <- TRUE;
END;
END;
END UnloadResponse;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE StartIOSs (RequostToLoad : RequestExecutionStatus;
ServiceState : IOServiceStateType) ;
CONST OneMilliSecond- 0.001;
VAR NetworkCo_nter : INTEGER;
BitTimeToNextMilliSecond : REAL;
BEGIN
WITH RequestToLoad ^ DO
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IF RequestType - ApplicatlonRequest
REPORT "%d" Request^.Identifier TAGGED "Start Network Activity";
FOR NetworkCounter :- 1 TO NumberOfNetworks DO
IF ExecutingOn[NetworkCounter] THEN
IF ServiceState.NetworkHealth[NetworkCo_ter] - InService THEN
NOW outport[PortArray[NetworkCounter]]^.ChainToiOS
<- RequestA.ChainArray[NetworkCounter];
ELSE
(* This chain was loaded when network was
in service, but has gone out of service
before the chain co,ld begin execution,
ExecutingOn[NetworkCounter] :- FALSE;
,)
END;
END;
END;
ELSE
NOW outport[Port]^.Ch_nToIOS <- Request^._a_;
END;
BitTlmeToNextMilliSecond :- OneMilliSecond - RealMod(clock, OneM/lliSecond);
AFTER (BitTimeToNextM/lliSecond + Request^.RequestTimeoutVal,e)
IOCompletionPoll <- RequestToLoad;
END;
END StartIOSs;
Network_ager2Port :- GetOutPort (ManagerIDNetwork2} ;
ApplicationPort [I] :- GetOutPort (ApplicationID [1]) ;
ApplicationPort [2] :- GetOutPort (ApplicationID [2] ) ;
ApplicationPort [3] := GetOutPort (ApplicationID [3] ) ;
IOPPort :- GetOutPort (IOPIdentifier) ;
ControlsPort :- GetOutPort (ControlsIdentifier) ;
(* Request lOP to complete Power Up Initialization.
NEW (PowlrUpProcessing) ;
WITH PowerUpProcessing ^ DO
,)
Function :- PowerUp;
END;
NEW (PowerUpRequest) ;
WITH PowerUpReq_est ^ DO
Priority :- IOSystemServicePriority;
ProcessingRequired :- Poweruplntialize;
WrlteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'IOServicePowerUp';
Data :- PowerUpProcessing;,
END;
NOW outport[lOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- PowerupRequest;
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LOOP
WAITUNTIL (ProcessorResponse)
ProcessorResponse :
ProcessResponse :- ActlvIPort^.ProcessorResponse;
NetworkData :- ProoessResponse ^ .Data;
WITH NetworkData ^ DO
IF Function - PowerUp TH_
NOW InitializeService <- TRUE;
EXIT;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "Probl_ during power up processing. ");
WriteLn (ParamOur) ;
END;
END;
EI_);
DISPOSE (NetworkData} ;
DISPOSE (ProcessResponse) ;
END;
(* This loop waits for the initialize service request.
would happen at power up in a flight syst_. *)
LOOP
WAITUNTIL (InitializeService)
Init ializaService :
(* Find out how many IOS's each network has.
This request
*)
FindIOSConnections(l, ICNetworkConnections(l].NetworkConnections);
FindIOSConnections(2, IGNetworkConnectionsI2].NetworkConnectiofls);
(* Initialize all network connections to idle. *)
FOR NetworkCounter :- 1 TO NumberOfNetworks DO
FOR lnterfaoeCounter :- i TO NumberOfIOSPerChannel DO
IF IONetworkConnectio, s[NetworkCounter].
NetworkConnections[InterfaceCounter]0GPCAddress
<> OTHZN
IONetworkConnections[NetworkCounter].
ConnectionStatus[I,terfaceCounter] :- Idle;
ELSE
(* This simulation run does not have an interface
with this ID, set its status to failed. *)
IONetworkConnections[NetworkCounter].
ConnectionStatus[InterfaceCounter] :- Failed;
END;
END;
END;
(* Initialize Active interfaces. Since all hardware should
B_9
END;
END;
LOOP
be "good", the first interface will be used. *)
IC_etworkConnections[1].ConnectionStatus[1] :-
IONetworkConnections[2].ConnectionStatus[l] :-
IOServiceState.NetworkHealth[1] :-
IOServiceState.NetworkHealth[2] :-
IOServiceState.ActiveRootLinkI1] :-
IOServiceState.Activel%ootLink[2] :-
IOServiceStateoExecutingl00Hz :-
IOServiceState.ExecutingSOHz :-
IOServiceState.Executing25Hz :-
Active;
Active;
InService;
InService;
IONetworkConnections[l).NetworkConnections[1].GPCAddress; _-
IONetworkConnections[2].NetworkConnectionsIl].GPCAddress;
FALSE;
FALSE_
FALSE;
(* Create chain to monitor network 2 for faults. *}
Re_dNodelnterConnections(2_ Network2Connections);
FaultMonitor2 :- MakeMonitorRequest(Network2Connections);
WITH FaultMonitor2 ^ DO
Identifier :- 302;
Priority :- i;
ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
RequestType :- MonitorForFault;
Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- 2;
Chain^.Chainldentifier := 302;
END;
(* Notify controller that the networks are available to use.
NOW o_tport[ControlsPort]^.ServiceAvailable <- TRUE;
EXIT;
*)
WAITUNTIL EVENT
lOSe rviceRequest:
ServiceReq_est := ActivePort^.IOServiceReq_est;
IF ServiceRequest _ .OnDemand THEN
OnDemandRequestDelay := Random(l, 0.000020, 0.000035);
ELSE
OnDemandRequestDelay := 0.0;
END;
IF (ServiceReq_est^.RequestType- ApplicationRequest) AND
(ServiceRequest^.Priority- i0) AND
NOT IOServiceState.E_ecutingl00Hz THEN
SAMPLE I. 0 WITH SystemProbe[ProbeNumber] ;
IOServiceState.Executing100Hz :- TRUE;
RequestTime :- ComputeIOLoadTime (ServiceRequest, IOServiceState)
+ OnDemandRequestDelay + RequestProcessing;
NEW (ProcessRequest) ;
WITH ProcessRequest _ DO
Function := IORequestSchedule;
IORequest := Service.Request;
END;
SubmitReques_roces sLug (ProcessRequest,
NOT ServiceRequest ^ .OnDemand, ServiceRequest ^.Frame,
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RequestT/me, $erviceRequest ^.Priority) ;
ELSIF (ServiceRequest*.RequestType - ApplicationRequest) AND
{ServiceRequest^.Prlorlty - 9) AND
NOT IOServiceState.ExecutingSOHz THEN
SAMPLE 1.0 WITH Syst_robe_ProbeNumber] ;
IOServiceState. ExecutingSOHz :- TRUE;
RequestTime :- ComputeIOLoadTi_e (ServiceRequest, IOServiceState)
÷ On_dR_estDelay + R_questProcessing;
NEW (Proce amRequest) ;
WITH ProcessRequest ^ DO
Function :- IORequestSchedule;
IOReq_est :- ServlceRequest;
END;
SubmitReques tProces slng (ProcessRequest,
NOT ServiceRequest^.Or_d, ServiceReq_est^.Frame,
RequestTime, ServlceRequest ^.Priority} ;
ELSIF (ServiceRequest^.RequestType - ApplicationRequest) AND
(ServlceRequest^.Prlorlty - 8)
NOT IOServiceState.Executing25Hz THEN
SA_LE 1.0 WITH SysteRProbe[ProbeNumber] ;
IOServiceState.Executlng25Hz :- TRUE;
Req_estTime :- CoBputeIOLoadTime (ServiceRequest, IOServiceState)
+ On_dReq_estDe_ay + RequestProcessing;
NEW(ProcessRequest } ;
WITH ProcessRequest ^ DO
Function :- IORequestSchQdule;
IORequest :- ServloeReq_est;
END;
SuhmitReques tP roces sing (ProcessRequest,
NOT ServiceRequest^.OnDemand, ServiceRequest^.Frame,
RequestTime, ServiceRequest ^ .Priority) ;
ELSIF ServiceRequest^.RequestType - NetworkManagerRequest THEN
RequestTime :- CcmputeIOLoadTiae (ServiceRequest, IOServiceState) ;
NEW (ProcessRequest) ;
WITH ProcessRequest ^ DO
Function :- IORequestSchedu le;
IORequest :- ServiceRsquest;
END;
SubmitRequestProcessing(ProcessReq_est, FALSE, 0, Req_estTi_e,
ServiceRequest ^ .Priority) ;
END;
I IOCoupletionPoll:
RequestToService :- IOC_letionPoll;
IF RequestToService^.Request^.ResponseExpected THEN
UnloadResponse(RequestToService, IOServiceState, ResponseData} ;
TimeToUnloadRequest :- ComputeIOUnloadTime (ResponseData .Response) ;
IF RequestToService^.RequestType - ApplicationReq_est THEN
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(* 1/27/88 *)
(* 1127188 *)
(* 1/27/88 *}
ResponseCompletion (ResponsaData .Regp_nae) ;
CheckNetworksForFault (ResponseData .Response,
IOServicaState };
(* Release semaphore and check for a higher priority
request that is waiting for start IOS. *)
Releasa(PendingStatus);
IF Pe,cilngStatus > RequestToService^.Requeat^.Priority THEN
NEW(Pend/ngIOProcessing);
PendinglOProcessing^.Function :- StartPend/nglO;
NextRequest(PendingRequest);
PendingIOProcesslng^.RequestStatus :- PendingRequest^.ExecutionStatus;
DISPOSE(PendingRequest);
NEW(ProcessingStartPendingIO);
WITH ProcessingStartPendingIO ^ DO
Priority :- PendingStatus;
ProcessingReq_ired :- 0.0;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'Start Pending i/O';
Data :- PendingIOProcesaing;
END;
NOW outport[IOPPort]A.ProcessorReq_est <- ProcessingStartPendingIO;
END;
NEW(ResponseDataProcessing);
WITH ResponseDataProcessing ^ DO
Function :- IOResponseSchedule;
IOResponse :- ResponseData.Response;
END;
_tUnloadIORequest(ResponseDataProcessing,
TimeToUnloadRequest, RequestToService^.Reqgeat^.Priority};
ELSIF RequestToService^.RequestType - NQtworkManagerRequest THEN
NEW(ResponseDataProcessing);
WITH ResponseDataProcessing ^ DO
Function :- IOResponseSchedule;
IOResponse :- ResponseData.Response;
END;
SL_mitUnloadIORequest(ResponseDataProcessing,
TimeToUnloadRequest, RequestToService^.Request^.Priority);
ELSIF RequestToService^.RequestType - MonitorForFault THEN
IF ResponseData.Response^.Kesponse^.AllFailed THEN
NEW(ServiceNetworkRequest);
WITH ServiceNetworkRequest ^ DO
ServiceRequest :- SwitchRootLink;
(* This section of code uses internal workings
of DENET to determine the Fa/ledRootNode.
IT IS CONFIGURATION DEPENDANT. *)
CurrentNodeID :R IOServiceState.ActiveRootLink[2];
FailedRootNode :- GetOutNode(2};
Cu_rentNodeID :- MyNodeID;
FailedRootNumber :- FailRootLink(IONetworkConnections(NetworkID2],
IOServiceState.ActiveRootLink[NetworkID2]);
B-72
IOServlceState.ActiveRootLinkINetworkID2]
:- SwitchRootLinks(IONetworkConnections[NetworkID2],
NetworkID2, FailedRoot_r);
IF IOServiceState.ActlveRootLink[NetworkID2] - 0 THEN
(* A good root link cannot be found. This
network will not be returned to service. *)
WrlteString(ParamOut, '_etwork 2 has no more root links.");
WriteLn(ParamOut};
WriteStrlng(ParaBOut, "Continue operation with Network 2 out of service. ");
NriteLn(ParamOut);
END;
(* This section of code uses internal workings
of DEh_BT to determine the FailedRootNode.
IT IS CONFIGURATIC_ DEPENDANT. *)
CurrentNodeID :- IOServiceState.ActiveRootLink[2] ;
NewRootNode :- GetOutNode (2) ;
CurrentNodeID :- MyNodeID;
END;
(* Make a request to the IOP for execution time
to switch root links. *)
NEW(RootLinkSwitchProcessing};
RootLinkSwitchProcessing^.Function :- NetworkRepair;
RootLinkSwitchProcessing^.RepairData :- ServiceNetworkRequest;
NEN(ProcessingNetworkRepair);
WITH ProcessingNetworkRepalr ^ DO
Priority :- IOSystemServic_Priority;
ProcessingRequired :- TimeToUnloadRQquest + SwitchRootLinkProcessing;
WritaData :- FALSE;
ProcesslD :- 'Switch Root Link Processing';
Data :- RootLinkSwitchProcessing;
END;
ReleaseChai_sponseMemory(ResponseData.Response^.Response);
DISPOSE(ResponseOata.Response); (* PRR *)
ELSE
NEW(ServiceNetworkRequest);
WITH ServiceNetworkRequest ^ DO
ServiceRequeat :- RepairFault;
MonitorChainResponse :-ResponseData.Response;
END;
NEW(RepairNetworkProcassing);
RepairNetworkProcessing^.Function :- NetworkRepair;
RepairNetworkProcessing^.RepalrData :- ServiceNetworkRequest;
NEN(ProcessingNetworkRepair);
WITH ProcessingNetworkRepair ^ DO
Priority :- IOSystemServicePriority;
ProcessingRequired :- TimeToUnloadRequest;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'Repair Network Processing';
Data :- RepalrNetworkProcessing;
END;
END;
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NOW outport(IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingNetworkRepair;
END;
ELSE
(* The request for this poll Just contains output
transactions with no input transactions, check
for any pending request that is higher priority. *)
(* Deleted Lines *)
(* Release semaphore and check for a higher priority
request that is waiting for start IOS. *)
Release(PendingStatus);
IF PendingStatus > RequestToServlce^.Request^.Priority THEN
_W(PendingIOProcessing);
Pend/ngIC_rocsssing^.Function :- StartPendingIO;
NextRequest(PendingRequest);
PendingIOProcessing^.RequestStatus :- PendingRequest^.ExecutionStatus;
DISPOSE(Pend/ngRequest);
NEW(ProcessingStartPendingIO);
WITH ProcessingStartPendingIO ^ DO
Priority :- PendingStatus;
ProcessingRequired :- 0.0;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'Start Pending I/O';
Data :- PendingIOProcesslng;
END;
NOW outport(IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingStartPend/ngIO;
END;
NEW(ResponseDataProcsssing);
WITH ResponseDataProcessing ^ DO
Function :- OutputResponseSchedule;
Rate :- RequestToService^.Request^.Identifier;
END;
NEW(ProcessingOutputResponse);
WITH ProcessingOutputResponse ^ DO
Priority :- RequestToServiceA.Request^.Priority;
IF (IOServiceState.NetworkHealth[1] - InService) AND
(IOServiceState.NetworkHealth[2] - InService) THEN
ProcessingRequired :- ResponseCompletionProcessing
+ (2.0 * EndOfChainProcessingOverhead);
ELSE
ProcessingRequired :- ResponseCompletionProcessing
÷ EndOfChainProcessingOverhead;
END;
WriteData
ProcessID
Data
:- FALSE;
:- 'Output Repsonse Processing';
:- ResponseDataProcesslng;
END;
NOW outport{IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingOutputResponse;
E2qD;
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DISPOSE(Req_estToService); (* PRB *)
I RtnNetworkToService:
(* This event is used to return network 2 to service
after the NetworkManaglr has repaired it. *}
NewNetworkStata :- ActlvePort^.RtnNetworkToService;
DataColleotlonRecord.EventID :- 29;
DataCollect ionRecor d. Siuul&tlcnTime :- clock;
DataCo llectionRecord. Frequency :- NonCyclic;
DataColleotlonRecord.NonCy¢i/cData.N Varlation :- NetServiceChange;
DataCollectlo_Record.NonCyclicData.NetworkID :- NewNetworkStat e ^.NetworkID;
NriteDataElementType (DataCollectlo_Record) ;
WITH NewNetworkState ^ DO
FaultMonitor2 ^.Chain :- MonitorChain;
Fault.Monitor2 ^ .RequestTimeoutValue :- ComputeChainTimeout (0,
QSize (FaultMonitor2 ^ .Chain ^ .TransactionQueue) ) ;
TimeNetworkOutOfService :- clock - NetworkOutOfServiceTime [NetworkID] ;
WriteLn (ParamOur) ;
WriteString(ParamOut, " Network 2 was out of service for ");
WriteReal (ParamOur, TimeNetworkOutOfService, 0) ;
WriteString (ParamOur, " seconds. "} ;
WriteLn (ParamOur };
WrlteLn (ParamOur) ;
IOServiceState.NetworkHealth [Network]D] :- InService;
NOW outport [ControlsPort] ^.ServiceAvailable <- TRUE;
END;
DISPOSE(NewNetworkState) ; (* PRB *)
J ProcessorResponse :
ProcessResponse :- ActivePort^.ProcessorResponse;
NetworkData :,, ProcessResponse^. Data;
W_TH NetworkData ^ DO
CASE Function OF
IORequestSchedule:
IF IORequest^.RequestType - ApplicationRequest TH_N
ExecuteApplicationRequest (IORequest, IOServiceState} ;
ELSE
Exec_teManager2Request (IORequest, IOServiceState) ;
END;
I IOResponseSchedu le:
IF IOResponse^.ResponseType - ApplicationResponse THEN
REPORT "%d" IOResponse^.Identifier TAGGED "Finish IOP Activity";
CASE IOResponse ^.Identifier OF
I00 : NOW outport [ApplicationPort [i] ]^.
ApplicationResponse <- IOResponse;
IOServiceState.Executingl00Hz :- FALSE;
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I 50: NOW outport[ApplicatlonPort[2]] ^.
ApplicationResponse <- IOResponse;
IOServiceState.Exec, tingSOHz :- FALSE;
I 25: NOW outport[ApplicationPort[3]] ^.
ApplicationResponse <- IOResponse;
IOServiceState.Executing25Hz :- FALSE;
END;
IF (NOT IOServiceState,Executingl00Hz} AND
(NOT IOServiceState.ExecutingSOHz) AND
(NOT IOServiceState.Executing25Hz) THEN
SAMPLE 0.0 WITH SystemProbe[ProbeNumber];
END;
(* Check for any pending requests.
SemaphoreIdle(IOSystemStatus);
IF IOSystemStatus THEN
,)
Release(PendingStatus);
IF (PendingStatus - I0} OR
((PendingStatus - 9) AND
(NOT IOServiceState,Executingl00Hz}) OR
((PendingStatus - 8} AND
(NOT IOServiceState,Executingl00Hz) AND
(NOT IOServiceState.Exe_tlngSOHz)) THEN
NEW(PendingIOProeessing);
PendinglOProcessing^.Function :- StartPendingIO;
NextReq_est(PendingReql/eat};
PendingIOProcessing^.ReqgestStatus :- PendlngRequest^,ExecutionStatus;
DISPOSE(PendingRequest};
NEW(ProcessingStartPendingIO);
WITH ProcessingStartPendingIO ^ DO
Priority :- PendingStatus;
ProcessingRequired :- 0.0;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'Start Pending I/O';
Data := PendingIOProcessing;
END;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingStartPendingIO;
END;
END;
ELSE
NOW outport[NetworkManager2Port] ^ .
IOManager2Response <- IOResponse^.Response;
IOResponseA.Response :- NIL; (* MJS *)
DISPOSE(IOResponse}; (* PRB *)
E_;
I OutputResponseSchedule:
REPORT "%d" Rate TAGGED "Finish IOP Activity";
CASE Rate OF
i00:
IOServiceState.Executingl00Hz :- FALSE;
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[ 50:
IOServiceState.Executing50Hz :- FALSE;
I 25:
IOServiceState.Executing25Hz :- FALSE;
END;
IF (NOT IOServiceState.Executingl00Hz) AND
(NOT IOServlceState.ExecutingSOHz) AND
|NOT IOServlceState.Executing25Hz) THEN
SAMPLE 0.0 WITH SystemProbe[ProbeNumber] ;
END;
(* Check for any pending requests. *)
$emaphoreIdle (IOSystemStatus) ;
IF IOSystemStatus TH_
Release (PendingStatus) ;
IF (Pend/ngStatus- 10) OR
((PendingStatus - 9} AND
(NOT IOServlceState.Executingl00Hz} ) OR
( (Pend/ngStatus - 8) AND
(NOT IOServiceState.Executingl00Hz) AND
(NOT IOServiceState.ExecutingSOHz) } THEN
NEW (PendingIOPro ces sing );
Pend/ngIOProcessing ^.Function :- StartPendingIO;
NextRequest (PendingRequest) ;
PendingIOProcess ing ^ .RequestStatus :- PendingReques t ^ .ExecutionStatus;
DISPOSE (PendingRequest) ;
NEW (ProcessingStartPendlngIO) ;
WITH ProcessingStartPendingIO ^ DO
Priority "- PendingStatus;
ProcessingRequired :- 0.0;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProceseID :- 'Start Pending I/O';
Data :- PendingIOProcessing;
END;
NOW outport[IOPPort] ^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingStartPendingIO;
END;
END;
[ StartPendingIO:
Star tIOSs (Request Status, IOServiceState) ;
f StartFaultMonitor:
ExecuteManager 2Reque st (FaultMonit or 2, IOServiceState) ;
I NetworkRepa/r :
IF Net_rkData ^ .RepairData ^ .ServiceRequest -
SwitchRoot Link THEN
WITH DataCollectionRecord DO
Event ID :- 29;
SimulatlonTime :- clock;
Frequency :- NonCyclic ;
NonCyclicData.NVariation :- NetServiceChange;
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NonCyc licData .NetworkID :- 2;
END;
WriteDataEl_entType (DataCollemtionR_ord) ;
TimeNotworkOutOfService :- clock - NatworkOutOfServiceTime 12];
WriteLn (ParamOut) ;
WriteString(ParamOut, " Net_rk 2 was out of service for "} ;
WriteRoal (ParamOut, TimeNetworkOutOfService, 0) ;
NriteString(ParamOut, " seconds.") ;
WriteLn (ParamOut) ;
WriteLn {ParamOut );
IOServiceState .NetworkHealth [2 ] :- InService;
NOW outport [ControlsPort] ^.ServlceAvailable <- TRUE;
END;
NOW outport [NetworkManager2Port] ^.
ManagerServiceRqst <- NetworkData^.RepairData;
ELSE
WriteString (ParamO_t, "Unexpected Response from the IOP in the I/O Service. ") ;
WriteLn (ParamOut) ;
END;
END;
DISPOSE (NetworkData) ;
DISPOSE (ProcessResponse };
J Reset:
SetSemaphoreIdle;
(* Reinitialize all network connections to idle. *)
FOR NetworkCounter :- I TO NumberOfNetworks DO
FOR InterfaceCounter :- 1 TO N%u_berOfIOSPerChannel DO
IF IONetworkCounections [NetworkCounter ].
NetworkConnections [InterfaceCo_nter ].GPCAddzess
<> 0 THEN
IONetworkConnections INetworkCounter].
ConnectionStatus(InterfaceCounter] :- Idle;
ELSE
(* This simulation run does not have an interface
with this ID, set its status to failed. *}
IONetworkConnections (NetworkCounter] .
ConnectionStatus (InterfaceCounter] :- Failed;
END;
END;
END;
(* Reinitialize Active interfaces. Since all hardware should
be "good", the first interface will be used. *}
IONetworkConnectionsIl].ConnectionStatus[l] :- Active;
IONetworkConnectionsI2].ConnectionStatus(l] :- Active;
IOServiceState.NetworkHealth[l) :- InService;
IOServiceState.NetworkHealth(2] :- InService;
IOServiceState.ActiveRootLink[l] :- IONetworkConnections(l].NetworkConnections(l].GPCAddress;
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END;
END;
END IOService.
IOServiceState. ActlvQRootLink 12]
IOServiceState, Executingl 00Hz
IOSorvlceState .Executing50Hz
•IOServiceState, Executing25Hz
I ProbeReset:
(*
* check if the io system ks busy by looking at the last sample taken with the probe
*)
IF SystGmProbe[ProbeNu_ber]^.ProbeValue - 1.0 THEN
ClearProbe (SystemProbe [ProbeNumber ]} ;
SAMPLE 1.0 WITH SystemProbe[ProbeNumber];
ELSE
ClearProbe {System2robe [ProbeNumber] ) ;
SAMPLE 0.0 WITH SystemProbe[ProbeNumber] ;
:- IONetworkConnections [2 ] .NetworkConnections Ii ].GPCAddress i
:- FALSE;
:- FALSE;
:- FALSE;
END;
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DEYINITIONMODULE Utilities;
FRC_ IOS ]I_POI_ Cha/nType, ChainStat_sData;
FRQM BusMessag IMPORT PortNameType, PortEnableRegisterType;
FROM TypeConst IMPORT ChannelIDType, StatusType, NodaArrayType,
NodeStatusArray, PortStatusArray, Cha_nelStatusRecord;
EXPORT _ALIFIED ClearPortStatusArray, t_dateLinkStatus, SetNodeStatusFailed,
ConvertPortStatusToEnable, InitiallzeStatusVariables,
NodeslnThisSimulation, Cosp_teChainTimeout,
ManagerChainUnloadTime;
****************************************************************************
(* This proctNiure computes the time al_nt to perfo_ the unloading
of a network manager chain from the OPM in the IOS to the IOP. *)
PROCEDURE ManagerChalnUnloadTime(Responae : ChainStatusData) :REAL;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure will return an azray of type PortStatusArray
with all the elements set to IdlePort. *)
PROCEDURE ClearPortStatusArray(VAR PortStatus : PortStatusArray};
PROCEDURE UpdateLinkStatus(VAR StatusArray : NodeStatusArray;
spawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningPort : PortNameTypo;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
TargetPort : Per tNameType;
LinkStatus : StatusType} ;
PROCEDURE SetNodeStatusFailed(VAR $tatusArray : NodeStatusArray;
NetworkConnections : NodeArrayType;
FailedNoda : INTEGER);
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure takes an array of type PortStatusArray and
converts it to a PortEnableRegister. If an elment in the
PortStatusArray is Active then the corresponding element in
the PortEnableRegister is set to Enabled, otherwise the
element is set to Disabled. *}
PROCEDURE ConvertPortStatusToEnable(VAR PortStatus : PortStatusArray;
VAR EnableRegister : PortEnableRegisterType};
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure will initialize the variables that the network manager
needs to maintain the network. *)
PROCEDURE InitializeStatusVariables(NodeConnections : NodaArrayType;
VARNodeStatus : NodeSLatusArray;
VAR ChannelStatus : ChannelStatusRecord};
(* This procedure will read the node connections array and determine
how many nodes are in the current simulation. This number will be
0 < NodesInSimulation <- NumberOfNodea. *)
PROCEDURE NodesInThisSimulation (NodeConnections : NodeArrayType}
: INTEGER;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure computes the time to execute a chain based on the
number of normally c_pleting transactions and transactions actions
that time out. A time is also included that represents the turn
around time between transactions at the IOS. *)
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PROCEDURE ComputeChainTinoout (NormalComplotions : INT_R;
TimooutComplotions : INTEGER) :REAL;
8_2
UTILITIES
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IMPL_ATION M_ULE Utilities;
FRCH BusMeesag ID_C_T BusMessageType, PortNameType,
PortEnableRogisterType, PortStateType, NulberOfPortsPerNode,
NumberOfNodes, MakeNodeConfigurationCommand;
FROM TypeConet IMPORT ChannelIDType, StatusType, PortConfiguratlonType,
NodeArrayType, NodeStatusArray, PortStatusArray,
ChanneIStatusRecord, NetworkElementType;
FROM CentralDB IMPORT FindNodaNmaber;
FROM IOS I_T ChainType, ChainStatueData, TraneactionType,
InputYrameType, TimeOut IndicatorType;
FRQM InO_t ID_ORT WriteLn, WriteString, WriteReal, WriteInt;
FROM Storage IMPORT ALLOCATE;
FRCM Q_eueM IMPORT InitQ, QSize, Qlnsert, QSucc, FirstQ;
FROM MathLib0 IMPORT rood;
CONST TransactlonTimeO_t
FixedChainUnloadTime
DataExchangeUnloac_rime
One_4111iSecond
ManagerDXResponseLength
= 0.000500; (* sac *)
- 0.000050; (* sac *)
- 0.000004; (* sac/byte *)
- 0.001;
- 13; (* bytes *)
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ManagerChainUnloadTime(Response : ChainStatusData) :REAL;
VAR UnloadTime :-REAL;
TraneactionUnloadTime : REAL;
NumberOfInputFrames : INTEGER;
BEGIN
N_rOfInputFrames :- QSize (Response ^ .InputFrameQueue) ;
TransactionUnloadTime :- FLOAT (Num_erOflnputFrames *
ManagerDXResponseLength } *
Dat aExchangeOnloadTime;
UnloadTime :- FixedChainUnloadTime + TransactionUnloadTime;
RETURN (UnloadTime) ;
END Manag erChainUn loadTim a;
***************************************************************************
(* This procedure will return an array of type PortStatusArray
with all the elements sat to IdlePort. *)
PROCEDURE ClearPortStatusArray(VAR PortStatus : PcrtStatusArray);
VAR Portlndex : PortNameType;
BEGIN
FOR PortIndax :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
PortStatus [PortIndex] .Status :- Idle;
PortStatus [PortIndax] .Direction :- Inboard;
END;
END C learPor t StatusArray;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE UpdateLinkStatus (VAR StatusArray : NodeStatusArray;
SpawningNode : INTEGER;
B_4
SpawningPort : Pot tNameType;
TargetNode : I_EG_R;
TargetPort : PortNameType;
LinkStatue : StatusType) ;
VAR SpawniugNodeNumber : INTEGER;
TargetNodeN%uRber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
SpawningNodeNumber :- FindNodeNQmber (SpawningNode) ;
TargetNodeNumber := FindNodeNm_ber {TargetNode) ;
WITH StatusArray[SpawningNodeNumber] .PortStatus [SpawningPort] DO
IF LinkStatus - Active THEN
Status :- Active;
Direction :- Outboard;
ELSE
Status :- LinkStatus;
END;
END;
WITH StatusArray[TargetNodQNumber] .PortStatus [TargetPort] DO
IF LinkStatus - Actlvm T_
Status :- Active;
Direction' :- Inboard;
ELSE
Status :- LinkStatus;
END;
END;
END UpdateLinkS tatus;
PROCEDURE SetNodeStatusFailed(VAR StatusArray : NodeStatusArray;
NetworkConnections : NodeArrayType;
FailedNode : INTEGER) ;
VAR NodeNumber : IN--R;
AdjacentNodeNumhar : INTEGER;
Port Index : PortNameType;
AdjacentPort : PortNameType;
BEGIN
NodeNumber :- FindNodeNumber (FailedNode) ;
(* Set status of node to failed. *)
StatusArray [NodeNumber] .Status :- Failed;
(* Set status of ports on this node to failed and the
ports on any adjacent node to failed. *)
FOR PortIndex :- I TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
StatusArray[NodeNumber] .PortStatus[PortIndex] .Status :- Failed;
WITH NetworkConnections [NodeN_er] .PortArray[PortIndex] DO
CASE AdjacentElement OF
8_5
GPC, DIU, None:
I Node:
Ad jaoentNodeNumber :- FindNodeNumber (NodeAddress) ;
AdjacentPor t :- Port;
StatusArray (AdjacentNodeNumber ] .PortStatus
(AdjacentPort] .Status :- Failed;
END;
END;
END;
END SetNodeStatusFailed;
************************************************************************
(* This procedur$ takes an array of type PortStatusArray and
converts it to a PortEnableRegister. If an element in the
PortStatusArray is Active then the corrssponding element in
the PortEnableRegister is set to Enabled, otherwise the
element is set to Disabled. *)
PROCEDURE ConvertPortStatusToEnable (VAR PortStatus : PortStatusArray;
VAR EnableRegister : PortEnableRegisterType);
VAR PortIndex : PortNameType;
BEGIN
FOR Portlndex :- i TO Number0fPortsPerNoda DO
IF PortStatus[PortIndex] .Status - Active THEN
EnableRegistsr [PortIndex] :- Enabled;
ELSE
EnableRegister [PortIndex] :- Disabled;
END;
END;
END ConvertPort StatusToEnable;
************************************************************************
(* This procedure will initialize the variables that the network manager
needs to maintain the network. *)
P),0CEDURE InitializeStatusVariables (NodeConnectlons : NodeArrayType;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR ChannelStatus : ChannelStatusRecord) ;
VAR Nodelndex : INTEGER;
ChannelIndex : Chann$1IDType;
Port Index : PortNameType;
BEGIN
FOR Nodelndex :- i TO Number0fNodes DO
WITH NodeStatus [NodeIndex] DO
Address :- HodeConnections (NodeInde_.] .NodeAddress ;
Status := Idle;
ClearPortStatusArtay (PortStatus) ;
END;
END;
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ChannelStatus.GP_ess "- I00;
ChannelStatus. ChannellD :- A;
ChanQelStatus. Status :- Idle;
END InitializeStatusVariables;
************************************************************************
(* This procedure coaputes how many nodes are in the current simulation
based on the NodeAddress for each node being d/fferent than the
NodeNumber. The Central Database initializes its network description
so that each node n_ber is the name as the node address. If
this strategy ks not continued in the future, this routine may
need to be changed. *)
PROCEDURE NodesInThisSimulation (Nod_onnections : NodeArrayType)
: INTEGER;
VAR NodeCount : INTEGER;
NodeIndex : INTEGER;
BEGIN
NodeCount :- 0;
FOR NodeIndex :- i TO NumberOfNodes DO
IF Node Index <> INTEGZR (NodeConnectlons (NcdeIndex ].NodeAddress ) THEN
NodeCount :- NodeCount + 1;
END;
END;
RETURN (NodeCount) ;
END Nodes InThis Simulation;
****************************************************************************
(* Since the network manager is the only one to use this routine,
the returned time will be based on all transactions timing out
and then adding one millisecond to account for transaction turn
around and transaction transmission time. *}
PROC@DURE ComputeChainTimeout (NormalCompletlons : INTEGER;
TimeoutComzpletions : INTEGER) :REAL;
VAR ExecutionTime : REAL;
BEGIN
IF ((Normalcompletions + TimeoutCompletions) MUD 2) - 0 THEN
RETURN (FLOAT (NormalCompletions + TimeoutCompletions)
* TransactioaTimeOut) + OneMilliSecond;
ELSE
RETURN (FLOAT {TRUNC ( ((FLOAT (NormalCompletions + TimeoutCompletions)
* TransactionTimeOut)" + OneMilliSecond) / OneMilliSecond))
* OneMilliSecond) ;
END;
END ComputeChainTimeout ;
****************************************************************************
END Utilities.
8_7
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DEFINITION MODULE GrowNet;
FRQM lOService IMPORT IORoquestType;
FROI4 TypoConst IMPORT PortStatusArray, NodeStatusArray, NodeArrayType;
FRCM BusMessag IMPORT PortNameTypo;
EXPORT QUALIFIED GROHTOROOTNODE, TransactlonTimeOut, NetworkManagerPriority,
EnabloLink, DeletoNodeFr_oNotwork, AddDIUToNetwork,
AddGPCToNotwork, DisabledTransmitTest, DisabledRetransmitTest,
Reset Con figur ationCcaaand, MakeMonitorRequost;
CONST TransactlonTimeOut - 0.000500;
NetworkManagorPriority - i;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE GROWTOROOTNODE (RootNodaAddress : INTEGER;
RootNodelnboardPort : PortNamoType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IORequest : IC_equestType) ;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE EnableLink (SpawningNode : INTEGER;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodoStatusArray;
VAR AddNodeIOReq_est : IORequostType);
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE DeleteNodeFro_Network (SpawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningNodeOutboardPort : PortNameType;
TargetNodo : INTEGER;
TargetNode InboardPort : PortNamoType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR DoleteNodeIORequest : IORequestType) ;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE AddDIOToNetwork (Node : INTEGER;
Port : PortNsmoType;
Nodestatus : NodoStatusArray;
VAR 10Request : IORoquestType);
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE AddGPCToNetwork (Node : INTEGER;
Port : PortNamoType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IOReq_lest : IORequestType);
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE DisabledTransmitTest(TargetNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IORequest : IORequestType);
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE DisabledRotransmitTest (Test.Node : INTEGER;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IORequest : lORoquestTypo);
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ResetConfiqurationCommand (TestNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IOReq_est : IORequestType);
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PROCEDURE MakeMonitorRequest (NodeConnection : NodeArrayType) : IORequestType;
****************************************************************************
END GrowNet.
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IMPL_ATION MODULE GrowNet ;
FRCM IOService I_ORT IORequestTypm, RequestActlvityType;
FROM IOS IMPORT ChainType, TransactionType;
FROM CentralDB IMPORT FindNodeNumber;
FRCt4 TypeConst IMPORT NodeStatusArray, NodeArrayType;
FROM BusMessag IMPORT PortNameType, PortEnahleRagisterType,
BusMessageType, DIUCommandType, NumberOfNodes,
MakeNodeConf igur at ionCo_nd, MakeMonitorCcmmand;
FRCM Utilities I_ORT Convert.PortStatusToEnable, ComputeChainTimeout;
FROM QueueM IMPORT InitQ, QInsert, QSize, dNEW;
FROM Storage IMPORT ALLOCATE;
FROM SYST_ IMPORT SIZE;
FROM InOut IMPORT WriteString, Writelnt, WriteReal, WriteLn;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE GROWTOROOTNODE (RootNodeAddress : INTEGER;
RootNodelnboardPort : PortNameType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR lORequest : lORequestType) ;
CONST GrowToRootNodeIdentifier = 305;
VAR Transaction
Command
PortEnableRegister
RootNumber
BEGIN
: TransactionType;
: BusMessageType;,
: PortEnableRegisterType;
: INTEGER;
dNEW(IORequest, SIZE(IORequest^));
IORequest^.refcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.copycnt :- i;
IORequest^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(IORequest^.Chain,SIZE(IORequest^.Chain^));
IORequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.Chain^.copycnt :- I;
IORequest^.Chain^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(Transaction, SIZE(Transaction^));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- i;
Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
Root.Number :- FindNodeNumber (RootNodeAddress) ;
(* Now convert Configuration into a Port Enable Register command. *)
Convert2ortStatusToEnable(NodeStatus[RootNumber].PortStatus, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the command to grow to the Root Node. *)
Command :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(RootNodeAddress, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the transaction. *)
WITM Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :_ RootNodeAddress;
TimeOutValue := TransactionTimeC_t;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
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(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
OInsert(Transaction, IORequest^.chain^.TransactionQueua, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN IORequeet^.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
WITH IORequest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier :- GrowToRoot/_ode Ident ifier;
NumbarOfTransactions :- QSIze(IORequest ^.Chain ^.TransactionQueue} ;
END;
WITH IORequest A DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
OnDemand :- FALSE;
RequestTimeo, tValue :- ComputeChainTimeout (0, Chain ^ .NumberOfTransactions) ;
RequestType :- NetworkManagarRequest;
END-
END GROWTOROOTNODE;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE EnableLink(SpawningNode • INTEGER;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR AddNodeIORequest : IORequestType};
CONST AddNodeToNetworkChainIdentifier - 306;
VAR Transaction : TransactionType;
Co_mand : BusMessageTypa;
PortEnableRegistar : PortEnableRegisterT_pe;
SpawningNu_bar : INTEGER;
TargetNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
SpawningNumber :- FindNodeNumber (SpawningNoda) ;
TargetNtu_r :- FindNodeNumber (TargetNode) ;
dNEW (AddNodaIORequest, SIZE (AddNode IORequast ^ ));
AddNodeIORequest^.refcnt :- 0;
AddNodeIORequest ^.copycnt :- I;
AddNodeIORequest ^.neXtq :- NIL;
dNEW (AddNodeIORequest ^.Chain, SIZE (AddNodeIORequest ^.Chain ^) );
AddNodeIORequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
AddNodeIORequest ^ .Chain ^ .copycnt :- 1;
AddNodeIORequest ^ .Chain ^ .nextq :- NIL;
AddNodeIORequest ^ .Chain ^ .TransactionQueue :- InitQ ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0) ;
(* Convert the spawning node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable (NodeStatus ISpawningNumber] .PortStatus, PortEnableRegister) ;
(* Generate command for Spawning node to turn on outboard port. *)
Co_mand :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(SpawningNode, PortEnableRegister) ;
dNEW (Transaction, SIZE (Transaction ^ ));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
Transaction^.nextq :_ NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- SpawningNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionT/me_t;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
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*)
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, AddNodeIORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN AddNodeIORequest ^ .Chain ^ .TransactionQueue;
(* Generate a transaction for target node to turn on its inboard port. *)
(* Convert the target node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *}
Convert2 ort StatusToEnable (NodeStatus [TargetNumber ]. PortStatus, PortEnableRegister) ;
(* Generate command for Spawning node to turn on outboard port. *)
Command :-MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(TargetNode, PortEnableRegister);
dNEW (Transaction, SIZE (Transaction ^ ) } ;
TransactionA.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt := i;
Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- TargetNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert (Transaction, AddNodeIORequest ^.Chain^. TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
INSERT Transaction LAST IN AddNodeIORequest ^ .Chain ^ .TransactionQueue;
WITH AddNodeIORequest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier
NumberOfTransactions
END;
WITH AddNodelORequest ^ DO
:- AddNodeToNetworkChainIdentifier;
:- QSize (AddNodeIORequesta.Chaina.TransactionQueue);
END;
Priority := NetworkManagerPriorlty;
OnDemand :- FALSE;
RequestTimeoutValue :- ComputeChainTimeout(0, Chain^.N_nberOfTransactions);
RequestType :- NetworkManagerRequest;
END EnableLink;
PROCEDURE DeleteNodeFromNetwork(SpawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningNodeOutboardPort : PortNameType;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
Tar getNode Inboar dPort : PortNameType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR DeleteNodeIORequest : IORequestType);
CONST AddNodeToNetworkChainIdentifier - 307;
VAR Transaction : TransactionType;
Command : BusMessageType;
PortEnableRegister : PortEnableRegisterType;
SpawningNumber : INTEGER;
TargetNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
dNEW(DeleteNodeIORequest,SIZE(DeleteNodeiORequest^));
DeleteNodeIORequest^.refcnt := 0;
_94
(*
*)
(*
*)
DeleteNodeIORequest ^ .copycnt :- i;
DeleteNodeIORequest^.nextq :- NIL;
thrEW (DeleteNode IOReques t ^. Chain, S I ZE (DeleteNode IOReques t ^. Chain ^ ) ) ;
DeleteNodeIORequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
DeleteNodeIORequest^.Chain^.copycnt :- I;
DeleteNodeIOReques t ^ . Chain ^ .nextq :- NIL;
DeleteNodeIORequest ^ . Chain ^ .TransactionQueue :- InitQ ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0) ;
(* Generate a transaction for target node to turn off its inboard port.*)
TargetNumber :- FindNodeNumber (TargetNode) ;
(* Convert the target node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable (NodeStatus [TargetNumber] .PortStatus, PortEnableRegister) ;
(* Generate command for Spawning node to turn on outboard port. *)
Command :-MakeNodeConfiqurationCommand(TargetNode, PortEnableRegister);
dNEW (Transaction, SIZE (Transaction ^) ) ;
Transaction ^. refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- i;
Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- TargetNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert (Transaction, DeleteNodeIORequest ^.Chain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
INSERT Transaction LAST IN DeleteNodeIORequest ^ .Chain ^.TransactionQueue;
SpawningNumber := FindNodeNtulber (SpawningNode) ;
(* Convert the spawning node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable (NodeStatus ISpawningN_mber] .PortStatus, PortEnableRegister) ;
(* Generate command for Spawning node to turn on outboard port. *)
Command :- MakeNodeConfiqurationCommand(SpawningNode, PortEnableRegister) ;
dNEW (Transaction, SIZE (Transaction ^ } } ;
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt := i;
Transaction^.nextq := NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- SpawningNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert (Transaction, DeleteNodeIORequest ^.Chain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
INSERT Transaction LAST IN DeleteNodeIORequest ^ .Chain^.TransactionQueue;
WITH DeleteNodeIORequest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier :- AddNodeToNetworkChainIdentifier;
NumberOfTransactions :- QSize (Delet_NodeIORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue);
END;
WITH DeleteNodeIORequest ^ DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
OnDemand :- FALSE;
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RequestTimeoutValue := ComputeChainTimeout (0, Chain ^. NumberOfTransactions) ;
RequestType := NetworkManagerRequest;
END;
END De let eNodeFromNetwork;
PROCEDURE AddDIUToNetwork(Node : INTEGER;
Port : PortNameType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IORequest : IORequestType);
CONST AddDIUIdentifier = 308;
VAR Transaction
Command
PortEnableRegister
NodeNumber
: TransactionType;
: BusMessageType;
: Por tEnableRegisterType;
: INTEGER;
BEGIN
dNEW(IORequest, SIZE(IORequest^));
IORequestA.refcnt := 0;
IORequest^.copycnt := i;
IORequest^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(IORequest^.Chain,SIZE(IORequest^.Chain^));
IORequest^.Chain^.refcnt := 0;
IORequest^.Chain^.copycnt :- i;
IORequest^.Chaln^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(Transaction, SIZE (Transaction^}};
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- i;
TransactionA.nextq := NIL;
IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
NodeNumber :- FindNodeNumber(Node);
(* Now convert Configuration into a Port Enable Register command. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable(NodeStatus[NodeNumber].PortStatus, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the command to grow to the Root Node. *)
Command :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(Node, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the transaction. *)
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- Node;
TimeOutValue := TransactionTimeOut;
Output.Frame :- Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
WITH IORequest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier := AddDIUIdentifier;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize(IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue);
END;
WITH lORequest ^ DO
Priority := NetworkManagerPriority;
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OnDemand :- FALSE;
RequestTimeoutValue :- CamputeChainTimeout (0, Chain ^. NumberOfTransactions) ;
Req_estType "- Networ kManage rReque s t;
END;
END AddDIUToNetwork;
PROCEDURE AddGPCToNetwork(Node : INTEGER;
Port : PortNameType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IOR_est : IORequestType);
CONST AddGPCIdentifier - 309;
VAR Transaction
Cowmand
PortEnableRegister
NodeNumber
: TransactionType;
• BusMessageType;
: Por tEnableRegisterType;
: INTEGER;
BEGIN
dNEW(IORequast,SIZE(IORequast^));
IORequest^.refcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.copycnt := I;
IORequest^.nextq := NIL;
dNEW(IORequest^.Chain,SIZE(IORequest^.Chain^));
IORequest^.ChainA.refont :- 0;
IORequest^.Chain^.copycnt :- I;
IORequest^.Chain^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(Transaction,SiZE(Transaction^));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
TransactionA.copycnt :- I;
TransactionA.naxtq :- NIL;
IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQuaue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
Nod@Number :- FindNodeNumber (Node) ;
(* Now convert Configuration into a Port Enable Register command. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable(NodeStatus{NodeNumber].PortStatus, PortEnableReqister);
(* Generate the command to grow to the Root Node. *)
Command :- MakeNodeConfigurationCom_and(Node, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the transaction. *)
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := Node;
TimeOutValue := TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN IORequestA.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
WITH IORequest^.Chain ^ DO
Chainldentifier :- AddGPCIdentifier;
NumberOfTransactions :- QSize(IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue);
END;
WITH IORequest ^ DO
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Priority := NetworkManagerP rior ity;
OnDemand :- FALSE;
RequestTimooutValue := ComputeChainTimeout(0, Chain^.N%_berOfTransactions);
Requ estType :- NetworkManagerReques t;
END;
END AddGPCToNetwork;
PROCEDURE DisabledTransmitTest(TargetNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IORequest : IORequestType);
CONST DisabledTransmitIdentifier - 250;
VAR Transaction : TransactionType;
Command : BusMessageType;
PortEnableRegister : PortEnableRegisterType;
TargetNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
dNEW(IORequest,SIZE(IORequest^));
IORequest^.rofcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.copycnt :- i;
IORequestA.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(IORequest^.Chain, SIZE(IORequest^.Chain^));
IORequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.Chain^.copycnt :- i;
IORequest^.ChainA.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(Transaction, SIZE(Transaction^));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
IOReq_estA.Chain^.TransactionQueue := InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
TarqetNumber :- FindNodeNumber(TargetNode};
(* Now convert Configuration into a Port Enable Register command. *}
ConvertPortStatusToEnable(NodeStatus[TargetNumber].PortStatus, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the command to disable all ports on target node*)
Command :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(TargetNode, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the transaction. *}
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- TargetNode;
TimeOutValue := TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
[* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE};
INSERT Transaction LAST IN IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
WITH IORequest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier := DisabledTransmitIdentifier;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize(IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQ_eue);
END;
WITH IORequest ^ DO
Priority := NetworkManagerPriority;
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OnDemand :- FALSE;
RequestTimeoutValue "- ComputeChainTimeout (0, Chain ^ .NumberOfTransactions ) ;
RequestType :- NetworkManagerReque s t;
END;
END DisabledTransmitTest;
PROCEDURE DisabledRetransmitTest (TestNode : INTEGER;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IORequest : IORequestType);
CONST DisabledRetransmitChainIdentifier - 251;
VAR Transaction : TransactionType;
Command : BusMessageType;
PortEnableRegister : PortEnableRegisterType;
SpawningN%%mber : INTEGER;
TargetNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
SpawningNumber :- FindNodeN%_mber(TestNode);
TargetNumber :- FindNodeN%uLber(TargetNode);
dNEW(IORequest,SIZE(IORequest^)};
IORequest^.refcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.copycnt :- I;
IOR_estA.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(IORequest^.Chain,SIZE(IOReq_est^.Chain^));
IORequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.Chain^.copycnt :- i;
IOR_est^.Chain^.nextq :- NIL;
IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue :-InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
(* Convert the spawning node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable(NodeStatus[SpawningNumber].PortStatus, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate command for Spawning node to turn off the port connected
to the target node. *)
Command :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(TestNode, PortEnableRegister);
dNEW(Transaction, SIZE(Transaction^)};
Transaction^.refcnt :- O;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := TestNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame :_ Command;
END;
(*
,)
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
(* Generate a transaction for target node to return its status. *)
(* Convert the target node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable(NodeStatus[TargetNumber].PortStatus, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate command for Spawning node to return its status. *)
Command := MakeMonitorCommand(TargetNode);
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dNEW(Transaction, SIZE(Transaction^));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- TargetNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
(_ Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, IORequestA.Chain^.TransactionQueuQ, FALSE);
INSE_T Transaction LAST IN IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
WITH IORequest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier := DisabledRetransmitChainIdentifier;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize(IORequest^.ChainA.TransactionQueue);
END;
WITH !ORequest ^ DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
OnDemand := FALSE;
KequestTimeoutValue :- ComputeChainTimeout(0, Chain^.NumberOfTransactions);
RequestType :- NetworkManagerReq_est;
END;
END DisabledRetransmitTest;
PROCEDURE ResetConfigurationCommand(TestNode : INTEGER;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR IORequest : IORequestType);
CONST ResetConfiqurationIdentifier = 252;
VAR Transaction
Command
PortEnableRegister
TestNumber
: TransactionType;
: BusMessageType;
: PortEnableRegisterType;
: INTEGER;
BEGIN
dNEW(IORequest,SIZE(IORequest^));
IORequestA.refcnt :- 0;
IORequest^.copycnt := I;
IORequestA.nextq := NIL;
dNEW(IORequest^.Chain,SIZE(IORequest^.Chain^));
IORequest^.Chain^.refcnt := 0;
IORequest^.ChainA.copycnt := I;
IORequest^.Chain^.nextq := NIL;
dNEW(Transaction, SIZE(Transacticn^));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
Transaction^.nextq := NIL;
IORequest^.Chaln^.TransactionQueue := InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0};
TestNumber := FindNodeNumber(TestNode);
{* Now convert Configuration into a Port Enable Register command. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable(NodeStatus[TestNumber].PortStatus, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the command to grow to the Root Node. *)
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Ccamand :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(TestNode, PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate the transaction. *}
WITH Transaction* DO
Identifier :- TestNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame :- Coumand;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, ZORequest^.Chain^.TransactlonQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN IORoq_est^.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
WITH IORaquest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier :- RssetConfig,/rationIdentifier;
N_mberOfTransactions :- QSize(IORequest^.ChainA.TransactionQueue};
END;
WITH IORoquest ^ DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
OnDemand :- FALSE;
RequestTimeoutValue :- C_m_uteChainTimeout(0, Chain^.NumberOfTransactions};
RequostType :- NetworkManagerRequest;
END;
END ResetConfigurationCommand;
PROCEDURE MakeMonitorRequest _odeConnection : NodeArrayType} : IORequestType;
CONST TalkerOutOfTurnIdentifier - 253;
VAR MonitorRequest : IORequestType;
Transaction : TransactionType;
Cc_and : BusMessagQType;
NodeIndex : INTEGER;
BEGIN
dNEW(MonitorRequest, SIZE(MonitorRequest^));
MonitorRequest^.refcnt := 0;
MonitorRequest^.copycnt :- i;
MonitorRequest^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(MonitorRequest^.Chain, SIZE(MonitorRequest^.Chain^));
MonitorRequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
MonitorRequestA.Chain^.copycnt :- i;
MonitorRequest^.Chain^.nextq :- NIL;
MonitorRequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
FOR NodeIndex := 1 TO NumberOfNodes DO
WITH NodeConnectionINodeIndex] DO
(* A node addresses are initialize to their index in the
array, if the address is not the index then a node
must be present in this index. *)
IF NodeAddress <> Nodelndex THEN
Command :- MakeMonitorCommand (NodeAddress) ;
dNEW(Transaction,SIZE(Transaction^));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
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Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- NodeAddress;
T_eOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, MonitorRequest ^.Chain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
END;
END;
END;
WITH MonitorRequest ^.Chain ^ DO
Chainldentifier :- TalkerOutOfTurn Identifier;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize(MonitorRequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue)
END;
WITH MonitorRequest ^ DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPrior ity;
RequestT/meoutValue :m ComputeChainTimeout {0, Chain ^ .NumberOfTransactions) ;
OnDemand " := FALSE;
Request Type :- NetworkMa_ agerReques t;
END
RETURN (MonitorRequest) ;
END MakeMonitorRequest;
****************************************************************************
END GrowNet.
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DEFINITION MODULE Repair;
FROM IOService IMPORT IORequestType;
FROM IOS IMPORT ChainStatusData;
FROM TypeConst IMPORT NodeArrayType, NodeStatusArray, ChannelIDType;
FROM BusMassag IMPORT PortNameType, NumberOfNodes;
EXPORT QUALIFIED NodeSetRange, NodeSet, AnalysisStatusType, FaultType,
FaultAnalysisRecordType, ErrorRecordType, BranchArrayType,
ReconnectRoot, BranchReconnect, TalkToRootOfTree,
ErrorAnalysis ;
TYPE NodeSetRange - [i .. NumberOfNodes] ;
NodeSet - SET OF NodeSetRange;
BranchArrayType- ARRAY [i .. 3] OF NodeSet;
AnalysisStatusType - (AnalysisSucessful, AnalysisUnsucessful) ;
FaultType- (RootLinkFailure, LinkFailure);
FaultAnalysisRecordType - RECORD
CASE Fault : FaultType OF
Roo tLinkFailure :
FailedChannel : ChannelIDType;
I LinkFailure :
FailedRoot • INTEGER;
FailedInboardPort : PortNameType;
: NodeSet;
: INTEGER;
FailedNodeSet
FailedNodeCount
END;
END;
ErrorRecordType = RECORD
CASE Status : AnalysisStatusType OF
AnalysisSucessful :
FaultAnalysisRecord : FaultAnalysisRecordType;
I AnalysisUnsucessful :
END;
END;
PROCEDURE RaconnectRoot(NodeConnections : NodeArrayType;
VAR NetworkStatus : NodeStatusArray;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
FailedNodeSet : NodeSet;
VAR ReconnectIOReqeust : IOReq_estType;
VAR PortCount : INTEGER)
:BOOLEAN;
PROCEDURE BranchReconnect(ErrorReport
NodeConnections
VAR ReconnectNode
: ErrorRecordType;
: NodeArrayType;
: INTEGER;
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VAR ReconnectPort : PortNameType;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR Branches : BranchArrayType;
VAR BranchReconnect1ORequest : IORequestType;
VAR PortCount : INTEGER) ;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ErrorAnalysis (MonitorResponse : ChainStatusData;
HetworkConfiguration : NodeStatusArray;
NodeConnect ions : NodeArrayType;
VAR ErrorReport : ErrorRecordType;
VAR PortCount : INTEGER) ;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE TalkToRootOfTree (Root : INTEGER;
VAR TalkIORequest : IORequestType);
****************************************************************************
END Repair.
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IMPLEMENTATION MODULE Repair;
FROM TypeConst IMPORT NodeArrayType, NodeStatusArray, PortStatusArray,
StatusType, PortConfig_rationType, NetworkElementType,
Channe I IDType;
FROM BusMea_aq IMPORT PortNameType, BusMen_ageType,
PortEnableRegisterType, NumberOfPortsPerNode, NumberOfNodes,
MakeNodeCon figur ationCommand, MakeMonitorCommand;
FROM IOServlce _IMPC_LT IORequestType, RequestActivityType;
FRC_4 IOS I_ORT ChainType, TransactionType, ChainStatusData,
InputFrameType, InputFrameQueuaType, TimeOutlncLicatorType;
FROM CentralDB I_ORT FindNodeNumber;
FROM GrowNet IMPORT TransactionTimeOut, NetworkManagerPriorlty;
FROM Utilities IMPORT ConvertPortStatusToEnable, ComputeChainTimeout;
FR_4 QueueM I_ORT QInsert, InitO, FirstQ, QSucc, QSiza, dNEW;
FROM Storage IMPORT ALLOCATE;
FROM SYST_4 IMPOR_ SIZE;
FROM InOut I_ORT WriteString, WriteLn;
CONST ReconnectChainIdentifier - 221;
TalkChainIdentifier - 222 ;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE GetNodeResponse (Responses : ZnputFrameQueueType;
Node : INTEGER;
VAR NodeResponse : InputFrameType) ;
VAR InputFrame : InputFrameType;
BEGIN
NodeResponse :- NIL;
InputFrame :- FirstQ(Responses) ;
LOOP
IF FindNodeNumber (InputFrame ^ .MessageAddress) = Node THEN
NodeResponse :- InputFrame;
EXIT;
END;
InputFrame :-QSucc(InputFrame, Responses};
IF InputFrame s NIL THEN
EXIT;
END;
END;
END GetNodeResponse;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure searchs the network status for an idle port on this
node that is connected to another node.
If so, the port and a true value will be returned, otherwise false
will he returned. *}
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PROCEDURE IdlePortOnNode (Test.Node : INTEGER;
NetworkStatus : NodeStatuaArray;
NetworkConnections : NodeArrayType;
VAR IdlePort : PortNameType;
VAR Count : INTEGER) :BOOLEAN;
VAR IdlePortFound : BOOLEAN;
TestNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
TestNumber :- FindNodeNumber (TestNode) ;
LOOP
INC(Count);
IF (NetworkStatus[TestNumber].PortStatus[IdlePort].Status - Idle)
AND (NetworkConnections[TestNumber].PortArray[IdlePort].
AdjacentElement - Node} THEN
IdlePortFound :- TRUE;
EXIT;
ELSIF (IdlePort - NumberOfPortsPerNode) THEN
IdlePortFound :- FALSE;
EXIT;
ELSE
IdlePort := IdlePort + i;
END;
END;
RETURN (IdlePortFound) ;
END IdlePortOnNode;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure checks the Spawning node to see if it is present in
the failed node set. If it ks not, the true will be returned with
the spawning port, otherwise false will be returned. *)
PROCEDURE ValidSpawningNode(SpawningNode : INTEGER;
Target-Node : INTEGER;
NetworkStatus : NodeStatusArray;
NetworkConnections : NodeArrayType;
FailedNodeSet : NodeSet;
VAR SpawningPort : PortNameType;
VAR Count : INTEGER) :BOOLEAN;
VAR ValidSpawningNodeFound : BOOLEAN;
SpawningNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
SpawningNumber :- Finc_odeNumber(SpawningNode);
(* Check to see if spawning node is in failed node list. *)
IF NodeSetRange(SpawningNumber) IN FailedNodeSet THEN
(* Spawning Node was in failed node set.
has NOT been found. *)
ValidSpawningNodeFound :- FALSE;
A valid spawning node
ELSE
(* Determine outboard pozt of spawning node *)
SpawningPort :- I;
LOOP
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INC (Count) ;
IF SpawningPort -NumberOfPortsPerNode THEN
ValidSpawnlngNodeFound :- FALSE;
EXIT;
ELSIF NetworkStatus ISpawninqNumber] .PortStatus [SpawnlngPort].
Status <> Idle THEN
SpawningPort :- SpawningPort + i;
ELSIF (NetworkStatus ISpawningl_er] .PortStatus
[SpawningPort] .Status - Idle) AND
_etworkConnections [SpawningNumber] .PortArray
[SpawningPort] .NodaAddress <> TargetNode) THEN
SpawninqPort :- SpawningPort + 1;
ELSE
ValidSpawningNodeFound :- TRUE;
EXIT;
END;
END;
END;
RETURN (ValidSpawningNodoFound) ;
END ValidSpawningNode;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure formats an I/O chain for the Network manager to
reconnect a spawing node to a target node. *)
PROCEDURE MakeReconnectChain_pawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningPort : PortNameType;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
TargetPort : PortNameType;
NetworkStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR ReconnectRequest : IOReq_estType};
VAR SpawningNumber : INTEGER;
TargetNumber : INTEGER;
Transaction : TransactionType;
Command : BusMessageType;
PortEnableRegister : PortEnableRegisterType;
BEGIN
SpawningNumber :- FindNodeNumber(SpawningNode);
TargetNumber :- FzndNodeNumber(TarqetNode);
dNEW(ReconnectRequest,SIZE(ReconnectRequest^});
ReconnactRequest^.refcnt :- 0;
ReconnectRequest^.copycnt :- i;
ReconnectRequest^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW(ReconnectRequest^.Chain,SIZE(ReconnectRequestA.Chain^));
ReconnectRequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
ReconnectRequest^.Chain^.copycnt :- I;
ReconnectRequest^.Chain^.nextq :- NIL;
ReconnactRequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
(* Convert the spawning node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *)
ConvertPortStatusToEnable(NetworkStatus[SpawningNumber].PortStatus,
PortEnableRegister);
(* Generate command for Spawning node to turn on outboard port. *)
Command :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(SpawningNode, PortEnableRegister);
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(*
*)
dNEW (Transaction, SIZE (Transaction ^ ) ) ;
Transaction^.refcnt := 0;
TransactionA.copycnt := I;
Transaction ^.nextq :- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier : - SpawningNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
O_tputFrame : - Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, ReconnectRequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN ReconnectRequeetA.Chain^.TransactionQueue;
(* Generate a transaction for target node to turn on its inboard port.*)
(* Convert the target node's port status to a Port Enable Register. *)
ConvertgortStatusToEnable (NetworkStatus [TargetNumher ] .PortStatus,
Por tEnableRegister) ;
(* Generate command for Spawning node to turn on outboard port. *}
Command :- MakeNodeConfigurationCommand(TargetNode, PortEnableRegister) ;
dNEW (Transaction, SIZE (Transaction ^ ) ) ;
Transaction^.refont :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
Transaction^.nextq "- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- TargetNode;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionTimeOut;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Q_eue. *)
QInsert(Transaction, ReconnectRequeet^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN ReconnectReqeust ^ ,Chain ^ .TransactionQueue;
WITH KeconnectReq_est ^ .Chain ^ DO
ChainIdent ifier :- ReconnectChain Ident ifier;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize (ReconnectRequest ^ .Chain ^,TransactionQueue} ;
END;
WITH ReconnectRequest ^ DO
Priority :- Networ kManage rPr iority;
OnDemand :_ FALSE;
Req_estTimeoutValue :- ComputeChainTimeout (0, Chain ^ .NumberOfTransactions) ;
KequestType := Networ kMa_agerReques t;
END;
END MakeReconnectChain ;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE FindBranches (FailedNodeSet : NodeSet;
FailedRoot : INTEGER;
NodeConnect ions : NodeArrayType;
Node Status : NodeStatusArray;
VAR BranchesFromRoot : BranchArrayType} ;
VAR NodeIndex : INTEGER;
Portlndex : PortNameType ;
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BranchIndex : INTEGER;
FailedRootNumber : INTEGER;
FailedSet : NodeSet;
************************************************************************
PROCEDURE TraverseBranch (VAR BranchSet : NodeSet;
PAR FailedSet : NodeSet;
FailedRoot : INTEGER;
NodeConnections : NodeArrayType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray) ;
PAR PortIndex : PortNameType;
FailedRootNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
FailedRootNumber :- FindNodeNumber (FailedRoot) ;
FOR PortIndex :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
(*Determine the Number of Branches, Find the Root of each
branch and put in Branch from Root Array. *)
WITH NodeConnactions [FailedRoot.N%%mber ]. PortArray [PortIndex ] DO
IF (NodeStatus [FailedRootN_mber] .PortStatus [PortIndex] .Status
- Active) AND (AdJacentElement - Node) AND
(NodeSetRange (NodeNumber) IN FailedSet) THEN
(* A root of a branch has been found. *)
INCL (BranchSet, NodeSetRange (NodeNumber)) ;
EXCL (FailedSat, NodeSetRange (NodeNumber)) ;
TraverseBranch (BranchSet, FailedSet, NodeAddress,
NodeConnections, NodeStatus) ;
END;
END;
END;
END TraverseBranch;
************************************************************************
BEGIN
(* Copy Failed Node Set in Failed Set for local manlpulation. *)
FailedSet :-NodeSet { };
FailedSet :- FailedSet + FailedNodeSet;
FailedRootNumber :- FindNodeNumbar (FailedRoot) ;
(* Remove Failed Root from failed set. The failed root
is from where the branches start, so it should not be
in the failed node set. *)
EXCL (FailedSet, NodeSetRange (FailedRootNumber)) ;
(* Initialize Branches from Root Of Failed Tree to Nil. *)
FOR BranchIndex := i TO 3 DO
BranchesFromRoot [BranchIndex] :- NodeSet ( } ;
END;
Branchlndex :- i;
(*Determine the Number of Branches. Find the Root of each
branch and put in Branch from Root Array. *)
FOR PortIndex := 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
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(*
*}
WITR NodeConnections [FailedRootNumber] .PortArrayIPortIndex] DO
IF (NodeStatus [FailedRootNumber ]. PortStatus [PortIndex]. Status
-Active) AND (Ad]acentE_ement- Mode} AND
(NodeSetRanqe (NodeNumbar) IN FailedNodeSat) THEN
(* A root of a branch has been found. *)
INCL (BranchesFromRoot [BranchIndex], NodeSetRange (NodeNumher)) ;
EXCL (FailedSet, NodaSetR_lnge(NodaNumber) ) ;
TraverseBranch (BranchesFromRoot [BranchIndex], FailedSet,
NodeAddress, NodeConnections, NodeStatus} ;
Branchlndex := Branchlndex + i;
END;
END;
END;
END FindBranches;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ErrorAnalysis (MonitorResponse : ChainStatusData;
NetworkConfiguration : NodeStatusArray;
NodeConnections : NodeArrayType;
VAR ErrorReport : ErrorRecordType;
VAR PortCount : INTEGER) ;
VAR NodeResponse : InputFrameType;
FailedRootNumber : INTEGER;
Node Index : INTEGER;
Port Index : PortNameType;
BEGIN
PortCount :- 0;
ErrorReport.Status := AnalysisSucessful;
IF MonitorResponse ^.AllFailed THEN
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
Fault := RootLinkFailure;
FailedChannel :- C;
END;
ELSE
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
Fault := LinkFailure;
FailedNodeCount := 0;
FailedNodeSet := NodeSet { } ;
END;
FOP.EACH NodeResponse IN MonitorResponse ^ .InputFrameQ_eue DO
NodeResponse := FirstQ (MonitorResponse ^ . InputFrameQ_eue) ;
LOOP
IF NodeResponse _ .TransactionTimeOutlndicator = TimedOut THEN
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
FailedNodeCount :-FailedNodeCount + i;
I_CL (FailedNodeSet, FindNodeNumber
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(NodeResponse ^ .MessageAddress )) ;
_4D;
END;
NodeResponse :- QSucc (NodeResponse,
MonitorResponae ^.Inpu tFrameQueue) ;
IF NodeResponsa - NIL THEN
EXIT;
_D;
END;
(* Find the inboard port of the failed tree. *}
NITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
IF FailedNodeSet - NodeSat {} THEN
(* Must have. bean a DIU link failura. Set analysis to
unsuccesaful. *)
ErrorReport. Status :- AnalysisUnsucassful;
ELSIF RootOfFailedTree(FailedNodeSet, NetworkConfig_ration,
NodeConnections, MonitorResponse, FailedRoot, PortCount) THEN
FailedRootNumber :- FindNodeNumber (FailedRoot) ;
Portlndex :- I;
W_ILE (NatworkConfig_ration[FailedRootNumber] .PortStatus
[PortIndex] .Status <> Active} OR
{NetworkConfiguration [FalledP_tNumber] .PortStatus
[PortTndex] .Direction <> Inboard) OR
(NodaConnections [FailedRootNumber] .PortArray [PortIndex].
AdjacentElement O Node) DO
INC IPortCount) ;
PortIndex :- Portlndax + i;
END;
FailedInboardPort :- PortIndex;
ELSE
WriteString("Unable to find root of failed tree."};
WriteLn ();
END;
END;
END;
END ErrorAnalysis;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE RootOfFailedTree (FailedSet : NodeSet;
NetworkConfiguration • NodeStatusArray;
NetworkConnections : NodeArr ayType;
MonitorResponse$ : ChainStatusData;
VAR Root : INTEGER;
VAR Count : INTEGER)
:BOOLEAN;
VAR FoundRoot : BOOLEAN;
FailedNodes : NodeSet;
RootNumber : INTEGER;
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BEGIN
AdjacentNode : INTEGER;
SetIndex : NodeSetRange;
Portlndex : PortNameType;
Inboard_or t : PortNameType;
AdjacentNodeResponse : InputFrameType;
YoundRoot :- FALSE;
Fauile4Nodes :- FailedSet;
FOR SetIndex :- 1 TO NumberOfNodes DO
IF Setlndex IN FailedNodes THEN
EXCL (FailedNodes, Setlndex) ;
(* Find the inboard port of this node.
PortIndax :m i;
,)
LOOP
INC (Count) ;
WITH NetworkConfiqurationISetlndex] .PortStatus [Portlndex] DO
IF (Status- Active) AND (Direction- Inboard) AND
(NetworkConnections [SetIndex] .PortArray [PortIndex] .
Adjacent.Element - Node) THEN
InboaxdPort :- Portlndex;
EXIT;
ELSE
(* No check is make for last port on node because
we expect to find an inboard port. *)
Portlndex :- PortIndex + I;
END;
END;
END;
CASE NetworkConnections[Setlndex].PortArray[InboardPort].
AdjacentElement OF
Node:
AdjacentNode :- NetworkConnections[SetIndex].
PortArrayIInboardPort].NodeNumber;
GetNodeResponse(MonitorResponses^.InputFrameQueue,
AdjacentNode, AdjacentNodeResponse);
(* This loop will need to modified to support
a failed node set that does not have a
root. *)
IF AdjacentNodeResponse^.TransactionTimeOutIndicator
- NormalCompletion THEN
FoundRoot :- TRUE;
Root :- NetworkConnections[SetIndex].NodeAddress;
END;
END;
END;
END;
RETURN (FoundRoot) ;
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END R_tO_aile_r_;
PROCEDURE ReconnectRoot (NodeConnections : NodeArrayType;
VAR NetworkStatus : NodeStatusArray;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
FailedNodeSet : NodeSet;
VAR ReconnectIORequest : IORequsstType;
VAR PortCount : INTEGER)
:BOOLEAN;
VAR ReconnectSucoessful : BOOLEAN;
SpawningNodo : INTEGER;
SpawningNumber : INTEGER;
SpawningPort : PortNameType;
TargetPort : PortNameType;
TargetNumbor : INTEGER;
BEGIN
PortCount :- 0;
Target-Number :- FindNodQNumber(TargetNode);
ReconnectSuccessful :- FALSE;
(* Set Target Port to start searching with port I.
TargetPort :- i;
LOOP
,)
INC(PortCo_nt);
IF IdlePortOnNode(TargetNode, NetworkStatus, NodeConnections,
TargetPort, PortCount) THEN
(* A potential spawing node has been identified. *)
SpawningNode :- NodeConnections[TargetN_mber).PortArray
[TargetPort] .NodeAddress;
SpawningNumber :- FindNodeNumber(SpawningNode);
(* Check for a valid spawning node. *)
IF ValidSpawningNode (SpawningNode, TargetNode, NetworkStatus,
NodeConnections, FailedNodeSet, SpawningPort, PortCount) THEN
(* Upadate status of the new lank used to reconnect
nodes. *)
WITH NetworkStatus(SpawningNumber].PortStatus [SpawningPort] DO
Status := Active;
Direction :- Outboard;
END;
WITH NetworkStatus[TargetNumber].PortStatus(TargetPort] DO
Status :- Active;
Direction :- Inboard;
END;
(* Make chain to reconnect spawning node to target node. *)
MakeReconnectChain(SpawningNode, SpawningPort, TargetNode,
TargetPort, NetworkStatus, ReconnectIORequest);
ReconnectSuccessful :- TRUE;
EXIT;
END;
ELSIF TargetPort < NumberOfPortsPerNode THEN
TargetPort := TargetPort + I;
ELSE
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ReconnectSuccessful :- FALSE;
EXIT;
END;
END;
RETURN (ReconnectSu cces s ful ) ;
END ReconnectRoot;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE BranchReconnect (ErrorReport : ErrorRecordType;
NodeConnections : NodeArrayType;
VAR ReconnectNode : INTEGER;
VAR ReconnectPort : PortNameType;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
VAR Branches : BranchArrayType;
VAR BranchReconnectlORequest : IORequQstType;
VAR PortCount : INTEGER) ;
VAR BranchNode : NodeSetRange;
Bran chNumber : INTEGER;
SpawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningPort : PortNameType;
FailedRootNumber : INTEGER;
SpawningN%u_ber : INTEGER;
ReconnectNumber : INTEGER;
************************************************************************
(* This function will return a node from the branch. If assumes
that a branch with no nodes will be passed to it. *)
PROCEDURE GetNodeFromBranch(VAR Branch : NodeSet) :NodeSetRange;
VAR Node : NodeSetRange;
BEGIN
Node:- i;
LOOP
IF Node IN Branch THEN
EXCL(Branch, Node) ;
EXIT;
ELSE
Node :- Node + I;
END;
END;
RETURN (Node) ;
END GetNodeFromBranch;
************************************************************************
BEGIN
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
FindBranches (FailedNodeSet, FailedRoot, NodeConnections,
NodeStatus, Branches) ;
FailedRootNumber := FindNodeNumber (FailedRoot) ;
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END;
BranchNumber :- I;
LOOP
(* Check current branch to see if it has any nodes left to check. *)
IF Branches[BranchNumber] <> NodeSet { } THEN
(* Get a node from the branch. *}
BranchNode :- GetNodeFromBranch (Branches [BranchNumber ] );
Recon,ectNode :- NodeConnections [BranchNode] .NodeAddress;
ReconnectNumber :- FindNodeN%_ber (ReconnectNode) ;
(* Check this node to see if it contains any idle ports
which are not connected to the failed node set. *)
Reconnect.Port :- i;
IF IdlePortOnNode (ReconnectNode, NodeStatus, NodeConnections,
Reconnect.Port, PortCount) THEN
(* A potential spawing noda has been identified. *)
SpawningNode :- NodeConnections [BranchNode] .PortArray
[ReconnectPort] .NodeAddress ;
SpawninqNumber :- Fin_NodeNumber (SpawninqNode) ;
(* Check for a valid spawning node. *)
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
IF ValidSpawningNode (SpawningNode, ReconnectNode,
NodeStatus, NodoConnections, FailedNodeSet,
SpawningPort, PortCount} THEN
(* Upadate status of the new link used to reconnect
nodes. *)
WITH NodeStatus[SpawningNumber].PortStatus[
SpawningPort ] DO
Status :- Active;
Direction :- Outboard;
END;
WITH NodeStatus[ReconnectNumber].PortStatus[
ReconnectPort] DO
Status :- Active;
Direction :- Inboard;
END;
(* Make chain to reconnect spawning node to target
node. *)
MakeReconnectChain(SpawningNode, SpawningPort,
ReconnectNode, ReconnectPort, NodeStatus,
BranchReconnectIORequest);
(* A Node on a branch has been identified for
attempted reconnection to the network. *)
EXIT;
END;
_D;
ELSE
(* LOOp again and check for next node in branch. *)
END;
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ELSE
BranchNumber :-BranchNumber + I;
END;
END;
END BranchReconnect;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE TalkToRootOfTree (Root : INTEGER;
VAR TalkIORequest : IORequestType);
VAR Transaction : TransactionType;
Command : BusMessageType;
BEGIN
dNEW (TalkIORequest, SIZE (TalkIORequest ^) ) ;
TalkIORequest^.refcnt :- 0;
TalkIORequest_.¢opycnt :- I;
TalkIORoquest^.nextq :- NIL;
dNEW (TalkIORequest ^.Cha/n, SIZE (TalkIORequest ^.Chain ^ ) );
TalkIORequest^.Chain^.refcnt :- 0;
TalkIORequest ^ .Chain ^ .copycnt :- I;
TalkIORequest^.Chain^.nextq :- NIL;
TalklORequest ^ .Chain ^ .TransactionQueue :- InitQ ("TraasactionQuaue", FALSE, 0) ;
Command :- MakeMonitorCom_and(Root) ;
dNEW (Transaction, SIZE (Transaction ^ ));
Transaction^.refcnt :- 0;
Transaction^.copycnt :- I;
Transaction^.nextq :- NIL;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- Boot;
TimeOutValue :- TransactionT/meOut;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
(* Enter the transaction on the Transaction Queue. *)
QInsert (Transaction, TalkIORequest ^.Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
(*
INSERT Transaction LAST IN TalkIORequest^.ChainA.TransactionQueue;
*)
WITH TalkIORequest^.Chain ^ DO
ChainIdentifier :- TalkChainIdentifier;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize (TalklORequost ^ .Chain ^ .TransactionQueue) ;
END;
WITH TalkIORequest ^ DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPrior i ty;
OnDemand := FALSE;
RequestTimeoutValue := ComputeChainT/meout(0, Chain^.NumberOfTransactions);
Request Type := Net workManagerReques t;
END;
END TalkToRootO fTree;
****************************************************************************
END Repair.
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DEFINITION DEVM NetManger;
EX_ORT SpawningNodeType*, SpawningQueueType;
TYPE SpawningNodeType - ENTITY
Node : INTEGER;
END;
SpawningQueueTyp@ - QUEUE OF SpawningNodeType;
END Net24anger.
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DEVM NenManger;
FRCM IOService REACH IORequestType*,
IOResponseType*,
NetworkManagerServiceRequest*,
NewNetworkStateType*;
FRC_4 IOS REACH ChainStatusData*, ChainType*,
InputFrameType*, TransactionType*;
FRCMProcessor REACH ProcessinqUnit*;
FRCM BusMessaq REACH BusMeesageType*;
FROM IOService IMPORT NetworkManagerActivityType, NetworkHealthType,
ChainExecutedWithoutError, ReleaseChainResponseMemory;
FROM 10S IMPORT TimoOutIndicatorType;
FROM CentralDB IMPORT ReadNodelnterConnections, FindNodeNumber;
FROM TypeConst IMPORT NodeArrayType, NodeStatueArray, ChannelStatusRecord,
NetworkElementType, PortStatusArray, StatusType,
PortConfigurationType;
FROM BusMessag IMPORT PortNameType, NumberOfPortsPerNode,
NumberOfNodes, MakeMonitorCcmmand;
FROM Utilities IMPORT InitializeStatusVariables, NodesInThisSimulation,
UpdateLinkStatus, SetNodeStatusFailed;
FROM GrowNet IMPORT GROWTOROOTNODE, EnableLink, DeleteNodeFromNetwork,
AddDIUToNetwork, AddGPCToNetwork, DisabledTransmitTest,
DisabledRetransmitTest, ResetConfiqurationCommand,
MakeMonitorReq_est;
FROM Repair I_ORT NodeSetRange, NodeSet, FaultType,
FaultAnalysisRecordType, ErrorRecordType, BranchArrayType,
ErrorAnalysis, AnalysisStatusType, ReconnectRoot,
BranchReconnect, TalkToRootOfTree;
FROM Senddata IMPORT DataElementType, FrequencyType, NonCyclicDataType,
NonCyclicVariationType, WriteDataElementType;
INPUTS
EVENT ServiceRequest : NetworkManagerServiceRequest;
IONetworkResponse : ChainStatusData;
ProcessorResponse : ProcessingUnit;
MissedDeadLine : INTEGER; (* ignored, since turned off for the IOP *)
Reset : BOOLEAN;
PARA NetworkIDToManage : INTEGER;
ProcessingPriority : INTEGER;
IOPIdentifier : INTEGER;
InitialNodeConficuration : ARRAY [I .. NumberOfNodes], [i .. NumberOfPortsPerNode] OF BOOLEAN;
InitialOrientation : ARRAY [I .. NumberOfNodes], [i .. NumberOfPortsPerNode] OF BOOLEAN;
END;
OUTPUTS
VAR IONetworkRequest
NewNetworkState
ProcessorRequest
IORequestType;
NewNetworkStateType;
ProcessingUnit;
END;
TYPE Network/4anagerJobType - (GROWNetwork, KepairNetwork);
GrowNetworkModeType = (GrowToRootNode, AddRemainingNodes, AddDIUS,
AddGPCS, DiagnosticCheck);
RepairNetworkModeType = (DisconnectLink, RepairLink, ReconnectLink,
ReconnectBranch, TalkToRootFailedTree);
DiagnosticModeType = (LinkEnable, DisabledTrans_it, DisabledRetransmit,
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ResetConfig_ration, TalkerOutOfTurn,
DiagnosticsComplete) ;
DIUSpawningRecord - ENTITY
Spaw_ingNode : INTEGER;
OutboardPort : PortNameType;
END;
GPCSpawningRecord - ENTITY
SpawningNode : INTEGER;
InboardPort : PortNameType;
END;
DIUListQ_eueType - QUEUE OF DIUSpawningRecord;
GPCListQueueType - QUEUE OF GPCSpawningRecord;
DiagnosticRecordType - RECORD
Diagnostic : DiagnosticModaType;
Tes_ode : INTEGER;
TestPort : PortNameType;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
TargetPort : PortNameType;
LinkEnableSucessful : BOOLEAN;
PortDiagnosticsRun : BOOLEAN;
TalkerRequest : iORequestType;
END;
NetworkGrowthProgressType - RECORD
CASE Mode : GrowNetworkModeType OF
GrowToRootNode :
Root_NodeAddress : INTEGER;
InboardPort : PortNameType;
AddRemainingNodes :
SpawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningPort : PortNameType;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
TargetPort : PortNameType;
AddD IUS :
DIUAddress : INTEGER;
AddGPCS:
SpareRootNode_dress : INTEGER;
DiagnosticCheck :
END;
END;
ProcessingType = (Powerup, GrowRequest, NetworkRequest,
NewState, FaultAnalysis) ;
ProcessType - RECORD
CASE Message : ProcessingType OF
Powerup:
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I GrowRequest, NetworkRequest, FaultAnalysis :
IORequest : IORequestType;
] NewState :
StateData : NewNetworkStateType;
END;
END;
DataPointer - POINTER TO ProcessType;
CONST NQtworkManagerPriority = I;
NodePowerupInitilizeTime - 0.000025;
GrowInitializeNodeTime - 0.000025;
N_tworkResponseComputation - 0.000050;
ComputeOneTransactionChain = 0.000075;
ComputeTwoTransactionChain - 0.000150;
ChangeNetworkStatus = 0.000025;
F±xedErrorReportAnalysis = 0.000075;
PortErrorAnalysis = 0.000005;
VAR NetworkState
RequestForService
NodeConnections
NodeStatus
ChannelStatus
Spawn ingQueue
DIUList
GPCList
NetworkManagerStatus
NetworkGrowthProgress
DiagnosticStatus
: NewNetworkStateType;
: NetworkManagerServiceRequest;
: RodeArrayTypa;
: NodeStatusArray;
: ChannelStatusRecord;
: SpawningQueuQType;
: DIUListQ_eueType;
: GPCListQueueType;
: NetworkManagerJobType;
: NetworkGrowthProgressType;
: DiagnosticRecordType;
NodeslnNetwork
NumberOfActiveNodes
: INTEGER;-
: INTEGER;
NetworkResponse
RepairNetworkMode
ErrorKeport
BranchNode
BranchPort
BranchesOfRoot
ReconfigurationStrateqy
AnalysisPortDecisions
DataCollectionRecord
NodeIndex
PortIndex
ErrorIndex
Transaction
SourceNode
TargetNode
: ChainStatusData;
: RepairNetworkModeType;
: ErrorRecordType;
: INTEGER;
: Por tNameType;
: BranchArrayType;
: RepairNetwor kModeType;
: INTEGER;
: DataElementType;
: INTEGER;
:Por tNameType;
: INTEGER;
: TransactionType;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
PreviousChainFailed
GoodRootNodeFound
• BOOLEAN;
: BOOLEAN;
PowerupRequest
NetworkResponseRequest
ProcessResponse
PowerupProcessing
NetworkResponseProcessing
ProcessingResponse
LastNetworkRequest
: DataPointer;
: DataPointer;
: DataPointer;
: ProcessingUnit;
: ProcessingUnit;
: ProcessisgUnit;
: IORequestType;
RootNode
FailedNode
CurrentPort
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: PortNauneType;
IOPPort : INTEGER;
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(**************************************************************************)
(* This procedure uses a Node Status Array and a Network Connection
Array to determine if a Spawning Node has any ports to which
an idle node is connected. When an idle node is found, the
search ks stop, the Idle Node Variable is set, add the BOOLEAN
return variable is set to TRUE, the First Port to Check variable
ks set to the next port to cheek on the next call to this routine.
Any ports connected to DIU's found during this search are entered
on a DIU list for later use. If no ports connected to idle
ports are found, then the BOOLEAN is set to FALSE. *)
pROCEDURE FoundAdjacentIdleNode (SpawningNode : INTEGER;
VAR SpawningNodeOutboar_ort : PortNameType;
VAR IdleNode : INTEGER;
VAR TargetNodeInboardPort : PortNameType;
NodeConnections : NodaArrayType;
NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
DIUList : D IUListQ_eueType;
GPCList : GPCListQ_eueType)
:BOOLEAN;
VAR PortIndex : PortNameType;
FoundIdleNode : BOOLEAN;
DIURecord : DIUSpawningReeord;
GPCRecord : GPCSpawningRecord;
SpawningNodeNumber : INTEGER;
IdleNodeNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
FoundldleNode :- FALSE;
SpawningNodeNumber :- FindNodaNumber (SpawningNode) ;
LOOP
CAS_ NodeConnections [SpawningNodeNumber] .
PortArray[SpawningNodeOutboardPort] .AdjacentElement OF
Node :
IF (NodeStatus[NodeConnections[SpawningNodeNumber].
PortArrayISpawningNodeOutboardPort].NodeNumber].
Status - Idle) Ah_ (NodeStatus[SpawningNodeNumber].
PortStatus[SpawninqNodeOutboardPort].Status - Idle) THEN
IdleNode :- NodeConnections[SpawningNodeNumberl.PortArray
[SpawningNodeOutboardPort].NodeAddress;
IdleNodeNumber :- NodeCon_ections[SpawningNodeNumber].PortArray
[SpawningNodeOutboardPort].NodeNumber;
FoundIdleNode :- TRUE;
PortIndex :- I;
LOOP
wITH NodeConnections[IdleNodeNumber].PortArray[PortIndex] DO
CASE AdjacentElement OF
Node :
IF NodeAddress - SpawningNode THEN
TargetNodeInboardPort :- PortIndex;
EXIT;
ELSE
PortIndex :- PortIndex + i;
END;
ELSE
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PortIndex :- Portlndex + i;
END;
END;
END;
END;
[ DIU:
NEW (DIURecord) ;
DIURecord ^ .SpawningNode :- SpawningNode;
DIURecord ^ .OutboardPort :- SpawningNodeOutboardPort;
INSERT DIURecord LAST IN DIUList;
i GPC:
(* This check keeps the root lank currently used
for growth from being put on the GPCList. *)
IF NodeStatus [SpawningNodeNttmber ] .PortStatus [SpawningNodeOutboardPort].
Status - Idle THEN
NEW (GPCRecord) ;
GPCRecord ^ .SpawninqNode :- SpawningNode;
GPCRecord ^ . InboardPort :- SpawningNodeOutboardPort;
INSERT GPCRecord LAST IN GPCList;
END;
ELSE
END;
IF FoundIdleNode TH_N
EXIT;
ELSIF SpawningNodeOutboardPort < NumberOfPortsPerNode THEN
SpawningNodeOutboardPort := SpawningNodeOutboardPort + i;
ELSE
EXIT;
END;
END;
RETURN (FoundIdleNode) ;
END FoundAdjacentIdleNode;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE NextNodeToAdd(VAR GrowthStatus : NetworkGrowthProgressType;
NodeConnections : NodeArrayType;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
DIUList
VAR Next SpawningNode
NodeToAddToNetwork
DIUElement
AddRemainingNodes IORequest
AddD IUIOReq_est
RequestToAddNode
: DIUListQueueType};
SpawningNodeType;
SpawningNodeType;
DIUSpawningRecord;
IORequestType;
IOKequestType;
DataPointer;
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ProcQssin_o_dNode
RequestToAddDIU
ProcessingToAddDIU
Nodelndex
: ProcesslngUnit;
: DataPointer;
: ProcessingUnit;
: INTEGER;
BEGIN
(* Find out if all the ports on the spawning node have been checked,
if not continue from the current spawning node,
otherwise get a new spawning node. *}
LOOP
WITH GrowthStatus DO
IF FoundAdjacentIdleNode(SpawningNode, SpawningPort, TargetNode,
TargetPort, NodeConnections, NodeStatus, DIUList, GPCList) THEN
(*Add the idle node to spawning queue. *)
NEW(NodeToAddToNetwork);
NodeToAddToNetwork^.Node :- TargetNode;
INSERT NodeToAddToNetwork LAST IN SpawningQueue;
(* Update Status of the two nodes that are being used to
add the next node. *)
UpdateStatusLinkEnable(SpawningNode, SpawningPort, TargetNode,
TargetPort, NodeStatus);
EnableLink(SpawningNode, TargetNode, NodeStatus, AddRemainingNodesIORequest);
AddRemainlngNodesIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
AddRemainingNodesIORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
AddRemainingNodesIORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
NEW(RequestToAddNode);
RequestToAddNode^.Message :- NetworkRequest;
RequestToAddNode^.IORequest :- AddRemainingNodesIORequest;
NEW(ProcessingToAddNode);
ProcessingToAddNode^.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingToAddNode^.ProcessingRequired :- ComputeTwoTransactionChain
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessingToAddNode^.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingToAddNode^.ProcessID :- 'NW Add Node Processing';
ProcessingToAddNode^.Data :- RequestToAddNode;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessinqToAddNode;
EXIT;
ELSIF QSize(SpawningQueue} - 0 THEN
FOR NodeIndex :- I TO NumberOfNodes DO
IF NodeStatus[Nodelndex].Status - Idle THEN
NodeStatus[NodeIndex].Status := Failed;
END;
END;
(* Set mode to add DIUs. *);
Mode :- AddDIUS;
(* All good nodes are a part of the network, now start
adding dius. *)
DID'Element :- FirstQ(DIUList);
REMOVE DIUElement FROM DIUList;
(* Update spawning node and spawning port status so
network manager will know what status to change.
WITH DIUElement ^ DO
*)
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NodeStatus [FindNodeNumber (SpawningNode) ]. PortStatus
{OutboardPort] .Status :- Active;
NodeStatus [FindNodeN_r (Spaw_iagNode) ] .PortStatus
[OutboardPort] .Direction :- Outboard;
AddDIUToNetwork(SpawningNode, OutboardPort, NodeStatus,
AddD IUIOReq_est) ;
(* Data Collection. *}
DIUAddress :- NodeConnections [FindNodeNumber (SpawningNode} ].
PortArray |outboardPort ] .DIUAddress ;
END;
DI SFOSE (D IUE lament) ;
AddDIUIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
AddDIUIORequest ^ .Identifier :- MyNodeID;
AddDIUIOReq_est ^ .ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
NEW (RequestToAddDIU) ;
Reques tToAddDIU^. Mes sage :- NatworkRequest;
RequestToAddDIU ^. IORequest :- AddDIUIORequast;
NEW (ProcessingToAddDIU) ;
ProcessingToAddDIU ^ .Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingToAddDIU^.ProcessingRequired :- ComputeOneTransactionChain
+ Networ kRespons eComput at ion;
ProcessingToAddDIU ^.ProcesaID :- 'NW Add DIU Processing' ;
ProcessingToAddDIU ^ .WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingToAddDIU ^ .Data :- RequastToAddDIU;
NOW outport [ IOPPort ] ^, ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingToAdc%DIU;
EXIT;
END;
REMOVE FIRST NextSpawningNode FROM SpawninqQueue;
SpawningNode :- NextSpawningNode^.Node;
SpawningPort :- I;
DISPOSE (NextSpawningNode) ;
END;
END;
END NextNodeToAdd;
****************************************************************************
(* This procdure performs the diagnostic checks durning network growth.
Since the current model does not include the failure modes that
this diagnostic sequence checks, not attempt is made to process the
responses. It is assumed that the chains produced by this routine
will complete normally. *)
PROCEDURE RunDiagnostic(VARDiagnosticStatus : DiagnosticRecordType;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
NodeConfiguration : NodeArrayType);
VAR TestNodeNumbar
TargetNodQNumber
ProcessingTime
DisconnectIORequest
DiagnosticRequest
DiagnosticProcessing
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: REAL;
: IORequestType;
: DataPointer;
: ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
WITH DiagnosticStatus DO
TestNodeNumber :- FindNodeNumber(TestNode};
(* Determine if the current test port should run tests.
If so, start tests, otherwise, determine if all ports
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have been tested. If so, run reset configuration and
talker out of turn test. *}
IF Diagnostic - LinkEnable TREN
(* Determine the next port under test. *)
LOOP
WITH NodeConfiguratlon [TestNodeNumber] .PortArray [Test.Port] DO
IF (AdjacentElement - Node} AND
(NodeStatus [NodeNumber]. Status - Idle) AND
(NodeStatus {TestNodeNumber] .PortStatus
ITestPort] .Status - Idle) TH_
_* A Port with an adjacent idle node has been found.
TargetNode :- NodeConfiguration[TestNodeNumber].
P ortArray [TestPort ].NodeAddres s;
TargetPort :- NodeConfiguration[TestNodeNumber].
PortArray [TestPort ] .Port;
.I
EXIT;
ELSIF Test.Port < NumberOfPortsPerNode THEN
TestPort :- Test-Port + i;
ELSIF PortDiagnosticsRun THEN
(* No more ports to test and some idle ports have
been tested. *}
Diagnostic :- ResetConfiguration;
EXIT;
ELSE
(* This node has no idle ports to run d/agnostics on,
no reason to reset its configuration. *)
Diagnostic :- TalkerOutOfTurn;
EXIT;
END;
END;
END;
TargetNodeNumber :- NodeConfiguration{TestNodeNumber].
PortArray{TestPort],NodeNumber;
NEW(DiagnosticReq-uest);
DiagnosticRequest^.Message :- NetwcrkRequest;
CASE Diagnostic OF
LinkEnable :
(* Update port status so that Enable Link will generate
the proper co_m_nd. Only set status since it will be
changed back later in diagnostics. *)
PortDiagnosticsRun :- TRUE;
NodeStatus[TestNodeNumber].PortStatus[TestPort].Status :- Active;
NodeStatusITargetNodeNum_er].PortStatus[TargetPort].Status :- Active;
EnableLink (TestNode, Target.Node, NodeStatus, DiagnosticReguest^.IORequest};
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Chain^.ChainIdentifier :- 200;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
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ProcessingTime :- ComputeTwoTran sac t io nChain;
Diagnostic :- DisabledTransmit;
DisabledTransmit:
IF NOT (LinkEnableSucessful) THEN
(* Mark the links failed, generate request to
disconnect failed links, and set diaqnostic
mode to link enable. *)
NodaStatus [FindNodeNumber (Te stNode ) ]. PortStatus
[Test.Port] .Status :- Failed;
NodeStatus [FindNodeN_mber (TargetNode) ].
PortStatus [ TargetPort ]. Status :- Failed;
Delet eNodeFromNetwork (Tes tNode, Tea tPort, TargetNode,
TargetPort, NodeStatus, DiagnosticRequest ^. IORequest) ;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn := NetworkIDToManage;
DiagnosticReq_est^.IOR_quest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequestA.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
ProcessingTime :- ComputeTwoTransactionChain;
Diagnostic :- LinkEnable;
ELSE
NodeStatus[TargetNodeNumber].PortStatus[TargetPort].Status := Idle;
DisabledTransmitTest(TargetNode, NodeStatus, DiaqnosticRequest^.IORequest);
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequestA.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
ProcessingTime := ComputeOneTransactionChain;
Diagnostic :- DisabledRetransmit;
END;
DisabledRetransmit:
NodeStatus[TestNodeNumber].PortStatus[TestPort].Status := Idle;
DisabledRetransmitTest(TestNode, TargetNode, NodeStatus,
DiagnosticRequest^.IOReq_est);
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn := NetworkIDToManage;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
ProcessingTlme :- ComputeTwoTransactionChain;
Diagnostic := LinkEnable;
TestPort :- TestPort + I;
ResetConfiguration:
ResetConfigurationCommand(TestNode, NodeStatus,
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest);
DiagnosticRequest^.IOKequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn := NetworkIDToManage;
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
DiaquosticRequest^.IORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
ProcessingTime := ComputeOneTransactionChain;
Diagnostic :- TalkerOutOfTurn;
TalkerOutOfTurn:
DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest :- MakeMonitorRequest(NodeConnections);
WITH DiagnosticRequest^.IORequest ^ DO
(* PRB *)
Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :w NetworkIDToManage;
Identifier := MyNodeID;
ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
END;
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ProcessingTime
Diagnostic
:= 0.0;
:- DiagnosticsComplete;
END;
END;
NEW(DiagnosticProcessing);
WITH DiagnosticProcessing ^ DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingRequired :- ProcessingTime + NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcesslD :- 'NMDiagnostics';
WritaData :- FALSE;
Data :- DiagnosticRequest;
END;
NOW outportIIOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- DiagnosticProcessing;
END RunDiagnostic;
****************************************************************************
(* This procadure updates the network status variables after a successful
branch reconnect. It sets the status of all the active ports
of the failed node set, except the node through which the reconnect
was made, to outboard. *)
PROCEDURE UpdataNodeStatusBranchReconnect(ReconnectNode : INTEGER;
ReconnactPort : PortNameType;
FailedRoot : INTEGER;
VARNetworkStatus : NodeStatusArray};
VAR ReconnectNumber : INTEGER;
FailedRootNumber : INTEGER;
SpawningNumber : INTEGER;
TargetNumber : INTEGER;
InboardPor t : PortNameType;
NewInboardPort : PortNameType;
OutboardPort : PortNameType;
BEGIN
ReconnectNumber := FindNodeNmnber (ReconnectNode) ;
FailedRootNumber := FindNodeNumber (FailedRoot) ;
(* Since the repair was sucessful, there will be two ports on the
Reconnect node that have the status "inboard".
One is due to the reconnection of the branch is
connected to the Reconnect port, the other is the inboard
port prior to the failure, this one should now be outboard. *)
SpawningNumber :- ReconnectNumber;
[* Find the port that must be changed to outboard.
OutboardPort := I;
LOOP
*)
WITH NetworkStatus[SpawningNumber].PortStatus[OutboardPort] DO
IF (Status = Active) AND (Direction = Inboard) AND
(OutboardPort <> ReconnectPort) THEN
(* The old inboard port has been found. *)
EXIT;
ELSE
OutboardPort := OutboardPort + i;
END;
END;
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END;
LOOP
(* Change Status of old inboard port to outboard. *)
NetworkStatus [SpawnlngNumber ].PortStatus [OutboardPort ].Status := Active;
NetworkStatus [SpawningNumber] .PortStatus IO_tboardPort] .Direction := Outboard;
(* Change the status of the port adjacent to the new outboard port
to inboard. *)
WITH _onnections [SpawningN_mber] .PortArray[OutboardPort] DO
NetworkStatus [NodeNumber] .PortStatus [Port] .Status '- Active;
NetworkStatus [NodeNumber] .PortStatus [Port] .Direction '- Inboard;
IF NodaNumber - FailedRootNumber TKEN
(* No more port statuses need to be changed. *)
EXIT;
ELSE
SpawningN_mbar :- NodeNumber ;
OutboardPort :- I;
NewInboardPort "- Port;
LOOP
WITH NetworkStatus [SpawningNumber] .PortStatus [
O_tboardPor t ] DO
IF (Status- Active) AND (Direction- Inboard) AND
(OutboardPort <> NewInboardPort) THEN
(* The old inboard port has been found. *)
EXIT;
ELSE
OutboardPort :- OutboardPort + i;
END;
END;
END;
END;
END;
END;
END UpdateNodeStatusBr anchReconnect;
PROCEDURE UpdateStatusLinkEnable(SpawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningPort : PortNameType;
TargetNode : INTEGER;
TargetPort : PortNameType;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray};
VAR SpawningNumber : INTEGER;
TargetNumber : INTEGER;
BEGIN
SpawningNumber := FindNodeNumber(SpawningNode);
Target_Number :- FindNodeNumber(TargetNode);
NodeStatus[SpawningNumber].PortStatus[SpawningPort].Status :- Active;
NodeStatus[SpawningNumber],PortStatus[SpawningPort],Direction := Outboard;
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NodeStatu$ [ TargetNumber ]. PortStatus [Target.Port ]. Status
NodeStatus [TargetNumber] .PortStatus [TargetPort] .Direction
•- Active;
:- Inboard;
E_ Updat eSt atu sLinkEnable;
PROCEDURE StartNetworkGrowth(RootLinkToGrowFrom : INTEGER;
VAR GrowPrpgress : NetworkGrowthProgressType;
NodeConnactions : NodeArrayType;
VARNodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
NodeslnThisNatwork : INTEGER);
VARRootNodaNumber : INTEGER;
NodeIndax : INTEGER;
Portlndex : PortNameType;
GrowIORequest : IOReq_astType;
ProcessingTime : REAL;
Req_estToGrow : DataPointer;
GrowRequestProcessinq : ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
(* Now find the Root Node connected to the active IOn. *)
FOR NodeIndex :- 1 TO NodeslnNetwork DO
FOR PortIndax :- I TO NumberOfPortaParNode DO
IF (NodeConnections[NodeIndax].PortArray{Portlndex].
AdJacentElement -GPC} AND
(Noc_K:onnections[NodeIndex].PortArray[Portlndex].
GPCAddress - RootLinkToGrowFrom} THEN
GrowProgress.RootNodaAchiress :- NodeConnections[Nodelndex].NodeAddress;
RootNodeNumber :- FindNodeNumber(GrowProgress.RootNodeAddress);
GrowProgress.lnboardPort :- Portlndex;
END;
END;
END;
WITH GrowProgress DO
Mode :. GrowToRootNoda;
(* Set status of Root Node that is being used for network growth. *)
NodaStatus[RootNodeN_Enber].PortStatus{InboardPort].Status :- Active;
NodeStatus[RootNodeNumber].PortStatus[InboardPort].Direction :- Inboard;
GROWTOROOTNODE (RootNodeAddress, InboardPort, NodeStatus, GrowIORequest) ;
END;
GrowIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
GrowIOReq_est^.Idantifier :- MyNodeID;
GrowIORequest^.RasponseExpected :- TRUE;
(* This is the processing time required to execute this procedure. *)
ProcessingTime :- FLOAT(NodesInThisNetwork) * GrowInitializeNodeTime;
NEW(RequestToGrow);
RequestToGrow^.Massage :- GrowRequest;
RequestToGrow^.IORequest :- GrowIOReq_ast;
NEW(GrowRequestProcessing);
GrowRequestProcessing^.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
GrowRequastProcassingA.ProcessingReq_irad :- ProcassingTime;
GrowRequestProcessing^.WriteData :- FALSE;
GrowRequestProcessing^.ProcessID :- 'NW Grow Processing';
GrowRequestProcessing^.Data :- RequestToGrow;
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NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- GrowRequestProceasing;
END StartNetworkGrowth;
PROCEDURE NetworkRepair(FaultDetectionData : ChainStatusData;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
NodeConnections : NodeArrayType;
VAR ErrorReport : ErrorRecordType;
VARRepairMode : RepairNetwork24odeType);
VARSpawningNode : INTEGER;
SpawningPort : PortNameType;
SpawningNodeNumber : INTEGER;
DisconnectIOReq_est : IORequestType;
RequestToDisconnectLink : DataPointer;
ProcessingToDisconnectLink : ProcessingUnit;
RequestNewState : DataPointer;
ProcessingNewState : ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
(* Analysis monitor response to determine the fault type, *)
ErrorAnalysis(FaultDetectionData, NodeStatus, NodeConnections,
ErrorReport, AnalysisPortDecisions);
IF (ErrorReport.Status - AnalysisSucessful) AND
(ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord.Fault m LinkFailure) THEN
REPORT "%12.8f" clock TAGGED "Link Failure";
RepairMode :- DisconnectLink;
(* Disconnect the failed tree from the rest of the
network through the broken node. *)
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
SpawningNode :- NodeConnections[FindNodeN_mber(
FailedRoot)].PortArray[
FailedlnboardPort].NodeAddress;
SpawningNodeNumber :- NodeConnections[FindNodeNumber(
FailedRoot)].PortArray[
FailedInboardgort].NodeNumber;
SpawningPort := NodeConnections[FindNodeNumber(
FailedRoot)].PortArrayl
FailedInboardPort].Port;
(* Update Status of the failed Links. *)
NodeStatusISpawningNodeNumber].PortStatus[SpawningPort].Status := Failed;
NodeStatus[FindNodeNumber(FailedRoot)].PortStatus[
FailedlnboardPort].Status :- Failed;
DeleteNodeFromNetwork(SpawningNode, SpawningPort, FailedRoot,
FailedlnboardPort, NodeStatus, DisconnectIORequest);
END;
DisconnectIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
DisconnectIORequest^.Chain^.ChainIdentifier := 300;
DisconnectIORequest^.Identifier := MyNodeID;
DisconneotIORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
NEW(RequestToDisconnectLink);
RequestToDisconnectLink^.Message := NetworkRequest;
RequestToDisconnectLink^.IORequest := DisconnectIOReq_est;
NEW[ProcessingToDisconnectLink);
ProcessingToDisconnectLink^.Priority :m NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingToDisconnectLink^.ProcessingRequired :- ComputeTwoTransactionChain
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessingToDisconnectLink^.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingToDisconnectLink^.ProcessID :_ 'Disconnect/Error Processing';
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ProcassingToDisconnectLink^.Data :- RequestToDisconnectLink;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- Processing"foDisconnectLink;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "Don't know how to repair this failure."};
WriteIm(ParamOut);
WriteString(ParamOut, "Returning network to service.");
WriteLn(ParamOut};
REPORT "%12.8f" clock TAGGED "Fault Analysis Unsucessful";
REPORT "%d" NetworkIDToManage TAGGED "ASSUME DIU LINK FAILURE, RETURN TO SERVICE";
WITH NatworkState ^ DO
NetworkID :- NetworkIDToManage;
State :- InService;
MonitorChain :- DiagnosticStatus.TalkerRequest^.Chain;
END;
NEW(RequestNewState);
Req_estNewState^.Message :- NewState;
RequestHewState_.StateDaCa :- NetworkState;
NEW(ProcessingNewState);
ProcessingNewStateA.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingNewState^.ProcessingRequired :- ChangeNetworkStatus
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessingNewStateA.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingNewState^.ProcessID :- 'New State Processing';
ProcassingNewState^.Data :- Req_estNewState;
NOW outport[10PPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingNewState;
END;
END NetworkRepair;
PROCEDURE DisconnectLinkProcess(ErrorReport : ErrorRecordType;
DisconnectResponse : ChainStatusData;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
NodeConnections : NodeArrayType);
VAR ReconnectIORequest : lOReque_tType;
RequestForErrorAnalysis : Data2ointer;
ProcessingForErrorAnalysis : ProcessingUnit;
ReconnectRootDecisions : INTEGER;
BranchReconnectDecisions : INTEGER;
IsolationPortDecisions : INTEGER;
ErrorAnalysisT/me : REAL;
BEGIN
ReconnectRootDecisions := 0;
BranchReconnectDecisions := 0;
IF ChainExecutedWithoutError(DisconnectResponse) THEN
WriteString(ParamOut, "Disconnect Link chain executed without error."};
WritaLn(ParamOut);
WriteString(ParamOut, "Something is wrong in network. ");
WriteLn(ParamOut);
WriteLn(ParamOut);
ELSE
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
IF ReconnectRoot(NodeConnections, NodeStatus, FailedRoot,
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FailedNodeSet, Reconnect lORequest,
ReconnectRootDecisions } THEN
RepairNetworkMode :- RaconnectLink;
ReconfigurationStrategy :- ReconnectLink;
ELSIF FailedNodeCount - 1 THF_N
(* This situation should not happen for the IAPSA II
experiments. *)
WriteString(ParamOut, "Found a node which is unreachable.") ;
Write/n (ParamO_t) ;
WriteString(ParamOut, "Logic not implace to repair this fault.");
WriteLn (ParamOut) ;
WriteLn (ParamOur } ;
ELSE
(* Reconnect through the branches of the failed tree. *)
BranchReconnect{ErrorReport, NodeConnections, BranchNode,
BranchPort, NodeStatus, BranchesOfRoot,
ReconnectIORequest,
BranchReconnect/)ecisions);"
RepairNetworkMode :- Reconnect.Branch;
ReconfigurationStrategy :- ReconnectBranch;
END;
IsolationPortDecisions :- ReconnectRootDecisions +
BranchReconnectDecisions;
ErrorAnalysisTlme :- FixedErrorReportAnalysis +
(FLOAT(AnalysisPort/)ecisions +
IsolationPort/)ecisions) *
PortErrorAnalysis)
+ ComputeTwoTransactionChain;
ReconnectIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
ReconnectIORequest^.Chain^.Chainldentifier :- 301;
ReconnectIORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
ReconnectIORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
NEW(RequestForErrorAnalysis);
Req_estForErrorAnalysis^.Message :- FaultAnalysis;
RsquestForErrorAnalysis^.IORequest :- ReconnectIORequest;
NEW(ProcessingForErrorAnalysis};
ProcessingForErrorAnalysis^.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingForErrorAnalysis^.ProcessingRequired :- ErrorAnalysisTime
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessingForErrorAnalysis^.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingForErrorAnalysis^.ProcessID :- 'Link/Branch Connect Processing';
ProcessingForErrorAnalysis^.Data :- RequestForErrorAnalysis;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorReq_est <- ProcessingForErrorAnalysis;
END;
END;
END DisconnectLink_rocess;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ReconnectLinkProcess(ErrorReport : ErrorRecordType;
ReconnectResponse : Cha£nStatusData);
VAR TalkToRoot0fFailedTreeIORequest : IORequestType;
RequestToTalkToRoot : DataPointer;
Process±ngToTalkToRoot : ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
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IF ChainExecutedWithoutError (ReconnectResponse) THEN
(* Reconnection was suceasful. Attempt to talk to root of
failed tree to see if failed link assumption was true. *}
RepairNetworkMode :- TalkToRootFailedTrea;
WITH ErrorReport. FaultAnalysisRecord DO
TalkToRootOfTree (FailedRoot, TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest) ;
END;
TalkToRootOfFailedTreeiORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :w NetworkIDToManage;
TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIOReq_est ^ .Chain ^ .Chainldentifier :- 302 ;
TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest ^ .Zdentifier :- MyNodeID;
TalkToRootOfFailedTr ee IOReques t ^. Respons eExpect ed :- TRUE;
NEW (Reques tToTalkToRoot) ;
RequestToTalkToRoot ^. Me s sage :- NetworkRequest;
RequestToTalkToRoot ^ . IORequest :- TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest;
NEW (ProceasingToTalkToRoot ) ;
P roces s ingToTalkToRoot ^. Prior ity :- NetworkManagerPr ior ity;
ProcessingToTalkToRoot^.ProcessingRequired :- ComputeOneTransactionChain
+ Networ kRe sponseC omputat ion;
Process ingToTalkToRoot ^. WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingToTalkToRoot^.ProceasID :- 'NW Talk To Root Processing';
Process ingToTalkToRoot ^. Dat a :- RequestToTalkToRoot;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorReq_est <- ProcessingToTalkToRoot;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "Reconnect Link encoutered network problems.");
WriteLn(ParamOut);
WriteString(ParamOut, "Either _E4 logic error or network problem. ");
WriteLn(ParamOut};
WriteLn(ParamO_t);
END;
END ReconnectLinkProcess;
PROCEDURE RQconnectBranchProcess(ErrorReport : ErrorRecordType;
ReconnectResponse : ChainStatusData);
VAR TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest : IORequestType;
Req_estToTalkToRoot : DataPointer;
ProcessingToTalkToRoot : ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
IF ChainExecutedWithoutError(ReconnectResponse)THEN
(* Branch reconnect was sucessful. Now talk to the root
of the failed tree. *)
RepairNetworkMode :- TalkToRootFailedTree;
WITH ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord DO
TalkToRootOfTree(FailedRoot, TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest);
END;
TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :-
NetworkIDToManage;
TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIOReq_est^.Chain^.Chainldentifier :- 302;
TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
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NEW(RequestToTalkToRoot);
RequeetToTalkToRoot^.Message :- NetworkRequest;
RequeetToTalkToRoot^.IORequest :- TalkToRootOfFailedTreeIORequeet;
NEW(ProcessingToTalkToRoot);
ProcessingToTalkToRoot^.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingToTalkToRoot^.ProcessingRequired :- ComputeOneTransactionChain
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessingToTalkToRoot^.WritaData :- FALSE;
ProcessingToTalkToRoot^.ProceseID :- 'NW Talk To Root Processing';
ProcesslngToTalkToRoot^.Data :- RequestToTalkToRoot;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingToTalkToRoot;
ELSE
(* Failure here ind/cates something unexpected happened.
Either model is not working right, a latent failure
is present, a second failure has occured, or there is a
problem in the network manager logic. *)
WriteString(ParamOut, "Repair action for branch reconnect unsucessful. ");
WriteLn(ParamOut);
WriteString(ParamOut, "SI]_JLATION ERROR.");
WriteLn(ParamOut);
END;
END ReconnectBranchProcess;"
PROCEDURE TalkToRootProcess(Responee : ChainStatusData;
ReconnectNode : INTEGER;
ReconnectPort : PortNemeType);
VAR Re_estNewState : DataPointer;
ProcessingNewState : ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
IF ChainExecutedWithoutError(Response) TKEN
(* Successfully talked to root of failed tree so link has been
repaired. If repair strategy was branch reconnect, then
update Node Status to reflect the new orientation of the nodes
in the failed node set. *)
IF ReconfigurationStrategy - KeconnectBranch THE_
UpdateNodeStatusBranchReconnect(ReconnectNode, ReconnectPort,
ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord.FailedRoot, NodeStatus);
END;
WITH DiagnosticStatus.TalkerRequest^.Chain ^ DO
Num_rOfTransactions :- QSize(DiagnosticStatue.TalkerReq_est^.Chain ^ .
TransactionQ_eue};
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
END;
NEW(NetworkState);
WITH NetworkState ^ DO
NetworkID := NetworkIDToManage;
State := InService;
MonitorChain := DiagnosticStatus.TalkerRequest^.Chain;
END;
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NEN(RequestNewState};
Req_estNewState^.Message :- NewState;
RequestNewState^.StateData :- NetworkState;
NEW(ProcessingNewState);
ProcessingNewState^.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingNewState^.ProcessingRequired :- ChangeNetworkStatus
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcesslngNewState^.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingNewState^.ProcessID :- 'New State Processing';
ProcessingNewState^.Data :- RequestNewState;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRaquest <- ProcessingNewState;
ELSE
(* Could not talk to root of failed tree. Link failure
assumption wrong. Failure is a node failure. *)
WriteLn(ParamOut);
NriteStrlng(ParamOut, "TIME TO IMPLEMENT NODE FAILURE ROUTINE");
WriteLn(ParamOut);
WriteLn(ParamOut);
END;
TalkToRootProcess;
PROCEDURE RootNodeProcess(RootNode : INTEGER;
VAR GoodRootNode : BOOLEAN;
SpawningQ_eue : Spawni,gQueueType;
VARGrowMode : GrowNetworkModeType;
VAR DiagnostlcStatus : DiagnosticRecordType;
GrowToRootNodeResponse : ChainStatusData;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray);
VAR SpawningElement : SpawningNodeType;
BEGIN
IF NOT GoodRootNode THEN
IF ChainExecutedWithoutError(GrowToRootNodeResponse) THEN
GoodRootNode :- TRUE;
(* Put Root Node on the Spawning Queue. *)
NEW($pawningElement);
SpawningElement^.Node :- RootNode;
INSERT SpawningElement LAST IN SpawningQueue;
NodeStatus_FindNodeNumber(RootNode)].Status :- Active;
(* A good root node has been found, change modes. *)
GrowMode :- DiagnosticCheck;
DiagnosticStatus.Diagnostic :- LinkEnable;
DiagnosticStatus.TestNode :- RootNode;
DiagnosticStatus.TestPort :- I;
DiagnosticStatus.PortDiagnosticsRun :- FALSE;
RunDiagnostic(DiagnosticStatus, NodeStatus, NodeConnections );
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "First Root Link tried ");
WriteString(ParamOut, "was bad.");
WriteLn(ParamOut);
END;
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END;
END RootNodeProcess ;
PROCEDURE AddNodeProcess(VAR GrowStatus : NetworkGrowthProgressType;
Response : ChainStatusData;
VAR StatusOfDiagnostlcs : DiagnosticRecordType;
VAR PreviousAddFailed : BOOLEAN;
VARNodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
NodeConnections : NodeArrayType};
VAR DisconnectIORequest : IORequestType;
RequestDisconnectNode : DataPointer;
ProcessingDisconnectNode : ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
IF ChainExecutedWithoutError(Response) THEN
(* Update the status of the spawning node and the target
node as a result of adding the new node. *)
NodeStatus[FindNodeNumber(GrowStatus.TargetNode)].Status :- Active;
GrowStatus.Mode :- DiagnostlcCheck;
StatusOfDiagnostics.Diagnostic :- LinkEnable;
StatusOfDiagnostics.TestNode :- GrowStatus.TargetNode;
StatusOfDiagnostics.TestPort := i;
StatusOfDiagnostics.PortDiagnosticsRun :- FALSE;
RunDiagnostic(StatusOfDiagnostics, NodeStatus, NodeConnections);
ELSIF PreviousAddFailed THEN
PreviousAddFailed := FALSE;
NextNodeToAdd(GrowStatus, NodeConnections, NodeStatus, DIUList};
ELSE
(* The previous try to connect to a node was unsucessful.
Assume that the link is b_oken. Update link statuses to reflect.
PreviousAddFailed :- TRUE;
,)
(* Update Status of the two nodes that were unsuccuessfully
added to the network. *}
N°deStatus[FindN°deNumber(Gr°wStatus'SpawningN°de)]'P°rtStatus[
GrowStatus.SpawningPort].Status :- Failed;
NodeStatus[FindNodeNumber(GEowStatus.TargetNode)].PortStatus[
GrowStatus.TargetPort].Status :- Failed;
DeleteNodeFromNetwork(GrowStatus. SpawningNode, GrowStatus.SpawningPort,
GrowStatus.TargetNode, GrowStatus.TargetPort, NodeStatus, DisconnectIORequest);
DisconnectIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworklDToManage;
DisconnectIOReq_est^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
DisconnectIOReq_est^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
(* Disconnect failed link. *)
NEW(RequestDisconnectNode};
WITH RequestDisconnectNode ^ DO
Message :- NetworkRequest;
IORequest :- DisconnectIORequest;
END;
NEW(ProcessingDisconnectNode);
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WITH ProcessingDisconnectNode ^ DO
Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessingRequired :- ComputeTwoTransactionChain
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessID :- 'NW Disconnect Node Processing';
Data :- RequestDisconnectNode;
END;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorReq_est <- ProcessingDisconnectNode;
END;
END AddNodeProcess;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE AddDIUProcess(VAR GrowStatus : NetworkGrowthProgressType;
Response : ChainStatusData;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray);
VARDIUEIement
AddDIUIORoquest
GPCEleme_t
AddGPCIORequest
AddDIURequest
ProcessAddDIU
AddGPCRequest
ProcessAddGPC
: DIUSpawningRecord;
: IORequestType;
: GPCSpawningRecord;
: IORequestType;
: DataPointer;
: ProcessingUnit;
: DataPointer;
: ProcessingUnit;
BEGIN
IF ChainExecutedWithoutError(Response) THEN
DIUElement :- FirstQ(DIUList);
IF DIUElement <> NIL THEN
REMOVE DIUElement FROM DIUList;
I* Update Status of node that is conected to the DIU that
is being added to the network. *)
WITH DIUElement ^ DO
NodeStatus[FindNodeNumber(SpawningNode)].
PortStatus[OutboardPort].Status :- Active;
NodeStatus[FindNodeNtuRber(SpawningNode)].
PortStatus[OutboardPort].Direction :- Outboard;
AddDIUToNetwork(SpawningNode, OutboardPort, NodeStatus, AddDIUIORequest);
(* Data Collection. *)
GrowStatus.DIUAddress :- NodeConnections[FindNodeNumber (SpawningNode}].
PortArrayIOutboardPort].DIUAddress;
END;
DISPOSE(DIUEIement);
AddDIUlORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworklDToManage;
AddDIUIORequest^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
AddDIUIORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
NEW(AddDIURequest);
AddDIURequest^.Message :- NetworkRequest;
AddDIURequest^.IORequest :- AddDIUIORequest;
NEW(ProcessAddDIU);
ProcessAddDiU^.Priority :. NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessAddDIU^.ProcessingRequired :- ComputeOneTransactionChain
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessAddDIU^.WriteData :- FALSE;
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ProcessAddDIu^.ProcessID :- 'NW Add DIU Processing';
ProcessAddDIU^ .Data :- AddDIURequest;
NOW outport IIOPPort ]^.ProcassorRequest <- ProcessAddDIU;
ELSE
(* All DIUs have been added to the network.
connections. Set mode to add GPCs. *)
GrowStatus.Mode :- AddGPCS;
Now add the GPC
GPCElement :- FirstQ(GPCList);
R_MOVE GPCElement FROM GPCList;
(* Update status of the node connected to the spare root
link connection to be added to the network. *)
WITH GPCElement ^ DO
NodeStatus[FindNodeNumber (SpawningNode)].
PortStatus[InboardPort].Status :- Active;
NodeStatus[FindNodeNumber(SpawningNode}].
PortStatusIInboardPort].Direction :- Inboard;
AddGPCToNetwork (SpawningNode, InboardPort, NodeStatus, AddGPCIORequest) ;
GrowStatus.SpareRootNodeAddress :- SpawningNode;
END;
DISPOSE(GPCEIement);
AddGPCIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDToManage;
AddGPCIORequestA.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
AddGPCIORequest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
NEW(AddGPCRequest);
AddGPCRequest^.Message :- NetworkRequest;
AddGPCRequestA.IORequest :- AddGPCIOReq_est;
NEW{ProcessAddGPC);
ProcessAddGPC^.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessAddGPC^,ProcessingRequired :- ComputeOneTransactionChain
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessAcldGPc^.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessAddGPC^.ProcessID :- 'NW Add GPC Processing';
ProcessAddGPC^.Data := AddGPCRequest;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessAddGPC;
END;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "Problems encountered enabling a DIU.");
WriteLn(ParamOut);
END;
END AddDIUProcess;
PROCEDURE AddGPCProcess(VAR GrowStatus : NetworkGrowthProgressType;
Response : ChainStatusData;
VAR NodeStatus : NodeStatusArray;
MonitorChain : ChainT_pe);
VAR GPCElement : GPCSpawningRecord;
AddGPCIORequest : IORequestType;
AddGPCRequest : DataPointer;
ProcessAddGPC : ProcessingUnit;
NewStateRequest : DataPointer;
ProcessNewState : ProcessingUnit;
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BEGIN
IF ChainExecutedWithoutError(Response) THEN
GPCEIJ_,ent :- FirstQ(GPCList) ;
IF GPCElement <> NIL THEN
REMOVE GPCElement FROM GPCList;
(* Update status of the node connected to the spare root
link connection to be added to the network. *)
WITH GPCEl_ment ^ DO
NodeStatus[FindNodeNu_ber(SpawuingNode)].
PortStatus[InboardPort].Status :- Active;
NodeStatus[FindNodeNumber(SpawningNod_)].
PortStatus[InboardPort].Direction :- Inboard;
AddGPCToNetwork(SpawningNode, InboardPort, NodaStatus, AddGPClORequest);
GrowStatus.SpareRootNodeAddress :- SpawningNode;
END;
DISPOSE(GPCEI_ent);
AddGPCIORequest^.Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn := NetworkIDToManage;
AddGPCIOReq_est^.Identifier :- MyNodeID;
AddGPClORoquest^.ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
NEW(AddGPCRoquost);
AddGPCRequest^oMessage :- NetworkRequest;
P___dGPCRequest^.IORequest :- AddGPCIORequest;
NEW(ProcessAddGPC);
ProcessAddGPC^.Priority :- NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessAddGPC^.ProcessingRequired :- ComputeOneTransactionChain
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
Process_dGPC^.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessAddGPC^.ProcessID :- 'NW Add GPC Processing';
PIocossAddGPC^.Data :- AddGPCRequest;
NOW outport[IOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessAddGPC;
ELSE
(* All GPCs have been added to the network. Notify the I/O Service
that my network is now operational. *)
NEW(NetworkState);
NetworkState^.NetworkID :- NetworkIDToManage;
NetworkState^.State :- InService;
NetworkState^.MonitorChain :- MonitorChain;
NEW(NewStateRequest);
NewStateRequest^.Message := NewState;
NewStateRequest^.StateData :- NetworkState;
NEW(ProcessNewState);
ProcessNewState^.Priority := NetworkManagerPriority;
ProcessNewState^.ProcessingRequired :i ChangeNetworkStatus
+ NetworkResponseComputation;
ProcessNewState^.NriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessNewState^.ProcessID :- 'Change Network State';
ProcessNewState^.Data := NewStateRequest;
NOW outportIIOPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessNewState;
END;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "Tried to add a GPC and failed.");
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WriteLn (ParamOur) ;
END;
END AddGPCProcess;
****************************************************************************
(* This procedure processes a network response and determines what the
next network manager action. *)
PROCEDURE ProcessNetworkResponse (Response : ChainStatusData;
Mode : Networh_lanager JobT ype;
VAR StatusOfGrowth • NetworkGrowthProgressType;
VAR StatusOfDiagnostics : DiagnosticRecordType) ;
VAR SpawningNode : SpawningNodeType;
BEGIN
IF Mode - GROWNetwork THE_
CASE StatusOfGrowth.Mode OF
GrowToRootNode :
RootNodeProcess (StatusOfGrowth.RootNodeAddress, GoodRootNodeFound,
SpawningQueue, StatusOfGrowth .Mode, StatusOfDiagnostics,
Response, NodeStatus} ;
AddRemainingNodes :
AddNodel_rocess (StatusOfGrowth, Response, StatusOfDiagnostics,
PreviousChainFailed, NodeStatus, NodeConnections) ;
AddD IUS :
AddDIUProcess IStatusOfGrowth, Response, NodeStatus) ;
AddGPCS :
AddGPCProces s (StatusOfGrowth, Response, NodeStatus,
StatusOfDiagnostics. TalkerRequest ^ .Chain) ;
DiagnosticCheck:
IF StatusOfDiagnostics.Diagnostic <> DiagnosticsComplete THEN
IF StatusOfDiagnostics.Diagnostic -DisabledTransmit THEN
Stat u sOfDiagnostics. LinkEnableSucessful :-
ChainExecutedWithoutError (Response) ;
END;
RunDiagnostic (StatusOfDiagnostics, NodeStatus,
NodeConnections ) ;
ELSIF QSize(SpawningQueue) <> 0 THEN
REPORT "%d" StatusOfDiagnostics.TestNode TAGGED "Node added.";
IF NumberOfActiveNodes - 0 THEN
(* This indicates that the root node is the only
node in the network and the other nodes have
yet to be added. *)
REMOVE FIRST SpawningNode FR_ SpawningQusue;
StatusOfGrowth.SpawningNode :I SpawningNode^.Node;
StatusOfGrowth. SpawningPort := i;
DISPOSE (SpawningNode) ;
END;
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NumberOfActiveNodes :-Num_erOfActiveNodes + I;
StatusOfGrowth.Mode :- AddRemainingNodes;
NextNodeToAdd (StatusOfGrow%h, NodeConnections, NodeStatus,
DIUList );
END;
END;
ELSE
CASE R_pairNetworkMode OF
DisconnectLink:
DisconnectLinkProcess(ErrorReport, Response, NodeStatus,
NodeConnections );
ReconnectLink:
ReconnectLinkProcess (ErrorReport, Response) ;
I ReconnectBranch :
ReconnectBranchProcess (ErrorReport, Response) ;
i TalkToRootFailedTree :
TalkToRootProcess(Response, BranchNode, BranchPort} ;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "DISCONNECT LINK IS THE ONLY MODE SUPPORTED");
WriteLn (ParamOur) ;
END;
END;
ReleaseChainResponseMemory (Response) ;
END ProcessNetworkResponse;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE ReleaseManagerRequest (VAR Request : IORequestType) ;
VAR Transaction : TransactionType;
ElementCounter : INTEGER;
NumberOfElements : INTEGER;
BEGIN
IF Request <> NIL THEN
WITH Request^.Chain ^ DO
NumberOfElements := QSize (TransactionQueue) ;
FOR ElementCounter :- 1 TO NumberOfElements DO
Transaction :- QRemove (TransactionQueue, TRUE) ;
DI SPOSE (Transaction ^.OutputFrame };
DISPOSE (Transaction) ;
END;
QDispose (TransactionQueue, SIZE (TransactionQueue)) ;
END;
DISPOSE (Request ^ .Chain) ;
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DISPOSE (Request) ;
END;
END ReleaseM_inager Request;
****************************************************************************
BEGIN
IOPPort :- GetOutPort(IOPIdentifier) ;
ReadNodeI nterConnectione (Natwor k IDToManage, NodeConnections) ;
InitializeStatusVariables (NodeConnections, Nodestatus, ChannelStatus) ;
Nodes InNetwork :- NodesInThisSimulation (NodeConnections) ;
WriteLn (ParamO_t) ;
WriteLn (ParamOut) ;
DiagnosticStatus.TalkerRequest := MakeMonitorRequest [NodeConnections) ;
WITH DiagnosticStatus.TalkerRequest ^ DO
Chain^.NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- NetworkIDTo_age;
I dentifler :- MyNode ID;
ResponseExpected :- TRUE;
END;
NEW {PowerupRequest ) ;
PowerupRequest ^.Message :- Powerup;
NEW (PowarupProcess ing) ;
PowerupProcessing^. Priority :- 2;
PowerupProcessinq ^.PrOcessingRequired :- FLOAT (NodesInNetwork) _ NodePoweruplnitilizeTime;
powerupProcessing ^ .WriteData :- FALSE;
PowerupProcessing ^.ProcessID :- '_ Power up' ;
PowerupProcessing ^ .Data := PowerupRequest;
NOW outport [ IOPPort] ^.ProcessorRequest <- PowerupProcessing;
LOOP
WAITUNTI L (ProcessorResponse)
ProcessorResponse :
ProcessingResponse :- ActivePort ^ .ProcessorResponse;
ProcessKesponse := P roces s ingResponse^. Data;
IF ProcessResponse ^ .Message - Powerup THEN
EXIT;
ELSE
WriteString(ParamOut, "Problem during NM power up processing");
WriteLn (ParamOur) ;
END;
END;
END;
DISPOSE(ProcessingRespo_se);
DISPOSE(ProcessResponse};
PreviousChainFailed := FALSE;
NumberOfActiveNodes := 0;
(* Initailize the Node Status variable to reflect the networks
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intial state. *)
FOR NodeIndex :- 1 TO NodesInNetwork DO
WITH NodeStatue[NodeIndex] DO
Address "- NodeConnections [NodeIndex ] .NodeAddress;
Status :- Active;
FOR PortIndex :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
IF InitialNodaConfiguration[NodeIndex) IPortIndex] THEN
PortStatus (PortIndex]. Status :- Active;
IF InitialOrientation[NodeIndex] [PortIndex] THEN
PortStatus [Portlndex] .Direction :- Inboard;
ELSE
PortStatus [PortIndex] .Direction :- Outboard;
END;
ELSE
PortStatus (PortIndex] .Status :- Idle;
_D;
END;
END;
END;
LOOP
WAITUNTIL EVENT
ServiceRequest :
RequestForService :- ActivePort ^.ServiceRequest;
CASE RequestForService^.ServiceRequest OF
GrowNetwork :
InitializeS tatusVariables (NodeConnections, NodeStatus,
ChannelStatus ) ;
GoodRootNodeFound :- FALSE;
NetworkManagerStatus :- GROWNetwork;
NetworkGrowthProgress.Mode :- GrowToRootNode;
StartNetworkGrowth (RequestForService ^ .ActiveRootLink,
NetworkGrowth9 rogres s, NodeConnections, NodeStatus,
Nodes InNetwork) ;
} RepairFault :
(* This reconfiguration strategy attempts
one shot repair of the network. *)
NetworkManagerStatus :- RepairNetwork;
AnalysisPor tDecisions :- 0;
NetworkRepair (RequestFor Service ^ .MonitorChainRespons e^. Re sponse,
NodeStatus, NodeConnections, ErrorReport,
RepairNetworkMode };
I SwitchRootLink :
WITH RequestForService ^ DO
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(* Get the node which is connected to the n_
root link and the node conneotld to the failed
root link. Deternine which port ot RootNode
which is connected to the NewRoot. *)
RootNode :- Fin_odeNumber (NewRootNode} ;
FailedNode :- FindNodeNumber (FailedRootNode) ;
C_rrentPort :- I;
WHILE NodeConneotions [RootNode] .PortArray[
CurrentPort] .AdjacentElement <> GPC DO
CurrentPort :- Current.Port + i;
END;
END;
(_ Update node status to reflect the root link switch. *}
UpdateNodeStatusBranchReconnect (NodeStatus IRootNode] .Address,
CurrentPort, NodeStatus (FailedNode ] °Address,
NodeStatus ) ;
END;
DISPOSE (RequestForService} ;
I IONetworkResponse :
NetworkResponse :- ActivePort^. IONetworkResponse;
Proces sNetworkResponse {NetworkResponse, NetworkManagerS tat us,
NetworkGrowthProqress, DiagnosticStatus) ;
(* Get rid of memory for I/O request correspond/ng to
this response. *)
RoleaseManagerRequest (LastNetworkRequest) ;
I ProcessorResponse :
ProcessingResponse :- ActivePort^.ProcessorResponse;
ProcessRosponse :- P recess ingResponse^. Dat a;
CASE ProcessResponse^.Message OF
GrowRequest, NetworkRequest, FaultAnalysis:
WITH DataCollectionRecord DO
SimulationT1me :- clock;
Frequency :- NonCyclic;
IF NetworkManagerStatus - GROWNetwork THEN
NonCyclicData.NVariation :- RegrowAction;
CASE NetworkGrowthProgress.Mode OF
GrowToRootNod_ :
Event ID :- 32;
NonCyclicData.Node DIU ID :- NetworkGrowthProgress.RootNodeAddress;
Wr i%eDat aEl ementType (DataCol lectionR_cord) ;
I AddR_mainingNodes :
Event ID :- 33;
NonCyclicData.Node DIU ID :- NetworkGrowthProgress .TargetNode;
Wr IteDataElementType (DataCollectionRecord) ;
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I AddD IUS :
Event ID :- 34;
NonCyclicData.Node DIU ID :- NetworkGrowthProgress.DIUAddress;
WriteDataEle_entType(DataCollectionRecord);
[ AddGPCS :
EventID :- 35;
NonCycllcData.Node DIU ID :- NetworkGrowthProgress.SpareRootNodeAddrass;
WrlteDataEl_entType(DataCollectionRecord);
ELSE
END;
ELSIF NatworkManagerStatus - RepairNetwork THEN
CASE RepairNetworkMode OF
DisconnectLink:
EventID :- 36;
NonCyclicData.NVariation :- ErrorEval;
NonCycllcData.NumberFailed :- ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord.FailedNodeCount;
ErrorIndex :- I;
FOR Nodelndex :- 1 TO NodesInNetwork DO
IF NodeSetRanga(NodeIndex) IN
ErrorReport.FaultAnalysisRecord.FailedNodeSet THEN
NonCyclicData.Node_IDIErrorIndex] :- NodeConnectionsINodeIndex].NodeAddress;
INC(Errorlndex);
END;
END;
WriteDataElementType(DataCollectlonRecord);
EventID :- 37;
NonCyclicData.NVariation :- OneShotAction;
Transaction :- FirstQ(ProcessResponse^.IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue);
TargetNode :- Transaction^.O_tputFrame^.Address;
Transaction :- QSucc(Transaction, ProcQssResponse^.lORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue
SourceNode :- I00 *Transaction^.OutputFrame^.Address;
NonCyclicData.LinkNodeID :- SourceNode + Target_Node;
I RaconnectLink:
EventID :- 38;
NonCyclicData.N_Variation :- OneShotAction;
Transaction :- FirstQ(ProcessResponse^.IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue);
SourceNode :- 100 *Transaction^.OutputFrame^.Address;
Transaction :- QSucc(Transaction, ProcessResponsa^.IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue
TargetNode :- TransactionA.OutputFrame^.Address;
NonCyclicData.LinkNoda_ID :- SourceNode + TargetNode;
I ReconnectBranch:
EventID :- 39;
NonCyclicData.NVariation := OneShotAction;
Transaction :- FirstQ(ProcessResponseA.IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQ_eue);
SourceNode :- I00 *Transaction^.OutputFrame^.Address;
Transaction :- QSucc(Transaction, ProcessResponse^.IORequest^.Chain^.TransactionQueue
TargetNode :- Transaction^.OutputFrame^.Address;
NonCyclicData.LinkNodeID :- SourceNode + TargetNode;
I TalkToRootFailedTree:
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EventlD :- 40;
NonCycllcData.N Variation :- OneShotAction;
Transaction :- FirstQ(ProcessResponse ^ .iOReq uest_ .Chain^ .TransactionQueue) ;
TaxgetNode :- Transaction^ •Out_utFrame ^.Address;
NonCyclicData.Link_Node ID :- TargetNode;
END;
WriteDataElementTypa (DataCollectionRecord) ;
END;
_D;
NOW outport [i]^. IONetworkReq_est <- ProcessResponse ^. IORequest;
LastNetworkRequest :- ProcessResponse ^.IORequest;
I NewState :
NOW outport [I]^ .NewNetworkState <- ProcessResponse ^.StateData;
END;
DISPOSE (ProcessingResponse) ;
DISPOSE (ProcessResponse} ;
I Reset :
(* Reset manager's view of the network. *)
(* Reinitailize the Node Status variable to reflect
the network's intial state. *)
PreviousChalnFailed :- FALSE;
NumberOfActivoNodos "- 0;
InitializeStatusVariables (NodoConnections, NodeStatus, ChannelStatus) ;
FOR NodeIndex :- I TO NodesInNetwork DO
WITH NodeStatus [NodeIndex] DO
Status :- Active;
FOR PortIndex :- 1 TO NumberOfPortsPerNode DO
IF InitialNodeConfiguration [NodeIndex] [PortIndex] THEN
PortStatus [PortIndex] .Status :- Activl;
IF InitialOrientation[NodeIndex] [PortIndex] THEN
PortStatus [PortIndex] .Direction :- Inboard;
ELSE
PortStatus [Portlndex] .Direction :- Outboard;
END;
ELSE
PortStatus[PortIndex].Status :- Idle;
END;
END;
END;
END;
END;
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DEFINITION MODULE BldChains;
FROM IOService IMPORT IORequestType;
FROM BusMessag IMPORT IOActivityChoice;
EXPORT QUALIFIED ApplicatlooType, BuildRequest;
TYPE ApplicatlonType - (FlightControl, EngineControl);
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE BuildReq_est (Application : AppllcatlonType;
Rate : INTEGER;
IOActivity : IOAotivityChoice) : IORequestType;
****************************************************************************
END BldChains.
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IMPLemENTATION MCOULE BldChains;
FROM IOService IMPORT IOActlvityType, IC_oquestType;
FRCM lOS IMPCRT ChainType, TransactionType;
FROM BusMessag I_C_T BusMossageTypa, MeesageType, IOActivityChoice;
FROM QueuoM IMPC_T InltQ, QInsert, QSLze;
FROM Storage IMPORT ALLOCATE;
CONST FllghtControlRequestTLmeoutl00
FllghtControlRequestTimeoutS0
FILghtControlReq_estTimeout25
- 0.002;
- 0.002;
- 0.001;
EngineControlRequestTimeout100
EngineControlRequestTimeoutSO
EngineControlRequestTimeout25
0.001;
0.001;
0.001;
EnginoControlZdentlfierlO0
EngineControlIdentifier50
EngineControlldentifier25
- 100;
- 50;
- 25;
FlightControlidentifierl00
F1ightControlldentifier50
FllghtControlIdentlfler25
- i00;
- 50;
- 25;
lhletReq_estPriority
NozzlaRoquoetPriority
gnginoRequostPriorlty
- 10;
- 9;
- 8;
FastRequeatPrlority
MiddleRequastPriority
SlowP_questPriority
- I0;
- 9;
- 8;
InletDIUAddressl - 81;
NozzleDIUAd_ressl - 83;
EngineDIUAddreul - 82;
InletDIUAddrees2 - iii;
NozzleDIUAddress2 - 113;
EngineDIUAddress2 - 112;
Sensor2DIUAddressl
Cockpit2DIUAddreBsl
CanardRightDIUAddressl
LeadingEdgeRightDIUAddressl
Out_boardFlaperonRiqhtDIUAddressl
InboardFlaperonRightDIUAddressl
TrailingEdgeRightDIUAddressl
R_dderRlghtDIUAddrelsl
RudderL_ftDIUAddressl
TrailingEdgeI_ftDIUAddressl
InboardYlaperonLeftDIUAddresel
Outl_ardYlaperonLeftDIUAddressl
NoseDIUAddressl
CanardLeftDIUAddressl
Cock_itlDIUAddressl
SanaorlDIUAddressl
- 91;
- 92;
- 93;
- 94;
- 95;
- 96;
- 97;
- 98;
- 99;
- i00;
- 101;
- 102;
• - 103;
- 104;
- 105;
- 106;
Sensor2DIUAddresa2
CocEpit2DIUAddress2
CanardR/ghtDIUAddress2
LeadingEdgeRightDl_JAddress2
OutboardFlaperonRightDIUAddross2
Ir_oardFlaperonRightDIUAddress2
TrailingEdgoRightDIUAddress2
RudderRightDIUAddress2
RudderLeftDIUAddresa2
TrailingEdgeLeftDIUAddress2
InboardFlaperonLeftDIUAddress2
Ou_ardFlaperonLeftDIUAddress2
- 111;
- 112;
- 113;
- 114;
- 115;
- 116;
- 117;
- 118;
- 119;
- 120;
- 121;
- 122;
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NoseDIUAddress2 - 123;
CanardLeftDIUAddress2 - 124 ;
CockpitlD IUAddress2 - 125;
SQnsor iDIUAddres s2 - 126;
(* This section controls the transaction timeouts of for transactions
in the flight control and engine application. *)
{* This section sets transaction timeouts for the engine application.
Since there is only one transaction An each of the chains,
tmeouts will be set at maximum execution t/me plus
tlme for response bits on the bus plus 10% of the previos sum. *)
InletTransactionTimeout - 0.000305; (* max 0.000277 *)
NozzleTransactionTimeout - 0.000229; (* max 0.000208 *)
EngineTransactionTimeout - 0.000637; (* max 0.000579 *)
(* This sections sets the transaction timeouts for the flight
control application. The timeouts are set such that if a
transaction times out, the succeding transaction in the chain
for the network with the failed transacton, will be
transmitted from the IOS approximately the same time as the
corresponcLtng transaction on the unfailed network. *)
Sensor2FastTransactionTimeout - 0.000208;
Sensor2MiddleTransactionTimeout
Cock_it2TransactionTimeout
CanardRightTransactionTimeout
LeadingEdgeRightTransactionTimeout
Ou_rdFlaperonRightTransactionTimeout -
InboardFlaperonRightTransactionTimeout -
TrailingEdgeRightTransactionTimeout
RudderR/ghtTransactionTimeout
RudderLeftTransactionTimeout
TrailingEdgeLeftTransactionTimeout
InboardFlaperonLeftTransactionTimeout -
OutboardFlaperonLeftTransactionTimeout -
NoseTransactionTimeout
CanardLeftTransactionTimeout
CockpitlMAddleTransactionTimeout
CockpitlSlowTransactionTimeout
SensorlFastTransactionTimeout
SensorlMiddleTransactionTimeout
SensorlSlowTransactionTimeout
0.000116;
0.000139;
0.000116;
0.000208;
0.000139;
0.000162;
0.000162;
0.000116;
0.000116;
0.000139;
0.000162;
0.000139;
0.000116;
0.000116;
0.000139;
0.000093;
0.000208;
0.000116;
0.000093;
PROCEDURE FltConl00Req_est(IOActivity : IOActivityChoice) :IORequestType;
VARFlightControll00Request
NetworklChaln
Network2Chain
Transaction
Co_=and
: IORequestType;
: ChainType;
: ChainType;
: TransactionType;
: BusMessageType;
BEGIN
(* This process controls the 100Hz I/O request. I/O Requests will
be generated at a 100Hz rate, i.e every 10ms. After the I/O
response is received, this process will delay for a time interval
Intended to represent the tame At takes to generate the next output.
NEW(FlightControll00Request);
NEW(NetworkIChain);
NEW(Network2Chain);
NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0};
Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue := InitQ ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
NetworklChain^.ChainIdentifier := i;
Network2Chain^.ChainIdentifier :- i;
NEW(Transaction);
NEW(Command);
WITH Command ^ DO
,)
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Address :- SensorlDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivlty;
CommandNumber :- I;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 100;
TimeOutValue := SensorlFastTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command} ;
WITH Command _ DO
Address :- Sensor2DIU_dressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber := i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 101;
TimeOutValue := Sensor2FastTransactionTimeout;
O_tputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, NetworklChaln^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
N_W (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
wITH Command ^ DO
Address :- OutboardFlaperonLeftDIUAddressl;
Message := DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 102;
TimeOutValue := OutboardFlaperonLeftTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- CoEmand;
B-157
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Cocmand ^ DO
Address :- OutboardFlaperonRightDIUAddressl;
Message :i DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :_ IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 1 ;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 103;
TimeOutValue :- OutboardFlaperonRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :_ Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Co_uLnd ^ DO
Address :- InboardFlaperonLeftDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :3 IOActivity;
CommandNumber := i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 104;
TimeO_tValue :_ InboardFlaperonLeftTransactionTimeout ;
OutputFr ame := Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW(Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :_ InboardFlaperonRightDIUAddress[;
Message := DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := I;
END ;
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(*
*)
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 105;
TimeOutValue :- InboardFlaperonRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE)
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW(Comuand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- TrailingEdgeLeftDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- I;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 106;
TimeOutValue :- TrailingEdgeLeftTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE)
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW(Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- TrailingEdgeR/qhtDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- I;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 107;
TimeOutValue := TrailingEdgeRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, NetworklChain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE}
INSERT Transaction LAST rN NetworkiChain^.TranactionQueue);
WITH NetworklChain ^ DO
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NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- I;
NumberOfTransactions :- QSize(NetworkIChain^.TransactionQueue);
END;
NEW(Transaction};
NEW(Command);
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- SensorlDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- I;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 200;
T1meOutValue :- SensorlFastTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW(Transaction);
NEW(Command};
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- Sensor2DIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivlty;
CommandNumber := i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 201;
TlmeOutValue :_ Sensor2FastTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^°TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW(Transaction);
NEW(Command);
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- OutboardFlaperonLeftDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivlty;
CommandNumber := i;
END;
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END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 202;
TimeOutValue :- OutboazdFlapercnLeftTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, Network2Cha/a ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE} ;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (C_and) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- OutboardFlapeEonR/ghtDIUAddress2 ;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
C_mmandNumber :- I;
END;
END;
WITH Traamaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 203;
Ti_eOutValue :- OutboardFlaperonRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.Tran_actionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :_ Inboard21aperonLeftDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCom_%nd DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 1;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 204;
TimeOutValue :- InboardFlaperonLeftTransactionTimeout;
Output.Frame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
8-161
Address :- InboardFlaperonRightDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :,, i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 205;
TimeOutValue :- InboardFlaperonR/ghtTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- command;
END;
Olnsert(Transaction, NQtwork2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW(Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- TrailingEdgeLeftDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITM DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 1;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 206;
TimeOutValue :- TrailingEdgeLeftTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW(Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- TrailingEdgeR/ghtDIUAddress2;
Message := DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :_ lOActivity;
Command_umber :- i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 207;
T1meOutValue :- TrailingEdgeR/ghtTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :_ Command;
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(*
*)
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
INSERT Transaction LAST IN Network2ChainA.TranactionQueue);
WITH Network2Chain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :I 2;
NumberOfTransactions :- QSize (Network2Chain ^ .TransactionQ_eue) ;
END;
WITH FlightControll00Request ^ DO
Priority :- FastRequestPriority;
Identifier :- FlightControlIdantifierl00;;
RequestTimeoutValue :- FlightControlRequestTimeoutl00;
RequestType :- ApplicationRequest;
ChainArray_l] :- NetworklChain;
ChainArray[2] := Network2Chain;
END;
RETURN (FlightControll00Request);
END FltConl00Request;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDDI%E FltConSORequest{IOActivity : IOActivityChoice} :IORequestType;
VAR FlightControl50Request : IOReq_estType;
NetworklChain : ChainType;
Network2Chain : ChainType;
Transaction : TransactionType;
Command : BusMessageType;
BEGIN
(* This process controls the 50Hz I/O Request. I/O Requests will be
generated at a 50Hz rate, i.e every 10ms. After the I/O response
is received, this process will delay for a time interval Intended
to represent the time it takes to generate the next output. *)
NEW(FlightControlSORequest);
NEW(NetworklChain);
NEW{Network2Chain);
NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
NetworklChain^.ChainIdentifier :- 2;
Network2Chain^.ChainIdentifier :- 2;
NEW (Transaction} ;
NEW (C_and} ;
WITH Comxnand ^ DO
Address :- SensorlDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
Comman_umber :- 2;
END;
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END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := I00;
TimeOutValue :- SensorIMiddleTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Coa_and) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- Sensor2DIUAddressl;
Message :_ DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivit y;
C_mmandNumber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 101;
TimeOutValue :- Sensor2MiddleTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, NetworklChain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE} ;
NEW {Transact ion) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- CockpitlDIUAddressl;
Message :_ DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 102;
TimeOutValue :- CockpitlM/ddleTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, NetworklChain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
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Address :- Cockpit2DIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNuuber :- 2 ;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 103;
TimeO_tValue :- Cockpit2TransactionTimeout;
O_tputFrame :- C_and;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, NetworklChain ^,TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (C_and) ;
WITH CoQuRand ^ DO
Address :- CanardLeftDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
Com_andNumber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 104;
TimeOutValue :- CanardLeftTransactionT/meout;
OutputFrame :- Ccamand;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW {Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- CanardRightDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := lOActivity;
CommandNumb_r : = 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 105;
TimeOutValue :- CanardRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
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END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQ_eue, FALSE};
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Cowaand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- RudderLeftDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber : = 2 ;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 106;
TimeOutValue :- RudderLeftTransactionTimeout;
Output_Frame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- RudderRightDIUkddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 2 ;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 107;
TimeOutValue :- RudderRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE};
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Co_and) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- NoseDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := 2;
END;
_166
(*
*)
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 108;
TimeOutValue :- NoseTransactionTimeout;
O_tputFra_e :- Command;
END;
QInaert (Transaction, NetworklChain ^.Transactlonouaue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Tranaaction) ;
_EW(C_mmd) ;
WITH Ccamaad ^ DO
Address :- Lead/ngEdqeRiqhtDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivit y;
C_mmdNuaber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 109;
TimeOutValue :- LeadingEdgel%ightTranaactlonTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, NetworklChain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
INSERT Transaction LAST IN NetworklChain*.TranactionQueue);
WITH NetworklChain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- I;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize (NetworklChain ^ .TransactionQueue) ;
END;
NEW (Transaction} ;
NEW (Connuand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- SensorlDIUAddress2;
Message := DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
Comu_a_dNumber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 200;
TimeOutValue :- SensorlMiddleTranaactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
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END;
Qlnsert (Transaction, Network2Chain ^.TransactionQuaue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (C_mand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- Sensor2DIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 201;
TimeOutValue :- Ssnsor2MiddleTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, Network2Chain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Co_mand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- CockpitlDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCo_and DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 2 ;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 202;
TimeOutValue :- cockpitlMiddleTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, Network2Chain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- Cockpit2DIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := 2;
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END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 203;
TimeOutValue :- Cockpit2TransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, Network2Chain ^.TranSactionQueue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transact ion ) ;
NEW (Coemand) ;
WITH C_mmand ^ DO
Address :- CanardLeftDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
ComumdNumber :- 2;
E_;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 204;
TimeOutValue :- CanardLeftTransactionTimeout;
Output.Frame :- C_a_d;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueu e, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- CanarctRightDIUAddress2 ;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 205;
TimeOutValue :- CanardRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, Network2Chain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transaction} ;
NEW (Comand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
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Ad(ires$ :- RudderLeftDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 206;
TimeOutValue := RudderLeftTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
OInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQn_eue, FALSE);
NEW(Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- RudderRightDIUAddress2 ;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 207;
TlmeOutValue :- RudderRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFram_ := Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- NoseDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CcamandNtunber := 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 208;
TimeOutValue := NoseTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
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*)
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command);
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- Lead/ngEdgeR/ghtDIUAddrass2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActlvit y;
CommandNumber :- 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 209;
TimeO_tValue "- LeadingEdgeRightTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE};
INSERT Transaction LAST IN Network2Chain ^.TranactionQueue} ;
WITH Network2Chain ^ DO
NetworkToBsExecutedOn :- 2;
NumberOfTransactions •- QSize (Network2Chain ^ .TransactionQ_eue) ;
END;
WITH FlightControl50Request ^ DO
Priority :- MiddleReques t Priority;
Identifier :- FlightControl Identifier 50 ;
RequestTimeoutValue :- FlightControlRequestTimeout50;
RequestType :- ApplicationReques t;
ChainArray I 1 ] := NetworklChain;
ChainArray [2] :- Network2Chain;
END;
RETURN (FlightControl50Request) ;
END FltConSOReq_est;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE FltCon25Request (IOActivity : IOActivityChoice) :IORequestType;
VAR FlightContro125Request : IOReq_estType;
NetworklChain : ChainType;
Network2Chain : ChainType;
Transaction : TransactionType ;
Command : BusMessageType;
BEGIN
(* This process controls the 25Hz I/O Request. I/O Requests will be
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generated at a 25Hz rate, i.e every 40ms, After the I/O response
is received, this process will delay for a time interval intended
to represent the time it takes to generate the next output. *)
NEW (FlightControl25Request) ;
NEW (NetworklChain) ;
NEW (Network2chain) ;
NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue :-InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
Network2Chain ^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0) ;
NetworklChain ^ .ChainIdentifier :- 3;
Network2Chain ^ .ChainIdentifier :- 3;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- SensorlDIUAddressl;
Message :I DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := 3;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- I00;
TimeOutValue :- SensorlSlowTransactionTimeout;
Output.Frame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworkiChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE};
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address := CockpitlDIUAddressl ;
Message := DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber := 3;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- i01;
TimeOutValue := CockpitlSlowTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, NetworklChaln ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
WITH NetworkiChain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn := i;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize (NetworklChain ^.TransactiOnQueue) ;
END;
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NEW (Transaction } ;
NEW (C_mand) ;
WITH Coa_and ^ DO
Address :- SensorlDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CaamandNumber :- 3;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 200;
TimeOutValue :- SensorlSlowTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Coamand;
END;
QInsert (Transaction, Network2Chain ^.TransactionQueue, FALSE) ;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (C_mand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- Cockl_itlDIUAddress2 ;
Message :- DIUInput;
_ITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumbar :- 3;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 201;
TimeC_tValue :- CockpitlSlowTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chai_^.TransactionQueue, FALSE)_
WITH Network2Chain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- 2;
NumberOfTransactions :_ QSize (Network2Chain ^ .TransactionQueue) ;
END;
WITH FlightContro125Request ^ DO
Priority :- SlowRequestPriority;
Identifier :- FlightCont rol Ident if ier 25;
RequestTimeoutValue :- FlightControlRequestTimeout25;
RequestType :- ApplicationReques t;
ChainArray [I] :- NetworklChain;
ChainArray [2 ] :- Network2Chain;
END;
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RETURN (FlightContro125Request) ;
END FltCon25R_est;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE Enginel0QRequest (IOActivity : IOActivityChoice) :IOReq_estType;
VAR EngineControll00Request : IORequestType;
Network iChain : ChainType;
Network2Chain • ChainType;
Transaction : TransactionType;
Command • BusMessageType;
BEGIN
(* This process controls the inlet, which is designated as DIU address
81 on network 1 and DIU address 91 on network 2. I/O Requests will
be generated at a 100Hz rate, i.e every 10ma. After the I/O
response is received, his process will delay for a time interval
intended to represent the time it takes to generate the next output.
(* Initialize the Inlet Chain which has three actuator writes
and six sensor reads. *)
NEW (EngineControll00Request) ;
NEW (NetworklChain) ;
NEW (Network2Chain) ;
NetworklChain ^ .TransactionQueue :- InitQ ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0} ;
Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue "-InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0};
NetworklChain ^.Chainlden rifler :- i;
Network2 Chain^. ChainIdentifier :- i;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW(Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- InletDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- I00;
TimeOutValue :_ InletTransactionTimeout;
0utputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
WITH NetworklChain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :_ i;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize (NetworklChain ^ .TransactionQueue) ;
END;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW(Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address := InletDIUAddress2 ;
Message :z DIUInput;
*)
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WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- i;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 200;
TimeOutValue :- InletTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2ChainA.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
WITH Network2Chain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedO'n := 2;
NumberOfTransactions :- QSize (Network2Chain ^ .TransactionQueue };
END;
WITH EngineControll00Request ^ DO
Priority :- InletReque stP riority;
Identifier :- EngineControlIdentifier100; ;
ReqUestType :- ApplicationRequest;
RequestTimeoutValue :- EngineControlRequestTimeoutl00;
RequestType :- ApplicationReques t;
ChainArray [l ] := NetworklChain;
ChainArray [2 ] :- Network2Chain;
END;
RETURN (EngineControll00Request) ;
END Enginel 00Request;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE EngineSORequest (IOActivity : IOActivityChoice) :IORequestType;
VAR EngineControlSORequest : IORequestType;
NetworklChain : ChainType;
Network2Chain : ChainType;
Transaction : TransactionType;
Command : BusMessageType;
BEGIN
(* This process controls the inlet, which is designated as DIU address
82 on network i and DIU address 92 on network 2. I/O Requests will
be generated at a 50Hz rate, i.e every 10ms. After the I/0 response
is received, this process will delay for a t/me interval intended to
represent the time it takes to generate the next output. *)
(* Initialize the Nozzle Chain which has three actuator writes
and six sensor reads, t)
NEW (EngineControlSORequest) ;
NEW (NetworkIChain) ;
NEW (Network2Chain) ;
NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue :-InitQ("TransactionQ_eue", FALSE, 0);
Network2Chain ^ .TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0) ;
NetworklChain^ 0ChainIden tif ier := 2;
Netwo rk2 Cha in^. Chain Identifier :- 2;
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NEW {Transactlon) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH C0_mmand ^ DO
Address :- NozzleDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber := 2;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := i00;
TimeOutValue := NozzleTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworkiChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
WITH NetworklChain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- I;
Nxu_berOfTransactions :- QSize(NetworklChain^.TransactionQ_eue) ;
END;
NEW (Transaction) ;
NEW (Command) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- NozzleDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity := IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 2 ;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier :- 200;
TimeO_tValue := NozzleTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
WITH Network2Chain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn := 2;
NumberOfTransactions := QSize (Network2Chain ^ .TransactionQueue) ;
END;
WITH EngineControl50Request ^ DO
Priority :- Nozz leRequestPriorit y;
Identifier := EngineControl Identifier 50;
RequestType := ApplicationRequest;
RequestTlmeoutValue := EngineControlRequestTimeout50;
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ChainArray[l] :- NetworklChain;
ChainArray[2] :- Network2Chain;
END;
RETURN (EngineControl50Request};
END EngineSORequest;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE Engine25Req_est(IOActivity : IOActivityChoice) :IORaquestType;
VAR EngineContro125Request
NetworkiChain
Network2Chain
Transaction
Command
BEGIN
: IORequestType;
: ChaulnType;
: ChainType;
: TransactionType;
: BusMessageType;
(* This process controls the inlet, which is designated as DIU address
83 on network i and DIU address 93 on network 2. I/O Requests will
be generated at a 25Hz rate, i.e every 10ms. After the I/O response
is received, this process will delay for a time interval intended to
represent the time it takes to generate the next output. *)
(* Initialize the Engine Chain which has three actuator writes
and six sensor reads. *)
NEW(EngineContro125Request);
NEW(NetworklChain);
NEW(Network2Chain);
NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue :- InitQ("TransactionQueue", FALSE, 0);
NetworklChain^.ChainIdentifier :- 3;
Network2Chain^.Chainldentifier :- 3;
NEW(Transaction};
NEW(C_and);
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- EngineDIUAddressl;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
Comman4_umber :- 3;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := i00;
TimeOutValue := EngineTransactionTimeout;
OutputFrame :- Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
WITH NetworklChain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- I;
NumberOfTransactions :- QSize(NetworklChain^.TransactionQueue);
END;
NEW(Transaction);
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NEW (Comand) ;
WITH Command ^ DO
Address :- EngineDIUAddress2;
Message :- DIUInput;
WITH DIUCommand DO
Activity :- IOActivity;
CommandNumber :- 3;
END;
END;
WITH Transaction ^ DO
Identifier := 200;
TimeOutValue := EngineTransactionTimeout ;
OutputFrame := Command;
END;
QInsert(Transaction, Network2Chain^.TransactionQueue, FALSE);
WITH Network2Chain ^ DO
NetworkToBeExecutedOn :- 2;
NuMberOfTransactions :- QSize (NetworklChain ^ .TransactionQueue) ;
END;
WITH EngineContro125Request ^ DO
Priority :- EngineRequestP rio r ity;
Identifier := EngineControlIdentifier 25;
Req_estType :- ApplicationReques t;
RequestTimeoutValue := EngineControlRequestTimeout25;
RequestType := ApplicationReql/es t;
ChainArray [1 ] :- Network 1Chain;
ChainArray [2 ] := Network2Chain;
END;
RETURN (EngineContro125Request) ;
END Engine25Request;
****************************************************************************
PROCEDURE BuildRequest (Application : ApplicationType;
Rate : INTEGER;
IOActivity : IOActivityChoice) :IORequestType;
VAR Request : IORequestType;
BEGIN
CASE Application OF
FlightControl :
CASE Rate OF
i00:
Request := FltConl00Request (IOActivity) ;
I 50:
Request := FltCon50Request(IOActivity) ;
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[ 25:
Request :- FltCon25Request (IOActivity) ;
END;
I EnqineControl:
CASE Rate OF
i00:
Request :- E_ginel00Request (IOActivity] ;
I 50:
Request :- F_glneSORequest (IOActivity) ;
I 25:
Request :- Engine25Request (IOActivity} ;
E_;
END;
Request ^ .ResponseExpected :- NOT (IOActivity - Output);
RETm_ (Request) ;
END BuildRequest;
****************************************************************************
END BldChains.
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APPLICATN
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DEVM Applicatn;
FRCM IOService REACH IORiquestType*, IORlsponseType*, ChainStatusType,
Re leas eChainRi sponseMemory;
FRCM Processor REACH ProcessingUnit*;
FRCI_ BusMessag IMPORT IOActivityChoice;
FROM BldChains IMPORT ApplicationType, BuildRequest;
FROM Senddata IMPORT WriteDataElimintType, CyclicDataType, DataElementType,
CyclicVariationType, FrequencyType;
INPUTS
EVENT
ReuponseApplication : IOResponsoType;
ProcessorResponse : ProcessingUnit;
Reeet : BOOLEAN;
PARA
CPID : INTEGER;
IOServiceID : INTEGER;
ProcessingTimeMean : REAL;
ProcessingTimeSigma : REAL;
EngineApplication : BOOLEAN;
OnDemand : BOOLEAN;
GroupidIOActivity : BOOLEAN;
ApplicationPriority : INTEGER;
IORequestInterval : REAL;
InitialOffset : REAL;
ApplicationIdentifier : INTEGZR;
END;
OUTPUTS
VAR
RiquestApplication : IORiquestType;
ProcessorRequest : ProcessingUnit;
END;
EVENT
CurrentFrame : INTEGER;
CONST
FrameStartUpTime - 0.000020;
VAR
ApplicationResponse : IOResponseType;
ApplicationRequest : IORequestType;
ApplicationlnputRequest : IORequestType;
ApplicationOutputRequest : IORequestType;
PartialData : BOOLEAN;
ProcessingRequest : ProcessingUnit;
CPResponseData : ProcessingUnit;
TempRequest : IORequestType;
CPPort : INTEGER;
IOServicePort : INTEGER;
OutputDataElement : DataElementType;
TherelsAFrameExecuting : BOOLEAN;
PROCEDURE CommunicationFaults(Response : IOResponseType) :BOOLEAN;
BEGIN
WITH Response ^ DO
RETURN (ChainStatus{l] <> NoFaults) OR (ChainStatus{2] <> NoFaults);
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PROCEDURE VerifyCorrectResponse (Response : IOResponseType} ;
BEGIN
IF GroupedIOActivity THEN
IF (Response ^ .Identifier <> ApplicationRequest ^ .Identifier) OR
(QSize (Response ^ .ResponseArray |I] ^. InputFra_eue) <>
ApplicationRequest ^ •Chain ^ .N_mberOfTransactions} OR
(QSize {Response ^ .ResponseArray [2]^. InputFrameQueue) <>
ApplicationRequest ^.Chain ^ .NumberOfTransactions) THEN
WriteString(ParamOut, "Unexpected response received from the IO System");
WriteLn (ParamOut) ;
HALT;
END;
ELSIF (Response ^.Identifier <> ApplicatloninputRequest ^.Identifier) OR
(QSize (Response ^ •ResponseArray [1]^. InputFrameQueue) <>
Applicat i°n InputReques t ^ •Chain ^ •NumberOfTransactions ) OR
(OSize (Response ^ .ResponseArray [2]^. InputFrameQueue} <>
Applicat ion InputRequest ^ •Chain^ .NumberOfTransactions ) THEN
WriteString(ParamOut, "Unexpected response received from the IO System");
WriteLn (ParemOut) ;
HALT;
END;
END VerifyCorrectResponse;
****************************************************************************
BEGIN
CPPort :- GetOutPort(CPID) ;
IOServicePort :- GetOutPort (IOServiceID) ;
ThereIsAFrameExecuting :- FALSE;
IF GroupedIOActivity OR NOT OnDemand THEN (* Scheduled IO must use GroupedIO *)
IF EngineApplication THEN
ApplicationRequest := BuildRequest(EngineControl, ApplicationIdentifier, Grouped);
ELSE
ApplicationRequest :-BuildRequest(F1ightControl, ApplicationIdentifier, Grouped);
END;
IF ApplicationIdentifier - i00 THEN
ApplicationRequest ^.ChainArray [I] ^.ChainIdentifier :- 1;
ApplicationRequest ^.ChainArray[2] ^.ChainIdentifier :- I;
ELSIF ApplicationIdentifier - 50 THEN
ApplicationRequest ^ .ChainArray [I ]^.ChainIdentifier :- 2 ;
ApplicationRequest ^ .ChainArray [2 ]^.ChainIdentifier :- 2;
ELSIF ApplicationIdentifier = 25 THEN
ApplicationRequest ^ .ChainArray [1 ]^.ChainIdentifier :- 3;
ApplicationRequest ^ .ChainArray [2 ]^ . ChainIdentifier :- 3;
END;
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ApplicationRequest^.OnDemand :- OnDemand;
ELSE (* separated IO Activity *}
IF EngineApplication THEN
ApplicationInputRequest :- BuildRequest (EngineControl, Applicationldentifier, Input) ;
AppllcationOutputRequest :- BuildRequest (EngineControl, Applicationldentifier, Output) ;
ELSE
ApplicationInputRequest :-BuildRequest(FlightControl, AppllcationIdentifier, Input};
ApplicationOutputRequest :- BuildRoquest (FlightControl, ApplicationIdentifier, Output} ;
END;
IF AppllcationIdentifiar - i00 THEN
AppllcatlonInputReq_est^.ChainArray[1]^.Cha/nIdentifier :- 5;
ApplicatlonInputRequest^.ChaiD_Krray[2]^.ChainIdeutifier :- 5;
ApplicationoutputRequest^.ChainArrayIl]^.ChainIdentifiar :- 9;
ApplicationOutputRequest^.ChainArray[2]^.ChainIdentifier :- 9;
ELSIF ApplicationIdantifier - 50 THEN
ApplicationInputRequest^.ChainArray[l]^.Chainldentifier :- 6;
ApplicationlnputRequest^.ChainArray[2]^.ChainIdentifier :- 6;
ApplicationO_t_utRequestA.ChainArray[1]^.ChainIdentifier :- i0;
ApplicationOutputRequest^.ChainArray[2]^.ChainIdentifier :- i0;
ELSIF ApplicationIdentifier - 25 THEN
ApplicationInputRequest^.ChainArrayI1]^.Chalnldentifier :- 7;
ApplicationInputRequest^.ChalnArrayI2]^.ChainIdentifier :- 7;
ApplicationOutputRequest^.ChainArray|l]^.ChainIdentifier :- 11;
ApplicationOutputRequest^.ChalnArrayI2]^.ChainIdentifier :- 11;
END;
ApplicationlnputRequest^.OnDemand :- OnDemand;
AppliaationOutpuCRequest^.OnDemand :- OnDemand;
END;
LOOP
WAITUNTIL EVENT
CurrentFrame:
AFTER IORequestInterval CurrentFrame <- CurrentFrame + I;
IF OnDemand THEN
IF ThereIsAFrameExecuting THEN
REPORT "%d" CurrentFrame TAGGED "frame overrun at frame number";
ELSE
NEW(ProcessingReqUest);
ProcessingRequest^.Priority :- ApplicationPriority;
ProcessingRequest^.ProcessID :- "FrameStartup";
ProcessingRequest^.Frame :- CurrentFrame;
ProcessingRequest^.ProcessingRequired :_ FrameStartUpTime;
ProcessingRequest^.ProcssngAfterBlock :- Normal(l, ProcessinqTimeMean, ProcessingTimeSigma);
ProcessingRequest^.WriteData :- TRUE;
IF GroupedIOActivity THEN
ProcessingReq_est^.Data :- ApplicationRequest;
ELSE
ProcessingReq_est^.Data :- ApplicationInputRequest;
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END;
NOW outport[CPPort] ^.ProcessorRequest <- ProoessingRequest;
ThereIsAFrameExecuting :- TRUE;
END;
ELSE {* scheduled IO *)
ApplicationRequest^.Frame :- CurrentFrame;
ApplioationRequest ^ .ChainArray [13 ^ .FrameCount :- CurEsntFraaa;
ApplicationRequest ^ .ChainArray 12]^.FrameCount :- CurrentFrame;
NOW outport[IOServicePort]^.RequestApplication <- ApplicationRequest;
END;
J ResponseApplication :
ApplicationResponse := ActivePort^.ResponseApplication;
(* Schedule use of the processor. *)
IF OnDemand THEN
ProcessingRequest^.ProcessingRequired :- ProcessingRequest^.ProcssngAfterBlock;
ProcessingRequestA.WriteData :- FALSE;
ProcessingRequest^.ProcessID := "Response Processing";
NOW outport[CPPort]^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcsssingRequest;
ELSE (* scheduled IO *)
rF ThereIsAFrameExecuting THEN
REPORT "%d" CurrentFrame TAGGED "frame ovQrrun at frame number";
OutputDataElement.CyclicData.FrameOverrun :- TRUE;
ELSE
NEW (Process ingReques t );
Proces s ingReq_est ^.Priorit y := ApplicaticnPriorit y;
Process ingRequest ^.Frame :i Applicat ionResponse ^. Frame;
ProcessingRequest^.ProcessingRequired := Normal(i, ProcessingT/meMean, ProcessingTimeSigma};
ProcessingRequest ^.ProcssngAfterBlock :- 0.0;
ProcessingRequest ^ .WriteData :- TRUE;
ProcessingRequest ^.ProcessID :I "Response Processing";
NOW outportICPPort] ^.ProcessorRequest <- ProcessingRequest;
ThereIsAFrameExecuting := TRUE;
OutputDataElement .CyclicData.FrameOverrun :- FALSE;
END;
END;
PartialData := CommunicationFaults (ApplicationResponse) ;
IF NOT PartialData THEN
VerifyCorrectResponse (ApplicationResponse) ;
END;
(* Dispose of the memory in the Application Response. *)
IF ApplicationRespon&e ^ ._esponseArrayIl] <> _IL THEN
Re_aseChainResponseMemory IApplicationResponse ^ .ResponseArray [iI) ;
END;
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IF ApplicationResponse^.ResponseArray[2] <> NIL THEN
ReleaseChainRespons eMemory (ApplicationResponse ^ .ResponseArray 12]);
END;
DISPOSE(ApplicationResponse);
ProcessorResponse:
C_ResponseData :- ActivePort^.ProcessorResponse;
IF OnDemand THEN
IF CPResponsQData^,WritoData THEN
TempRequest :- CPResponseData^.Data;
TampRequest^.Frame :- CPResponseData^.Frame;
T_Request^.Chair_Array[l]^.FrameCount :- CPResponseData^.Frame;
TempRequest^.ChaJltArray[2]A.FrameCount :- CPResponseData^.Frame;
NOW outport[IOServicePort]^.RequestApplication <- TempReq_est;
ELSE
CASE ApplicationIdentifier OF
I00 : OutputDataElement.EventID :- 4;
I 50: O_tputDataElement.EventID :-5;
I 25: OutputDataElement.EventID :- 6;
END;
O_tputDataElement. SimulationTime :- clock;
OutputDataElement.Frequency :_ Cyclic;
OutputDataElement.CycllcData.FrameCount :- CPResponseData^.Frame;
O_tputDataElement.CycllcData.CVariation :- EndComputing;
OutputDataElement.CycllcData.PartialDataUsedThisFrame :- PartialData;
OutputDataEl_ent.CyclicData.FrameOverrun :- CPResponseData^,Frame <> CurrentFrame;
OutputDataElement. CyclicData.ProcessingNotCompleted :- 0.0;
WriteDataElementType (OutputDataElement );
ThereIsAFrameExecuting :- FALSE;
IF (NOT GroupedIOActivity) AND
(ApplicationOutputRequestA.Chain^.NumberOfTransactions <> 0) THEN
kpplicationO_tputRequestA.Frame :- CPResponseData^.Frame;
ApplicationOutputRequest^.ChainArray[1]^.FrameCount :- CPResponseData^.Frame;
ApplicationOutputRequest^.ChainArray[2]^.FrameCount := CPResponseOata^.Frame;
NOW outport[IOServicePort]^.RequestApplication <- ApplicationOutputRequest;
END;
DISPOSE (CPResponseData) ;
END;
ELSE (* scheduled IO *)
CASE ApplicationIdentifier OF
100: OutputDataElement.EventID := 4;
50: OutputDataElement.EventID := 5;
J 25: OutputDataElement.EventID :- 6;
END;
OutputDataElement.SimulationTime :- clock;
OutputDataElement,Frequency := Cyclic ;
OutputDataElement .CyclicData.FrameCount := CPResponseData ^ ,Frame;
OutputDataElement.CyclicData.CVariation :- EndComputing;
OutputDataElement,CyclicData,PartialDataUsedThisFrame :- PartialData;
OutputDataElement .CyclicData.ProcessingNotCompleted := 0.0;
WriteDataElementType (OutputDataElement) ;
ThereIsAFrameExecutlng :- FALSE;
DISPOSE(CPResponseData);
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END;
J Reset :
ThereIsAFrameExecuting :. FALSE;
REPORT "%12.8f" clock TAGGED "Application started at ";
AFTER InitialOffset CurrentFrame <- i;
END;
END;
END _plicatn.
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DEFINITION DEVM Controls;
EXPORT Syste_Probe, NumberOfProbes;
CONST
NumberOfProbes - 4;
VAR
SystemProbe : ARRAy [i .. NumberOfProbes] OF AProbe;
END Controls.
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DEVMControls;
FROM Senddata IMPORT StartCollectingData, FlushDataStructure, EndCollectingData,
WriteDataElementType, DataElementType, NonCyclicV&rlationType,
FrequencyType;
FROM BusMessag IMPORT NumberOfNodes;
FROM Math IMPORT RealMod;
FROM Util IMPORT GetSeedValue, SetSeedValue;
FROM NodeM IMPORT RemoveArc, RestoreArc;
FROM Conversions IMPORT RealToDFloat;
INPUTS
EVENT
NetworkReady : BOOLEAN;
PARA
ApplicationID
IOSID
NetworklNodes
Network2Nodes
IOServiceID
NetworkManaqer2 ID
CPID
IOPID
Experiment Info
Star tRunNumbor
EndRunNumber
UseI nltialSeed
Init ialSeed
SimulationLength
LinkFaults
Sour ceFaultNode
Des tFau itNode
Star tCPFDIRTime
Star tIOPFD IRTime
SystemReportLevel
: ARRAY [i .. 3] OF INTEGER;
: ARRAY [I .. 6] OF INTEGER;
: ARRAY il .. NumberOfNodes] OF INTEGER;
: ARRAY [I .. NumbarOfNodos] OF INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: ARRAY [i .. 4] OF INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: BOOLEAN;
: INTEGER;
: REAL;
: BOOLEAN;
: INTEGER;
: INTEGER;
: REAL;
: REAL;
: INTEGER;
END;
OUTPUTS
VAR
ResetComnand : BOOLEAN;
SubmitSystem : BOOLEAN;
ResetProbeCommand : BOOLEAN;
END;
EVENT
Restart : INTEGER;
Insert.Fault : BOOLEAN;
StopSimulation : BOOLEAN;
StopProbe : BOOLEAN;
CONST
MaJorFrameLength - 0.040;
SecondMajorFrame - 0,050;
VAR
ApplicationPort
IOSPort
IOServicePort
NetworkManager2Port
IOPPort
CPPort
Nodelndex
IOSIndex
ABRAY [i .. 3] OF INTEGER;
ARRAY [i .. 6] OF INTEGER;
INTEGER;
INTEGER;
INTEGER;
INTEGER;
INTEGER;
INTEGER;
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BEGIN
NodeID : INTEGER;
FaultTime : REAL;
TimeToNextMaJorFrame : REAL;
NextMa JorFrame : REAL;
StartDataElement : DataElement Type;
TermDataElement : DataElmentType;
Index : INTEGER;
IOServicePort :- GetOut.Port (IOServiceID) ;
NetworkManager2Port :- GetOutPort (Networ kManager2 ID} ;
IOPPort :- GetOutPort (IOPID) ;
CPPoEt :l GetOutPort (CPID) ;
FOR Index :- 1 TO 3 DO
ApplicationPort [Index] :- GetOutPort (ApplicationID IIndex] } ;
END_
FOR IOSIndex :- I TO 6 DO
IOSPort [IOSIndez] :- GetOutPort (IOSID [IOSIndex] ) ;
END;
FOR NodeID :l i TO MaxNodeID DO
ReportLevel [NodeID] :- -I;
END;
TermDataElement.EventID :- 41;
TermDataElement.Frequnncy :- NonCyclic;
TermDataElement.NonCyclicData.N_Variation :- RunTerm;
StartDataElement.EventID :- 0;
StartDataElement.Frequency :_ NonCyclic;
$tartDataElement.NonCyclicData.N_Variation :- RunStart;
StartDataElement.NonCyclicData.FaultTime :- 0.0;
StartDataElement.NonCyclicData.FirstFDIR :- StartCPFDIRTime;
LOOP
WAITUNTIL EVENT
NetworkReady:
IF UseInitialSeed THEN
SetSeedValue (I, InitiaISeed} ;
END_
NOW Restart <- StartRunNumber;
FOR NodeID :- i TO MaxNodeID DO
ReportLevel [NodeID] :- SystemReportLevel;
END;
i Restart :
WriteString (ParamO_t, "Run number "};
WriteInt (ParamOur, Restart, 0) ;
WriteLn (ParamOut} ;
IF Restart > StartRunNumber THEN
(* turn off the report control *)
(* turn report control back on if desired *)
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TarmDataEloment.SimulationTine :- clock;
TarmDataElemont .NonCyclicData.FinalSood :- GetSoedValuo (I) ;
Wr iteDataElemantType (TermDataElement) ;
FlushDataStructure;
EndCollectingData;
(* Rostore link removed during previous run. *)
IF LinkFaults THEN
RestoreAr c (Sour ceFaultNode, DestFaultNode) ;
END;
END;
ResetTimar;
Star tCollectingData (Experiment Info 11],Exper iment In fo [2 ],Experiment Info [3 ],
Restart, Experiment Info [4]) ;
StartDataElement.SimulationTime :- clock;
StartDataElement.NonCyclicData. InitialSeed :- GetSeedValue (I) ;
(*
* Tell everybody to go back to initial state.
*I
IOSIndex :- i;
WHILE (IOSIndex <- 6) AND (IOSIDIIOSIndex] <> 0) DO
NOW outport IIOSPort [IOSIndex] ] ^.ResetCommand <- TRUE;
lq_C(IOSIndex) ;
END;
FOR NodeIndex :- 1 TO NumberOfNodes DO
IF NetworklNodes [NodeIndex] <> 0 THEN
NOW outport {GetOutPort (NetworklNodes INodeIndex] ) ]^ .ResetCom_and <- TRUE;
END;
IF Network2Nodes {NodeIndex] <> 0 THEN
NOW outport [GetOutPort (Network2Nodes [NodeIndex] } ]^ . ResetCommand <- TRUE;
END;
END;
NOW outport [IOServicePort] ^.Resetcommand <- TRUE;
NOW outport INetworkManager2Port] ^.ResetCoaRand <- TRUE;
NOW outport [IOPPort] ^.ResetCommand <- TRUE;
NOW outport[CPPort] ^ .ResetCommand <- TRUE;
(*
* Schedule the first application to run.
*)
AFTER StartCPFDIRTime outport[CPPort]^.Su_itSystem <- TRUE;
AFTER StartIOPFDIRTime outport [IOPPort] ^.SubmitSystem <- TRUEi
FOR Index :- 1 TO 3 DO
AFTER 0. 010 outport [ApplicationPort [Index] ]^.ResetCo_n_nd <- TRUE;
END;
(*
* Start sampling at the start of the 2nd major frame. Note that
* the command is only set to the first and fourth IOS. This
* is all that is needed to reset the network utilization probes.
*)
AFTER SecondMajorFrame outport [IOPPort] ^.ResetProbeCommand <- TRUE;
AFTER SecondMajorFrame outport[CPPort]^.ResetProbeCo_mand <- TRUE;
AFTER SecondMajorFrame ou_port [IOServicePort] ^.ResetProbecOmmand <- TRUE;
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AFTER SecondMa jorFrame outport [IOSPort [I ]]^.ResetProbeCommand <- TRUE;
AFTER SecondMajorFrame out]portIIOSPort[4] ]^.ResetProbeCommand <- TRUE;
IF LinkFaults THEN
FaultTime :-Kandon(1, 0.0, 0.040);
AFTER (SecondMajorFramo + FaultTime) insertFault <- TRUE;
StartDataElement.NonCyclicData.FaultTime :- SeconcE4ajorFrama + FaultTime;
ELSE
AT RealToDFloat (SimulationLength - MajorFrameLength) StopProbe <- TRUE;
IF Restart - EndRunNumbar THEN
AFTER SimulationLength StopSimulation <- TRUE;
ELSE
AFTER SimulationLength Restart <- Restart ÷ i;
END;
END;
WriteDataEl=nentType (StartDataElement) ;
StopSimulation :
TermDataElement.SimulationTime :- clock;
TermDataElement .NonCyclicData. FinalSeed :- GetSeedValue (1} ;
WriteDataElementType (TermDataElment) ;
FlushDataStructure;
EndColloctingData;
ResetTimer; (* has effect of stopping the simulation *}
InsortFault :
RemoveArc (SourceFaultNode, DeetFaultNode) ;
REPORT "%d,%d" SourceFaultNode, DestFaultNode TAGGED "Removed link between nodes ";
WAITUNT TL (NetworkReady)
NetworkRaady :
TimeToNextMajorFrame '- MajorFrameLength - RealMod(clock - 0. 010, MajorFrameLength) ;
NextMajorFrame :- TimeToNextMajorFrame + MajorFrameLength;
AFTER NextMajorFrama StopProbe <- TRUE;
IF Restart - EndRunNumher THEN
AFTER (NextMajorFrame) StopSimulation <- TRUE;
ELSE
AFTER (NextMajorFrame) Restart <- Restart + I;
END;
END;
StopProbe :
IF StopProbe THEN
FOR Index :- 1 TO NumberOfProbes DO
SAMPLE 0.0 WITH SystemProbeIIndex] ;
END;
(* this forces the last samples to be recorded *)
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END;
END;
END Controls.
TermDataElement .NonCyclioData. CPTimeUsed "- Syste_Probe [1 ]^. SumX;
TermDa_Element .NonCyclicData. CPTimeAvall :- SystemProbe [1]^. TEnd - SystemProbe [i] ^.TStart;
TermDataElement.NonCyclicData. IOPTimeUsed :- SystemProbe [2 ]^ . SumX;
TermDataElement .NonCyclicData. IOPT1meAvail :- SystemProbe [2 ]^.TEnd - SystemProbe [2 ]^.TStart;
TermDataElement.NonCyclicData.NWTimeUsed :- SystemProbe {3] ^. SumX;
TermDataElement.NonCyclicData.NWTimQAvail :- Syste_Probe [3] ^ .TEnd - SystemProbe [3] ^. TStart;
TermDataElement.NonCyclicData. IOSysTimeUsed "- SystemProbeI4]A.SumX;
TermDataElement.NonCyclicData. IOSysTimeAvail :- SystemProbe [4 ]^ .TEnd - SystemProbe [4]^.TStart;
END;
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PRINCIPAL
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DEVM principal;
DEVMS CentralDB, IOS, AIPSNode, DIU, IOSorvice, Not/4anger, Applicatn,
DEVC
Processor, Controls;
RootLinkOutboard - (OutputTransaction NodeCommandFrame);
RootLinkInSoard - (NodeR_sponseFrame InputTransaction);
NodeToNode - (NodeResponseFrame NodeComnandFrame) ;
NodeToDIU - (NodeResponseFramo DIUCcw_andFrame) ;
DIUToNode - (DIUResponseFrame NodeComlandFrame) ;
ServiceManagerConn- (ManagerServicaRqst ServiceReq_est,
ICManager2Response IONetworkResponso};
ManagerRequest - (ICNotworkRequest IOSorvlceRequost,
NewNetworkState RtnNetworkToService};
AppResponse - (ApplicationRosponse ResponseApplication};
AppRequest - (RequestAppllcation IOServiceRequest);
NIOutConnection - (ChainToIOS ChainToProcess,
StopIOS StopChain);
NIInConnection - (IOChainRosponse DataFromIOS,
ChainFinishod ChainCompleted);
Submit = (ProcessorRequest SubmuttProcess);
Receive - (Completed ProcessorResponse);
SchAndResetSystem - (Sub_tSystem StartSystem,
ResetCommand Reset,
ResetProbeCamunand ProboReset);
SystemReady - (ServiceAvailable NetworkReady);
ResetSystem - (ResotCommand Reset);
ResetProbeAndSys - (ResetCommand Reset,
ResetProbeCcmmand ProbeReset};
BEGIN
CheckQueue :- FALSE;
CheckM_nory :- FALSE;
WriteString(ParamOut,
WriteLn(ParamOut);
InitSimulator;
Simulate(100.0);
TerminateSimulator;
END principal.
"******* MIRON IS DOING THE MEMORY MANAGE_}_T *******");
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